# Ray

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · March 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11278141

## Case

- **Full name:** James Alexander Ray v. Brevard Police Department, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** March 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11278141

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:26-cv-00078-MR

JAMES ALEXANDER RAY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
) ON INITIAL REVIEW
)
BREVARD POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)
and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 5].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff James Alexander Ray, (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the
State of North Carolina currently incarcerated at Alexander Correctional
Institution in Taylorsville, North Carolina. On March 13, 2026, he filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Brevard Police
Department, Transylvania County Jail, District Attorney Elizabeth Dierauf,
and the “People of North Carolina.” [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff purports to sue
Defendants Dierauf and the People of North Carolina in their individual and
official capacities. [Id. at 3].
Plaintiff alleges, in pertinent part, as follows. Plaintiff was arrested by

the Brevard Police Department on July 20, 2017, without probable cause.
[Id. at 12]. On August 14, 2017, “the people of North Carolina grand jury”
indicted the Plaintiff on charges of robbery with a dangerous weapon and

conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon without allowing
Plaintiff to testify against witnesses Detective Godman and Aaron Thompson
of the Brevard Police Department. [Id. at 12, 15]. Thereafter, “they” denied
him a probable cause hearing on a first-degree murder charge and the

robbery charges. [Id.]. The Transylvania County Jail unlawfully detained the
Plaintiff for two years. [Id.]. Defendant Bierauf committed prosecutorial
misconduct by allowing the denial of Plaintiff’s right to testify at the grand jury

proceeding. [Id. at 13].
Plaintiff claims the violation of numerous rights under the U.S.
Constitution, the “North Carolina Constitution penal codes,” and various
other provisions. [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff alleges numerous injuries related to his

alleged unlawful arrest and false imprisonment, as well as “[d]efamation of
character, threat, coercion, harassment, [and] emotional mental distress.”
[Id. at 5]. Among other things, Plaintiff wants his conviction vacated, to be

released from custody, and monetary relief. [Id.]. Plaintiff also asks for
appointment of counsel. [Id.].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A
the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune to such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under
color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,

526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,
599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial review
for several reasons.
Neither a jail nor a police department is a “person” subject to suit under

§ 1983. See Brooks v. Pembroke Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C.
1989); Wilkerson v. Chapel Hill Police Dept., No. 1:09CV60, 2009 WL
1505614, at *1 (M.D.N.C. May 27, 2009). Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to

state a claim against these Defendants and the Court will dismiss them.
Moreover, prosecutors are immune from suit under the doctrine of
prosecutorial immunity, and “the People of North Carolina,” especially as
members of a grand jury, are not subject to suit under § 1983. Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419, 423, n.20 (1976). Furthermore, there is no
right, constitutional or otherwise, for the subject of a grand jury proceeding
to testify or confront witnesses. See State v. Jones, 354 S.E.2d 251, 258

(N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (“[A] defendant is not allowed to cross-examine
witnesses before a grand jury.”). As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
against Defendant Dierauf or the People of North Carolina. The Court will

dismiss these Defendants.
Next, it appears here that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court

held as follows:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a §
1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim
for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction
or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint
must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated. But if the district court
determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any
outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff,
the action should be allowed to proceed, in the
absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Here, given the nature
of the allegations in the Complaint, a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor would
necessarily imply the invalidity of any conviction or sentence in the

underlying criminal matter. Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that a
conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, his
Complaint appears to be barred by Heck.

Even if Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by Heck, it appears that they
may be barred by the applicable statute of limitations in any event. See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16); Nat’l Adv. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1162
n.2 (4th Cir. 1991).

The body of the Complaint contains allegations against individuals who
are not named as defendants in the caption as required by Rule 10(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the

complaint must name all the parties[.]”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d
551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o make someone a party the plaintiff must specify
him in the caption and arrange for service of process.”); Perez v. Humphries,
No. 3:18-cv-107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (“A

plaintiff’s failure to name a defendant in the caption of a Complaint renders
any action against the purported defendant a legal nullity.”). The allegations
directed at individuals not named as Defendants are therefore dismissed

without prejudice.
Finally, to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks relief under North Carolina
law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, as no federal

claim has passed initial review. See Artis v. Dist. Of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71,
74 (2018) (when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying
for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] as well all

related state claims.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, those claims are
dismissed without prejudice.
IV. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
There is no absolute right to the appointment of counsel in civil actions

such as this one. Therefore, a plaintiff must present “exceptional
circumstances” in order to require the Court to seek the assistance of a
private attorney for a plaintiff who is unable to afford counsel. Miller v.

Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987). The existence of exceptional
circumstances in each case “hinges on characteristics of the claim and the
litigant.” Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984). To make
this determination, a court must collectively assess “(1) whether the plaintiff

asserts a claim that is not frivolous, (2) the difficulty of the claim, and (3)
whether the plaintiff can present the claim considering the skill required to do
so and the plaintiff’s individual abilities.” Jenkins v. Woodard, 109 F.4th 242,

248 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Brock v. City of Richmond, 983 F.2d 1055, 1055
(4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). “The district court’s failure to make these
assessments is legal error.” Id. Where a pro se plaintiff presents a colorable

claim but “lacks the capacity to present it” in light of the objective complexity
of the claim and the plaintiff’s subjective abilities, the case presents
“exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 247 (quoting Whisenant, 739 F.2d at

162).
In this case, however, the Plaintiff has not yet even demonstrated that
this claim will pass initial review, much less that it has potential merit. Until
that has been shown, the Court cannot assess the complexity of the claim or

what skill may be required to prosecute the same. Therefore, at this stage,
the Plaintiff has failed to meet any of the requirements for establishing
exceptional circumstances necessitating the appointment of counsel.

V. CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed on initial review for Plaintiff’s
failure to state a claim for relief. The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days
to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses, to show that Heck does not apply,

that his Complaint is not barred by the applicable limitations period(s), and
to otherwise properly state a claim for relief. Should Plaintiff fail to timely
amend his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order, this action

will be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30)
days in which to amend the Complaint in accordance with the terms of this
Order. If Plaintiff fails to amend the Complaint in accordance with this Order
and within the time limit set by the Court, this action will be dismissed without
prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint will be
DISMISSED on initial review for Plaintiffs failure to state a claim for relief
and that Plaintiffs request for counsel therein is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Defendants are hereby
DISMISSED as Defendants in this matter.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank Section
1983 form.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed: March 18, 2026

Martifi Reidinger ee
Chief United States District Judge AS

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11278141. Public record. Not legal advice.
