# West

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · February 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11278130

## Case

- **Full name:** Kentes West v. Scott Ebers, Robert W. Rhoades, Zackary Connor, Ryan Ramsey, Kevin Tilley, Sylvester Lambert, Jessica Armbruster, Mark Hanks, Morgan Giacomo, and Warden of Menard Correctional Center
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KENTES WEST, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 23-cv-00224-SMY-MAB
)
SCOTT EBERS, )
ROBERT W. RHOADES, )
ZACKARY CONNOR, )
RYAN RAMSEY, )
KEVIN TILLEY, )
SYLVESTER LAMBERT, )
JESSICA ARMBRUSTER, )
MARK HANKS, )
MORGAN GIACOMO, )
and WARDEN OF MENARD )
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, )
)
Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty by
United States District Staci M. Yandle pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on a
Joint Motion for Pavey Hearing on the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendants Scott Ebers,
Robert W. Rhoades, Zackary Connor, Ryan Ramsey, Kevin Tilley, Sylvester Lambert,
Jessica Armbruster, Mark Hanks, and Morgan Giacomo (Doc. 72). For the reasons set
forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Joint Motion
for Pavey Hearing, ADOPT the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
FIND that the grievance process was unavailable to Plaintiff.
Background
Plaintiff Kentes West filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for alleged constitutional deprivations stemming from retaliation by staff at Menard

Correctional Center. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that prison officials
retaliated against him for filing a past lawsuit against Lieutenant Ebers by denying him
“crush and float” medication for nerve pain unless he submitted to tight cuffing (Docs.
19, 25). When Plaintiff complained that the painful cuffs caused him to decline medication
in July 2022, Lieutenant Ebers said he should be glad there was nothing more to complain

about given that Plaintiff sued him (see Doc. 25 at p 2). Plaintiff requested a different
medication time to avoid Lieutenant Ebers, but his request was denied (Id.). From July
12-14, 2022, Lieutenant Ebers ordered the guards to cuff Plaintiff for all medication (Id.).
After that, Plaintiff only received medication when Lieutenant Ebers was not working,
and he was eventually denied medication when he offered to wear handcuffs (Id.). Nurse

Morgan Giacomo became so accustomed to Defendants Ebers, Rhoades, Connor,
Ramsey, Tilley, and Lambert’s refusal to give Plaintiff medication that she stopped
packing it (Id. at p. 3). Defendants Armbruster, Hanks, and Rhoades issued him false
disciplinary tickets in retaliation for filing grievances and complaints against staff (Id.).
The Amended Complaint survived screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A on two

claims: Count 1 - a First Amendment claim against Defendants Ebers, Rhoades, Connor,
Ramsey, Tilley, Lambert, and Morgan for interfering with Plaintiff’s medication from July
to October 2022 in retaliation for suing Ebers; and Count 2 – a First Amendment claim
against Defendants Armbruster, Hanks, and Rhoades for issuing Plaintiff disciplinary
tickets in September and October 2022 in retaliation for filing grievances against staff (Id.
at pp. 4-9).

Motions for Summary Judgment
Defendants moved for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s alleged failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this suit1 (Docs. 56, 61). They identified
grievances relevant to this matter dated July 11, 2022, July 12, 2022, July 13, 2022, and
October 3, 2022, and argued that Plaintiff submitted each one directly to the
Administrative Review Board (ARB) without first using the institutional grievance

process to exhaust his administrative remedies at the prison (see generally Id.). Plaintiff
countered that the institutional grievance process was unavailable because Menard
officials routinely failed to respond to certain types of grievances, including those about
staff misconduct (Docs. 63, 67, 68). To demonstrate his good faith effort to exhaust
remedies before filing suit, Plaintiff says he submitted each grievance at the institution

and sent a copy to the ARB simultaneously (Id.).
The Court denied summary judgment on the papers but gave the parties an
opportunity to request a Pavey hearing to resolve factual disputes surrounding the
availability of administrative remedies at Menard (Doc. 71). See also Pavey v. Conley, 544
F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). Defendants requested a hearing (Doc. 72) and the matter was

then referred to the undersigned to conduct a Pavey hearing (see Doc. 73).

1 The Warden of Menard Correctional Center is named in an official capacity and did not participate in
summary judgment briefing.
A. Relevant Procedural Background
This Court scheduled a Pavey hearing for June 30, 2025 (see Doc. 74). Less than two
weeks before the scheduled Pavey hearing, the United States Supreme Court decided

Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (June 18, 2025). Pertinently, the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Perttu appeared to foreclose the use of Pavey hearings in a limited set of factual
situations. However, because of the timing of the Perttu decision and the significant
logistical challenges that go into scheduling a Pavey hearing2, the Court opted to leave
the Pavey hearing as scheduled and discuss a plan with the parties. At the outset of the

hearing, the Court raised the Perttu decision with Plaintiff and the attorneys for the
various Defendants (both IDOC employees and Wexford employees are named as
Defendants). Given the recency of Perttu, all parties, understandably, were not prepared
to have a detailed discussion on Perttu and its impact, if any, on the instant exhaustion
dispute. Accordingly, the Court determined that the best course of action would be to

conduct the evidentiary hearing as scheduled since all parties and witnesses were present
and ready to proceed (see Doc. 78). Thereafter, the Court took the matter under
advisement and allowed the parties additional time to assess the Perttu decision and
request permission to file supplemental briefing (Docs. 78, 79). Ultimately, after receiving
timely requests to supplement from Defendants (Docs. 81, 82), the Court allowed

supplemental briefing on the impact of Perttu, if any, on the instant exhaustion dispute

2 The Court had issued a video writ to Menard Correctional Center, which requires Menard to make video
conference space available for Plaintiff so that he could appear at the hearing and participate (Doc. 75).
Additionally, the Defendant had arranged to have two witnesses available to testify at the Pavey hearing
(Doc. 77).
(Doc. 83). The Court also decided to recruit counsel to represent Plaintiff in this case and
assist him in this supplemental briefing (Doc. 86).

B. Perttu v. Richards and its impact on the instant exhaustion dispute
The parties all filed Supplemental Perttu Briefs as directed (Docs. 88, 89, 93).
Accordingly, the first issue the Court must address before touching on any of the
testimony from the Pavey hearing is the impact, if any, the Perttu decision has on this case.
In Perttu, the Supreme Court held that a jury trial is required when PLRA exhaustion
disputes are intertwined with factual disputes on the merits of a claim covered by the

Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial. 605 U.S. at 479. In other words, the Perttu
decision forecloses the use of Pavey hearings to resolve factual disputes surrounding
exhaustion when those factual disputes are entangled or intertwined with the merits of
the ultimate claim or claims. Id. However, this does not foreclose Pavey hearings to resolve
factual disputes surrounding exhaustion when those disputes are not intertwined with

the ultimate merits of the claim or claims.3
After carefully considering the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Court believes this
case is distinguishable from Perttu and the factual disputes surrounding exhaustion are
not intertwined with the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s argument is that his
administrative remedies were rendered unavailable by the prison’s general practice of

providing no response to certain types of grievances, including those complaining of staff
misconduct. Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Defendants Ebers, Rhoades,

3 The Court expressed no opinion on whether a jury trial is required for all PLRA exhaustion disputes,
including those involving no intertwinement. Id. at 468.
Connor, Ramsey, Tilley, Lambert, and Morgan arise from their alleged use of tight
handcuffs to interfere with his medications in retaliation for a past lawsuit filed against

Lieutenant Ebers (Count 1). The First Amendment claim against Defendants Armbruster,
Hanks, and Rhoades arises from their alleged issuance of false disciplinary tickets in
retaliation for his miscellaneous grievances and complaints about prison staff (Count 2).
Plaintiff’s claims do not involve any assertion that Defendants interfered with the
grievance process to prevent him from grieving about his tight cuffs and medication
(Count 1) or his disciplinary tickets (Count 2). Accordingly, the factual disputes

surrounding the availability of administrative remedies can be resolved without reaching
the merits of either retaliation claim.
Moreover, different witnesses are needed to address exhaustion and the merits of
these claims. The exhaustion issue involves Plaintiff, grievance counselor(s), grievance
officer(s), and/or ARB staff. Meanwhile, addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s underlying

claims will likely involve testimony from Plaintiff and Defendants, who consist of the
prison’s nurses, guards, and internal affairs officers. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s testimony at
the Pavey hearing covered very different content from what the Court would expect for
his testimony at a trial on the merits. And, with the exception of Plaintiff, the witnesses
who testified at the Pavey hearing will almost certainly be entirely different from the

witness that may be offered at trial.
Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Joint
Motion for Pavey Hearing (Doc. 72) and consider the undersigned’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect to the Pavey hearing, because this exhaustion dispute is
not intertwined with the ultimate merits of Plaintiff’s claims.
The Pavey Hearing

At the Pavey hearing on June 30, 2025, Attorney Evan CreelGould appeared for the
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) Defendants, Attorney Tim Dugan appeared
for Nurse Giacomo, and Plaintiff appeared pro se by video. Defendants presented
testimony from two witnesses, including Grievance Officer Jeffrey Olson and ARB
Chairperson Ryan Nothnagle. Plaintiff cross-examined both witnesses and offered his
own testimony. The Court took the matter under advisement while the parties filed

Supplemental Perttu Briefs (see Doc. 83). Having now recommended that this case does
not present any Perttu intertwinement concerns, the Court turns to the issue of whether
administrative remedies were available to Plaintiff at Menard.
A. Findings of Fact
According to Grievance Officer Olson and ARB Chairperson Nothnagle, every

inmate at Menard receives an orientation manual outlining the prison’s grievance process
(Doc. 90, p. 13, ll. 21-23). This process requires an inmate to complete the following steps
to exhaust a grievance about his conditions of confinement4 (Id. at pp. 11-13). The inmate
first files a grievance with his counselor. If this does not resolve the matter, the inmate
submits the grievance to a Grievance Officer, who reports findings and recommendations

in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer (Warden). The Warden then provides the
inmate with a written decision. If the issue is not resolved, the inmate appeals the decision

4 These steps are also set forth at 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).
to the IDOC Director through the ARB. Along with the appeal, the inmate is required to
attach copies of the Grievance Officer’s report and Warden’s decision. The ARB considers

the matter and submits a written report of its findings and recommendations to the IDOC
Director for a final determination (Id).
An inmate facing an emergency uses a different route to exhaust his remedies
(Doc. 90, p. 15, ll. 17-25). Emergency grievances are sent directly to the Warden. If deemed
an emergency, the Warden expedites the matter. If deemed a non-emergency, the Warden
returns the grievance to the inmate for re-filing at each step of the grievance process5 (Id.).

Filing a grievance directly with the ARB is not considered proper procedure6
(Doc. 90, pp. 24-25, 33). Submitting an appeal to the ARB without including the Grievance
Officer’s response and Warden’s decision is also improper. When the ARB receives an
improper grievance or appeal, the ARB generally checks a box indicating the grievance
is noncompliant and returns it to the inmate for re-filing through normal channels (Id.).

Plaintiff testified that he was very familiar with Menard’s grievance process in
2022 (Doc. 90, p. 41, ll. 18-22). He had been incarcerated for 30 years and used the process
regularly. Over time, Plaintiff learned to expect no institutional response to certain types
of grievances, including those about staff misconduct as in this case (Id. at pp. 39-40).
When he filed said grievances, Plaintiff used a different approach to document his efforts

to exhaust. Specifically, Plaintiff filed each grievance in the prison’s grievance box and

5 Beginning September 1, 2023, all non-emergency grievances were automatically sent back through the
normal grievance channels for processing (Doc. 90, p. 27, ll. 19-25; p. 28, ll. 1-3).
6 There are exceptions for grievances about certain issues arising at another facility (Doc. 90, pp. 26, 33).
None of these exceptions applied to Plaintiff.
also sent a handwritten copy to the ARB (Id. at p. 40, ll. 17). In 2022, the metal grievance
box was easily breached (Id. at pp. 41-42). Grievances could be extracted from the box

using a pen. Consequently, inmate grievances regularly went missing. After inmates
complained, the metal box was eventually replaced with a wooden box (Id. at p. 42).
When sending his grievances directly to the ARB, Plaintiff described his difficulties
getting institutional level responses, and he requested the ARB’s help (Id.). Plaintiff knew
this was not the proper grievance procedure, but this was also the only way to document
his efforts to exhaust (Id. at ll. 19-20).

Grievance Officer Olson admits that staffing and resource shortages caused delays
in processing grievances at Menard in 2022 (Doc. 90, p. 17, ll. 24-25; p. 18, ll. 5-9). Inmates
with medical complaints had to wait 1- to 2- years to receive grievance responses (Id.). To
check on the status of a grievance, Olson explained that inmates could file a “kite” with
the grievance office (Id. at p. 17, ll. 14-22). Making an inquiry did not reduce the grievance

response time, but it helped inmates determine whether their grievances were lost (Id.).
The grievances at issue were all filed about staff misconduct in 2022 (Doc. 90, p.
23, ll. 20-25). Plaintiff did not receive an institutional response to any, and he believed
each grievance was lost (Id. at pp. 44-46). The ARB rejected each grievance as improperly
filed. When he commenced this lawsuit, Plaintiff was surprised that the IDOC could

produce receipts or responses for the grievances dated July 11, July 12, July 13, and
October 3, 2022 (Id. at p. 41, ll. 8-14; pp. 47-48). He thought the prison discarded,
destroyed, misplaced, or lost them (Id. at pp. 44, 47-48). Plaintiff points out that each
institutional grievance response lacked his signature because he never signed a response
indicating he received it (Id. at p. 53).

B. Conclusions of Law
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires inmates who have complaints
about prison conditions to exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing
suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). When a motion for summary judgment on the
issue of exhaustion presents material factual disputes and no Perttu intertwinement
problems, the Court conducts an evidentiary hearing to resolve contested issues of fact

concerning a prisoner’s efforts to exhaust, see Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir.
2008). After hearing evidence, finding facts, and determining credibility, the Court must
decide whether to allow a claim to proceed or to dismiss it for failure to exhaust. See id.;
Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is proper when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
To properly exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must “file complaints
and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo
v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly
take each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id.

at 1024.
Although the Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the exhaustion
requirement, an inmate is required to exhaust only those administrative remedies that
are available to the inmate. See Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). Prison
officials cannot utilize the exhaustion process to unfairly prejudice inmates. Grievance
procedures are unavailable to prisoners where prison officials do not respond to properly

filed inmate grievances or use affirmative misconduct to prevent prisoners from pursuing
administrative remedies. Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Dole,
438 F.3d at 809).
The exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense, which Defendants bear the
burden of proving. Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011); Banks v. Patton, 743
F. Appx. 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2018). When considering availability, Defendants bear the

burden of showing “beyond dispute” that Plaintiff’s administrative remedies were
available to him. Ramirez v. Young, 906 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2018). This unavailability
exception to the exhaustion requirement is nevertheless, “meant to be narrow.” Wallace
v. Baldwin, 55 F.4th 535, 543 (7th Cir. 2022).
Here, Defendants have not met their burden of showing “beyond dispute” that

Plaintiff’s administrative remedies were available to him. Ramirez v. Young, 906 F.3d 530,
533 (7th Cir. 2018). Admittedly, it is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to comply with the
grievance procedure because he filed each grievance at the prison and simultaneously
sent a copy to the ARB. As a result, the ARB rejected each copied grievance for failing to
include a counselor’s response, grievance officer’s response, or CAO’s decision. Thus,

Plaintiff did not comply with the process outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code for
these grievances. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).
However, Plaintiff presented credible testimony that the institutional grievance
process was unavailable. Plaintiff testified that over the course of 30 years in prison, he
became accustomed to receiving no responses to grievances addressing certain topics,
including staff misconduct (Doc. 90 at pp. 39-40). This is why he adopted the practice of

both placing his grievances in the grievance box and sending a copy to the ARB (Id.). In
addition, the metal grievance box was not secure and was frequently blamed for
grievances that went missing (Id. at pp. 41-42). For those grievances that reached
grievance officials, Grievance Officer Olson admits that grievance responses were
delayed up to 1 or 2 years (Id. at pp. 20-21).
The grievances at issue were filed in 2022, at a time when Grievance Officer Olson

described shortages in staff and resources that caused significant delays in grievance
processing at Menard. Plaintiff testified that he received no receipt, no response, and no
returned copy of his grievances. He was surprised when the IDOC produced copies of
receipts and responses in conjunction with this lawsuit. However, Plaintiff credibly
claims that he did not receive these receipts or responses before filing the lawsuit, and

that is why the responses do not bear his signature. Ultimately, based on the evidence
and arguments proffered by the parties related to Plaintiff’s grievances filed at the
institutional level, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s administrative remedies were
unavailable at Menard. Therefore, Plaintiff was not required to exhaust the institutional
grievance process before filing this lawsuit.

The undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Court ADOPT the findings of
fact and conclusions of law and FIND that the grievance process was unavailable to
Plaintiff.
Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the District Court GRANT
the Joint Motion for Pavey Hearing (Doc. 72), ADOPT the findings of fact and conclusions

of law, FIND that the grievance process was unavailable to Plaintiff, and ALLOW Counts
1 and 2 to proceed.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), the parties may object to
any or all of the proposed dispositive findings in this Report and Recommendation
within 14 days of service (see attached Notice). The failure to file a timely objection may

result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Report and Recommendation before
either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279,
284 (7th Cir. 2004).
DATED: February 9, 2026

/s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11278130. Public record. Not legal advice.