# Davenport

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11277656

## Case

- **Full name:** Justin Michael Davenport v. John Barwick, Latoya Hughes, Paige Long, Nurse Carol, Christine Brown, Illinois Dept. of Corr.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11277656

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JUSTIN MICHAEL DAVENPORT, )
S07433, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-1822-DWD
)
JOHN BARWICK, )
LATOYA HUGHES, )
PAIGE LONG, )
NURSE CAROL, )
CHRISTINE BROWN, )
ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CORR., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Justin Michael Davenport, an inmate of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC) currently detained at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings this
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his
constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and
his amended complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints
to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a
complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from
such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual
allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that on April 14, 2025, he experienced a seizure sometime before
breakfast while in his cell. He alleges that he did not have a cellmate, his cell was in the
back of the wing, and the cells are not equipped with emergency call buttons. When he
saw Defendant Nurse Carol during medication rounds, she commented that he had a
bump on his head, and she suggested that he sign up for sick call and attempt to alert

staff if he felt another seizure coming on. On May 9, 2025, Plaintiff wrote an emergency
grievance about the lack of emergency call buttons and submitted it directly to Defendant
Barwick, the warden. He complains that Barwick deemed it a non-emergency without
investigating. He reports that since the original seizure, he has experienced many
seizures. On May 19, 2025, Plaintiff’s seizure medication dose was increased. On May

23, 2025, he wrote a letter to Defendants Barwick and Brown asking to be placed in an
ADA cell or in healthcare so that he could secure help if he had more seizures. Barwick
never responded, and he alleges Brown denied his request. Plaintiff experienced four
additional seizures in June and July, so he wrote Defendant Brown another letter
complaining that he was not being seen by healthcare staff when he placed sick call

requests about his seizures, but he got no response from Brown.
Plaintiff faults Defendants Long and Hughes for denying him any relief via their
review of his grievance at the Administrative Review Board (ARB) level. He also faults
individuals not named in the case caption for their handling of grievances. His seizure
medication was increased two weeks prior to filing his complaint, but he has not been
moved to a new cell and does not believe he will be moved before his release in late March

of 2026. He alleges that when he has seizures his cellmate has tried to call out for help to
no avail.
At the end of the pleading, Plaintiff lists defendants one by one and makes discrete
claims against them. He faults Barwick and Brown for denying his requests and
grievances related to seizures, and he faults Hughes for reading and reviewing his
grievance without offering help or mandating emergency call buttons in the cells. He

faults Nurse Carol for failing to follow seizure protocol, which would have required a 24-
hour period of observation. He faults Defendant Long for failing to use her authority in
the grievance process to help him. Finally, he faults the Illinois Department of
Corrections. In support of the complaint, Plaintiff included affidavits from his cellmate
about his recurrent seizures and the inability to get staff’s attention for assistance.

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint the Court designates the
following counts:
Claim 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendant Nurse Carol;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants Barwick, Brown, Hughes, and Long, who
allegedly reviewed Plaintiff’s grievances and
correspondence but did not offer any assistance;

Claim 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendant Brown for her handling of Plaintiff’s
correspondence about his repeated seizures.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without
prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff named the Illinois Department of Corrections as

a defendant in his amended complaint, but the Department itself is not an entity subject
to suit under § 1983, so this defendant will be dismissed. See e.g., Smith v. Knox County
Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (the jail itself was not a suable entity).
Turning to Claim 1, an Eighth Amendment claim arising from the denial of
medical care consists of an objective and a subjective component. Berry v. Peterman, 604

F.3d 435, 439–40 (7th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff must show that he suffered from a serious
medical condition (i.e., an objective standard) and also show that each defendant
responded with deliberate indifference (i.e., a subjective standard). Id. To satisfy the
subjective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that an official knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir.

2005). Neither medical malpractice, nor mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical
judgment will amount to deliberate indifference. Id. Additionally, an inmate is not
entitled to demand specific care, and a medical professional may choose from a range of
acceptable courses of care. Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th
Cir. 2019).

Plaintiff faults Defendant Carol for deliberate indifference, but he describes a very
limited interaction with Carol. Specifically, he saw Carol while she was performing
medication rounds in the cellhouse and he reported his seizure. He indicates that she
verbally acknowledged a bump on his head, but he does not indicate that he reported
any acute medical distress, nor does he allege that Carol could observe any present
condition requiring treatment. Plaintiff complains that all Carol did was tell him to place

a sick call request and try to alert staff if he believed a seizure was imminent. It is not
apparent what about Carol’s response might constitute deliberate indifference. Plaintiff
did not have an acute medical need at the time she saw him, and she advised him how to
seek follow-up care. This series of events simply does not amount to deliberate
indifference.

Plaintiff again faults Defendants Barwick, Hughes, and Long for their handling of
grievances related to his seizures. As the Court previously explained, the mere role in
processing a grievance, without any participation in the underlying issue, is not sufficient
to state a claim. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (the alleged
mishandling of a grievance by those who did not cause or participate in the underlying

conduct states no claim). In some instances, inmates are allowed to proceed against
prison officials on the premise that they did not adequately investigate a serious issue
identified in a grievance, but here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet this standard yet.
See e.g., Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2015) (an inmate’s highly detailed
correspondence to prison administrators may form the basis for deliberate indifference
liability if the administrators turn a blind eye or fail to exercise their authority to

investigate). Plaintiff still has not described the contents of his grievances or
correspondence well enough for the Court to assess if he has a valid claim that a prison
official turned a blind eye to his situation.
For example, he faults Barwick for deeming a May 2025 grievance a non-
emergency, but he does not indicate what he wrote in the grievance, such as what sort of
injuries or concerns he raised or what sort of relief he sought. He goes on to fault

Defendants Long and Hughes for stamping or signing off on his grievances, but again,
does very little to explain what the grievance(s) said about his medical condition or living
situation, or what sort of relief he sought. In addition to Barwick, Long, and Hughes,
who are all named in the case caption, Plaintiff also faulted Counselor Lively, and
Administrative Review Board member Aponte for denying grievances, but these

individuals were not properly named as defendants in the case caption,1 so these factual
allegations do not form the basis for a valid claim.
In addition to the grievances, Plaintiff claims he sent a letter in May of 2025 to
Defendants Barwick and Healthcare Administrator Christine Brown, asking to be moved
to an ADA cell or a healthcare cell so that if he had a seizure it would be observable. A

letter writing campaign is generally not sufficient to establish personal liability against
high level prison administrators under § 1983. See e.g., Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592,

1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) states that the caption and title of the complaint must name all
parties.
595 (7th Cir. 2009) (writing letters to high level government officials is not sufficient to
attribute personal liability to them under § 1983 because bureaucracies divide

responsibilities, and high level staff can relegate things like the provision of good medical
care to medical staff). Inmates cannot demand specific care or a specific living situation.
In the complaint, Plaintiff describes the letter as being written just four days after he was
seen by a nurse practitioner about his recurrent seizures. The nurse practitioner increased
his dose of seizure medication at that appointment. The letter, sent just days after Plaintiff
was seen by a medical professional, and before he experienced any additional seizures,

is not sufficient to demonstrate that Warden Barwick exhibited deliberate indifference.
Barwick, as Warden, is allowed to delegate the handling of issues like this to medical staff
absent indication that absolutely nothing was being done and serious harm was likely. It
appears that the letter was a demand for specific care, rather than a complaint that
nothing was being done. Accordingly, neither the letter nor the grievances substantiate

a deliberate indifference claim against Hughes, Long, Barwick, or any of the other
individuals described but not name in the case caption. Claim 2 will be dismissed as
insufficiently pled.
By contrast, Defendant Brown was allegedly the healthcare unit administrator at
the time of the May 2025 letter and Plaintiff alleges that rather than ignoring the letter she

denied his request to move cells. In addition to the May letter, Plaintiff alleges that he
had three additional seizures in June and July of 2025, at which point he again wrote
Brown for help. He claims he told Brown that health care staff were not responding to
his sick call requests about recurrent seizures, but she did not respond. He alleges he had
additional seizures in late July and August of 2025. The combined impact of the May
2025 and July 2025 letters to Brown, and Plaintiff’s allegation that he continued to have

seizures with no ability to summon medical help, is sufficient at this basis to proceed on
Claim 3 against Defendant Brown.
FILING FEE
On October 9, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis and assessed an initial partial filing fee of $165.69 based upon the trust fund
statements for the previous six months. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff subsequently filed a new

Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 8) wherein he alleged that his
finances were artificially inflated by Social Security funds, which he was required to remit
back to the Social Security Administration by a September 2024 letter that he attached to
his Motion. He explains that with those funds long since gone, he cannot afford the initial
fee of $165.69. To assess Plaintiff’s current ability to pay, it directed Plaintiff to submit a

new Trust Fund statement that spans June 2025-December of 2025.
Plaintiff has now submitted a new trust fund statement along with a third Motion
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 12). Using the figures in the new trust fund
statement, Plaintiff’s initial partial filing fee would be $49.91. Although an inmate is not
allowed to spend his trust fund down for the purpose of evading a filing fee, Plaintiff

contends that he did not behave in this fashion and his balance instead dropped due to
repayments he needed to make to the Social Security Administration. The Court will
GRANT Plaintiff’s more recent Motions to Proceed IFP (Docs. 8, 12) and his new initial
partial filing fee shall be $49.91. Plaintiff must pay $49.91 within 30 days to proceed
with this case.
Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 3 of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 13)
survives against Defendant Christine Brown. By contrast, Claims 1 and 2 are insufficient
to proceed against Defendants Barwick, Hughes, Long, and Nurse Carol. The Clerk of
Court shall TERMINATE Defendants Barwick, Hughes, Long, Nurse Carol, and the
Illinois Department of Corrections.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendant Christine Brown: (1)
Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form
6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy
of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 13), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’
place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the

Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on
Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service,
to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be
maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues
stated in this Merits Review Order.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this
action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case
because it will involve the exchange of medical records.

Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to Amend (Doc. 14) is GRANTED
instanter and his amended complaint (Doc. 13) was considered timely filed. Plaintiff’s
Motions for Leave to Proceed IFP (Docs. 8, 12) are GRANTED for the reasons explained
above, and his adjusted initial partial filing fee is $49.91. Plaintiff must pay the $49.91
within 30 days to proceed with this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2026
s/ David W. Dugan
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your
lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,
the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will
likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,
but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants
have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important
information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not
submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles
that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but
it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening
only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some
relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged
actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is
the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11277656. Public record. Not legal advice.