# Eiermann

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11277621

## Case

- **Full name:** C.R.H. Industrial Water, LLC, et al. v. Michael Eiermann, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11277621

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting, 30 years ago, that the “general practice in the Cleveland legal commu- nity” was to bill in six-minute increments
- finding no abuse of discretion in a reduction of 7.5 percent

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
C.R.H. INDUSTRIAL WATER, LLC, ) CASE NO. 1:23-CV-1805
et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE
) JENNIFER DOWDELL ARMSTRONG
v. )
)
MICHAEL EIERMANN, et al., ) MEMORANDUM
) OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants. )

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This trade secrets case was dismissed with prejudice in March 2025 pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, after a lengthy mediation process that
led to a settlement. (Order, ECF No. 62.) The parties had agreed that the Court would retain juris-
diction over the terms of their settlement agreement (see Stipulated Notice, ECF No. 61), and
further specifically agreed that I would retain jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the terms of the
settlement agreement if any dispute arose. (See Minutes of Proceedings [non-document], Jan. 27,
2025.)
The case is now before the Court for the determination of attorney fees, costs, and interest
relative to a consent judgment entry after the defendants breached the settlement agreement that
ended their litigation. (Mem. Opinion and Order, ECF No. 74.)
The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth in detail in the Court’s
Memorandum Opinion and Order of December 10, 2025. (ECF No. 74, PageID# 674–76.) It need
not be repeated in detail here.
After an evidentiary hearing on October 27, 2025, the Court determined that Plaintiffs
C.R.H. Industrial Water, LLC and C.R.H. Ohio, LTD. (“Plaintiffs”) are entitled to the entry of a
consent judgment against Defendants Michael Eiermann, Andrew Bokovitz, Perry Celaschi, and
Engineered H2O Solutions, LLC (“Defendants”)—the remedy provided in their settlement agree-
ment for a breach. (Id.; see also Consent Judgment, ECF No. 63-1.)
Specifically, the Court set forth the following:
Plaintiffs shall have and recover judgment against Defendants in the total
amount of Sixty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($68,000) minus any payments
made pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and Waiver and Release be-
tween the parties plus Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) plus interest at
the statutory rate, court costs and reasonable attorney fees.

(ECF No. 74, PageID# 684.)

The Court requested briefing from the parties regarding attorney fees and ordered that the
parties set forth the amount that has already been paid pursuant to the settlement agreement. (Id.)
On December 24, 2025, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees, interest, and costs
(ECF No. 75), supported by: (1) an affidavit from attorney Thomas Feher as an expert (ECF No.
75-1); (2) an affidavit from attorney John Mitchell (ECF No. 75-2); (3) redacted billing entries for
the months of May through December 2025 (ECF Nos. 75-3, 75-4, 75-5, 75-6, 75-7, 75-8, 75-9,
and 75-10); (4) invoices from the company Veritext (ECF No. 75-11); and (5) food, lodging, and
rideshare confirmation emails, and printed electronic driving directions related to the travel of
attorney Lauren Kemp (ECF No. 75-12).
On January 19, 2026, the defendants filed a brief in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 77.)
On January 26, 2026, the plaintiffs filed a reply brief in support of their motion. (ECF No. 78.)
The Court then ordered the plaintiffs to submit unredacted copies of their billing entries for
the Court’s in camera review. (Order [non-document], Feb. 13, 2026.) The plaintiffs submitted
these records, and the Court has reviewed them thoroughly.
This Memorandum Opinion and Order follows.
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART the motion for attorney fees,
interest, and costs (ECF No. 75.) The Court awards reasonable attorney fees in the amount of
$62,316.50. The Court awards reasonable costs and expenses in the amount of $9,332.73. And the
Court awards pre- and postjudgment interest at the statutory rates, although less prejudgment in-
terest than the Plaintiffs request. The motion is otherwise DENIED.

The plaintiffs are ordered to file a notice on or before March 5, 2026, stating whether
the defendants have made additional payments under the settlement agreement since the filing of
their reply brief and, if so, the amount of the principal balance that is still outstanding. A final
judgment entry will promptly follow that notice.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Attorney Fees
Under Ohio law, a party who successfully enforces a settlement agreement in court may
recover its reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred in enforcing the settlement, as compen-
satory damages. E.g., Rohrer Corp. v. Dane Elec. Corp. U.S.A., 482 F. App’x 113, 117 (6th Cir.

2012). Here, the parties’ settlement agreement also expressly provided for the recovery of attorney
fees and costs:
Fee Shifting. The Parties agree that the prevailing Party in any action relat-
ing to or arising out of this Agreement will be awarded its reasonable attor-
neys’ fees and costs incurred as a result of such proceeding.

Settlement Agreement at 4, Oct. 27, 2025 Hrg. Ex. 7; see also Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Logistical
Advantage Corp., No. 1:22-cv-1118, 2023 WL 5277765, at *5 (N.D. Ohio June 14, 2023) (noting
that the existence of a contract that provides for fee-shifting is an independent basis to award fees).

And the parties’ negotiated consent judgment entry also provides for the award of fees,
costs, and interest:
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs
shall have and recover judgment against Defendants in the total amount of
Sixty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($68,000) minus any payments made pursu-
ant to the Settlement Agreement and Waiver and Release between the par-
ties plus Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) plus interest at the statutory
rate, court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the event any [Defendant]1
violates any term of the Settlement Agreement and Waiver and Release.
Reasonable attorneys’ fees shall only be awarded for attorney fees incurred
in connection seeking enforcement of the Settlement Agreement dated
March 18, 2025.

(Consent Judgment Entry, ECF No. 63-1.)

Indeed, Defendants do not seem to dispute that—in light of the Court’s finding of a material
breach—the Plaintiffs are entitled to some award of attorney fees. Rather, the dispute centers on
what a reasonable award is here.
Plaintiffs request $82,518.75. (Reply Br. at 6, ECF No. 78, PageID# 776.) This figure in-
cludes:
• $77,518.75 for work performed between May and December 2025 to inves-
tigate and litigate the issue of Defendants’ breach; and

• $5,000 for work performed in drafting the reply brief in support of their fee
application.

(See Mot. Att’y Fees at 2, ECF No. 75, PageID# 687; Reply Br. at 6, ECF No. 78, PageID# 776.)

Before turning to Defendants’ position, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ first request seems
to include a relatively small mathematical error. Mr. Mitchell avers—and the billing records sub-
stantiate—that he and the other professionals from his firm billed and collected from Plaintiffs:
• $7,023.75 in May;
• $5,406.25 in June;
• $25,103.75 in July;

1 Plaintiffs corrected a scrivener’s error in the original consent judgment entry before filing it; the parties
had mistakenly written “Plaintiff” instead of “Defendant” here. The Defendants have not contested that this
was an inadvertent drafting error.
• $10,890.00 in August;
• $6,448.75 in September;
• $16,550.00 in October; and
• $118.75 in November.

(Mitchell Aff., ECF No. 75-2, PageID# 712–13; Billing Records, ECF Nos. 75-3 through 75-10.)
Additionally, Mr. Mitchell avers—and the records substantiate—that his firm had earned
(though not yet billed) $5,805 for the month of December, up to the date Plaintiffs filed their mo-
tion for fees. (PageID# 713 & 722.)
These amounts total only $77,346.25. The difference between these figures, at only $172,
could reasonably be considered immaterial. But the Court will use the latter figure and consider
Plaintiffs’ request to be for a total of $82,346.25 in fees.
Defendants do not suggest an alternative fee calculation, but they argue that Plaintiffs’ fees
are unreasonable. They point to “numerous issues” with the request, which at that time did not

include fees attributable to the reply brief. (Opp’n Br., ECF No. 77, PageID# 765.) First, Defend-
ants argue that “the quantity of pleadings in term of number of filings” and the “complexity/vol-
ume” of this part of the litigation were “minimal.” (Id.) Defendants point specifically to 7.25 hours
billed leading up to the filing of the Consent Judgment entry. (Id., PageID# 767–68.) Next, De-
fendants argue that there was unreasonable redundancy in the Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ staffing of the
case. (Id., PageID# 765–66.) They respectfully question the necessity of Ms. Kemp’s travel for
and attendance at the evidentiary hearing, at which she did not examine a witness or present argu-
ment. (Id., PageID# 766–67.) They point out, accurately, that the July 2025 chambers conference
and the October 2025 evidentiary hearing involved less than a day of total “in court time”;2 they
further argue that allowing “every minute for every attorney to be compensated” would be “the
definition of redundancy.” (Id.) Defendants argue that it would be unreasonable to award fees and
costs incurred to subpoena witnesses that Plaintiffs never ended up calling to testify. (Id.,
PageID# 768.) They take issue with the cost of the expert report. (Id.) And finally, they point out

that the amount of fees requested dwarf the damages actually at stake in the litigation. (Id.,
PageID# 769.)
In reply, the Plaintiffs’ counsel insists that their requested fees are “commensurate with
seven[] months of work” investigating and litigating the breach and that the use of Ms. Kemp—
an associate attorney—for much of the work in the case resulted in efficient staffing. (Reply at 3–
4, ECF No. 78, PageID# 773–74.) Plaintiffs point out that they succeeded in proving a material
breach. (Id. at 4, PageID# 774.) They further state that Plaintiffs had paid all the attorneys’ fees
sought. (Id.) They argue that their work sending subpoenas to witnesses from outside businesses
was necessary and reasonable, even if none of those witnesses were ultimately called. (Id.) And

they contend that Defendants were fully aware that breaching the settlement agreement would
result in the assessment of attorney fees, costs, and interest. (Id. at 5, PageID# 775.)
A trial court has discretion in determining the amount of fees to award, and the court’s
primary concern is to award an amount that is reasonable. E.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471
(6th Cir. 1999) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893 (1984)); Lavin v. Husted, 764 F.3d 646,
649 (6th Cir. 2014). A reasonable fee is “adequate to attract competent counsel,” but does not

2 The Court notes that the docket reflects that the evidentiary hearing involved four hours of time in court.
(Minutes of Proceedings, Oct. 27, 2025.) But the transcript reflects that—inclusive of breaks—the hearing
lasted from 9:10 a.m. to 2:33 p.m. (or a little less than five and a half hours).
produce a “windfall” to attorneys. See, e.g., Reed, 179 F.3d at 471 (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 893–
94).
The starting point in determining a reasonable fee is to calculate what is called the “lode-
star,” by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. E.g.,
Rohrer Corp. v. Dane Elec., No. 1:10-CV-958, 2012 WL 3648904, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2012)

(citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The party seeking attorney fees bears the
burden of proving the reasonableness of the hours and the rates claimed. Id. Parties are not entitled
to recover fees for “‘hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” Id. (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
Here, plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly rates are:
• $690 for Mr. Mitchell, who is a partner at the law firm of Taft Stet-
tinius & Hollister LLP (“Taft”) with 29 years of legal experience.
(Mitchell Aff., ECF No. 75-2, PageID# 711–12.)

• $475 for Ms. Kemp, who was an associate at Taft during the relevant
period and who has 10 years of legal experience. (Id. at
PageID# 712.)

• $330 for Mr. Jones, a paralegal at Taft whose experience is not fur-
ther described. (See id.)

Plaintiff’s expert, Thomas Feher—a senior member of the Office of General Counsel at the
law firm Thompson Hine who has been practicing law since 1987—opined that these hourly rates
are reasonable and comport with Rule 1.5 of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. (Feher Aff.,
ECF No. 75-1, PageID# 694, 699–702.) Mr. Feher did not specifically address the hourly rate for
Mr. Jones.
Defendants seemingly concede the reasonableness of the attorneys’ hourly rates. (See
Opp’n Br., ECF No. 77, PageID# 766–67.) Specifically, Defendants write that their opposition was
“in no way an attack or disparagement of Ms. Kemp’s . . . qualification for her billable rate,” “[n]or
is it an attack of the billing by Mr. Mitchell and Ms. Kemp to their client.” (Id.) Defendants do not
address Mr. Jones’s rate.
Having independently reviewed these rates and the expert report, and with no opposition
from Defendants on this issue, the Court finds the attorneys’ rates to be reasonable. The Court has
considered the prevailing market rate in the Northern District of Ohio. See Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y

of Transportation, 227 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 2000). Mr. Fehrer opined that Mr. Mitchell’s rate is
squarely in the middle of the range for a Cleveland litigation partner as reported in the Wolters
Kluwer ELM Solutions Real Rate Report and is slightly below the normal billing rate of a partner
with his experience as reflected in the PricewaterhouseCoopers Revenue Management Report
(“PwC Report”). (Feher Aff. at 7–8, ECF No. 75-1, PageID# 700–01.) Mr. Feher further opined
that Ms. Kemp’s rate is slightly below the average rate billed by associates with one year less
practice experience, according to the PwC Report. (Id. at 8, PageID# 701.) The Court has also
considered the parties’ submissions and its own knowledge and experience in concluding that these
rates are reasonable. See Van Horn v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 1:08 CV 605, 2010 WL

1751995, *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2010) (citing Mikolajczyk v. Broadspire Servs., Inc., 499
F.Supp.2d 958, 965 (N.D. Ohio 2007); see also Bunn Enterprises, Inc. v. Ohio Operating Engi-
neers Fringe Benefit Programs, No. 2:13-CV-00357, 2016 WL 223717, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 19,
2016).
The Court turns next to a consideration of Mr. Jones’s paralegal rate. In the absence of any
meaningful evidence substantiating that Mr. Jones’s rate is reasonable, the Court finds that an ac-
curate benchmark for determining reasonable paralegal hourly rates in this case is the Ohio State
Bar Association’s publication “The Economics of Law Practice in Ohio 2024.” Federal district
courts in Ohio routinely rely on the OSBA’s economics survey report for calculating fee awards.
See Great Lakes Packers, Inc. v. P.K. Produce, Inc., Nos. 1:18cv2754 and 1:19cv1673, 2024 WL
6985554, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2024) (collecting cases).
In the OSBA’s 2024 report, the median hourly billing rate for a paralegal in 2023 was $150.
The ninety-fifth percentile rate for paralegals in the Cleveland region was $172. In the Akron,
Canton, and Youngstown regions, the ninety-fifth percentile was $181. In the Toledo region, the

ninety-fifth percentile was $154. Rates increased with the amount of experience a paralegal had,
but the Court has no competent evidence regarding Mr. Jones’s experience as a paralegal.
The Court therefore finds that Mr. Jones’s hourly rate is higher than the prevailing market
rate within the Northern District of Ohio. Even assuming that Mr. Jones has 10 years of experience,
most paralegals in the Cleveland area with that amount of experience are billed at $95 to $174 per
hour. Less than ten percent are billed at $195 or more. That percentage rises to fifteen percent in
the Toledo area and in the Akron, Canton, and Youngstown area, but the majority of paralegals in
those areas are still billed at $95 to $174 per hour.
The Court determines that a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Jones’s work is $130 per hour,

which is squarely within the range of paralegal rates for this district as reported by the OSBA and
consistent with the typical hourly rates awarded for paralegals in this district. See Great Lakes
Packers, Inc., 2024 WL 6985554, at *12 (approving a rate of $105 per hour for paralegal work
performed in 2021); Renouf v. Aegis Relocation Company Corp., 641 F. Supp.3d 439, 451 (N.D.
Ohio 2022) (noting in 2022 that typical hourly rates for paralegals in this district run between $100
and $130 per hour); Noco Company v. MacCalabur Investments, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-2173, 2022
WL 2870900, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 21, 2022) (approving fees for paralegal work at $100 and
$125 per hour in 2022).
Accordingly, the Court finds that a reasonable hourly rate for the plaintiffs’ legal team is:
$690 for Mr. Mitchell, $475 for Ms. Kemp, and $130 for Mr. Jones.
The Court next considers whether the plaintiffs proved the reasonableness of the hours
claimed.
Before addressing Defendants’ specific arguments about the reasonableness of the work

performed on the case, the Court considers two broader issues identified in Mr. Feher’s affidavit.
In reviewing the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ billing records, Mr. Feher identified “several entries” where
Plaintiffs’ counsel block-billed3 their time. (Feher Aff. at 4 n.1, ECF No. 75-1, PageID# 697.) Mr.
Feher also noted that the attorneys billed in minimum increments of fifteen minutes (0.25 hours),
as opposed to six minutes (0.1 hours). (Id. at 4, PageID# 697.) Mr. Feher averred that block-billing
and billing in 0.25 increments are “less common practices” among law firms. (Id.) But he opined
that neither “made a material difference in the overall reasonableness” of the fees. (Id.)
Attorneys who seek fees must “maintain billing time records that are sufficiently detailed
to enable courts to review the reasonableness of the hours expended.” Smith v. Serv. Master Corp.,

592 F. App’x 363, 371 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But an attorney is
“‘not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended.’” Id. (quoting
Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 473 F.3d 253, 273
(6th Cir. 2007); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12 (1983) (stating that, at the least, “counsel
should identify the general subject matter of his time expenditures”).
Regarding block-billing, the Sixth Circuit has held that if the description of the work per-
formed is adequate, block-billing can be sufficient. Smith, 592 F. App’x at 371.

3 “Block-billing” is a timekeeping method in which a lawyer enters the total daily time they spent working
on a case, rather than separately itemizing the time they spent on individual tasks. E.g., Benoist v. Titan
Med. Mfg., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-2704, 2021 WL 4477084, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2021).
Here, the Court has conducted an in camera review of counsel’s unredacted billing entries.
The block-billing is far more extensive than “several entries”; indeed, the entries are almost en-
tirely block-billed. But overall, and read together in context, the entries sufficiently describe the
work performed, the time spent on individual tasks, and by whom, such that the Court can ade-
quately consider the reasonableness of each entry. See Rohaley and Son Automotive, Inc. v. Trav-

elers Casualty Ins. Company of Am., No. 1:20-cv-2700, 2022 WL 18863788, at *3 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 21, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4023101 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 3,
2024).
But the minimum billing increment used in this case is a thornier issue. Deciding whether
quarter-hour billing is reasonable in a given case is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. See
Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, the Court is mindful that the general practice in this district is to bill in six-minute
increments. And it has been that way for a long time. See Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1492, 1520
(N.D. Ohio 1996) (noting, 30 years ago, that the “general practice in the Cleveland legal commu-

nity” was to bill in six-minute increments). Courts in this district have at times viewed quarter-
hour billing with disfavor. E.g., Corbis Corp. v. Starr, 719 F. Supp.2d 843, 845 n.1 (N.D. Ohio
2010). The concern with billing in larger increments is that the practice can lead to overbilling.
E.g., Yellowbook Inc., 708 F.3d at 849.
The Court is confident, after carefully reviewing the time entries, that this is not a case
where a firm used quarter-hour increments to intentionally pad a bill. In multiple instances, Plain-
tiffs’ attorneys gathered smaller tasks together under the same quarter-hour entry. For example,
Mr. Mitchell billed a single quarter-hour entry on June 13, 2025, that included multiple emails with
Ms. Kemp, a conference call with opposing counsel, and a post-call conference with Ms. Kemp.
(“Exhibit 2 – June 2025 Fees,” ECF No. 75-4.)
That said, it is equally clear that the practice of quarter-hour billing had the overall practical
effect of overbilling here. For instance, Ms. Kemp reported spending fifteen minutes reviewing
the Court’s five-sentence minute entry from the October 27, 2025 evidentiary hearing. (See “Ex-

hibit 6 – October 2025 Fees,” ECF No. 75-8; see also Minutes of proceedings [non-document],
Oct. 28, 2025.) Mr. Mitchell reported spending fifteen minutes reviewing a one-page motion to
continue. (See “Exhibit 5 – September 2025 Fees,” ECF No. 75-7, see also Mot. Continue, ECF
No. 72.)
Additionally, there are several instances where Mr. Mitchell documented the time spent on
individual tasks within a block-billed entry and where the quarter-hour-billed entry charges more
time. On December 10, 2025, for example, Mr. Mitchell reported performing two tasks that each
took 12 minutes (0.2 hours each), but these tasks were billed as though Mr. Mitchell spent a half
hour on the tasks (0.5 hours). (“Exhibit 8 – December 2025 Fees,” ECF No. 75-10.) On December

13, 2025, a task taking Mr. Mitchell six minutes (0.1) was billed as though it took fifteen minutes
(0.25). (Id.) And the same happened on December 19, 2025. (Id.)
The Court also notes that there are more than 20 quarter-hour entries for time associated
with only emails or “correspondence.” There are around seven quarter-hour entries for time asso-
ciated with internal conferences between Mr. Mitchell and Ms. Kemp, including an entry wherein
the two discussed only a joint motion to continue the evidentiary hearing (August 14, 2025 billing
entry). The compounding effect of the quarter-hour billing becomes more apparent in considering
the entries that follow that conference.
There is a quarter-hour entry for a phone call between Ms. Kemp and defense counsel
regarding their availability for the rescheduled hearing (August 15, 2025 billing entry). There is a
45 minute entry for time that included: (1) a call with the courtroom deputy regarding the unop-
posed motion to continue; (2) reviewing the minute entry moving the hearing; and (3) an internal
conference between Ms. Kemp and Mr. Mitchell “regarding same.” (August 22, 2025 billing en-

try).
These are just a few examples, included to support the Court’s conclusion, after a careful
review, that quarter-hour billing resulted in overbilling in this case. It is clear that time entries were
rounded up, not down. Compare D.S. v. Knox County, Tennessee, No. 3:20-CV-240-CEA-DCP,
2022 WL 1284234 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 3, 2022) (no reduction warranted for quarter-hour billing
where software kept track of time and time was rounded down, not up), report and recommenda-
tion adopted as modified, 2022 WL 885851 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2022) (agreeing with the Magis-
trate Judge that no reduction was warranted for quarter-hour billing).
The Court therefore finds that a reduction must be made to the number of hours billed to

arrive at a reasonable fee. See Stanley v. Macomb County, No. 19-11589, 2024 WL 95673, *7 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 8, 2024) (reduction warranted where quarter-hour entries were billed for reading emails
and reviewing electronic notifications generated by docket management program). The question
remains how large a reduction to make.
Mr. Feher opined that the quarter-hour billing here “yields an immaterial difference in the
overall reasonableness of the fee.” (Feher Aff. at 4 n.3, ECF No. 75-1, PageID# 698.) He arrived
at that conclusion by converting every 0.25 entry into a 0.1 entry, and by converting every 1.75
entry into a 1.6 entry, which he said results in “a roughly 5.4% reduction of total time.” He does
not explain why the logic of reducing each entry by 0.15 hours would not extend to other billed
increments (0.5, for instance, or 2.0).
The Sixth Circuit has held that quarter-hour billing cannot merit a reduction greater than
60 percent relative to tenth-of-an-hour billing. Yellowbook Inc., 708 F.3d at 849. And the Sixth
Circuit further cautions that “in most cases district courts should apply much lower percentage

reductions.” Id.; see also Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Toledo, 499 F. App’x 538, 549 (6th Cir.
2012) (finding no abuse of discretion in a reduction of 7.5 percent). The Sixth Circuit has affirmed
a reduction of up to 35 percent where quarter-hour billing—combined with a host of other defi-
ciencies—was found in a fee application. Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558, 575–
76 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Sevy v. Barach, No. 17-13789, 2022 WL 4234951, at *8 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 14, 2022) (applying a 35 percent reduction under similar circumstances). The purpose of
reducing fees under these circumstances is to counter overbilling, not to punish an attorney’s fail-
ure to use tenth-of-an-hour billing. Yellowbook, Inc., 708 F.3d at 849.
District courts in this circuit reduce fees for this issue in at least two ways. Some will apply

an across-the-board percentage reduction. See, e.g., Sevy, 2022 WL 4234951. Others will reduce
0.25 entries by 0.15 to reflect tenth-of-an-hour billing. See, e.g., H.D.V.-Greektown v. City of De-
troit, 2017 WL 9470887, *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2017).
The Sixth Circuit’s instruction that “lengthy or whole-hour tasks warrant little or no re-
duction”—Yellowbook, Inc. at 849 n.4—seems to suggest that an entry-by-entry review is more
appropriate, at least where it can be done feasibly.
The hours the plaintiffs request are as follows:
• 91.75 hours for Ms. Kemp;
• 47.5 hours for Mr. Mitchell;4 and
• 3 hours for Mr. Jones.
For the reasons discussed further below, the Court is reducing Ms. Kemp’s time by five
hours, attributed to travel time between Columbus and Cleveland for the July hearing. That brings

Ms. Kemp’s request to 86.75 hours.
The Court finds that a reasonable approach is to reduce the quarter-hour-billed entries by a
percentage that decreases with the length of the work performed: 0.25 entries will be reduced to
0.1 (a reduction of 60%); 0.5 entries will be reduced to 0.3 (a reduction of 40%); 0.75 entries will
be reduced to 0.6 (a reduction of 20%); and 1.0 entries will be reduced to 0.8 (a reduction of 20%).
This has the effect of discounting the numerous 0.25 entries significantly, while leaving longer
entries largely untouched. See Yellowbook, Inc. at 849 n.4. For instance, Mr. Mitchell’s and Ms.
Kemp’s five-hour entries attributed the July hearing are reduced to 4.8 hours each, a reduction of
only four percent.
Additionally, the Court will not reduce Mr. Mitchell’s entries for December 11 and 12,

because the entries document, in six-hour increments, the time spent on each task and substantiate
that these entries were not rounded up. Finally, the Court will reduce Mr. Mitchell’s December 10
entry only to 0.4, again because he documented the time spent on each task in six-minute incre-
ments.

4 Mr. Feher calculated Mr. Mitchell’s total hours at 47.75 (Feher Aff. at 5, ECF No. 75-1, PageID# 698.)
The difference between these calculations seems to stem from the August 2025 billing entries. Mr. Feher
appears to have used the amounts included in the “Orig Hrs” column for this month, as opposed to the “Rev
Hrs” column (which he used in every other month). The former number seems to represent hours as entered,
while the latter represents the amount actually billed. It seems that Plaintiffs intended to use the amount
actually billed in their fee application, and that is the number the Court also uses.
After applying these reductions to mitigate the overbilling caused by quarter-hour billing,
the Court arrives at the following figures:
• 65.1 hours for Ms. Kemp;
• 37.8 hours for Mr. Mitchell; and
• 2.4 hours for Mr. Jones.5

Expressed as a percentage, the Court’s reductions amount to a 25 percent reduction to Ms.
Kemp’s hours and a 20 percent reduction to Mr. Mitchell’s and Mr. Jones’s hours. The Court finds
these amounts reasonable for the case, and further notes that they reflect the relative balance of
workload between the professionals (and therefore the relative share of the overbilling) and are
well within the range courts have applied to correct overbilling from quarter-hour billing. See
Bench Billboard Co., 499 F. App’x at 549 (7.5 percent); Hubbell, 933 F.3d at 575–76 (35 percent).
Having addressed block-billing and quarter-hour billing, the Court turns to a consideration
of Defendants’ arguments on staffing, complexity, redundancy, and on the work to issue subpoenas.

5 To assist the parties with checking the math, the Court will further set forth its calculation by month:
• May 2025: Ms. Kemp, 8.25 hours reduced to 6.4 hours. | Mr. Mitchell, 4.5 hours reduced to 3 hours.
• June 2025: Ms. Kemp, 7.75 hours reduced to 6 hours. | Mr. Mitchell, 2.5 hours reduced to 1.7 hours.
• July 2025: Ms. Kemp, 20.25 hours (not including the disallowed travel entries) reduced to 16.8
hours. | Mr. Mitchell, 19 hours reduced to 16 hours.
• August 2025: Ms. Kemp, 15 hours reduced to 12.5 hours. | Mr. Mitchell, 4.5 hours reduced to 3
hours. | Mr. Jones, 2 hours reduced to 1.6 hours.
• September 2025: Ms. Kemp, 9.25 hours reduced to 7 hours. | Mr. Mitchell, 2.5 hours reduced to
1.2 hours. | Mr. Jones, 1 hour reduced to 0.8 hours.
• October 2025: Ms. Kemp, 18.5 hours reduced to 17.1 hours. | Mr. Mitchell, 11.25 hours reduced to
10.4 hours.
• November 2025: Ms. Kemp. 0.25 hours reduced to 0.1 hours.
• December 2025: Ms. Kemp, 7.5 hours reduced to 6.2 hours. | Mr. Mitchell, 3.25 hours reduced to
2.5 hours.
With one exception, the Court disagrees with Defendants that the hours requested were
unreasonable. While the number of substantive filings related to the breach was small (see Notice,
ECF No. 63; Joint Status Report, ECF No. 67; Mot. Att’y Fees, ECF No. 75; Reply, ECF No. 78),
the Court cannot agree that this was a “minimally” complex case. As an initial matter, the Court is
mindful that counsel’s work was necessary in the first place because Defendants breached the set-

tlement agreement by failing to maintain a complete communication log as required. The Court
also notes that Plaintiffs had failed to attend several required bimonthly conferences regarding the
defendants’ non-solicitation obligations. While counsel’s absence from the meetings was due to
significant family obligations, in the context of the resulting silence, and without a complete pic-
ture of the Defendants’ communications with potential customers, it is not unreasonable that Plain-
tiffs’ counsel spent a significant amount of time investigating the extent of the breach and confirm-
ing the details of Mr. Eiermann’s business with Plaintiffs’ customers.
Having reviewed counsel’s billing entries in camera, the Court finds that each entry relates
to work performed to investigate the Defendants’ breach of the settlement agreement and to litigate

that breach after Defendants contested the filing of the consent judgment. That litigation involved
preparing for and conducting an evidentiary hearing with multiple witnesses. And now it has in-
volved litigating a contested fee application.
The Court, having already reduced the number of hours billed as set forth above, does not
find any instance where the revised hours seem unreasonable when compared to the work de-
scribed. The Court has been in the position to oversee this litigation, including holding the July
2025 conference with the parties (at which the plaintiffs were prepared to present evidence) and
presiding over the evidentiary hearing. The Court is convinced that the plaintiffs have met their
burden to show that the hours worked were reasonable.
The Court also disagrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s staffing of the case was
unreasonable and resulted in redundancy. Counsel used Ms. Kemp (an associate attorney) for the
vast majority of the work here. As Mr. Feher points out, this has the effect of lowering the overall
fee. (Feher Aff., ECF No. 75-1, PageID# 699.) And on the flip side of the coin, the fact that Ms.
Kemp did most of the day-to-day work on the case makes it reasonable that she attend the im-

portant conferences and hearings in the case. This is not unreasonable redundancy.
Regarding subpoenas, the Court again agrees Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ counsel represents that
it has not billed for time related to securing the testimony of internal employees. In this non-solic-
itation litigation, it was not unreasonable for counsel to wish to interview (or examine under oath,
if necessary) the employees of outside entities that Plaintiffs suspect may have been improperly
solicited.
And regarding Defendants’ arguments about Mr. Feher’s expert report, the Court finds the
argument unpersuasive. Beyond generally complaining about the cost of the report, Defendants
put forth no substantive argument that the plaintiffs are not entitled to fees-on-fees, that is, attorney

fees for seeking attorney fees. A fee-shifting provision in a settlement agreement normally allows
a court to award fees-on-fees, and the parties’ agreement here did as well. See Linneman v. Vita-
Mix Corp., 970 F.3d 621, 629 (6th Cir. 2020) (provision in settlement agreement shifting fees
“incurred . . . in prosecuting the Lawsuit” allowed for fees-on-fees). The Court does not find the
cost of the report to be unreasonable.
Defendants freely negotiated a fee-shifting provision in the parties’ settlement agreement.
Defendants then breached the settlement agreement. Defendants then put Plaintiffs to their burden
of proof in litigating the breach. Defendants then opposed the plaintiffs’ fee application. Having
reviewed the work Plaintiffs did to respond to these matters over the course of eight months, the
Court is convinced that the work—and the resulting fees—were reasonable.
There is one exception. The Court will disallow Ms. Kemp’s request for five hours associ-
ated with travel between her office in Columbus and the courthouse in Cleveland for the July 10,
2025 hearing, as well as her hotel, rideshare, and food expenses related to her travel for that hearing

and the evidentiary hearing. (See Exhibit E, ECF No. 75-12.) The decision whether to compensate
counsel for travel time is a matter within this Court’s discretion. Perotti v. Seiter, 935 F.2d 761,
764 (6th Cir. 1991). Here, the plaintiffs chose counsel whose office is located outside the Northern
District of Ohio. See Hahnemann University Hosp. v. All Shore, Inc., 514 F.3d 300, 311 (3rd Cir.
2008) (citing Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 710
(3rd Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder normal circumstances, a party that hires counsel from outside the forum
of the litigation may not be compensated for travel time, travel costs, or the costs of local coun-
sel.”) While travel time can be compensable under some circumstances, see Smith v. Service Mas-
ter Corp., 592 F. App’x 363, 372 (6th Cir. 2014), and Ms. Kemp was the primary associate on this

case, the Court finds that billing for her travel to Cleveland at her full rate is not consistent with
the local practice in this district. Moreover, she did not bill for her travel for the November evi-
dentiary hearing.
For these reasons, the Court calculates the lodestar as follows:
• Ms. Kemp: 65.1 hours at $475 per hour, totaling $30,922.50.
• Mr. Mitchell: 37.8 hours at $690 per hour, totaling $26,082.
• Mr. Jones: 2.4 hours at $130 per hour, totaling $312.
The Court will also allow $5,000 for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s work in preparing the reply brief,
with the understanding that that figure will also reasonably cover counsel’s other post-briefing
work (communicating with the client regarding the case, reviewing this opinion, and any other
work left to be performed) such that there will not be a subsequent fee application. Accordingly,
the lodestar amount is $62,316.50.
“Upon determining the lodestar, a district court also has discretion to decide whether an
upward or downward adjustment is warranted in order to reach a reasonable fee award.” Van Horn

v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 436 F. App’x 496, 499–500 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Geier v.
Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The Court may consider the following factors when determining whether an adjustment is
appropriate:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (4) the
preclusion of employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case;
(5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount in-
volved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorney; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.

Van Horn, 436 F. App’x at 499–500 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n. 3 (1983)).
Here, Defendants essentially argue for a downward adjustment because the requested fees
dwarf the damages actually at stake in the breach litigation. After careful consideration, the Court
is not convinced it is appropriate here to depart from the lodestar amount. Plaintiffs’ counsel suc-
cessfully proved a breach of the settlement agreement after investigation, discovery, conversations
regarding settlement, and finally a contested evidentiary hearing. That work, over the course of
months, allowed the entry of a consent judgment in their clients’ favor, accelerating the payment
and increasing the overall judgment amount by $10,000. Defendants have not offered any evidence
or caselaw supporting a conclusion that the circumstances present here have led to downward de-
partures in other matters.
Defendants’ generalized objections here are insufficient to overcome the “strong presump-
tion” of reasonableness generated by the lodestar method. See Livingston v. Cavalry Portfolio
Servs., LLC, No. 1:09-CV-384, 2009 WL 4724268, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2009), citing Penn-

sylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). Accordingly, the
Court awards $62,316.50 in attorney fees.
B. Expenses and Costs
Plaintiffs seek $10,208.24 in costs and expenses, broken down as follows:
• $7,155 for Mr. Feher’s expert opinion regarding the reasonableness of their fees;

• $875.31 for travel costs, mileage, hotel accommodations, and other expenses re-
lated to Ms. Kemp’s travel for the hearings in the case; and

• $2,177.93 for expenses related to sending subpoenas to potential witnesses ahead
of the evidentiary hearing.

Plaintiffs support these requests with: (1) an affidavit from Mr. Mitchell, in which he avers
that these expenses were incurred for the reasons stated (ECF No. 75-2, PageID# 713–14); (2)
invoices from the company Veritext for services (ECF No. 75-11); and (3) food, lodging, and
rideshare confirmation emails, and printed electronic driving directions related to the travel of
attorney Lauren Kemp (ECF No. 75-12).
The Court has largely discussed Defendants’ objections to these costs above and need not
repeat its analysis in detail here. The Court has found it reasonable for Plaintiffs’ counsel to have
sent subpoenas to potential witnesses at other companies in this non-solicitation case, and it will
award costs for those subpoenas. See also Integrity Energy, Ltd. v. Hunter, No. 1:18-CV-978, 2021
WL 2808689, at *12 (N.D. Ohio July 6, 2021) (awarding costs for subpoenas issued to obtain
“information [the plaintiff] could not compel from Defendants and for records necessary to piece
together critical information Defendants withheld”). The Court has reviewed the invoices and
awards $2,177.73 in costs.6 The Court has found Mr. Feher’s work and overall fee to be reasonable.
The Court awards $7,155. The Court has found Ms. Kemp’s requested compensation for costs
associated with travel to be unreasonable, and therefore it will not award those costs. Accordingly,

the Court awards $9,332.73 in costs and expenses.
C. Principal Settlement Amount Balance
In their opening motion, Plaintiffs stated that Defendants have paid $33,999.98 pursuant to
the settlement agreement, to date. (ECF No. 75, PageID# 691.) In the reply brief, the plaintiffs
noted that Defendants had made a $3,777.78 payment in January 2026. (ECF No. 78,
PageID# 776.) Plaintiffs therefore report that Defendants owe $30,222.24 on the original settle-
ment balance. (Id.) Defendants do not address that accounting in their opposition brief or by way
of a sur-reply, and they have thus not disputed it.
Plaintiffs state that Defendants also owe an additional $10,000 by virtue of the consent

judgment. (ECF No. 75, PageID# 691; ECF No. 78, PageID# 776.) Defendants—in one sentence
in their opposition brief—seem to now dispute that. (See ECF No. 77, PageID# 769.) Specifically,
Defendants argue: “Because the $10,000.00 liquidated damages clauses only applied to violations
of the Disparagement and/or Disclosure clauses of the agreement, the claimed $10,000.00 penalty
would not apply.” (Id.)
Perhaps Defendants were just pointing out that penalties in other sections of the settlement
agreement would not apply. But to the extent that Defendants are arguing that the additional

6 Invoice number 8597369 was for $386.60, not $386.80 as stated in Mr. Mitchell’s affidavit. (Mitchell Aff.
at 3, ECF No. 75-2, PageID# 713; Invoice, ECF No. 75-11, PageID# 725.) That minor typographical error
is the source of the twenty cent discrepancy between the request and the award.
$10,000 provided for in the consent judgment somehow does not apply, the argument has been
conceded and is waived. Defendants have never raised the argument to date. Indeed, defense coun-
sel explained as follows at the evidentiary hearing:
Your Honor, if there is a violation per the settlement agreement, here’s what
happens: One, my client has to accelerate pay; two, he has to pay $10,000;
three, he has to pay reasonable attorney’s fees.

(Hrg. Tr. at 32.)

Moreover, the Court has already found that the additional $10,000 payment in the consent
judgment applies, and it will not revisit that conclusion in this fee dispute. (See Mem. Opinion and
Order, ECF No. 74, PageID# 684 (“Plaintiffs shall have and recover judgment against Defendants
in the total amount of Sixty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($68,000) minus any payments made pursuant
to the Settlement Agreement and Waiver and Release between the parties plus Ten Thousand Dol-
lars ($10,000.00) plus interest at the statutory rate, court costs and reasonable attorney fees.”)).
Therefore, the Court finds that the remaining principal settlement balance is $40,222.24.
The Court is mindful that Defendants may have made an additional payment in February
2026, or they may have made their March 2026 payment. Thus, Plaintiffs shall file a notice on
or before March 5, 2026, stating whether Defendants have made additional payments under
the settlement agreement and, if so, the amount of the principal balance that is still outstand-
ing. The Court would reduce the principal settlement amount accordingly before promptly render-
ing a final judgment.
D. Interest
The final remaining issue concerns prejudgment interest.7 Plaintiffs request prejudgment
interest beginning on January 27, 2025, at a rate of eight percent per annum, pursuant to Ohio

7 The Court will award postjudgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, also noting that the parties’
consent judgment expressly provides for it. (Consent Judgment, ECF No. 63-1, PageID# 640 (“plus interest
Revised Code §§ 1343.03(A) and 5703.47. Defendants do not address this request in their opposi-
tion brief.
The purpose of prejudgment interest is to make an injured party whole by accounting for a
delay in compensation. Capsa Solutions, LLC v. Concord Healthcare Grp., No. 2:18-cv-594, 2019
WL 4894038, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2019) (citing Osborn v. Griffin, 865 F.3d 417, 458 (6th Cir.

2017)). Courts in the Sixth Circuit have permitted prejudgment interest when a party breaches a
settlement agreement. E.g., Wilson v. Prime Source Healthcare of Ohio, No. 1:16-cv-1298, 2018
WL 1127653, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2018); Pal v. Deliberto, No. 1:23-cv-1233, 2025 WL
904458, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2025).
Where state law claims come before a federal court on supplemental jurisdiction, as they
did here, the award of prejudgment interest rests on state law. Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 333–34 (6th Cir. 2007). Alternatively, where a court exercises federal
question jurisdiction and in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, the court has the
discretion to award prejudgment interest. McPherson v. Suburban Ann Arbor, LLC, 719 F. Supp.3d

759, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (collecting cases).
Ohio Revised Code § 1343.03(A) provides for an award of prejudgment interest “when
money becomes due and payable . . . upon any settlement between parties . . . .” The rate is deter-
mined pursuant to Section 5703.47 of the Ohio Revised Code. Ohio Rev. Code § 1343.03(A). That
section provides that the annual rate is determined annually by the tax commissioner.

at the statutory rate”); see also Caffey v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2002) (postjudg-
ment interest is mandatory). Postjudgment interest is to be calculated in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961(a) (stating that interest “shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal
to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding[] the date of the judgment.”)
Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest, both by operation of Ohio Revised Code
§ 1343.03 and in this Court’s discretion after considering the facts and circumstances of the case,
the equity of withholding prejudgment interest, and the fact that the request is not opposed.
However, the statute and the equities of the case provide for prejudgment interest beginning
“when money becomes due and payable.” Ohio Rev. Code § 1343.03(A). Defendants have not

missed a settlement payment. Therefore, the Court will not begin running interest on January 27,
2025, as Plaintiffs request. Instead, the Court determines that interest should run beginning on the
date of the breach, when Plaintiffs were entitled to enter the consent judgment, accelerating the
payment and causing the entire principal amount to become due and payable.
The Court previously found that Defendants breached the settlement agreement “in and
after March 2025” by failing to maintain a complete communication log. (Mem. Opinion and Or-
der, ECF No. 74, PageID# 682.) Therefore, the Court will use March 18, 2025—the date the set-
tlement agreement was fully executed—as the start date for interest. Prejudgment interest will be
applied only to the principal settlement balance ($40,222.24 less any additional payments made

since the filing of the reply brief).
The statutory interest rate for 2025 was eight percent. Ohio Rev. Code § 5703.47; see also
Ohio Department of Taxation, Annual Certified Interest Rates, https://tax.ohio.gov/researcher/
interest-rates/interest-rates. That rate will apply between March 18, 2025 and December 31, 2025.
Assuming no further payments have been made since the filing of the reply brief, the plaintiffs are
entitled to $2,686.83 for this period.8

8 The Court arrived at this figure this way:
0.08 × $40,222.24 = $3,217.77
305 days ÷ 365 days = 0.835
0.835 × $3,217.77 = $2,686.83.
The statutory interest rate for 2026 is seven percent. That rate will apply between January
1, 2026 to the date of the judgment. See Deliberato, 2025 WL 904458 at *6. Assuming no further
payments have been made since the filing of the reply brief, and assuming that the Court enters its
final judgment on March 6, 2026, the plaintiffs are entitled to $501.16 for this period.9
Pending the plaintiff’s status report and any adjustments necessary to the principal settle-

ment as a result, the Court anticipates awarding prejudgment interest in the total amount of
$3,187.99.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART the motion for attorney fees,
interest, and costs (ECF No. 75.) The Court awards reasonable attorney fees in the amount of
$62,316.50. The Court awards reasonable costs and expenses in the amount of $9,332.73. The
Court finds the remaining principal settlement balance, as of the date of the reply brief (ECF No.
78), to be $40,222.24.
The plaintiffs are ordered to file a notice on or before March 5, 2026, stating whether

the defendants have made additional payments under the settlement agreement and, if so,
the amount of the principal balance that is still outstanding. The Court will adjust the remain-
ing settlement balance accordingly.
The Court awards prejudgment interest on the principal settlement amount, at the statutory
rate. The Court awards postjudgment interest, at the statutory rate, on the entire judgment amount.

See Deliberato, 2025 WL 904458 at *6 n.5. If additional payments were made, the Court will calculate
prejudgment interest on the revised principal settlement amount in the same way.
9 The calculation is:
0.07 × $40,222.24 = $2,815.55
65 days ÷ 365 days = 0.178
0.178 × $2,815.55 = $501.16
The motion is otherwise DENIED. A final judgment entry will follow promptly after the
Court receives the notice regarding additional payments.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2026 /s Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
JENNIFER DOWDELL ARMSTRONG
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11277621. Public record. Not legal advice.