# LOVEDAY SPRINGS v. KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE

> Court of Appeals of Tennessee · March 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11276712

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 17, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
- **Judges:** Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11276712

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that in reviewing a municipal governing body’s zoning decisions, “[t]he court’s inquiry is limited as to whether any rational basis exists for the legislative action and, if the issue is fairly debatable, it must be permitted to stand as valid legislation”

## Opinion text

03/17/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
November 13, 2025 Session

LOVEDAY SPRINGS ET AL. v. KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County
No. 1-219-22 E. Jerome Melson, Judge
___________________________________

No. E2025-00233-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________

In this zoning matter, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent
county and property development company and dismissed the petitioners’ declaratory
judgment action. The petitioners had challenged a sector plan amendment and rezoning as
illegal. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, the trial court specifically found that the
county zoning body maintained the authority under Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101
to impose conditions on the rezoning of the subject property. The petitioners have
appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.
MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Daniel A. Sanders, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Loveday Springs, Dawn
Close, and Margie Grace.

Michael W. Moyers, Knox County Law Director; Garrett P. Swartwood; and Taylor D.
Forrester, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Knox County, Tennessee, and Thunder
Mountain Properties, LLC.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 22, 2022, the petitioners—a homeowners’ association in Knox County,
Tennessee, known as Loveday Springs, and two of its members, Dawn Close and Margie
Grace (collectively, “Petitioners”)—filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Knox
County Circuit Court (“trial court”). They named as respondents Knox County and
Thunder Mountain Properties, LLC (“TMP”). In April 2021, TMP had purchased
approximately 159 acres of real property located at 8802 Sevierville Pike and Dry Hollow
Road in Knox County (“the Property”). As Petitioners described it in their complaint:

The Subject Property forms a horseshoe shape around an industrial area on
Valgro Road originally developed by the Camel Tent Manufacturing
Company in the 1930s. Approximately 64 acres of the Subject Property lying
generally to the north of Valgro Road is comprised of low-lying pastureland
with access to Sevierville Pike. The remaining 95 acres lying generally to
the south of Valgro Road is comprised of steep hillsides and lacks ready
access to any public road.

At the time of TMP’s purchase, the Property was designated a “rural” area under the
Knoxville-Farragut-Knox County Growth Policy Plan (“the Growth Plan”) and as
“agricultural” under both the Knoxville-Knox County General Plan 2033 (“the General
Plan”) and the Knox County Zoning Ordinance (“the Zoning Ordinance”). The Loveday
Springs neighborhood is located across Sevierville Pike from the Property.

In September 2021, TMP had applied to the Knoxville-Knox County Planning
Commission (“the Planning Commission”) requesting a general plan amendment and
rezoning for the 64 acres of pastureland from “agricultural” to “low density residential.”
In November 2021, TMP submitted a revised application requesting the same zoning
change for the other 95 acres of the Property. In December 2021, the Planning Commission
approved a general plan amending the 64-acre parcel to low density residential and the 95-
acre parcel to “rural residential” with approval of rezoning for the entire Property as
“planned residential.” According to the complaint, the Planning Commission’s approval
of the rezoning was subject to the following three conditions:

1. a maximum of 2.5 dwelling units per acre on the 64 acres of
pastureland,

2. a maximum of 1 dwelling unit per acre could be developed on the 95
acres of steep hillside, and

3. a total of 255 units on the total property with development
concentrated on the flatter part of the property.

(Internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted.)

The Knox County Commission (“County Commission”) heard TMP’s request
during two meetings, which were held in February and May of 2022. Several community
members spoke in opposition. On May 23, 2022, the County Commission met in a zoning
session to consider TMP’s sector plan amendment and rezoning request. In a transcript
-2-
incorporated into the trial court’s final judgment, the court set forth the undisputed facts
surrounding what Petitioners alleged to be an unlawful decision made during the May 2022
zoning session:

[O]n the 23rd day of May, 2022, the Knox County Commission heard
arguments for and against the required sector plan . . . the requested sector
plan amendments and rezoning for the subject property.

It is undisputed that various persons, as are reflected in the pages of
the transcript, spoke on behalf of the affected parties, including Mr. Taylor
D. Forrester speaking on behalf of TMP and Daniel A. Sanders speaking on
behalf of certain residents opposed—certain residents in the area of the
subject property opposed to the proposed amendments.

It is also of record in this case, pursuant to the filings made herein,
that during consideration of the resolutions various individuals and
commissioners in addition to Mr. Forrester and Mr. Sanders, as well as Knox
County Deputy Law Director Michael Moyers, also spoke concerning those
requested amendments.

And that it is further of record in this case, as demonstrated by the
transcript and by the associated minutes of the Knox County Commission,
that Commissioner Carson Dailey commented on the residential, commercial
and public development in the area, including such things as a reference to
condominium and apartment developments in the area, continued expansion
of the commercial development at that intersection of Chapman Highway
and Governor John Sevier Highway and other matters.

It is, of course, noted in the minutes that Commissioner Schoonmaker,
as has been mentioned here this morning, moved to amend the zoning
classification for the subject property from agricultural to planned residential
at a density of up to 180 dwelling units on the lower portion of the subject
property and up to 77 dwelling units on the upper portion of the subject
property subject to the condition that the development of the 180 lots be
platted on the lower portion before development could commence on the
platting of the 77 lots on the upper portion of the subject property, and that
the removal of the condition recommended by the planning commission to
allow clustering of the density. That motion was seconded by Commissioner
Dailey and the Knox County Commission approved that motion—original
motion of Commissioner Schoonmaker’s by a vote of eight to three.

-3-
That action, it is urged in this case, is by the petitioners to be viewed
as one that was unlawful or illegal. That is to say not in—not pursuant to
authority given the Knox County Commission.

In their complaint, Petitioners requested a judgment declaring the County
Commission’s decision “illegal, arbitrary, capricious, and void on any grounds available
under law.” They specifically alleged that the County Commission’s decision violated the
General Plan and the Growth Plan and that it constituted illegal rezoning and a
misconstruction of applicable law. Petitioners asserted that TMP “desire[d] to develop a
residential subdivision on the Subject Property and the Petitioners desire[d] to prevent the
development or to limit the allowed population density.”

In August 2022, TMP and Knox County filed separate answers to the complaint,
asserting that Petitioners had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Knox County concomitantly filed the record from the County Commission decision,
including transcripts of the February and May 2022 meetings during which the
Commission had discussed TMP’s application.

On June 21, 2024, Knox County and TMP (collectively, “Respondents”) jointly
filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were “entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law upholding the legislative action of the County Commission.” On October 4,
2024, Petitioners filed a competing motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were
“entitled to judgment as a matter of law” because “there [was] no genuine issue of material
fact concerning whether the Knox County Commission acted illegally when it approved
the rezoning application at issue.” Petitioners specifically argued that the County
Commission did not have the authority to impose conditions on rezoning under Tennessee
Code Annotated § 13-7-101. The parties filed responses to the respective summary
judgment motions and briefed the issue of conditional zoning as had been requested by the
trial court in a scheduling order.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on January 17, 2025, granting
summary judgment in favor of Respondents and denying Petitioners’ summary judgment
motion. The court concluded that the County Commission had not acted illegally,
specifically determining that Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101(a) granted zoning
authority to the County Commission and that § 13-7-101(b) did not operate to disallow
conditional zoning within that authority. The court further concluded that a rational basis
existed for the County Commission’s legislative actions related to rezoning the Property
and amending the sector plan. Petitioners timely appealed.

II. Issue Presented

Petitioners present the following issue, which we have restated as follows:

-4-
Whether the trial court erred by declining to find that the County
Commission exceeded its statutory authority under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 13-7-101 when it conditionally rezoned the Property by
imposing parcel-specific conditions.

III. Standard of Review

The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law; therefore,
our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Rye v. Women’s
Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015); Dick Broad. Co. of
Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Kinsler v. Berkline,
LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tenn. 2010)). As such, this Court must “make a fresh
determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure have been satisfied.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250. As our Supreme Court has
explained concerning the requirements for a movant to prevail on a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56:

[W]hen the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by affirmatively
negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by
demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment
stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. We
reiterate that a moving party seeking summary judgment by attacking the
nonmoving party’s evidence must do more than make a conclusory assertion
that summary judgment is appropriate on this basis. Rather, Tennessee Rule
56.03 requires the moving party to support its motion with “a separate
concise statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends
there is no genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. “Each fact is to
be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph and supported by a specific
citation to the record.” Id. When such a motion is made, any party opposing
summary judgment must file a response to each fact set forth by the movant
in the manner provided in Tennessee Rule 56.03. “[W]hen a motion for
summary judgment is made [and] . . . supported as provided in [Tennessee
Rule 56],” to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party “may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading,” but must respond, and
by affidavits or one of the other means provided in Tennessee Rule 56, “set
forth specific facts” at the summary judgment stage “showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. The nonmoving party “must
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. [v. Zenith Radio Corp.], 475
U.S. [574,] 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 [(1986)]. The nonmoving
party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which
could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. If
-5-
a summary judgment motion is filed before adequate time for discovery has
been provided, the nonmoving party may seek a continuance to engage in
additional discovery as provided in Tennessee Rule 56.07. However, after
adequate time for discovery has been provided, summary judgment should
be granted if the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage
is insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, 56.06. The focus is on the evidence the
nonmoving party comes forward with at the summary judgment stage, not on
hypothetical evidence that theoretically could be adduced, despite the
passage of discovery deadlines, at a future trial.

Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264-65. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, the trial
court must “state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the motion” for
summary judgment, and our Supreme Court has instructed that the trial court must state
these grounds “before it invites or requests the prevailing party to draft a proposed order.”
See Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303, 316 (Tenn. 2014). “Whether the
nonmoving party is a plaintiff or a defendant—and whether or not the nonmoving party
bears the burden of proof at trial on the challenged claim or defense—at the summary
judgment stage, ‘[t]he nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in
the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party.’”
TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 889 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Rye,
477 S.W.3d at 265).

Petitioners have raised an issue focusing on interpretation of Tennessee Code
Annotated § 13-7-101 (West April 16, 2012, to current). In conducting this analysis, we
adhere to the following longstanding principles of statutory construction:

When dealing with statutory interpretation, well-defined precepts apply. Our
primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or
restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ.
Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing legislative
enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and
purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General
Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722
(Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without
complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507
(Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language.
Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006).
It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the broader
statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v.
Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998).
Further, the language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but
“should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts are consistent
-6-
and reasonable.” Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196
(1968). Any interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of
the act repugnant to another” should be avoided. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v.
City of Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1937). We also
must presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments
at the time the legislation passed. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926
(Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613-14 (Tenn. 2009).

IV. Authority of County Commission

Petitioners contend that the trial court erred by finding that the County Commission
acted within its authority under Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 when it imposed
conditional zoning on the Property. Respondents argue that the trial court properly found
that the County Commission was empowered to impose conditional zoning and correctly
determined that a rational basis existed for the Commission’s rezoning decision. Upon
careful review, we determine that the trial court did not err in determining that the County
Commission maintained the authority to conditionally rezone the Property.

Concerning appellate review of zoning decisions, our Supreme Court has explained:

Our county legislative bodies are vested with broad powers to enact
and to amend zoning regulations governing the use of land. T.C.A., §§ 13-
7-101–13-7-105. When a municipal governing body acts under its delegated
police powers either to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance, it acts in a
legislative capacity and the scope of judicial review of such action is quite
restricted. Davidson County v. Rogers, 184 Tenn. 327, 198 S.W.2d 812
(1947); Mobile Home City of Chattanooga v. Hamilton County, supra;
Barret v. Shelby County, Tenn. App., 619 S.W.2d 390 (1981).

“Legislative classification in a zoning law, ordinance or
resolution is valid if any possible reason can be conceived to
justify it.” State ex rel. SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc. v.
Konigsberg, Tenn., 636 S.W.2d 430, 437 (1982).

Fallin v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 656 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tenn. 1983). As the Fallin
Court further explained:

Zoning is a legislative matter, and, as a general proposition, the
exercise of the zoning power should not be subjected to judicial interference
unless clearly necessary. In enacting or amending zoning legislation, the
local authorities are vested with broad discretion and, in cases where the
-7-
validity of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable, the court cannot substitute
its judgment for that of the legislative authority. If there is a rational or
justifiable basis for the enactment and it does not violate any state statute or
positive constitutional guaranty, the wisdom of the zoning regulation is a
matter exclusively for legislative determination.

In accordance with these principles, it has been stated that the courts
should not interfere with the exercise of the zoning power and hold a zoning
enactment invalid, unless the enactment, in whole or in relation to any
particular property, is shown to be clearly arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, or
welfare, or is plainly contrary to the zoning laws.

Id. at 342-43 (quoting 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 338 (1976)). See Keeton v.
City of Gatlinburg, 684 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that in reviewing a
municipal governing body’s zoning decisions, “[t]he court’s inquiry is limited as to
whether any rational basis exists for the legislative action and, if the issue is fairly
debatable, it must be permitted to stand as valid legislation”).

Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 concerns the grant of regulatory powers to
county legislative bodies and provides in pertinent part:

(a)(1) The county legislative body of any county is empowered, in
accordance with the conditions and the procedure specified in this
part, to regulate, in the portions of such county which lie outside of
municipal corporations, the location, height and size of buildings and
other structures, the percentage of lot which may be occupied, the
sizes of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density and
distribution of population, the uses of buildings and structures for
trade, industry, residence, recreation or other purposes, and the uses
of land for trade, industry, residence, recreation, agriculture, forestry,
soil conservation, water supply conservation or other purposes, and
identify areas where there are inadequate or nonexistent publicly or
privately owned and maintained services and facilities when the
planning commission has determined the services are necessary in
order for development to occur. . . .

***

(b) The chief legislative body of any county having a population of not
less than two hundred eighty-seven thousand seven hundred (287,700)
nor greater than two hundred eighty-seven thousand eight hundred
(287,800), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent
-8-
federal census, is further authorized and empowered to rezone
properties conditionally or based upon contract, where the agreed
conditions are designed to ameliorate injuries created by the rezoning
to surrounding property interests or to county interests.

(Emphasis added.) Petitioners attached to their motion for summary judgment federal
census population figures for Tennessee’s counties, beginning with the 1980 census. The
trial court took judicial notice of these figures, and the parties agreed that the population
range set forth in § 13-7-101(b) of 287,700 to 287,800 applies to Hamilton County but does
not apply to Knox County.

It is undisputed that when the County Commission rezoned the Property, it engaged
in conditional zoning by imposing conditions specific to parcels within the Property. This
Court has previously defined conditional zoning in part by differentiating it from contract
zoning:

It is the use of governmental power as a bargaining chip that the [City
of Knoxville v.] Ambrister [263 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1953)] and Haymon [v.
City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)] courts
criticized as the unsavory aspect of contract zoning. When a government
negotiates in this manner it agrees to limit its right and duty to act on behalf
of the public. Rezoning is approved, not based upon the merit of the zone
change request nor because it is in the public interest, but because a deal has
been struck.

On the other hand, the mere unilateral imposition of conditions for
public benefit is quite different. In contract zoning the government entity
sacrifices its authority. In conditional zoning it exercises it. By imposing
conditions under which Homestead’s property could be rezoned,
Chattanooga did not bargain away its authority, but rather exercised it for
public safety reasons.

Citizens for Safety & Clean Air v. City of Clinton, 434 S.W.3d 122, 129 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2013) (quoting Benton v. City of Chattanooga, No. 808, 1988 WL 74608, at *2-3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. July 20, 1988)).

Petitioners argue that because § 13-7-101(b) authorizes contract and conditional
zoning for Hamilton County and any other county that may qualify under the population
range specified, it operates to prohibit contract and conditional zoning for counties with
populations not in that range. Respondents acknowledge that contract zoning has long
been disallowed in Tennessee unless specifically authorized. See Citizens for Safety &
Clean Air, 434 S.W.3d at 129; City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 263 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn.
1953) (“Contracts made for the purpose of unduly controlling or affecting official conduct
-9-
of the exercise of legislative, administrative and judicial functions, are plainly opposed to
public policy.” (quoting Whitley v. White, 140 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tenn. 1940))). However,
Respondents assert that conditional zoning has long been allowed in Tennessee and that
the General Assembly’s inclusion of conditional zoning in § 13-7-101(b) was simply in
furtherance of established law for all Tennessee counties.

The trial court made the following findings regarding the County Commission’s
authority under § 13-7-101 to conditionally zone the Property:

As has been mentioned, it is the contention of the petitioners that the
conditional zoning authority or conditional zoning action undertaken by the
Knox County Commission on the date as specified herein is not lawful and
is, and may be construed as a matter of law, to be illegal. Nevertheless the
petitioners are forced to concede and do readily concede to this court that
under TCA 13-7-101 there is a grant of zoning power statute that generally
does apply to a county legislative body and did so apply to Knox County at
all times material hereto. And, as such, [the] statute does recognize that the
county legislative power is empowered in accordance with the conditions and
the procedures specified in this part to regulate in the portions of such county
which lie outside of municipal corporations many things, that include by
reference to the verbiage of the statute, the location, height and size of
buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot which may be occupied,
the sizes of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density and distribution
of population, the uses of buildings and structures for trade, industry,
residence, recreation or other purposes, and the uses of land for trade . . .
industry, residence, recreation, agriculture, forestry, soil conservation, water
supply conservation or other purposes. And identified areas where there are
inadequate or nonexistent publicly or privately owned and maintained
services and facilities when the planning commission has determined the
services are necessary in order for development to occur.

Reading only that portion of the statute, the court as well as the parties
recognizes that the county legislative body of Knox County is empowered
with a great range and scope of authority as respects regulating the use of
land as in many different ways and varieties within its boundaries.

In respect of this matter, the court concludes that the decisional law
that has been cited reflective of an examination of the statutory language does
not, to the satisfaction of this court, demonstrate that there is any explicit,
judicial recognition that the use of conditional zoning within Tennessee is
disallowed, is illegal and/or is unlawful.

- 10 -
Upon thorough review of § 13-7-101 and other applicable authorities, we agree with the
trial court.

In describing “decisional law,” the trial court specifically referenced this Court’s
decision in O’Dell v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Johnson City, 910 S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995). On appeal, Petitioners take issue with the trial court’s reliance on O’Dell and assert
that the O’Dell decision “should be limited or overruled.” In O’Dell, this Court affirmed
the trial court’s finding that rezoning of the property at issue had not constituted
“impermissible contract zoning.” O’Dell, 910 S.W.2d at 437. Petitioners do not challenge
the holding regarding contract zoning. However, the O’Dell Court quoted the trial court
with approval in finding that conditions imposed by the zoning authority had been
reasonable and were allowed under the law:

[U]nder the authority of the cases mentioned, the Court cannot find any
illegal contract zoning. The City’s imposition of conditions as a requirement
of rezoning were reasonable and were a valid exercise of their police power
for the good of the general public. The conditions imposed were to regulate
traffic, [were] for the safety of the general public and [were] to provide a
buffer zone adjacent to Mountcastle Hills Subdivision. All of these
conditions are reasonable. And they’re reasonable considerations of a zoning
authority.

Id. at 441. We note that in O’Dell, this Court expressly stated that it “concur[red] in [the
trial court’s] findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are made an appendix to this
opinion.” Id. at 437.

O’Dell was decided after the General Assembly amended § 13-7-201 in 1984 to add
subsection (b).1 See Benton v. City of Chattanooga, No. 808, 1988 WL 74608, at *2 (Tenn.
Ct. App. July 20, 1988). The “authority of the cases mentioned” above in O’Dell included
two cases decided before the enactment of subsection (b)—City of Knoxville v. Ambrister,
263 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1953), and Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1973)—and two cases decided afterward—Copeland v. City of Chattanooga
through Bd. of Comm’rs, 866 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), and Benton, 1988
WL 74608.

In Armbrister, our Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination that the
City of Knoxville was not entitled to a judgment declaring that a parcel of land had been

1
Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-201 (West April 16, 2012, to current) is a counterpoint to Tennessee
Code Annotated § 13-7-101 and addresses regulatory powers granted to municipalities. Subsection -201(b)
contains the same substantive language as subsection -101(b) and is applicable to municipalities located
within counties that have the same population range. For this reason, we determine that case law analyzing
§ 13-7-201(b) is applicable to § 13-7-101(b). The General Assembly amended § 13-7-101 to add subsection
(b) in 1985. See 1985 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 44, § 1.
- 11 -
dedicated to the city by the defendant landowners upon determining that the purported
dedication constituted illegal contract zoning. Armbrister, 263 S.W.2d at 530-31. The
Armbrister Court thereby helped to establish that contract zoning is disallowed in
Tennessee but did not address conditional zoning. In Haymon, this Court affirmed the trial
court’s finding that a zoning ordinance was void that had been passed in consideration of
a covenant, also found to be void, between the City of Chattanooga and the plaintiff
apartment complex owners because the covenant constituted contract zoning. Haymon,
513 S.W.2d at 187. However, regarding conditional zoning, the Haymon Court stated:
“Nothing in this opinion is to be construed as holding that a planning commission, without
a covenant, cannot prescribe reasonable conditions for the benefit of the general public.”
Id. at 188 n.1.

This Court decided Benton four years after the 1984 amendment adding subsection
(b) to § 13-7-201. Because Chattanooga is located within Hamilton County, Benton (and
subsequently Copeland, as explained below) involved a municipality that fit within the
population parameters of § 13-7-201(b). The plaintiff in Benton had filed a declaratory
judgment action challenging a city rezoning ordinance and arguing that the ordinance was
illegal because it constituted contract zoning. Benton, 1988 WL 74608, at *1. On this
basis, the Benton plaintiff had challenged the constitutionality of § 13-7-201(b). Id. The
Benton trial court had upheld the ordinance upon finding that it “involve[d] only
conditional zoning.” Id. at *4. For this reason, the trial court had determined that it need
not address the constitutionality of § 13-7-201(b). Id. at *1. This Court affirmed the trial
court:

We hold the chancellor properly construed the facts to involve only
conditional zoning. Section 13-7-201(b) authorizes Chattanooga to engage
in conditional zoning. Since conditional zoning is consistent with Tennessee
law, the constitutionality of the provision need not be reached at this time.
However, as the chancellor duly noted, determination of the constitutionality
of § 13-7-201(b) would be proper in a case where contract zoning has taken
place.

Id. at *4 (emphasis added). In determining that conditional zoning was “consistent with
Tennessee law” and therefore did not raise a constitutionality issue regarding § 13-7-
201(b), the Benton Court cited the holdings in Armbrister and Haymon with approval. Id.
at *3-4 (citing Armbrister, 263 S.W.2d 528; Haymon, 513 S.W.2d 185).

This Court decided Copeland several years later, affirming the trial court’s finding
that the City of Chattanooga’s imposition of a condition (dedication of a right-of-way)
upon the defendant landowners’ rezoning request had been “a proper exercise of
government police power.” Copeland, 866 S.W.2d at 570. The Copeland Court cited
Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-201(b) and stated that the statute “authorizes the City
of Chattanooga to engage in conditional zoning which has been determined consistent with
- 12 -
Tennessee law.” Id. at 567 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Copeland Court
noted that the appellants had not asserted that the issue was “a matter of contract zoning,
requiring a determination of the constitutionality of T.C.A. § 13-7-201(b).” Id. at 567 n.4.
In other words, if the Copeland appellants had challenged the city’s actions on the basis of
contract zoning, the constitutionality of the statute would have been at issue because the
statute allows Hamilton County to engage in contract zoning, and contract zoning had
previously been held to be against public policy. However, the Copeland Court did not
find that the provision for conditional zoning in § 13-7-201(b) required a constitutional
analysis because it was already “consistent with Tennessee law.” Id.

Returning to the trial court’s reliance on O’Dell, Petitioners here argue that the
O’Dell decision was flawed because (1) the O’Dell plaintiff did not directly challenge the
city zoning board’s authority under statute; (2) the O’Dell Court relied on decisions
involving Chattanooga, which was covered by the population parameters of § 13-7-201(b)
when Johnson City was not; (3) the statement in O’Dell regarding conditions imposed by
the city as a valid exercise of police power was “dicta”; and (4) the decision included a
“peculiar caveat” questioning whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge the zoning
decision. We do not find these arguments persuasive and will address each in turn.

First, although the O’Dell plaintiff did not challenge the city’s zoning authority
under the statute, he did challenge the validity of the city’s zoning ordinance, which
required the trial court and this Court to review the statute empowering the city with zoning
authority. Second, as noted above, the O’Dell Court analyzed case law predating the
General Assembly’s addition of § 13-7-201(b), particularly Haymon, 513 S.W.2d at 188
n.1, to establish that conditional zoning was already allowed in Tennessee when subsection
(b) was added to the statute. See O’Dell, 910 S.W.2d at 439. Third, we find the O’Dell
Court’s statement regarding the “imposition of conditions” as “a valid exercise of [the city
zoning body’s] police power” to be integral to the Court’s determination that the
conditional zoning at issue was allowed. See id., 910 S.W.2d at 441. Fourth, contrary to
Petitioners’ argument, we do not find that the question of standing undercut the Court’s
holding in O’Dell; instead, the Court determined that if the zoning at issue had been a
contract, the plaintiff would have been a party to that contract and may have lacked
standing to challenge its validity. See id. at 437. This statement undercut the plaintiff’s
argument, but it did not undercut the Court’s holding. Importantly, O’Dell is a reported
case of this Court with no negative history and with a holding that we determine to be
aligned with Tennessee precedent on conditional zoning. We decline to find the O’Dell
decision “unsound,” as Petitioners’ urge.

Despite the precedent explained above, Petitioners advance the position that because
§ 13-7-101(b) “separately and explicitly confers conditional zoning authority” on counties
meeting the population criteria of 287,700 to 287,800, “such authority is not implicitly
granted under subsection (a)” to other counties. In support, Petitioners rely on the canon
of statutory construction, expressio unis est exclusio alterius, which holds that “the
- 13 -
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” See Northshore Corridor Assoc.
v. Knox Cnty., 633 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Rich v. Tenn. Bd. of
Med. Exam’rs, 350 S.W.3d 919, 927 (Tenn. 2011)). Petitioners assert that the General
Assembly’s use of the phrase, “further authorized and empowered,” in subsection -101(b)
means that any stated authority or power following that phrase—namely, “to rezone
properties conditionally or based upon contract”—is illegal because it is not “implicitly
granted” by subsection -101(a).

In Northshore Corridor, this Court affirmed the trial court’s application of expressio
unis est exclusio alterius to interpretation of a zoning ordinance to hold that “the absence
of public utilities as a permitted use in the PR [planned residential] zone when such were
expressly permitted in other residential zones indicated that public utilities had been
expressly excluded from the PR zone.” Northshore Corridor, 633 S.W.3d at 580. Here,
rather than examining a list of uses prescribed in a zoning ordinance, we are confronted
with the broad authority granted to county legislative bodies by subsection -101(a) to
regulate the uses of land within their purview. Given the longstanding precedent
establishing that conditional zoning is within this authority, we are not persuaded that the
mention of conditional zoning in subsection -101(b) precludes counties not identified by
subsection -101(b) from engaging in conditional zoning.2

Petitioners further argue that the zoning statutory scheme supports their position
that the County Commission exceeded its authority by imposing parcel-specific conditions.
They cite the requirement provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-102 (West June
13, 2008, to current) that “regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings
throughout any such district”; the requirement provided in Tennessee Code Annotated §
13-7-119(a) (West June 1, 2009, to current) that county zoning bodies must compile zoning
ordinances “so as to be able to provide any member of the public with a current zoning
ordinance and map”; and the requirements delineated in Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-
7-105 (West March 8, 2016, to current) for amendment of ordinances. Petitioners argue
that because Respondents imposed conditions on the Property during County Commission
meetings, members of the public would have to search meeting minutes to know what

2
Apparently as an alternative argument, Respondents posit that the General Assembly included conditional
zoning in § 13-7-101(b) because both the conditional and contract zoning allowed by the subsection involve
“agreed conditions,” see Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-101(b), as opposed to the “unilateral imposition of
conditions” by a county that has been held to be consistent with Tennessee law, see Citizens for Safety &
Clean Air, 434 S.W.3d at 129 (quoting Benton, 1988 WL 74608, at *3). In support, Respondents argue that
the “series qualifier canon” operates to apply the entire clause beginning with “where” at the end of § 13-
7-101(b) (“where the agreed conditions are designed to ameliorate injuries created by the rezoning to
surrounding property interests or to county interests”) to both “conditionally” and “based upon contract”
preceding the clause. See READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 147 (Thomson/West
2012) (“When there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a
prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.”). Given that “conditionally” and
“based upon contract” are not nouns or verbs in a series, we do not find this to be a viable application of
the series qualifier canon.
- 14 -
conditions were imposed. Petitioners thereby posit that Respondents’ actions in imposing
parcel-specific conditions and a lack of transparency in imposing the conditions were
against the overall zoning statutory scheme.

Respondents counter that Petitioners have waived any issue regarding whether
Respondents improperly amended the Zoning Ordinance because they failed to raise the
issue at the trial court level. Respondents also posit that the imposition of unilateral
conditions does not equate to amending a zoning ordinance as contemplated by § 13-7-
105. In reply, Petitioners insist that their argument regarding the statutory scheme is all
part of one issue: whether the County Commission exceeded its authority. We note that
Petitioners’ statement of the issue on appeal is specific to the County Commission’s
authority under § 13-7-101 and that Petitioners do not allege that the language of § 13-7-
101 is ambiguous. See In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d at 614 (“It is only when a statute
is ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the
legislation, or other sources.”). Moreover, having determined that the County Commission
maintained the authority under § 13-7-101 to impose conditions when rezoning the
Property, we find Petitioners’ arguments regarding the broader statutory scheme to be
unavailing.

Finally, Petitioners do not argue that the trial court erred by finding that the County
Commission maintained a rational basis for the subject zoning decision. Instead, they
assert that the court erred by applying the rational basis standard of review based on their
contention that the County Commission did not have authority to impose conditions. We
have concluded that the County Commission maintained this authority. As to the rational
basis for the County Commission’s decision, the trial court specifically determined that
“there was an extensive consideration of factors relating to the public welfare that underlay
the decision of the Knox County Commission to approve the rezoning with the
conditions[.]” Upon thorough review of the record, we agree that the County
Commission’s decision to rezone the Property with the conditions imposed was predicated
on a rational basis. See, e.g., Fallin, 656 S.W.2d at 343-44 (“We are unable to conclude
that the legislative classification represented by the amendatory resolution of the Knox
County Board of Commissioners is without any rational basis; we consider that the issue
is fairly debatable and, therefore, that we must permit it to stand as valid legislation.”).

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We remand this
case to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment and collection of costs below. Costs
on appeal are assessed to the appellants, Loveday Springs, Dawn Close, and Margie Grace.

s/Thomas R. Frierson, II______________
THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE
- 15 -

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11276712. Public record. Not legal advice.