# K.I.

> District Court, N.D. New York · March 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11275477

## Case

- **Full name:** K.I. v. Ann Marie T. Sullivan, M.D., Li-Wen Grace Lee, M.D., Carmen Barber, and Tony Trahan
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11275477

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the district court properly took judicial notice of New York Correction Rules and Regulations at motion to dismiss stage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
- noting the "federal test [for quasi-judicial immunity] involves applying the so-called Cleavinger factors"

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________

K.I.,

Plaintiff,
vs. 1:25-CV-00264
(MAD/ML)
ANN MARIE T. SULLIVAN, M.D., et al.,

Defendants.
____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

THE BELLANTONI LAW FIRM, PLLC AMY L. BELLANTONI, ESQ.
2 Overhill Road
Suite 400
Scarsdale, New York 10583
Attorney for Plaintiff

OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE LELA M. GRAY, AAG
ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Counsel for Defendants Ann Marie T. Sullivan,
M.D., Li-Wen Grace Lee, M.D., Carmen Barber,
and Tony Trahan

OFFICE OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEY KAREN FOLSTER LESPERANCE,
James T. Foley U.S. Courthouse AUSA
445 Broadway, Room 218
Albany, New York 12207-2924
Counsel for Defendants Pam Bondi and Kash
Patel

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff K.I. commenced this action on February 27, 2025. See Dkt. No. 1. On April 14,
2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief
for violations of her Second Amendment rights. See Dkt. No. 16. Through her amended
complaint, Plaintiff brings claims against Ann Marie T. Sullivan, M.D., in her official capacity
("Defendant Sullivan"), Li-Wen Grace Lee, M.D, Carmen Barber, and Tony Trahan, in their
individual capacities (collectively, "Panel Member Defendants"), as well as Pam Bondi and Kash
Patel, in their official capacities (collectively, "United States Defendants"). See id. 1
Broadly speaking, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unlawfully applied provisions of the

Mental Hygiene Law and federal law to permanently disarm her, based on a temporary mental
health-related hospitalization in 2019. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants violated her
constitutional rights by denying her application to be removed from the National Instant Criminal
Background Check System ("NICS") reporting database ("NICS database") and that Panel
Member Defendants violated her constitutional rights by denying her application for a certificate
of relief from disabilities relating to firearms ("certificate of relief").
On April 28, 2025, and June 27, 2025, respectively, State Defendants and United States
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. Nos. 19, 30. For the reasons that follow, the

motions to dismiss are granted.
II. BACKGROUND
The Court will begin with a discussion of the relevant statutory and regulatory background
before discussing Plaintiff's claims related thereto.

1 On September 24, 2025, the Court so-ordered Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of the claims
asserted against Defendant Rossana Rosado, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(i). Thus, Defendant Rosado is no longer a party to this action.
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
Federal law prohibits certain individuals from buying, owning, or possessing a firearm,
see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and prohibits dealers from selling firearms to such individuals, see 18
U.S.C. § 922(d). "The Gun Control Act of 1968 created a number of provisions designed 'to deny
access to guns and ammunition to . . . defined special risk groups.'" Phelps v. Bosco, 711 Fed.
Appx. 63, 64 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (quoting Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and
Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. Legal Stud. 133, 152 (1975)). "Among those
'special risk groups' who are not allowed to buy guns and to whom dealers are not allowed sell

guns are those who 'ha[ve] been committed to any mental institution.'" Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(4)).
Indeed, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), it is unlawful for any person "who has been
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution" to possess or
receive firearms or ammunition. Federal regulations define "committed to a mental institution"
as:
A formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court,
board, commission, or other lawful authority. The term includes a
commitment to a mental institution involuntarily. The term
includes commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness. It
also includes commitments for other reasons, such as for drug use.
The term does not include a person in a mental institution for
observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.

27 C.F.R. § 478.11.
"In 1993, to better enable enforcement of its gun control laws, Congress enacted the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act ('Brady Act'), which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)."
Susman v. Sullivan, 2025 WL 575515, *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2025) (citing Robinson v. Sessions,
721 Fed. Appx. 20, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order)). "The Brady Act 'require[d] the
Attorney General to establish a national instant background[ ]check system by November 30,
1998.'" Id. (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997)). "The result was NICS,
which refers to the system managed by the FBI . . . that provides information 'on whether receipt
of a firearm by a [particular person] . . . would violate [f]ederal or state law.'" Id. (quoting 28
C.F.R. § 25.2) (other citation omitted).
"While NICS is a creation of the federal government, it operates with assistance from the
states. Indeed, . . . the NICS [database] includes records from both federal and state agencies."
Id. at *5 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 25.2). "In 2007, Congress passed the NICS Improvement

Amendments Act, which aimed to make the federal background check system more
comprehensive, including by providing grants to assist states in submitting all relevant records to
NICS." Id. *5 (citing NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-180, 122 Stat.
2559) (footnote omitted).
"In response to the NICS Improvement Amendments Act, 'New York State law was
amended to allow relevant mental health records to be made accessible to NICS.'" Id. (quoting
Montgomery v. Cuomo, 291 F. Supp. 3d 303, 316 (W.D.N.Y. 2018)). New York's record-sharing
statutory provision provides, in relevant part, that:
The commissioner [of the Office of Mental Health ("OMH")], in
cooperation with other applicable state agencies, shall collect, retain
or modify data or records, and shall transmit such data or records:

(i) to the division of criminal justice services, or to the criminal
justice information services division of the federal bureau of
investigation, for the purposes of responding to queries to the
[NICS database] regarding attempts to purchase or otherwise take
possession of firearms as defined in 18 USC 921(a)(3), in
accordance with applicable federal laws or regulations, or

(ii) to the division of criminal justice services, which may re-
disclose such data and records . . . for determining whether a person
is no longer permitted under federal or state law to possess a
firearm. Such records . . . shall include only names and other non-
clinical identifying information of persons who have been
involuntarily committed to a hospital pursuant to article nine of this
chapter . . . .

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 7.09(j)(1) (emphasis added).
The New York Mental Hygiene Law ("MHL" or "Mental Hygiene Law") defines
"hospital" as, among other things, "the in-patient services of a psychiatric center under the
jurisdiction of [OMH]," "a psychiatric in-patient facility maintained by a political subdivision of
the state," "a ward, wing, unit, or other part of a hospital . . . operated as a part of such hospital for
the purpose of providing services for the mentally ill," "or other facility providing in-patient care
or treatment of the mentally ill . . . ." N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 1.03(10). And OMH regulations
define "committed to a mental institution" as:
a formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court,
board, commission, or other lawful authority. Such term includes a
commitment to a mental institution involuntarily; commitment for
mental defectiveness or mental illness; and commitments for other
reasons, such as for drug use, provided, however, that such term
does not include a person in a mental institution for observation or a
voluntary admission to a mental institution. For purposes of this
Part, committed to a mental institution shall include persons who
have been involuntarily committed or confined pursuant to article 9
or 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law . . . .

14 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs ("N.Y.C.R.R.") § 543.4.
Mental Hygiene Law § 9.392 ("MHL § 9.39") permits, for a period of fifteen days, the
involuntary admission to a hospital with qualifying mental-health services any person with "a
mental illness for which immediate observation, care, and treatment in a hospital is appropriate

2 MHL § 9.39 is a section of article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law, which is referenced in N.Y.
Mental Hyg. Law § 7.09(j)(1) and 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 543.4.
and which is likely to result in serious harm to [herself] or others." N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §
9.39(a). "Like[ly] to result in serious harm" means, in relevant part:
1. a substantial risk of physical harm to [herself] as manifested by
threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other
conduct demonstrating that [she] is dangerous to [herself], or

2. a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested
by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed
in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.

Id. Involuntary admission under MHL § 9.39 is permitted "only if a staff physician of the hospital
upon examination of such person finds that such person qualifies under the requirements of this
section." Id. And to retain such person for longer than forty-eight hours, the first physician's
finding must be confirmed by a second physician "who shall be a member of the psychiatric staff
of the hospital." Id.
As required by the NICS Improvement Amendments Act, New York adopted MHL §
7.09(j)(2), which "sets forth a process for removing a name from the NICS list by seeking a
certificate of relief[.]" Houston v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep't, 2020 WL 7643132, *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 23, 2020). A certificate of relief may be granted where the Commissioner of OMH or her
designee(s) determine that a "person's record and reputation are such that such person will not be
likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and where the granting of the relief would not
be contrary to public safety." N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 7.09(j)(2); see N.Y.C.R.R. § 543.5.
If the application for a certificate of relief is granted, the psychiatric commitment "is
deemed not to have occurred" for the purpose of the federal law disarmament. 34 U.S.C. §
40915(b). And if the application is denied, the applicant can "file a petition with the State court
of appropriate jurisdiction for a de novo judicial review of the denial." Id. § 40915(a)(3). In New
York, the de novo judicial review of a denial of a certificate of relief can be accomplished through
an Article 78 proceeding. See D.B. v. Sullivan, No. 1:22-CV-0282, 2025 WL 1033883, *10
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2025), R&R adopted, 2025 WL 864043 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2025) (citing
Houston, 2020 WL 7643132, at *3) (footnote omitted). "Further, an aggrieved individual can
resubmit a renewed request for a certificate of relief . . . related to firearms one year after the
denial of a prior request." Id.
B. Allegations in the Amended Complaint
The following recitation of facts is drawn from the amended complaint; these facts are
presumed true at this juncture.3 Plaintiff is a United States citizen and resident of Ulster County,

New York. See Dkt. No. 16 at ¶ 19. In May 2019, Plaintiff visited a hospital emergency room on
two occasions for panic attacks and anxiety. See id. at ¶¶ 140, 143, 145. On May 14, 2019,
Plaintiff was hospitalized for "inpatient stabilization" due to a diagnosis of "Psychiatric
Diagnosis: Depressive disorder, atypical[.]" Id. at ¶¶ 143-149. Plaintiff's medical records
indicated, among other things, that "when her panic attacks occurred today[,] she began having
thoughts of self[-]harm." Id. ¶ 149. Nevertheless, an emergency room attending physician noted
that Plaintiff did not represent a danger to herself or others but that Plaintiff did require inpatient
stabilization. See id. ¶ 146. Plaintiff was hospitalized pursuant to MHL § 9.39. See id. at ¶ 83.
On May 17, 2019, after being committed to the hospital for three days, Plaintiff was

discharged. See id. at ¶ 150. Following this hospitalization, OMH reported plaintiff to NICS as a
person "committed to a mental facility" pursuant to MHL § 7.09(j). Id. at ¶ 151. After Plaintiff

3 The Court does not, however, consider the myriad of legal conclusions contained in the
amended complaint. See Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006)
("'[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not
suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss'") (quoting Smith v. Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Plan, 291 F.3d
236, 240 (2d. Cir. 2002)).
learned that she had been reported to NICS as a person "committed to a mental facility," she
applied to the Office of NICS Appeals ("ONA") for a certificate of relief. Id. at ¶¶ 151-52.
Plaintiff's medical and hospital records were forwarded to the ONA, along with her
application for a certificate of relief. See id. at ¶¶ 153-54. Plaintiff also sent a follow-up letter to
the ONA Panel Members on March 13, 2023. See id. at ¶ 157. On June 21, 2023, the Panel
Members issued a written denial of Plaintiffs' application. See id. at ¶ 166.
In the present matter, Plaintiff does not challenge the constitutionality of involuntary
commitments under MHL § 9.39. See generally, id. Rather, Plaintiff requests declaratory

judgments that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) violates the Second Amendment as applied to MHL § 9.39
admissions and as applied to her, and that MHL § 7.09(j) violates the Second Amendment as
applied to MHL § 9.39 admissions and as applied to her. See id. at 29. Plaintiff also seeks orders
enjoining Defendants Bondi and Patel from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) against individuals
based solely on MHL § 9.39 admissions, including Plaintiff. See id. Plaintiff further requests
orders directing Defendants Bondi and Patel to remove her 2019 hospital admission and all
disqualifying information from NICS and CJIS, and directing Defendant Sullivan to take all steps
necessary to remove Plaintiff's information from the OMH and DCJS databases, NICS, and CJIS
related to Plaintiff’s 2019 hospital admission as well as the personal identifying information of all

individuals reported to NICS and/or CJIS based solely on a MHL § 9.39 admission. See id. at 29-
30. Finally, Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment that 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 543.5 is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to her. See id. at 30.
To achieve this relief, Plaintiff brings six causes of action for violation of the Second
Amendment, pursuant to § 1983: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to brief,
emergency admissions like those under MHL § 9.39; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional
as applied to Plaintiff; (3) MHL § 7.09(j) is overbroad in violation of the Second Amendment as
applied to MHL § 9.39 admissions; (4) MHL § 7.09(j) violates the Second Amendment as applied
to Plaintiff; (5) 14 NYCRR § 543.5 violates the Second Amendment facially and as applied to
Plaintiff; and (6) Panel Member Defendants violated Plaintiff's Second Amendment rights. See
id. at ¶¶ 180-91 The crux of Plaintiff's claims is that MHL § 709(j) violates the Second
Amendment to the extent it requires reporting MHL § 9.39 admissions to NICS and 18 U.S.C.
922(g)(4) violates the Second Amendment to the extent it does not exclude admissions under
MHL § 9.39 from its definition of persons "committed to a mental institution."

Although not made explicitly clear in Plaintiff's attorney-drafted amended complaint, the
Court reads the first and second causes of action to be brought against United States Defendants,
the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action to be brought against Defendant Sullivan, and the sixth
cause of action to be brought against Panel Member Defendants.
C. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
State Defendants and United States Defendants seek dismissal of the amended complaint.
See Dkt. Nos. 19, 30. State Defendants argue: (1) Plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of
action should be dismissed for lack of standing; (2) Defendant Sullivan is entitled to sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; (3) Defendant Sullivan and Panel Member Defendants

are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity; and (4) Defendant Sullivan and Panel Member Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's claims for money damages. See Dkt. No. 19-2
at 14-28. United States Defendants contend that: (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's claims because she failed to exhaust her state law remedies; and (2) Plaintiff's
Second Amendment challenge to New York's implementation of federal requirements for firearms
restrictions on persons who have been committed for mental health issues fails as a matter of law.
See Dkt. No. 30-1 at 7-22.
Upon review of United States Defendants' submissions, the Court observed that, although
ripeness was not explicitly mentioned, "United States Defendants implicitly argue that Plaintiff's
claims are subject to dismissal on ripeness grounds because Plaintiff has failed to bring an Article
78 proceeding for review of the denial of her application for a certificate of relief from disability
related to firearms possession." Dkt. No. 39. Accordingly, the Court ordered supplemental
briefing on the issue of ripeness. See id. United States Defendants submitted a supplemental

memorandum of law. See Dkt. No. 40. Plaintiff did not file a response thereto.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
"'A court faced with a motion to dismiss pursuant to both Rules 12 (b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
must decide the jurisdictional question first because a disposition of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a
decision on the merits and, therefore, an exercise of jurisdiction.'" Dutrow v. N.Y. State Gaming
Comm'n, No. 13-CV-996, 2014 WL 11370355, *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2014), aff'd, 607 Fed.
Appx. 56 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Magee v. Nassau Cnty. Med. Ctr., 27 F. Supp. 2d 154, 158
(E.D.N.Y. 1998)); see also Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S.

422, 430-31 (2007) ("[A] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first
determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit ([i.e.,] subject-matter
jurisdiction)") (citation omitted). "A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, a "[p]laintiff[ ] bear[s] the burden of
'showing by a preponderance of the evidence that subject matter jurisdiction exists.'" APWU v.
Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550, 554 (2d
Cir. 2003)). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court "must accept as true
all material factual allegations in the complaint, but [is] not to draw inferences from the complaint
favorable to plaintiffs." J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the party's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir.
2007) (citation omitted). In considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-
pleaded facts in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSI
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This
presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citation omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the
claim," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled
to relief.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (citation omitted). Under this

standard, the pleading's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the
speculative level," see id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are "plausible on
[their] face," id. at 570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of the
'entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, "when the allegations
in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 558, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [her] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible, the [ ] complaint must be dismissed[,]" id. at 570.
B. Claims Against Defendant Sullivan—Article III Standing
"Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'" SM Kids, LLC v. Google LLC, 963 F.3d 206, 211
(2d Cir. 2020) (citing Dhinsa v. Krueger, 917 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2019)). "The doctrine of

standing gives meaning to these constitutional limits by 'identify[ing] those disputes which are
appropriately resolved through the judicial process.'" Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573
U.S. 149, 157 (2014) (citation and footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court has "established that the 'irreducible constitutional minimum' of
standing consists of three elements." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (quoting
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). "The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
"The traceability requirements for Article III standing means that 'the plaintiff must

demonstrate a causal nexus between the defendant's conduct and the injury.'" Chevron Corp. v.
Donzinger, 833 F.3d 74, 121 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). However, the causal nexus that
must be demonstrated is something "lower than that of proximate cause." Rothstein v. UBS AG,
708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013). "Such a nexus is most easily shown if there is a direct
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant with respect to the conduct at issue." Id. But,
"an 'indirect[ ]' relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct does not necessarily
mean that the plaintiff lacks standing, although it may make the showing required 'substantially
more difficult.'" Susman, 2025 WL 575515, at *7 (quoting Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 91).
"The third element, called 'redressability,' refers to 'a non-speculative likelihood that the
injury can be remedied by the requested relief.'" Id. at *8 (quoting W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co.,
LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 107 (2d Cir. 2008)). "There is no redressability
where such depends on an independent actor who retains 'broad and legitimate discretion [that]
the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.'" Neary v. Weichert, 489 F. Supp. 3d 55,
67 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989)).

"As with any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, each element
of standing must be supported 'with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive
stages of the litigation.'" Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc., 126 F.4th 109, 119 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561)). "At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting
from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Elias Bochner,
287 7th Ave. Realty LLC v. City of New York, 118 F.4th 505, 518-19 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
State Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her third, fourth, and fifth

causes of action because her alleged injuries are not traceable to State Defendants' conduct and
are not redressable through the injunctive relief requested in the amended complaint. See Dkt.
No. 19-2 at 14-17. State Defendants do not contest the first element of standing—i.e., whether
Plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact—therefore, only traceability and redressability are relevant
to the Court's analysis herein. Specifically, as for traceability, State Defendants argue that neither
MHL § 7.09(j) nor 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 543.5 bar individuals from purchasing or possessing a
firearm because MHL § 7.09(j) is a reporting statute that authorizes the transfer of records to
NICS and 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 543.5 "merely reiterates that directive and authorizes the
establishment of the required 'certificate of relief from disabilities' process for persons whose
records were submitted to the NICS system." Id. at 16. State Defendants contend, 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(4)—a federal statute not enforced by State Defendants—is the statute inflicting Plaintiff's
injury. See id. at 16-17.
And, as for redressability, State Defendants argue that, even if this Court issued an
injunction prohibiting the transmission of Plaintiff's MHL § 9.39 admission to NICS, "(1)

Plaintiff would still be prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) from possessing or purchasing a firearm,
(2) Plaintiff's MHL § 9.39 admission would still be a 'commitment to a mental institution' under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and (3) a federal prosecutor could therefore still prosecute Plaintiff for
purchasing or possessing a firearm." Id. at 17 (citing Susman, 2025 WL 575515, at *11).
In response, Plaintiff states that her "position . . . is that emergency admissions under §
9.39 do not fall within the scope of § 922(g)(4) and that the State is falsely reporting people to
NICS." Dkt. No. 22 at 12 (emphasis in original). Further, Plaintiff contends that if the Court
determines MHL § 9.39 admissions do fall within § 922(g)(4), "the federal government must
defend its regulations from constitutional scrutiny under Bruen, as Plaintiff contends that §

922(g)(4) as applied to [MHL] § 9.39 admissions violates the Second Amendment." Id.
As an initial matter, New York State courts "have repeatedly held that commitments under
[MHL §] 9.39 are involuntary as a matter of law." Susman, 2025 WL 575515, at *11 (collecting
cases). As such, "the Second Circuit already has found that a commitment under [MHL §] 9.39 is
an involuntary commitment under [§] 922(g)(4) and that such a commitment disqualifies an
individual from purchasing a gun under federal law." Id. (citing Phelps, 711 Fed. Appx. at 64).4
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has also rejected the argument that a commitment in a New York
hospital pursuant to MHL § 9.39 does not constitute a commitment under § 922(g)(4). See
Escamilla v. United States, 62 F.4th 367, 374 (7th Cir. 2023).
Plaintiff's citation to decisions from other Circuits interpreting hospitalizations pursuant to
different state law does not compel this Court to disregard the Second Circuit's Phelps decision,
which directly addresses the intersection of MHL § 9.39 and § 922(g)(4). See Dkt. No. 22 at 12-
14. Indeed, in Phelps, the Second Circuit relied heavily upon United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29

(2d Cir. 1994)—a case with precedential effect. In Waters, the Second Circuit held that an
"involuntary admission" under MHL § 9.27 "constitute[d] a 'commitment' within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)." Waters, 23 F.3d at 36. In so finding, the Circuit rejected the defendant's
argument that because he was hospitalized under MHL § 9.27 without "any formal judicial
'commitment' or adjudication of mental illness," he could not be convicted of violating §
922(g)(4). Id. at 34. Although the present case involves a hospitalization under MHL § 9.39, not
MHL § 9.27, in Phelps the Second Circuit determined that "Waters provides all the guidance we
need" in interpreting whether an involuntary hospitalization under MHL § 9.39 qualifies as a
commitment under § 922(g)(4). Phelps, 711 Fed. Appx. at 64-65.5 Therefore, Plaintiff's

4 As the Western District observed in Susman, "[a]lthough Phelps is a non-precedential summary
order, the parties do not cite—nor has this Court found—any other Second Circuit decisions
directly on point." Susman, 2025 WL 575515, at *11 n.16. This remains true at the present time.

5 Plaintiff also argues that MHL § 9.39 admissions are merely for observation and "admissions
for observation and evaluation do not fall within the scope of § 922(g)(4)." Dkt. No. 22 at 10
(citing 27 C.F.R. § 478.11) (emphasis in original). Albeit, 27 C.F.R. § 478.11—which defines
"committed to a mental institution for purposes of § 922(g)(4)—states that "committed to a
mental institution . . . does not include a person in a mental institution for observation or a
v oluntary admission to a mental institution." However, Plaintiff's interpretation of MHL § 9.39
disregards the statute's plain text; the statute permits the involuntary commitment of persons
overarching position, that her § 9.39 admission was "falsely" reported to NICS because it does not
qualify as an involuntary commitment under § 922(g)(4), does not persuade the Court.
Plaintiff further distinguishes Phelps, arguing that the decision pre-dates the Supreme
Court's Bruen decision, and did not involve a constitutional challenge. Dkt. No. 22 at 15. This is
true; the plaintiff in Phelps "did not raise a constitutional challenge to [New York State officials']
conduct on appeal." Phelps, 711 Fed. Appx. at 65. And the Second Circuit noted that "[s]uch a
[constitutional] challenge would present complex issues, whether under the Second Amendment
or the Due Process Clause." Id. However, as the Western District observed in Susman, "none of

this makes [Plaintiff's] injury any more 'traceable' to [Defendant] Sullivan." Susman, 2025 WL
575515, at *12 (discussing similar arguments related to Phelps).
Although Susman is not directly apposite to the present case (as here Plaintiff has also
sued federal actors and the present matter involves a motion to dismiss instead of a motion for
preliminary injunction), the Court finds Susman to be instructive on the issue of standing. Indeed,
the Court finds Plaintiff's challenges to MHL § 7.09(j) and 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 543.5 suffer from the
same defects as those in Susman.
As a matter of law, the statute inflicting Plaintiff's alleged injury is § 922(g)(4)—which
Plaintiff challenges in her first and second causes of action. See Dkt. No. 16 at ¶¶ 180-183.

Neither MHL § 7.09(j) nor 14 NYCRR § 543.5 substantively bar any individual from purchasing
or possessing a firearm. As noted, § 922(g)(4) is a criminal statute that prohibits a person "who

"alleged to have a mental illness for which immediate observation, care, and treatment in a
hospital is appropriate" and can be employed only where the alleged mental illness "is likely to
result in serious harm" to the mentally ill person or to others. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.39
(emphasis added). Thus, it does not appear that "observation" is the only objective accomplished
by a MHL § 9.39 admission. The Court need not, and does not, venture to define this statutory
language, but merely points this out as potential additional support for the conclusion that MHL §
9.39 admissions qualify as commitments under § 922(g)(4).
has been committed to a mental institution" from "receiv[ing] any firearm or ammunition which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
As State Defendants point out, Plaintiff essentially argues that "in the absence of state
reporting, the federal government would never know that she is disqualified under federal law
from possessing or owning a firearm." Dkt. No. 26 at 6 (citing Dkt. No. 22 at 16) (emphasis in
original). But, regardless of whether the State reported Plaintiff's MHL § 9.39 commitment to
NICS, Plaintiff is prohibited from possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(4). See Susman, 2025 WL
575515, at *10 ("OMH's report is not even a but-for cause of [the plaintiff's] possession of

firearms being illegal . . . . [MHL §] 7.09(j) is only a reporting statute that authorizes the transfer
of records to NICS, it has no effect on what is actually illegal—as opposed to what is flagged as
being illegal. Put still another way, NICS is a tool designed to flag unlawful transactions and thus
to 'prevent guns from falling into the wrong hands. But the mere fact that someone has passed a
NICS background check does not mean that the person's possession of a weapon is, in fact, legal")
(quoting Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 172 (2014)). As such, Plaintiff's injury is not
fairly traceable to Defendant Sullivan because she does not enforce the statute that actually causes
the alleged injury. See id. at *7 ("[C]ourts have frequently found that an injury was not 'fairly
traceable' to the conduct of a defendant who did not enforce the statute causing the alleged

injury") (collecting cases).
Further, under federal law Plaintiff would be compelled to disclose her involuntary
commitment via a Firearms Transaction Record prior to taking possession of a firearm. See id. at
*4 ("Each 'prospective customer[ also] must complete . . . the [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives] Form 4473, which elicits personal information and propounds
questions to certify that the customer is qualified to possess a firearm under the enumerated Brady
Act factors'") (quoting Robinson, 721 Fed. Appx. at 22). In question 21(g) of the Firearms
Transaction Record (Form 4473) an applicant must certify whether they have been committed to a
mental institution. See U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives Form 4473 (5300.9) (revised August 2023), https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/4473-
part-1-firearmstransaction-record-over-counter-atf-form-53009/download (last accessed Jan. 20,
2026). Form 4473 states that any person who answers "yes" to question 21(g) is "prohibited from
receiving, possessing, or purchasing a firearm." Id.
Plaintiff's bald assertion, with no citation to legal authority, that the New York State

Legislature "decided which events to codify as firearms disqualifiers under MHL § 7.09(j)—and
the list includes temporary and brief hospital admissions under [MHL] § 9.39" does not alter the
Court's conclusion. Dkt. No. 22 at 12. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 922, which disarms persons
"committed to any mental institution." 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4), (g)(4). And federal regulations
give meaning to the term "committed to a mental institution," defining it as including involuntary
commitments by a lawful authority. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. The New York State Legislature
does not define who is prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law.
Indeed, MHL § 7.09(j) and 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 543 do not themselves disarm persons
involuntary committed. As the court observed in Susman, MHL § 790(j) "is a reporting statute;

by its own terms, it imposes no criminal penalties [or] proscriptions . . . [and] it simply authorizes
the transfer of records to NICS." Susman, 2025 WL 575515, at *9 (citing N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law
§ 7.09(j)(1)). "And rule 543 merely reiterates that directive." Id. (citing 14 N.Y.C.R.R. §
543.1(c)). As such, "neither [§] 7.09(j) nor rule 543 bar[] anyone from purchasing or possessing a
weapon. To argue otherwise is to confuse the whistleblower with the prosecutor, the person who
calls in a tip with the arresting officer." Id.
Stated another way, MHL § 7.09(j) and 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 543 merely regulate the
transmittal of records "in accordance with [the] applicable federal laws or regulations" and
provide a process for lifting the prohibition on gun possession by formerly committed persons
through an application for certificate of relief. N.Y. Mental Hyg. L. § 7.09(j); see 14 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 543.1 et seq. State Defendants are not free to change what Congress defined as "committed to a
mental institution." As the court aptly stated in Susman:
Federal law provides that if a state grants 'an application for relief'
under a certificate of relief from disability program 'with respect to
an adjudication or a commitment to a mental institution . . . the
adjudication or commitment, as the case may be, is deemed not to
have occurred for purposes of subsections (d)(4) and (g)(4) of
section 922 of Title 18. In other words, if relief is granted through
this state process—which [the plaintiff] thus far has declined to
pursue—then federal law provides that [§] 922(g)(4) no longer
applies. But the state has no free-floating power to otherwise
determine the correct interpretation of [§] 922(g)(4), much less how
it will be enforced.

See Susman, 2025 WL 575515, at *12 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 40915).
In sum, § 922(g)(4) would continue to disarm Plaintiff even if this Court enjoined MHL §
7.09(j) and 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 543.5 in the manner requested in the third, fourth, and fifth causes of
action. For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff's injury is not traceable to Defendant Sullivan
and her injury is not redressable through these causes of action. See Susman, 2025 WL 575515,
at *13 ("Regardless of what the Court orders OMH to do, [the plaintiff] will not be able to
purchase and possess a firearm legally absent some action by the federal government or a change
to the interpretation of federal law in this [C]ircuit"). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against
Defendant Sullivan are dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing.
C. Claim Against Panel Member Defendants—Quasi-Judicial Immunity
State Defendants argue that Panel Member Defendants and Defendant Sullivan are entitled
to quasi-judicial immunity because they perform functions closely associated with the judicial
process. See Dkt. No. 19-2 at 20-23. Plaintiff contends that State Defendants are not entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity because "they have no connection to the judicial process." Dkt. No. 22 at
28.
For purposes of evaluating quasi-judicial immunity, State Defendants request that the
Court take judicial notice of 14 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 543.1-543.6, which are the regulations that
establish the certificate of relief from disabilities process. See Dkt. No. 19-2 at 22. "Courts may

take judicial notice of rules or regulations governing certain proceedings to determine whether
they are quasi-judicial in nature." Richey, 2025 WL 1836492, at *13 (taking notice of 14
N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 543.1-543.6); see D.B., 2025 WL 1033883, at *9 (same). Accordingly, the Court
takes judicial notice of 14 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 543.1-543.6. See Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723,
726 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that the district court properly took judicial notice of New York
Correction Rules and Regulations at motion to dismiss stage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action).
Generally, courts agree that issues of absolute immunity are properly considered under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Wang v. Delphin-Rittmon, 664 F. Supp. 3d 205, 218 (D. Conn. 2023).
"Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity are both absolute immunities." Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72,

81 (2d Cir. 2009), certified question answered, 304 Conn. 234 (2012) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985)). "[F]ederal law on quasi-judicial immunity applies to state officials
sued in federal court on federal claims." Id.; see Kuck v. Danaher, 822 F. Supp. 2d 109, 147 (D.
Conn Sept. 29, 2011) (observing "quasi-judicial immunity should only extend to claims against
defendants sued in their individual and not official capacities") (citation omitted). Quasi-judicial
immunity entitles the holder "to absolute immunity for acts taken pursuant to [his or her] office."
Finn v. Anderson, 592 Fed. Appx. 16, 18-19 (2d. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
"[O]fficials acting in a judicial capacity are entitled to absolute immunity against § 1983
actions, and this immunity acts as a complete shield to claims for money damages." Montero v.
Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999); see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) ("Like other
forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate
assessment of damages") (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). This absolute immunity "extends to
administrative officials performing functions closely associated with the judicial process because

the role of the 'hearing examiner or administrative law judge . . . is functionally comparable to
that of a judge.'" Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)) (internal quotation
omitted). Absolute "judicial immunity is conferred in order to [e]nsure 'that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'" Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir.
2009) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871)).
Additionally, in a § 1983 action "brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To determine whether quasi-judicial immunity applies, courts consider six factors: (i) "the
need to assure that the individual can perform [his or her] functions without harassment or
intimidation;" (ii) "the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as
a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct;" (iii) "insulation from political influence;" (iv)
"the importance of precedent;" (v) "the adversary nature of the process;" and (vi) "the
correctability of error on appeal." Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985) (citing Butz,
438 U.S. at 512); see Gross, 585 F.3d at 80 (noting the "federal test [for quasi-judicial immunity]
involves applying the so-called Cleavinger factors"). The "immunity analysis is 'functional' and
scrutinizes the actual responsibilities of the government official in question in light of the six
factors." Tulloch v. Coughlin, 50 F.3d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
However, the six factors above are "just a few of the many checks on malicious action by
judges." Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (footnote omitted). Ultimately, to ascertain whether an official is
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, courts take "a functional approach and look to the particular
acts or responsibilities that the official performed." King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287-88 (2d

Cir. 1999).
To accomplish this functional approach analysis, courts must conduct "'[s]ome factual
inquiry' to determine if the duties of the defendants were judicial or prosecutorial, which entitles
them to absolute immunity, or administrative, which may entitle them to qualified immunity." Id.
at 288 (quoting Stewart v. Lattanzi, 832 F.2d 12, 13 (2d Cir.1987)). For instance, "a parole board
official is absolutely immune from liability for damages when he 'decide[s] to grant, deny, or
revoke parole,' because this task is functionally comparable to that of a judge." Scotto v. Almenas,
143 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir.
1981)).

After taking judicial notice of 14 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 543.1-543.6 and applying the requisite
factors, a judge in this District recently found that Li-Wen Grace Lee, M.D., Carmen Barber,
Tony Trahan were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in their function as Panel Members of the
ONA. See Richey, 2025 WL 1836492, at *14-16. In the present matter, after careful
consideration, the Court comes to the same conclusion: all six factors, as well as the functional
approach, weigh in favor of granting Panel Member Defendants absolute immunity.6
As for Defendant Sullivan, there is nothing the amended complaint, the regulations, nor
the parties' briefing that suggests she acted in a manner similar to Panel Member Defendants.
Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Sullivan was on the panel that considered her
application for a certificate of relief nor that she personally participated in the denial of her
application. Moreover, Defendant Sullivan is sued in her official capacity only. See Kuck, 822 F.
Supp. 2d at 147. As such, Defendant Sullivan is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. See

Richey, 2025 WL 1836492, at *16 (finding same).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for money damages against Panel Member
Defendants must be dismissed. And, because Plaintiff "'alleges neither the violation of a
declaratory decree, nor the unavailability of declaratory relief'" any claim for injunctive relief

6 In March 2025, this Court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order that, at first glance, could
appear to contradict a finding here that Panel Member Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity. See D.B., 2025 WL 864043, at *3. However, the Court's decision in D.B. arose under
a distinct set of circumstances. In D.B., the plaintiff moved for leave to amend his complaint to
add, inter alia, Dr. Li-Wen Grace Lee, Carmen Barber, and Tony Trahan as defendants. See id. at
*1. The magistrate judge issued a Report-Recommendation & Order which, in relevant part,
recommended that the plaintiff be permitted to amend because "under the facts and circumstances
of this case as it is currently presented, it is not clear from the four corners of the proposed
amended complaint or defendants' opposition that the defendant panel members are entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity." D.B. v. Sullivan ("D.B. I"), No. 1:22-CV-0282, 2025 WL 1033883, *12
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2025), R&R adopted, 2025 WL 864043 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2025). Although
the defendants had opposed the motion to amend, no objections to the Report-Recommendation &
Order were filed, so the Court reviewed the magistrate judge's recommendations merely for clear
error. See id. at *1-2. At the time this Court adopted the Report-Recommendation & Order there
was "no case directly on point that assesses whether individuals who make the determination
whether an individual is entitled to a certificate of relief from disabilities as it relates to firearms
are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity." D.B. I, at *10. A few months later, the district court
decision in Richey was issued, which the Court now relies upon as persuasive authority. See
Richey, 2025 WL 1836492. Given the evolution of the case law over the course of the past year
and the procedural differences between D.B. and the present matter, the Court is now comfortable
reaching the conclusion that Panel Member Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
against Panel Member Defendants is therefore barred under § 1983. Richey, 2025 WL 1836492,
at *16 (quoting Montero, 171 F.3d at 761); see Fraccola v. DelConte, No. 6:25-CV-00034, 2025
WL 3228085, *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2025) ("Here, because Plaintiff did not identify a
declaratory decree that Judicial Defendants allegedly violated, 'nor did he establish that
declaratory relief was unavailable[,]' judicial immunity applies, shielding Judicial Defendants
from liability in their individual capacities") (citing Sibley v. Watches, No. 24-855, 2025 WL
2448202, *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2025)).
D. Qualified Immunity

In the alternative, State Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. See
Dkt. No. 19-2 at 24-28. The Court has found that Panel Member Defendants are entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity, therefore, it need not reach the issue of whether they are also entitled to
qualified immunity. See Richey, 2025 WL 1836492, at *16 n.7. And, as for Defendant Sullivan,
she is sued in her official capacity only. See Dkt. No. 16 at ¶ 20. Therefore, the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity is unavailable to her. See Rossy v. City of Buffalo, No. 23-CV-
7296, 2025 WL 816301, *5 (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 2025) ("In short, 'with respect to an official-capacity
claim, qualified immunity is simply not a defense'") (quoting Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d
127, 164 (2d Cir. 2012)).

E. Dismissal of Claims Against State Defendants With or Without Prejudice
State Defendants argue that all claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice,
see Dkt. No. 19-2 at 28. Plaintiff fails to oppose this argument. Nevertheless, because the Court
lacks standing with regarding to the claims against Defendant Sullivan, the claims against her
must be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Carter v. HealthPort Techs.,
LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 2016) ("[W]here a complaint is dismissed for lack of Article III
standing, the dismissal must be without prejudice, rather than with prejudice. Such a dismissal is
one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction") (collecting cases). On the other hand, the claims
against Panel Member Defendants are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See
Hubbuch v. Small, No. 25-CV-1003, 2025 WL 1099109, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2025) (dismissing
claims barred by quasi-judicial immunity with prejudice).
F. Claims Against United States Defendants—Prudential Ripeness
In their supplemental submission, United States Defendants clarify their position: they do
not raise an Article III ripeness challenge because they concede that Plaintiff has alleged an actual

injury. See Dkt. No. 40 at 4. Instead, United States Defendants contend that the amended
complaint should be dismissed on prudential ripeness grounds. See id. As noted, Plaintiff did not
file a response to this prudential ripeness argument, despite being given an opportunity to do so.
See Dkt. No. 39.
The Second Circuit has repeatedly recognized that prudential ripeness is "'a justiciability
doctrine[.]'" BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Vill. of Monroe, 93 F.4th 595, 601 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting
Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003)). As
"[j]usticiability is . . . a threshold question[,]" it may be addressed "in advance of consideration of
subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. at 600-01 (quoting Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 162 n.1 (2d

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court will address ripeness as a
threshold question before the other arguments raised in United States Defendants' briefing.
"'Ripeness' is a term that has been used to describe two overlapping threshold criteria for
the exercise of a federal court's jurisdiction." Simmonds v. I.N.S., 326 F.3d 351, 356-57 (2d Cir.
2003) (citing Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57, n.18 (1993)). "The first such
requirement—which we refer to as 'constitutional ripeness'—is drawn from Article III limitations
on judicial power." In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65,
109-10 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). "The second such requirement—which we refer to as
'prudential ripeness'—is drawn from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." Id.
at 110 (citations omitted). "Both constitutional ripeness and prudential ripeness 'are concerned
with whether a case has been brought prematurely.'" Id. (quoting Simmonds, 326 F.3d at 357).
The doctrine of prudential ripeness "is a more flexible doctrine" than constitutional
ripeness. Simmonds, 326 F.3d at 357. Prudential ripeness "'constitutes an important exception to

the usual rule that where jurisdiction exists a federal court must exercise it,' and allows a court to
determine 'that the case will be better decided later.'" In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65
at 110 (quoting Simmonds, 326 F.3d at 357). This doctrine is "a tool that courts may use to
enhance the accuracy of their decisions and to avoid becoming embroiled in adjudications that
may later turn out to be unnecessary or may require premature examination of, especially,
constitutional issues that time may make easier or less controversial." Simmonds, 326 F.3d at
357. In determining whether a claim is prudentially ripe, courts ask "'whether [the claim] is fit for
judicial resolution' and 'whether and to what extent the parties will endure hardship if decision is
withheld.'" In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65 at 110.

Here, the Court agrees with United States Defendants that it would be imprudent to
engage in a weighty Second Amendment analysis of the interplay between § 922(g)(4) and the
New York state statutory and regulatory scheme regulating firearm ownership at this time because
Plaintiff chose not to challenge the denial of her application for a certificate of relief through an
Article 78 proceeding. See Dkt. No. 40 at 6.
As discussed, Congress incentivized the States, as part of the NICS Improvement
Amendments Act of 2007, "to report information to NICS that would disqualify someone from
possessing a gun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (such as an involuntary commitment)." Montgomery,
291 F. Supp. 3d at 315. Pursuant to 34 U.S.C. § 40915, States must establish a relief from
disabilities program as a condition to receiving invectives pursuant to the NICS Improvement
Amendments Act of 2007. Specifically, Congress directed the States to establish a relief from
disabilities program to permit a person committed to a mental institution under state law to apply
to be relieved of the restrictions imposed by 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(4). See 34 U.S.C. § 40915. Such

relief can be granted if a person can show they "will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to
public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest." 34
U.S.C. § 40915(a)(2). Further, Congress directed that the States must permit "a person whose
application for the relief is denied to file a petition with the State court of appropriate jurisdiction
for a de novo judicial review of the denial." 34 U.S.C. § 40915(a)(3).
"In response to the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, New York State law
was amended to allow relevant mental health records to be made accessible to NICS."
Montgomery, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 316 (citing New York Bill Jacket, 2008 Senate Bill 8706, Ch.
491). MHL § 7.09(j)(1) gives OMH authorization to collect certain data and to make such

information available to queries from NICS. See id. And, to comply with 34 U.S.C. §
40915(a)(3), New York's MHL § 7.09(j)(2) establishes a relief from disabilities program. See
Susman, 2025 WL 575515, at *5-6.
In other words, MHL § 7.09(j) contains New York's relief from disabilities program and
establishes a procedure for individuals to seek to have their name removed from the NICS
database by applying for a certificate of relief from disabilities. See MHL § 7.09(j)(2). And, in
compliance with 34 U.S.C. § 40915(a)(3), the denial of a certificate of relief is subject to judicial
review in state court through an Article 78 proceeding. See id. ("The denial of a petition for relief
from disabilities may be reviewed de novo pursuant to the proceedings under article seventy-eight
of the civil practice law and rules") Federal courts have held that New York's relief from
disabilities program satisfies due process. See Houston, 2020 WL 7643132, at *3.
After her certificate of relief application was denied, Plaintiff never pursued judicial
review of the denial through an Article 78 proceeding. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 151, 166. Instead,
she filed the instant action, contending primarily that MHL § 709(j) violates the Second

Amendment to the extent it requires reporting MHL § 9.39 admissions to NICS, and that 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) violates the Second Amendment to the extent it does not exclude "brief
emergency admissions under § 9.39" from the definition of "persons committed to a mental
institution." Id. at ¶¶ 6-8, 11-13.
As for the first prudential ripeness consideration, these novel and complex constitutional
questions are not fit for judicial resolution at this time because Plaintiff refused to pursue the
relief explicitly provided by federal and state statutes and regulations. As United States
Defendants correctly point out, if Plaintiff were to successfully challenge the denial of a
certificate of relief though an Article 78 proceeding, "her alleged injury would be rectified, and

her constitutional challenge rendered moot." Dkt. No. 40 at 8. Practically speaking, Plaintiff asks
this Court to become "embroiled in adjudications that may later turn out to be unnecessary"—a
key consideration in determining prudential ripeness. Simmonds, 326 F.3d at 357; see Pondolfino
v. N.Y. State & Loc. Ret. Sys., No. 3:10-CV-00749, 2010 WL 3927624, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 7,
2010) (dismissing complaint on ripeness grounds where the plaintiff sought to "'bypass the
administrative process and review procedures,' including . . . state court review pursuant to CPLR
Article 78, which "'would create a serious risk that difficult and important constitutional issues
would be decided without an adequate factual context or before it was clear that they even need to
be decided'") (quoting Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582, F.2d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 1978)).
The second ripeness consideration, whether and to what extent the parties will endure
hardship if decision is withheld, also favors withholding a decision at this time. Plaintiff may re-
apply for a certificate of relief and, if such relief is denied, can seek state court review pursuant to
Article 78, at which time Plaintiff may raise her constitutional claims. See Richey, 2025 WL
1836492, at *14 ("A determination pursuant to MHL § 7.09(j)(2) is subject to Article 78 review . .

. . Aside from the availability of Article 78 review, an applicant may reapply for a certificate of
relief from disabilities one year after a denial") (citations omitted); see also Hellenic Am.
Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1996)
("[C]onstitutional issues can be decided in Article 78 proceedings") (citation omitted).
Accordingly, Plaintiff will not suffer undue hardship from dismissal on prudential ripeness
grounds. See Pondolfino, 2010 WL 3927624, at *4 ("Nor will the plaintiff suffer hardship if the
Court declines to entertain this action based on ripeness[, as] . . . any final administrative
determination will be subject to state court review pursuant to CPLR Article 78, at which time
[the p]laintiff may raise his constitutional claims") (internal quotation marks omitted).

For these reasons, Plaintiff's claims against United States Defendants are dismissed
without prejudice as unripe. 7
IV. CONCLUSION

7 The threshold justiciability determination of prudential ripeness obviates the need to address
United States Defendants' related, but less persuasive, arguments regarding exhaustion of
administrative remedies and constitutional avoidance. And, of course, the Court need not venture
into any arguments related to the merits of Plaintiff's claims at this time.
After careful review of the pleadings, the parties' submissions, and the applicable law, the
Court hereby
ORDERS that State Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 19) and United States
Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 30) are GRANTED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Sullivan are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE but WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND for lack of standing;8 and the
Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's claims against United States Defendants are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE but WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as unripe;9 and the Court
further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's claims against Panel Member Defendants are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules; and the Court further

8 See Holcombe v. Ingredients Sols., Inc., 797 Fed. Appx. 630, 634 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary
order) (finding dismissal without prejudice but without leave to amend appropriate where case
was dismissed for lack of standing, plaintiff did not request leave to file second amended
complaint, and plaintiff could not articulate how she could cure standing deficiencies).

9 See Kincade Enters. LLC v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 25-CV-0476, 2025 WL 2677144, *4
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2025) ("Having established that [the p]laintiff[']s dispute is not ripe, this
Court need not—indeed, may not—evaluate the merits. Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed
without prejudice, and without leave to amend") (citing Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd.
of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2002).
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close this case.'°
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 2, 2026 J) 7 i
Albany, New York □□ +o He, LD hpez +24
Mae A. D’Agostino~/
U.S. District Judge

10 Tf Plaintiff believes she can establish standing and ripeness, "she can attempt to bring a new
action in federal court, assuming that no independent barrier exists." Holcombe, 797 Fed. Appx.
at 635 n.2.

31

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11275477. Public record. Not legal advice.