# Eugene Moxley v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital

> Court of Appeals of Tennessee · March 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11275209

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 13, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Senior Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
- **Judges:** Senior Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11275209

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the requirements of Section 121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) may be satisfied through substantial compliance

## Opinion text

03/13/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
January 14, 2026 Session

EUGENE MOXLEY v. AMISUB SFH INC. D/B/A SAINT FRANCIS
HOSPITAL ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
No. CT-4603-20 Cedrick D. Wooten, Judge
___________________________________

No. W2025-00443-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________

The trial court granted Appellees’ joint motion to dismiss Appellant’s healthcare liability
action based on its finding that Appellant failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit
notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Appellant
appeals. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Affirmed and Remanded

ROY B. MORGAN, JR., SR. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CARMA DENNIS
MCGEE and VALERIE L. SMITH, JJ., joined.

William Bryan Smith, Memphis, Tennessee, and A. Wilson Wages, Millington, Tennessee,
for the appellant, Eugene Moxley.

Karen S. Koplon and Megan Lane, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Kirsna Norris
Chapman, and AMISUB (SFH), Inc. d/b/a St. Francis Hospital.

Joseph M. Clark and Raleigh Kent Francis, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees,
Zachary K. Corr and The Urology Group.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

1
Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall
be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and shall not be
I. Background

This is the third appeal in this case. See Moxley v. Amisub SFH, Inc., W2021-
01422-COA-R9-CV, 2022 WL 3715056 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2022) (“Moxley I”);
Moxley v. Amisub SFH, Inc., No. W2023-00220-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 1765046 (Tenn.
Ct. App. April 24, 2024) (“Moxley II”). The relevant background facts are set out in
Moxley I as follows:

The complaint filed in this case alleges that [Appellant] Eugene Moxley was
injured due to medical negligence during the course of a cancer treatment on
July 5, 2019. On July 3, 2020, [Appellant’s] counsel, A. Wilson Wages, sent
the statutorily required pre-suit notice of a potential health care liability claim
to twelve possible defendants. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-
121(a)(2)(E) provides that pre-suit notice must include “[a] HIPAA [i.e.,
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act] compliant medical
authorization permitting the provider receiving the notice to obtain complete
medical records from each other provider being sent a notice.” (Emphasis
added). [Appellant] admits that a mistake was made with respect to the
HIPAA authorizations he sent to each provider.

On October 30, 2020, [Appellant] initiated this lawsuit by filing a
complaint against four defendants—Nurse Chapman, The Urology Group,
PC, Dr. Zachary Corr, and St. Francis Hospital [(together, “Appellees”)].
[Appellant’s] counsel, Mr. Wages, attached an affidavit stating that he had
complied with the pre-suit notice requirements and, among other things, sent
“a HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the providers who
were sent a notice to obtain medi[c]al records from the other providers.” He
attached all of the pre-suit notice letters and enclosed authorization forms
sent on the dates mentioned above.

Moxley I, 2022 WL 3715056, at *1-*2. As discussed in Moxley I,

The pre-suit notice letter sent to Nurse Chapman included twelve separate
HIPAA authorization forms. Each of the twelve forms Ms. Chapman
received designated her as the “releasing provider.” Thus, the forms she
received contained language stating that she could “release” medical records
to other entities. For example:

“I, Eugene T. Moxley, . . . do hereby authorize Kirsna J. Norris- Chapman,

cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

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R.N., to release to The Urology Group, the medical records . . . relating to
my treatment[.]”

“I, Eugene T. Moxley, . . . do hereby authorize Kirsna J. Norris- Chapman,
R.N., to release to St. Francis Hospital-Memphis, the medical records . . .
relating to my treatment[.]”

“I, Eugene T. Moxley, . . . do hereby authorize Kirsna J. Norris-Chapman,
R.N., to release to Zachary K. Corr, M.D., the medical records . . . relating
to my treatment[.]”

However, none of the twelve forms Nurse Chapman received contained
language stating that she could “obtain” any medical records, although
[Appellant] did send one authorization to Nurse Chapman that included her
name in both fields as follows:

“I, Eugene T. Moxley, . . . do hereby authorize Kirsna J. Norris-Chapman,
R.N., to release to Kirsna J. Norris-Chapman, R.N., the medical records . . .
relating to my treatment[.]”

The same mistake was repeated with the forms sent to all twelve potential
defendants.

Moxley I, at *1.

On January 25, 2021, St. Francis and Nurse Chapman filed a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), alleging
failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-
121(a)(2)(E). St. Francis and Nurse Chapman pointed out that the HIPAA
authorization forms they received with pre-suit notice allowed each of them
to “release” medical records but did not state that they could procure records
from other providers. As such, they argued that [Appellant] had failed to
substantially comply with the statute’s requirement that pre-suit notice
include “[a] HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the provider
receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from each other
provider being sent a notice.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E).

Moxley I, at *2. The remaining Appellees joined in the motion to dismiss. In opposing the
motion, Appellant asserted that he had substantially complied with the statutory
requirements. Specifically, “[h]e suggested that each provider should have known that
authorizations had been sent to all of the other potential defendants allowing the ‘release’
of records, such that ‘everyone involved could obtain copies of the relevant records’ if they
simply called and requested them.” Moxley II, at *1 (citing Moxley I, at *3). Following
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a hearing, the trial court denied Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02
motion on its finding that, although Mr. Moxley did not substantially comply with
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), extraordinary cause excused his
noncompliance. See Tenn. Code Ann. §29-26-121(b) (allowing the trial court to exercise
“discretion to excuse compliance [with the statutory pre-suit notice requirement] . . . only
for extraordinary cause shown”). In the Moxley I appeal, which was taken under Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Appellees’
Rule 12.02(6) motion. As discussed in Moxley II:

The only question certified in the Rule 9 appeal [i.e., Moxley I] was whether
the trial court erred in finding extraordinary cause. We determined that it did
and reversed the extraordinary cause finding but left undisturbed the trial
court’s finding on substantial compliance.2 On remand, the trial court granted
Appellees’ motion to dismiss without hearing.

Moxley II, at *1. Mr. Moxley then filed a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 appeal,
i.e., Moxley II. In Moxley II, we reviewed the trial court’s initial finding that Appellant
did not substantially comply with the statutory requirements and held that the trial court
applied an incorrect legal standard to that question. Specifically, the Moxley II Court
concluded that the trial court erroneously held Mr. Moxley to strict compliance with the
statutory requirements as opposed to substantial compliance. Moxley II, at *5. As we
explained:

[T]he trial court [erroneously] focused on whom Appellees could obtain the
records from, and not on whether Appellees could obtain the records at all .
. . . [The trial court’s] ruling was that Mr. Moxley’s pre-suit notice prejudiced
Appellees insofar as they were denied the benefit of ‘obtain[ing] all of [Mr.
Moxley’s] medical records from the other providers receiving pre-suit
notice.’ (Emphasis added). Respectfully, “the conclusion that a deficient
medical authorization would ordinarily deprive a defendant of the benefit of
Section 121 does not mean that such deficiency will always result in such
deprivation. . . . If a defective medical authorization automatically meant a
plaintiff failed to comply with section 121 pre-suit notice, there would be no
reason to consider prejudice.” Hayward [v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cty.
Hosp. Auth., d/b/a Erlanger Health Systems, et al.], 680 S.W.3d [250, at]
261 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2013)].
However, “[I]f the plaintiff’s noncompliance neither frustrates nor interferes
with the purposes of Section 121 nor prevents a defendant from receiving a
benefit the statute confers, then a court is more likely to determine that the
plaintiff has substantially complied.” Martin [v. Rolling Hills Hospital,

2
No appeal was taken from Moxley I. As such, the Moxley I holding that no extraordinary
cause exists is res judicata.
-4-
LLC, 600 S.W.3d [322,] at 334 [(Tenn. 2020)], (citing Stevens [ex rel.
Stevens v. Hickman Community Healthcare Services, Inc., 418 S.W.3d
[547], at 555 [(Tenn. 2013)]. To date, the trial court has not resolved this
question.

Id. Because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, the Moxley II Court vacated
its order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings,
“including consideration of the question of substantial compliance under the correct
standard.” Id. at *6.

Pursuant to this Court’s mandate in Moxley II, on remand, the trial court was to
determine whether Mr. Moxley’s pre-suit notices, which did not authorize his providers to
“obtain” medical records from other providers, constituted substantial compliance with the
statutes. Following a hearing on October 25, 2024, the trial court entered an order on
March 5, 2025. Therein, the trial court held that Mr. Moxley failed to substantially comply
with the pre-suit notice statutes and that Appellees were prejudiced by the non-compliance.
Accordingly, the trial court granted Appellees’ joint motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Mr.
Moxley appeals.

II. Issues

Mr. Moxley raises two issues for review as stated in his brief:

1. The trial court erred when it held Moxley failed to comply substantially
with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)€ where his
HIPAA-compliant medical release allowed each potential defendant
receiving notice of intent to sue to obtain medical records from every other
potential defendant receiving notice simply by requesting those records.
2. The trial court erred when it dismissed the case with prejudice holding that
Moxley was not entitled to the extension of the limitations period available
to an HCLA plaintiff giving notice to all potential defendants under Tenn.
Code Ann. 29-26-121€ where each potential defendant received pre-suit
notice of suit.

As an initial matter, in his second issue, Appellant asks us to review the trial court’s
dismissal of the case WITH PREJUDICE. As set out in the order appealed, the trial court
dismissed Mr. Moxley’s lawsuit WITHOUT PREJUDICE, i.e., “Plaintiff’s Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice as to all Defendants. . . .” Accordingly, Appellant’s second
issue is a mere hypothetical and, as such, is not justiciable. Therefore, we will not address
it. Hurd v. Flores, 221 S.W.3d 14, 30 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tenn.2000)) (explaining that courts “will not render
an opinion in an appeal which . . . involves a purely hypothetical or theoretical set of

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facts”).3 Rather, the sole question before us is whether the trial court erred in granting
Appellees’ motion to dismiss on its finding that Mr. Moxley failed to substantially comply
with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-
121(a)(2)€.

III. Standard of Review

As explained in Moxley II:

In Martin v. Rolling Hills Hospital, LLC, 600 S.W.3d 322, 334-35 (Tenn.
2020), the Tennessee Supreme Court explained that the proper avenue to
challenge a plaintiff’s compliance with the pre-suit notice requirements of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 is by a Tennessee Rule of
Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. A trial court’s grant of a motion
to dismiss is a question of law, which we review de novo with no presumption
of correctness. Ellithorpe v. Weismark, 479 S.W.3d 818, 824 (Tenn. 2015).

Moxley II, at *3.

IV. Analysis

In Moxley II, we explained:

[T]he standard applicable to the question of substantial compliance is more
complex than strict compliance with the statute. Indeed, the Tennessee
Supreme Court has held that the requirements contained in section 29-26-
121(a)(2) (which include “[a] HIPAA compliant medical authorization
permitting the provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical
records from each other provider being sent a notice,” Tenn. Code Ann. §
29-26-121(a)(2)€) are “directory” and may be satisfied by “substantial
compliance.” Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Community Healthcare
Services, Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tenn. 2013) (evaluating whether a
plaintiff substantially complied with Section 121(a) (2)€); see also Arden v.
Kozawa, 466 S.W.3d 758, 762-64 (Tenn. 2015) (holding that the
requirements of Section 121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) may be satisfied through
substantial compliance); Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease
Consultants, PLC, 433 S.W.3d 512, 520 (Tenn. 2014) (holding that the

3
To receive the additional 120-day extension of the statute of limitations under Tennessee Code
Annotated section 29-21-121(c), a plaintiff must substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 29-26-121. See, e.g., Byrge v. Parkwest Medical Ctr., 442 S.W.3d 245, 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 24, 2014). Here, we conclude that Mr. Moxley did not comply with section
29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Accordingly, even if we could address issue two substantively, Mr. Moxley would not
be entitled to the 120-day extension.
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affidavit requirement of Section 121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) may be satisfied by
substantial compliance). So, strict compliance with section 121 is not
required for substantial compliance. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of the pre-
suit notice requirement is to allow potential defendants to investigate the
merits of the claims against them and to pursue settlement negotiations prior
to the lawsuit being filed. See Martin, 600 S.W.3d at 331; Runions v.
Jackson-Madison Cnty. Gen. Hosp. Dist., 549 S.W.3d 77, 86 (Tenn. 2018).
In short, “[n]ot every non-compliant HIPAA medical authorization will
result in prejudice.” Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 556. Concerning the question of
prejudice, the Martin [v. Rolling Hills Hosp., LLC, 600 S.W.3d 322, 331
(Tenn. 2020)] Court clarified that prejudice is not a separate and independent
analytical element; rather, as Stevens explained, prejudice is a consideration
relevant to determining whether a plaintiff has substantially complied.
Prejudice, or the absence of prejudice, is especially relevant to evaluating the
extent and significance of the plaintiff’s noncompliance. If a plaintiff’s
noncompliance with Section 121 frustrates or interferes with the purposes of
Section 121 or prevents the defendant from receiving a benefit Section 121
confers, then the plaintiff likely has not substantially complied with Section
121. On the other hand, if the plaintiff’s noncompliance neither frustrates or
interferes with the purposes of Section 121 nor prevents a defendant from
receiving a benefit the statute confers, then a court is more likely to determine
that the plaintiff has substantially complied. Martin, 600 S.W.3d at 333-34
(internal citations omitted); see also Hayward v. Chattanooga-Hamilton
Cty. Hosp. Auth., d/b/a Erlanger Health Systems, et al., 680 S.W.3d 252,
260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2013) (citing
Martin, 600 S.W.3d at 334).

Moxley II, at *5 (footnote omitted). Here, the trial court held that Appellant “has NOT
substantially complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)€ and defendants suffered
prejudice as they were not able to have access to plaintiff’s medical records which would
allow defendants to investigate the merits of the claim, thus frustrating and interfering with
the purpose of the statute” (capitalization in original). We agree with the trial court’s
conclusions.

As noted above, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) requires
“[a] HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the provider receiving the notice
to obtain complete medical records from each other provider being sent a notice”
(emphases added). As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained:

Because HIPAA itself prohibits medical providers from using or disclosing
a plaintiff’s medical records without a fully compliant authorization form, it
is a threshold requirement of the statute that the plaintiff’s medical
authorization must be sufficient to enable defendants to obtain and review a
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plaintiff’s relevant medical records. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (“a
covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information without
an authorization that is valid under this section”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-
121(d)(1) creates a statutory entitlement to the records governed by § 29-26-
121(a)(2)(E). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(d)(1) (“All parties in an
action covered by this section shall be entitled to obtain complete copies of
the claimant’s medical records from any other provider receiving notice . . .
.”) (emphasis added).

Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 555 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). As this Court has
cautioned,

[b]ecause the penalties imposed on entities that wrongfully disclose or obtain
private health information in violation of HIPAA are severe, the sufficiency
of the plaintiffs’ medical authorizations is imperative. [Stevens., 418 S.W.3d
at 555] (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (“[A] covered entity may not use
or disclose protected health information without an authorization that is valid
under this section.”)).

Woodruff by and through Cockrell v. Walker, 542 S.W.3d 486 at 499 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017). Indeed, “[e]ntities that wrongfully disclose
or obtain private health information in violation of HIPAA may face fines of up to $50,000
per offense and/or imprisonment of up to one year.” Id. at fn. 9 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. §
1320d–6). Here, Appellant argues that the authorizations “were not deficient” and “were
wholly and completely HIPAA-compliant” because Appellees

were able to obtain complete copies of [Appellant’s medical] records by
simply asking for them. What matters is that the authorization is effective to
allow listed medical providers to obtain medical records from each other.
The word “obtain” is not magical. If an authorization permits a defendant to
obtain medical records but does not say “obtain,” it is compliant all the same.
All Defendants had to do to “obtain” the records was ask for them. And
because they could “obtain” records from one another by way of the releases
provided, Defendants incurred no prejudice from Moxley’s method.

Appellant’s argument is incorrect insofar as it ignores the plain language of Tennessee
Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which requires a HIPAA authorization
specifically “permitting the provider . . . to obtain complete medical records.” (Emphasis
added).4 As correctly noted in Appellees’ brief, “a facially valid authorization allowing

4
In Bray v. Khuri, 523 S.W.3d 619 (Tenn. 2017), the Tennessee Supreme Court established two
exceptions to requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E): (1) “a plaintiff need
not provide a HIPAA-compliant authorization when a single healthcare provider is given pre-suit notice of
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Provider A to release its records to Provider B does not allow Provider A to use that same
authorization to obtain records from Provider B.” Such is the case here. Although “less-
than-perfect compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) [] should not derail a
healthcare liability claim,” Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 555, the required notice must still “be
sufficient to enable defendants to obtain and review a plaintiff’s relevant medical records.”
Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1)). As this Court recently explained:

HIPAA authorizations are required to provide “[t]he name or other specific
identification of the person(s), or class of persons, authorized to make the
requested use or disclosure” as well as the “[t]he name or other specific
identification of the person(s), or class of persons, to whom the covered
entity may make the requested use or disclosure.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(ii)-
(iii).

Crenshaw on behalf of Murphy v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosp., et al.,
No. W2024-00682-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 1336350, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 7, 2025),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2025). Indeed, in J.A.C. by & through Carter v.
Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals., 542 S.W.3d 502, 513-14 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2016), this Court held that the plaintiff’s authorizations were “clearly ineffective to allow
the Providers to receive medical records from one another” where “[t]he forms merely
contained blanks where” they were supposed to disclose the “person(s), or class of persons,
that were authorized to disclose protected health information” and the “person(s) or class
of persons, to whom a disclosure of information could be made.” Because the
authorizations tendered by Appellant do not contain the identifying information of each
person or entity able to receive/obtain Mr. Moxley’s medical information, the
authorizations are incomplete and ineffective. Crenshaw, 2025 WL 1336350, at *4 (citing
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(ii)-(iii)). In this regard, Appellant failed to substantially comply
with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), and
Appellees were deprived of the ability to obtain and review the applicable medical records.
This Court has held that, “Defendants are clearly prejudiced when unable, due to a form
procedural error, to obtain medical records needed for their legal defense.” Lawson, 544
S.W.3d at 709-710 (citing Hamilton v. Abercrombie Radiological Consultants, Inc., 487
S.W.3d 114, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 15, 2015));
Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 556; Lott v. Mallett, No. W2020-01233-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL
894755, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 25, 2022) (holding that appellant failed to
substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) because
her authorization did not allow defendant/doctor to obtain medical records from the other
health care provider receiving pre-suit notice.); Wenzler v. Xiao Yu, No. W2018-00369-

a healthcare liability claim,” and (2) a health care provider may use or disclose protected health information
for its health care operations and does not need to obtain a medical authorization in order “to use a patient's
medical records in [its] possession and consult with counsel to evaluate the merits of a potential claim.” Id.
at 622-23. Neither of the Bray exceptions is applicable here.
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COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 6077847, *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2018 (citing Hamilton,
487 S.W.3d at 120) (same).

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s lawsuit is
affirmed. The case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are
consistent with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Eugene
Moxley. Execution for costs may issue if necessary.

s/ Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
ROY B. MORGAN, JR., SENIOR JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11275209. Public record. Not legal advice.