# RODWELL

> District Court, D. New Jersey · February 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274463

## Case

- **Full name:** Rodwell, et al. v. City of Newark, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** February 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAMBERS OF Martin Luther King, Jr. Federal Bldg.
JESSICA S. ALLEN & U.S. Courthouse
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 50 Walnut Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
(973-645-2580)
LETTER ORDER
February 6, 2026
TO: ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD

Re: Rodwell, et al. v. City of Newark, et al.
Civil Action No. 22-6427 (EP) (JSA) __

Dear Counsel:

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ informal motion seeking to depose non-party Ras Baraka, the
Mayor of Defendant the City of Newark (“the City”). (See ECF No. 118, at times, “Plaintiffs’
motion”). The City objects to Mayor Baraka’s deposition and cross-moves for a protective order,
contending the deposition is barred by the Morgan doctrine, which derives from the United States
Supreme Court’s Opinion in United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). (See ECF No. 119).
No oral argument was heard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons set forth below, and for good
cause shown, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED, and the City’s cross-motion for a protective order
precluding the deposition is GRANTED.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND1

This case arises out of a June 1, 2021 altercation on Cypress Street in Newark, New Jersey
between brothers Jaykil Rodwell, Branden Rodwell, Jasper Spivey, and Justin Rodwell on one
side, and defendant law enforcement officers Detective M. DaSilva, Detective C. Serrano, and
Lieutenant P. Ranges on the other. The altercation began when the three officers allegedly
assaulted Jaykil Rodwell without identifying themselves as members of law enforcement,
prompting his brothers to intervene. The result was a prolonged scuffle that ultimately led to the
arrest of all four brothers.

Beginning four days later, on June 5, 2021, Monique Rodwell, the mother of the four
brothers, organized protests against the treatment of her sons by law enforcement. She alleges that
Mayor Baraka and other local officials responded with a “campaign of harassment and
intimidation” against her and her family. On November 2, 2022, Monique Rodwell, Branden

1 The Opinion issued by the Honorable Kevin McNulty, U.S.D.J. (Ret.) on September 5, 2023 (the “September 5th
Opinion”), sets forth the allegations of the case in detail. (See ECF No. 34). This background section draws from
that Opinion, while omitting direct citations. Only what is relevant to deciding Plaintiffs’ motion is recited herein.
Rodwell, Jaykil Rodwell, and Jasper Spivey (collectively “Plaintiffs”) brought this action against
the City, Mayor Baraka, and certain current and former city officials and law enforcement officers
(collectively “Defendants”),2 asserting various tort, constitutional, and statutory claims.

On January 2, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (See ECF No.
13). Mayor Baraka and the City filed motions to dismiss the FAC. In the September 5th Opinion,
District Judge McNulty dismissed all claims against the City other than a Monell claim, and
dismissed all claims against Mayor Baraka without prejudice. (See ECF Nos. 34-35). Thereafter,
Plaintiffs declined to file a Second Amended Complaint, and Mayor Baraka was dismissed with
prejudice. (See ECF No. 65).3 As a result, the operative complaint remains the FAC. Plaintiffs
remaining claims are: (1) a Monell claim against the City, and (2) several claims against the
remaining individual city officials and law enforcement officers, including a First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendants O’Hara and Baraka, Jr. only. (See ECF No. 34 at 7).

II. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

Plaintiffs seek to depose Mayor Baraka regarding his alleged “orchestration of the heavy
police ‘protest detail’ deployed on Cypress Street with the purpose to harass and intimidate
plaintiffs into silence and in retaliation for their protest efforts.” (ECF No. 118 at 5). Plaintiffs
acknowledge that the Morgan doctrine, which holds that high-level government officials should
not be compelled to sit for depositions absent extraordinary circumstances, applies, and that Mayor
Baraka’s deposition should not be permitted absent extraordinary circumstances. (Id. at 6-8).
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs claim that “[d]iscovery now has revealed the Mayor not only knew about
but orchestrated the entire retaliatory campaign.” (Id. at 1). They specifically contend a police
mobile station had been parked on Cypress Steet; police officers had patrolled Cypress Street on
foot and in cars; barricades had been marked by police officers requesting identification from
anyone who wanted to enter Cypress Street; and a helicopter had been flown over the Rodwell
home. (Id. at 1).

The City opposes Mayor Baraka’s deposition and seeks a protective order, arguing that
Plaintiffs have failed to show the extraordinary circumstances required by the Morgan doctrine
and that the Morgan factors weigh against the deposition. The City advances four primary
arguments. First, the claims against Mayor Baraka have been dismissed. (ECF No. 119 at 1).
Second, the discovery to date confirms that Mayor Baraka undertook only the pro forma act of
directing the City’s Public Safety Director to establish a police presence on Cypress Street in the
immediate aftermath of the June 1st altercation, and that Mayor Baraka does not possess any unique
personal knowledge about the police protest detail. (Id. at 5-6). Third, individuals other than
Mayor Baraka were responsible for coordinating and implementing the City’s police protest detail
and can (and have) provided the information Plaintiffs purport to seek from Mayor Baraka. (Id.)
Finally, a deposition of Mayor Baraka does not involve essential information and would
significantly interfere with his official duties. (Id. at 7-8).

2 The individual defendants are: (1) Brian O’Hara, the City’s Former Public Safety Director; (2) Amiri Baraka, Jr.;
(3) Sergeant Taray J. Tucker; (4) Sergeant Luis Rivera; (5) Detective M. DaSilva; (6) Detective C. Serrano; (7)
Former Captain Rasheen Peppers; (8) Lieutenant P. Ranges; and (9) Detective Thomas Bender.

3 This case was reassigned to the Honorable Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J. on November 29, 2023. (ECF No. 63).
III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 permits parties to “obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). However, the Court may enter a protective order
precluding discovery upon a showing of good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

In United States v. Morgan, the United States Supreme Court held that high-level
government officials should not be compelled to appear for depositions absent extraordinary
circumstances. 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); see also Buono v. City of Newark, 249 F.R.D. 469, 470-
71 n.2 (D.N.J. 2008).

Applying Morgan, courts have decided on a case-by-case basis whether extraordinary
circumstances exist that warrant the deposition of a high-level government official. See U.S. v.
Sensient Colors, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316 (D.N.J. 2009). In reaching this determination,
several courts in this District have adopted a five-part test, referred to as the Buono factors, under
which the party seeking the deposition must show that:

(1) the official’s testimony is necessary to obtain relevant information that is not available
from another source;
(2) the official has first-hand information that cannot reasonably be obtained from other
sources;
(3) the testimony is essential to the case at hand;
(4) the deposition would not significantly interfere with the ability of the official to perform
his government duties; and
(5) the evidence sought is not available through less burdensome means or alternative
sources.

Sensient Colors, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 322; see also Buono, 249 F.R.D. at 470-71 n.2 (quoting Bogan
v. City of Boston, 489 F.3d 417, 423-24 (1st Cir. 2007)).

Since the five-factor test sets forth overlapping factors, they are typically considered in
groups. See Sensient Colors, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d at 322. Factors (1), (2), and (5), which all focus
on the deponent's level of personal knowledge or involvement of the underlying circumstances,
are generally considered first, followed by factors (3) and (4). See Sensient Colors, 649 F. Supp.
2d at 322; see also Stevenson v. City of Newark, 2024 WL 1526102, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2024).
While “personal involvement in or knowledge of the subject events seems to be a necessary
prerequisite for deposing a high-ranking government official . . . a party must still show that the
information cannot be gleaned from other sources or achieved through less burdensome means.”
Sensient Colors, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (emphasis added). Finally, even if the government official
has personal knowledge, the information sought must be “essential to the case.” Id at 322-23
(“[T]he information sought should form a key component of the party's claim or defense.”); see
also Buono, 249 F.R.D. at 470-71 n.2.
B. Application of the Buono factors4

1. Personal Involvement, Knowledge, and Whether the Information Is
Available from Other Sources

The first group of Buono Factors—Factors 1, 2, and 5—require the Court to focus on
whether the witness has personal involvement and knowledge that cannot be obtained from other
sources. See Sensient Colors, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 322. Here, Plaintiffs contend that Mayor Baraka’s
deposition is necessary to prove their case because he allegedly orchestrated the police protest
detail for the purpose of harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs into silence and in retaliation for
their protest efforts that began on June 5, 2021. (See ECF No. 118 at 5-6). The Court disagrees
that the first group of Buono factors weigh in favor of allowing the deposition to proceed.

At the outset, the Court notes that, in their letter brief, Plaintiffs appear to seek Mayor
Baraka’s deposition because discovery has revealed that Mayor Baraka himself was responsible
for the alleged First Amendment retaliation that occurred. (See, e.g., ECF No. 118 at 7-8). Indeed,
Plaintiffs cite the September 5th Opinion’s conclusion that the FAC failed to state a First
Amendment retaliation claim against Mayor Baraka but then purport to argue that discovery has
shown otherwise. (See id.) To be clear, the September 5th Opinion dismissed the claims against
Mayor Baraka, and he is no longer a party to this case. Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking
discovery to support a dismissed claim, the deposition of Mayor Baraka is clearly not appropriate.
However, to the extent Plaintiffs seek Mayor Baraka’s deposition to support the First Amendment
retaliation claim that remains against Defendants O’Hara and Baraka, Jr., Plaintiffs have not shown
that Mayor Baraka has personal involvement or knowledge that is not available from other sources.

The City does not dispute that Mayor Baraka directed the police presence in the area
surrounding Cypress Street immediately following the June 1, 2021 altercation. (See ECF No. 119
at 5-6). However, the City argues that the discovery taken to date reflects that Mayor Baraka’s
involvement was limited to pro forma directives, and that Plaintiffs have not shown that Mayor
Baraka has personal knowledge of, or any involvement in, the particulars or execution of the police
detail that occurred following the protests that began four days later on June 5, 2021. Based on
the record presented, this Court agrees.

The deposition testimony presented to the Court supports this conclusion. First, Plaintiff
Monique Rodwell testified, consistent with the City’s position, that Mayor Baraka directed
increased police presence on Cypress Street immediately after the incident on June 1, 2021, and
prior to the commencement of any protests on June 5, 2021. (See Transcript of Deposition of
Monique Rodwell, dated November 15, 2024 (“Rodwell Tr.”), at 66:21-25; ECF No. 118, Ex. A).
Second, Defendant O’Hara testified that Mayor Baraka directed the police presence be established
shortly after the incident, not on June 5, 2021, in response to protests. (See Transcript of
Deposition of Brian O’Hara, dated July 10, 2025 (“O’Hara Tr.”), at 29:1-31:11, 36:2-8, ECF No.

4 Whether a government official is sufficiently high-ranking for purposes of the Morgan doctrine is determined on a
case-by-case basis. Buono, 249 F.R.D. at 470-71 n.2. Here, there is no dispute that Mayor Baraka is a high-level
government official or that the Buono factors apply. (See ECF No. 118 at 6-7; ECF No. 119 at 2-3). This conclusion
is supported by two decisions from this District. See Stevenson, 2024 WL 1526102, at *2 (Mayor Baraka qualifies as
a high-level government official for purposes of Morgan doctrine); Buono, 249 F.R.D. at 472 n.2 (Mayor of Newark
is a high-level government official for Morgan purposes).
118, Ex. B). Third, Plaintiffs deposed Newark Police Captain Richard Casale, commander of the
Emergency Services Unit, who testified that Defendant O’Hara directed that he implement a
“stabilization grid” following the altercation, that he assisted in the implementation of the grid,
and that the authority to issue a stabilization grid rested with a Chief or Deputy Chief in the Newark
Police Department. (See Transcript of Deposition of Richard Casale, dated May 5, 2025 (“Casale
Tr.”), at 11-7:25, 17:5-12, 29:10-30:8, & 32:17-23, ECF No. 118, Ex. G).

In short, the deposition testimony submitted to the Court shows that Mayor Baraka only
directed Defendant O’Hara to implement additional police presence on Cypress Street on or about
June 1, 2021, following the altercation but days before the protests began on June 5th; that
Defendant O’Hara directed that a police detail be established; and that Defendant O’Hara relayed
that message to Captain Casale. (O’Hara Tr. 29:7-31:13, 36:2-8; Casale Tr. 11-7:25, 17:5-12,
29:10-30:8). Further, nothing has been presented to the Court that suggests Mayor Baraka did, or
even had the discretion to, determine and implement police tactics, such as deploying helicopters,
establishing a stabilization grid, directing police patrol patterns, or setting protest detail perimeters.
(See, e.g., Casale Tr. at 33:19-34:19).

Despite this, Plaintiffs appear to argue that Mayor Baraka should nevertheless be deposed
because neither Defendant O’Hara nor Captain Casale could specifically recall during their
respective depositions who ordered a helicopter to be flown over Cypress Street. However, this
is not a basis to depose Mayor Baraka. First, Captain Casale testified about who has the power to
authorize the use of a helicopter, and his testimony does not identify the Mayor. (See Casale Tr.
at 33:19-34:19). Second, Captain Casale’s testimony makes clear that helicopters are routinely
deployed during protest activity to ensure safety, regardless of the specific circumstances. (See id
at 36:20-37:1). The fact that Defendant O’Hara and Captain Casale could not remember who
specifically authorized use of the helicopter is not extraordinary circumstances that would warrant
deposing Mayor Baraka. Rather, it is pure speculation and a fishing expedition to suggest that
Mayor Baraka should sit for a deposition to explain the use of a helicopter—especially when
testimony to date makes clear the individuals who authorize the use of helicopters and the protocol
for doing so, and neither scenario involves the Mayor. Thus, for the above reasons, Plaintiffs fail
to show that Mayor Baraka has unique, personal knowledge that would support taking his
deposition.5

Plaintiffs also have not shown that any information regarding the police protest detail is
unavailable from other sources. Indeed, for the most part, the depositions cited and relied upon by
both parties in their motion papers (and described above) appear to provide Plaintiffs with the

5 Plaintiffs’ motion confirms that they served an interrogatory on the City, seeking the identity of the person(s) who
ordered the helicopter to be deployed to which the City objected on the basis that the interrogatory is “vague, indefinite,
overbroad and . . . . unduly burdensome.” (ECF No. 118 at 5, referring to Interrogatory No. 14, attached as Ex. K).
No party brought this apparent written discovery dispute to the Court’s attention prior to the filing of Plaintiffs’ motion.
Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed Interrogatory No. 14 and the City’s objection, (see id. at Ex. K), and finds that
the City’s objections are without merit. Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 14 is not vague,
indefinite, or overbroad, nor would it be unduly burdensome for the City to respond. Accordingly, the Court directs
the City to provide a response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 14. Parenthetically, the fact that Interrogatory No. 14
was served and objected to (but not raised with the Court), is, in fact, proof that there are less intrusive ways for
Plaintiffs to obtain information regarding the police protest detail other than deposing Mayor Baraka. See Sensient
Colors, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (deposition not appropriate when discovery is obtainable from less intrusive means).
specifics of the police protest detail, including who implemented it and when. In other words,
Plaintiffs are not pursuing new information from Mayor Baraka, rather they are seeking additional
testimony on topics already explored with other witnesses about which they testified. Thus, even
if Mayor Baraka had personal knowledge, any such testimony about the police protest detail would
appear duplicative. The Morgan doctrine does not support taking a high-level government
official’s deposition merely to double check or confirm the testimony of other witnesses.

Based on the above, the Court concludes the first, second, and fifth Buono factors weigh
against allowing Plaintiffs to proceed with Mayor Baraka’s deposition.

2. Whether the Testimony is Essential

The third Buono factor, whether the testimony sought is essential to the case, weighs
against Mayor Baraka’s deposition. There is no apparent dispute that Mayor Baraka directed the
increased police detail near Cypress Street be put into place prior to the onset of any protests. Yet,
the testimony before the Court confirms that Mayor Baraka was not directly in charge of
organizing or implementing the police presence, as Defendant O’Hara testified that it would have
been at the direction of the Chief of Police or Deputy Chief. (See O’Hara Tr. 40:14-41:11). In
short, no testimony has been presented suggesting Mayor Baraka had any involvement in the actual
implementation of the police protest detail on Cypress Street following the protests, or that the
police detail was established in response to the protests, as opposed to the altercation four days
earlier. For that reason, Plaintiffs have not shown that Mayor Baraka’s deposition testimony is
relevant, let alone essential, to their First Amendment retaliation claim. See, e.g., Sensient Colors,
649 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23 (“[T]he information sought should form a key component of the party's
claim or defense.”).

3. Whether the Deposition Would Result in a Significant Interference with
Mayor Baraka’s Official Duties

The fourth and final Buono factor requires the requesting party show that “the deposition
would not significantly interfere with the ability of the official to perform his government duties.”
Buono, 249 F.R.D. at 470-71 n.2. Plaintiffs do not address this factor in their motion papers, and
therefore, fail to carry their burden of establishing this prong is met. See 8 Erie St. JC LLC v. City
of Jersey City, 2023 WL 3735949, at *8 (D.N.J. May 31, 2023). Nevertheless, for completeness,
the Court will analyze this factor. The Court notes that Mayor Baraka serves as Mayor of New
Jersey’s largest city, “responsible for overseeing public safety, city administration, and countless
policy initiatives that demand his continuous attention.” (ECF No. 119 at 7-8). And, as another
court in this District has reasoned, “depositions of mayors arising from their official duties are
inherently disruptive.” 8 Erie Street, 2023 WL 3735949, at *8. Further, as the City argues,
Plaintiffs “offer no specificity regarding the scope, duration, or necessity of this examination, nor
do they identify any safeguards to ensure that the Mayor’s time and resources are not needlessly
diverted.” (Id. at 8). For those reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the deposition would
not interfere with Mayor Baraka’s duties, and thus, have failed to carry their burden with respect
to the fourth Buono factor.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court finds that all five Buono factors weigh against Plaintiffs’
request to depose Mayor Baraka. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel the deposition, (ECF
No. 118), is DENIED, and the City’s cross-request for a protective order precluding Mayor
Baraka’s deposition, (ECF No. 119), is GRANTED. However, the City is directed to provide a
response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 14 on or before February 17, 2026. The Clerk of the
Court is directed to terminate the motions filed as ECF Nos. 118 and 119.

SO ORDERED.

s/Jessica S. Allen____________
Hon. Jessica S. Allen
United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Honorable Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274463. Public record. Not legal advice.