# PELPHREY-WEIGAND

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · February 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274456

## Case

- **Full name:** Cheryl Pelphrey-Weigand v. Resources for Human Development, Inc. d/b/a Montgomery County Recovery Center
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274456

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that kitchen sink Complaint and opposition to summary judgment motion increases difficulty of the task before the Court in resolving such a motion

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHERYL PELPHREY-WEIGAND, :
:
:
Plaintiff, :
v. : 2:24-cv-01325
:
RESOURCES FOR HUMAN :
DEVELOPMENT, INC. d/b/a :
MONTGOMERY COUNTY RECOVERY :
CENTER, :
:
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
At the time of her termination, Plaintiff Cheryl Pelphrey-Weigand was a 64-
year-old, Caucasian woman, raised in the Mennonite tradition. She was hired in
September of 2022 as an Assistant Director/Clinical Supervisor with Defendant
Resources for Human Development, Inc. (RHD) at its Medication Assisted Treatment
Center in Norristown, Pennsylvania, which treats individuals who are in recovery
from narcotics addiction. During her employment, Plaintiff was effectively second in
command at RHD, reporting only to Teresa (Terry) Meckley, the Program Director.
According to Plaintiff, her tenure with RDH was rife with incessant mistreatment,
discrimination, retaliation, and unlawful mismanagement. See generally Pl.’s Compl.
Ultimately, RDH, through Mackley, took the position that Plaintiff’s performance did
not meet organization standards. Plaintiff was ultimately terminated in October of
2023 for poor performance.
In May of 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Defendant
Resources for Human Development, Inc. (RHD) asserting fifteen state and federal
claims, sounding in unlawful discrimination as well as whistleblower and retaliation

claims. RHD filed a timely Answer and moved for Summary Judgment. In October
of 2025, based on the breadth of discrimination asserted by Plaintiff, the Court held
oral argument. At argument, the Court instructed the parties to address each
argument individually. Before this Court are RHD’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. 39), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (Dkt. 42), and RHD’s reply to Plaintiff’s
response (Dkt. 47). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion is granted.
The breadth of Plaintiff’s claims requires a disjointed and nonlinear recitation

of pertinent facts. Accordingly, instead of presenting the background up front, the
Court will introduce the critical facts in this matter as it addresses Plaintiff’s
particular claims. But first, a note on the presentation of Plaintiff’s claims, generally.
II. Kitchen Sink Pleading

This Court wishes to first address the nature of Plaintiff’s Complaint in this
case. In her Complaint, Plaintiff claims that she was the victim of discrimination on
the basis of : (1) age; (2) disability; (3) worker’s compensation status; (4) race; (5)
religion; (6) refusal to violate the FMLA; (7) refusal to violate the APSA; (8)
whistleblower status; and (9) refusal to commit an unlawful act. Plaintiff’s Complaint
brings as astounding fifteen counts with at least nine unique theories of discrimination
plus a wage claim. As this Court will explain, infra, this sort of pleading raises serious

concerns under Rule 11 and creates a significant burden on the judiciary.
a. Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 11
Based upon Twombly, Iqbal, and the Third Circuit’s expansive library of
decisions interpreting those precedents, plaintiffs in federal court are well on notice

that they are required to plead specific facts which, if true, would support their cause
of action. The pleading must raise that cause of action up to the threshold of
plausibility, rather than mere mathematical possibility. Conclusory allegations,
including those which may not appear at first to be pure legal conclusions, are set
aside for this purpose. Put another way: a plaintiff is not permitted to guess they have
a claim.
Against that backdrop, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 provides that upon the signing of a

Complaint, counsel is certifying to the Court a belief that “the claims, defenses, and
other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law” and
that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3). The Rules also require that

these default certifications be made “after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
The Third Circuit has summarized the thrust of Rule 11 as imposing on counsel
“a duty to look before leaping and may be seen as a litigation version of the familiar
railroad crossing admonition to ‘stop, look, and listen.’” Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v.
Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d
151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986)). Rule 11 requires, therefore, both a “reasonable investigation
of the facts and a normally competent level of legal research supporting the
presentation.” Lieb, 788 F.2d at 157. Rule 11 is intended to discourage pleadings

that are “frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though
the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith.” Id. (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir.1986). There is no subjective good faith safe
harbor. Id. Instead, the test is an objective one of reasonableness. Eavenson,
Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985) (implicitly
overruled on other ground).
b. “Kitchen Sink” Pleadings, generally

As mentioned above, Plaintiff alleges that her employer discriminated against
her on almost every protected class imaginable. While an employer so broadly hateful
is, perhaps, not impossible, such allegations by their very nature strain credulity to
its outer limits. This approach of “identify all my conceivable protected classes now,
figure out which ones they hated the most later,” has been rightly decried by both
courts and the defense bar as a “kitchen sink” pleading. A kitchen-sink pleading is

so-called as a reference to the phrase “everything but the kitchen sink,” meaning
everything imaginable. In employment law terms, it refers to an unfocused complaint
which makes various unrelated allegations of discrimination based on a multitude of
protected classes. As one District Judge from the Middle District of Alabama
observed:
This all-encompassing contention defies common sense. It is apparent
that what [Plaintiff] and her attorneys have done is to take a kitchen
sink approach—that is, to put before the court all conceivable claims,
with the hope that the court would sort and sift through them in search
of a colorable one. This trial strategy is grossly unfair to the court and
all other litigants who come before it. For, the inordinate amount of
time the court has had to spend sorting through [Plaintiff’s] claims has
been time unavailable to analyzing other claims and fashioning relief
for other individuals, many of whom may truly have been the victims of
serious wrongs. [Plaintiff’s] attorneys, not the court, have the
responsibility of weeding out frivolous and questionable claims. Her
attorneys should have presented to the court only those claims which
they believe presented colorable allegations of wrongdoings. They, not
the court, should sift through her allegations and determine whether
she has been the victim of discrimination and, if so, of what type and for
what acts.

The court understands that a person can be a victim of pervasive
and multiple types of discrimination. But this understanding has
reasonable limits and is not an invitation to abuse. Lawyers have an
obligation, just as much as judges, to make sure that these limits are
respected. When lawyers fail to meet this obligation they fail to live up
to the oath they took as officers of the court. Indeed, courts cannot
function as delivers of justice—they cannot give all cases the fair and
careful and expeditious consideration each one deserves—when they are
burdened with cases such as this one.

Malladi v. Brown, 987 F. Supp. 893, 900-01 (M.D. Ala. 1997). See also Gray v.
Walgreens Boots All., Inc., No. 23 CV 11441, 2024 WL 2863332, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June
6, 2024) (dismissing complaint despite some potentially meritorious claims being
buried within it because the Complaint “is the kind of vague, confusing, and
‘kitchen sink’” approach which warrants dismissal regardless); Corley v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-4732-SCJ-CMS, 2021 WL 12300064, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9,
2021) (observing kitchen-sink approach and dismissing complaint as impermissible
shotgun pleading); Wright v. Barr, No. 17-CV-1081 (EGS/GMH), 2020 WL 13598000,
at *22 (D.D.C. June 8, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Wright
v. Garland, No. CV 17-1081 (EGS/GMH), 2022 WL 17584011 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2022)
(noting kitchen sink approach is “widely disapproved”); Torres v. Miami-Dade Cnty.,
No. 15-24013-CIV, 2017 WL 364327, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2017) (noting that using

the kitchen sink approach creates a “pleading deficiency” and a “tangled mess of
allegations”); Laincy v. Chatham Cnty., Ga., No. CV409-098, 2010 WL 4553447, at *1
(S.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2010) (“Simply asserting a multitude of claims falling within this
Court's jurisdiction without properly asserting facts is not a best practice.”);
Stephens v. Thomas Pub. Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that
kitchen sink Complaint and opposition to summary judgment motion increases
difficulty of the task before the Court in resolving such a motion). This Court has

previously criticized this approach in the context of a pro se litigant bringing claims
related to credit reports. See Anderson v. First Premier Bank, et al., No. 25-CV-5502,
2025 WL 3214776, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2025) (Weilheimer, J.).
While far from ideal, some plaintiffs will begin with a kitchen sink complaint
which is just barely strong enough to survive a motion to dismiss, with the intent and
expectation of taking fact discovery to figure out which claims have legs and abandon

the ones that don’t. This “strategic retreat” approach may still run afoul of Rule 11,
understood in the context of Twombly and Iqbal, as was explained above. But district
courts have responded positively when plaintiffs avoid compounding that initial
pleading mistake by agreeing to narrow their claims after discovery. E.g., Robb v.
Rollins, No. 20-CV-929 (GMH), 2025 WL 1025084, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2025) (noting
that plaintiff “[s]ensibly” narrowed her claims at summary judgment after initially
filing a kitchen sink complaint).
This Court has significant doubts that any but the most specific and

meritorious “kitchen sink” complaint could possibly clear the bar set collectively by
Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 11. Absent extreme circumstances supported by specific
factual allegations, this Court questions whether it is even possible for a barred
attorney to truly find it plausible enough to pass Rule 11 muster that a given
defendant employer had animus towards (or tolerated a hostile work environment
regarding) nine different (largely unrelated) protected classes. This Court observes
that an experienced employment attorney who is diligently stopping, looking, and

listening would find it unlikely that such vague and broad allegations of
discrimination can plausibly be alleged so as to justify submission to a federal court.
In the rare case where an individual has indeed been the victim of nine unique and
simultaneous types of discrimination, it is not asking too much of a Plaintiff’s lawyer
to spend serious time in drafting a pleading which captures enough specifics to set it
apart from the type of kitchen sink pleadings which sound in bad faith litigation

tactics or represent unsupported paranoia from the plaintiff.
The bench and bar would benefit from additional Third Circuit authority which
discourages such pleadings or makes observations similar to the above. Such a
decision may give the District Courts more leeway to marshal the allegations before
it - in the rare case where such facts do, indeed, exist- and dismiss outright where
there are no such facts. But as the law stands, district courts have no choice but to
carefully sift through the record evidence and arguments for each and every claim
that has been thrown in with the kitchen sink.
c. The Complaint in this case is a “kitchen sink” complaint, and
Plaintiff has made no attempts to cure that deficiency

As an initial matter, this Court finds that the Complaint in this case is, indeed,
a “kitchen sink” pleading. That was clear from this Court’s first review of the
allegations with their noticeably meager factual allegations, and has been made even
more clear by the weak or nonexistent evidence proffered to oppose summary
judgment as to each of the counts in this case. This label was made all the more apt
because Plaintiff here, unlike some alluded to above, declined the invitation to narrow
the focus after fact discovery. Both in briefing and in oral argument, Plaintiff’s
counsel affirmed her intention to continue to pursue each and every claim as pleaded
in the Complaint.

This Court recognizes that there is no precedent in this Circuit which might
allow it to summarily dispense with Plaintiff’s claims on the basis of being a kitchen
sink pleading. That is, perhaps, the reason many plaintiffs pursue it; while bad form,
there are frequently no formal consequences to doing it. Many plaintiffs, in all
likelihood, are betting that our overworked courts see the extensive briefing on a
lengthy complaint and just throw up the white flag, identifying some vague factual
disputes, and leaving it all for a jury to sort out.1 That same difficulty courts face is

1 For the sake of clarity, this Court is referring here to neither the specific Plaintiff at bar nor
her attorney, but rather making general observations about the motivations which frequently underlie
pleadings like the one in this case. This Court has found no reason to believe that this Plaintiff or her
counsel was engaging in such gamesmanship.
faced by defendants, who are forced to defend themselves on innumerable unrelated
fronts, presenting serious challenges in drafting a cohesive summary judgment brief.
Some of those same plaintiffs are likely also betting that this bad faith scattershot

approach will drive up expected costs to engage in fact discovery and brief summary
judgment by defendant in such a way that it may facilitate a more lucrative pre-
discovery settlement offer. At the very least, these sorts of pleadings drive up
plaintiff’s counsel’s lodestar if they are someday awarded attorneys’ fees.
This Court will not take the path of least resistance in this case or any like it.
To the contrary, this Court has undertaken the process that its sister courts have
rightly referred to as laborious and time-consuming, and has carefully analyzed each

claim individually, and the record evidence Plaintiff claims supports it. As will be
explained, infra, this Court has given each claim its due consideration and its due
deference at summary judgment, and still found that each one lacks record evidence
to establish a genuine issue of material fact.2
As a final observation, this Court notes that while each of Plaintiff’s claims
have been analyzed individually, there still has been practical consequences of the

disfavored (and arguably violative) kitchen sink approach in this case. Rather than
being able to focus her fact discovery on her two or three best varieties of

2 Even if one or a few of Plaintiff’s claims did have merit, that would do nothing to change this
Court’s characterization of the Complaint as a “kitchen sink” complaint. The presence of some
meritorious claims does nothing to absolve the guilt of numerous asserted unmeritorious claims.
Arguably, the existence of claims that do have merit would make the kitchen sink offense worse, as
the plaintiff in such a case had no discernible reason to stack claim upon claim. Further, the existence
of a meritorious claim among the morass of a kitchen sink complaint only further aggravates the strain
this sort of complaint places on the Court, as it requires the Court to be all the more careful in sifting
through the often-confusing allegations of such a complaint.
discrimination claims, Plaintiff has been forced to take and defend discovery on
numerous totally-unrelated claims. Further, while Plaintiff sought, and received,
additional pages of briefing to oppose Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

dividing 30 pages into nine theories of discrimination as opposed to (for example) her
three best theories necessarily means she has diluted her focus, leaving most
arguments largely underdeveloped. It is likely that this has negatively impacted the
coherence and effectiveness of her briefing and oral argument.
Suffice to say that when you throw in the kitchen sink, everything else becomes
harder to carry. That doubtlessly has occurred here. Each claim, analyzed
individually and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, fails as a matter of law based

on the record evidence and legal arguments provided by Plaintiff in her briefing
opposing summary judgment.
III. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “when the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mann v. Palmerton Area School District, 872
F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation omitted). A fact is
“material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it is essential to the proper
disposition of the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
An issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id.
The party moving under Rule 56 “bears the burden of demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issues of material fact. When determining whether there is a
triable dispute of material fact, the court draws all inferences in favor of the non-

moving party.” Doeblers’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820-
821 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation omitted).
The movant's initial burden does not relieve complainant's obligation of
producing evidence that would support a jury verdict. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Because a motion for summary judgment looks beyond the pleadings, the opposing
party must advance specific facts showing that there is a genuine factual dispute. See
Marshall v. Sisters of Holy Family of Nazareth, 399 F.Supp.2d 597, 598 (E.D. Pa.

2005). The non-movant may not rest on their pleadings but must point to probative
evidence tending to support the complaint. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Id. at 252.
If the “evidence presented by the non-movant is merely colorable, or is not

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250. “Where
the movant is the defendant, or the party without the burden on the underlying claim,
the movant has no obligation to produce evidence negating its opponent's case. The
moving party merely has to point to the lack of any evidence supporting the non-
movant's claim.” Brown v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. CV 24-6412, 2025 WL 2044174,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2025) (Weilheimer, J.) (citing National State Bank v. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992).
Claims based upon discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et
seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951 et seq., are
essentially identical, requiring the same proofs and including the same burden
shifting, and therefore are analyzed together. Cf. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102,
105 (3d Cir. 1996). To make a prima facie case for disparate treatment under those
statutes, a plaintiff must be able to prove: “(1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected

class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse
employment action despite being qualified; and (4) the action occurred under
circumstances that raise an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Anderson v.
Mercer Cty. Sheriff Dep't, 815 F. App'x 664, 666 (3d Cir. 2020).
To prevail on a claim for unlawful retaliation under those statutes, a plaintiff
must prove: (1) they engaged in conduct that was protected under the relevant

statutory provision; (2) the employer took a materially adverse action or a series of
materially adverse actions against them; and (3) there was a causal relationship
between the protected conduct and the employer's materially adverse response or
responses to that conduct. Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177
(3d Cir. 1997).
Finally, absent a contract to the contrary, employment in Pennsylvania is at
will, meaning “[g]enerally, an employer may discharge an employee with or without
cause, at pleasure ....” Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. 1998) (cleaned up).

Despite this default rule, “courts have forbidden the firing of at-will employees when
doing so would offend Pennsylvania's public policy.” Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 352 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 2003). This exception is construed narrowly. Id.
IV. Discussion
a. Age

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) makes it unlawful to
discharge or discriminate against any individual regarding compensation and terms
of employment based on that individuals age if that individual is over 40. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634; Willis v. UPMC Children's Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643-644 (3d
Cir. 2015). In the absence of direct evidence, allegations that an employee was the
object of age discrimination are analyzed under the familiar McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework. If a claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden
of production shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action. Meis v. Aria Health Physician Servs., 788
F. Supp. 3d 661, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (Weilheimer, J.). If the defendant employer
successfully meets its burden of production, the plaintiff must present evidence that
the employer’s proffered reason for its action is pretextual. Scott v. Wedge Recovery
Ctr., No. 23CV4934, 2024 WL 5188042, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2024) (Beetlestone,
C.J.). Here, RHD concedes that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case under the
burden-shifting standard in her claim under the ADEA and the PHRA.
In a scattershot approach, Plaintiff asserts that she was made to feel inferior

because of her age by other members of the management team. Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that Office Manager Donna Bartram made several mean comments towards
her, stating that she was “too old,” “stuck in her ways,” and that she should just retire.
Plaintiff further alleges that younger staff joined in on these comments and that the
ideas of younger staff were platformed over Plaintiff’s own, similar ideas. See Am.
Compl. at 4-5; Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n, at 8-9. One of Plaintiff’s many theories is that these
comments amount to age discrimination and that no investigation was done, despite,

Plaintiff’s Complaints.
There are a few problems with this theory of the case. First, the principal
perpetrator according to Plaintiff was Bartram who is not Plaintiff’s superior, nor the
decision maker in this case. Next, Plaintiff stated in her deposition that the only
person she told about this perceived agism was her supervisor, Terry Meckley. Pl.’s
Dep. at 263-264. Plaintiff further testified that Meckley spoke with Bartram and that

Bartram’s behavior changed. Id. at 264-265. She also stated that Meckley took steps
to bolster morale and change the culture, including engaging multiple third-parties
for team building. Id.
What’s more, RHD has advanced a fulsome record with respect to Plaintiff’s
failures to satisfactorily discharge her duties. Plaintiff’s failures include repeated
instances, after direction from Meckley, to supervise counselors under her charge
whose productivity was lacking. On February 3, 2023, Meckley issued Plaintiff a first
written warning and plan of correction. This warning, related to several complaints
from other RDH staff members, included allegations that Plaintiff: (1) confronted a

counselor by yelling and banging hands on a desk; (2) failing to follow clinic
procedures and policies during patient dosing hours; (3) confronted a nurse by yelling
in the lobby where persons served were located; and (4) failed to meet with
supervisees on a monthly basis. Meckley Decl. at Ex. 4.
Roughly one month later, in April of 2023, Meckley issued Plaintiff a second
written warning. That warning documented the following:
Program Director was alerted to a concern regarding two IC notes [ ]
that were signed/completed by Cheryl but actual sessions and notes
were written by patients primary counselor, Cynthia. Both notes had
been sent for billing with erroneous signatures. Compliance department
was notified. Cheryl was informed that an investigation would be
opened and she was instructed not to change/adulterate the notes until
further instruction were given by compliance. This directive was not
followed as it was observed by the [Program Director] that the notes had
again been opened/unsaved the following day.

Id. at Ex. 5. On August 8, 2023, Meckley issued a final written warning outlining
several missed deadlines and several billing/auditing inaccuracies. Id. at Ex. 6.
Critically, this final written warning observed that missed auditing and/or patient
access deadlines place the program’s license, credentialling, and funding at risk. Id.
In between each of these written warnings were regularly scheduled “supervisions”
where Meckley and Plaintiff discussed Plaintiff’s performance.
On August 29, 2023, Meckley emailed Human Resources and Regional Director
Michele Kenny (Kenney) about continued concerns regarding Plaintiff’s performance.
Kenny Decl. at ¶ 10. Specifically, Meckley addressed Plaintiff’s failure timely review
billing and her failure to supervise and address productivity issues with two
counselors under her charge. Id. at Ex. 4. Notably, one of those counselors verbalized

to Meckley that scheduled supervisions between she and Plaintiff had not actually
occurred – suggesting that written documentation of the same was likely
misrepresentative of their completion. Id.
That same month, RHD suspended Plaintiff after a patient made a complaint
about an interaction between Plaintiff and the patient. After an investigation
Meckley and Kenny determined that the complaint was unfounded. Meckley Decl. at
¶ 23; Kenny Decl. at ¶ 11. In September Meckley contacted Plaintiff to discuss the

scheduled return date of October 2, 2023. Upon Plaintiff’s arrival on the morning of
October 2, 2023, Meckley terminated Plaintiff’s employment.
Against this backdrop, this Court finds Defendant has carried its burden in
establishing a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination. In
response, Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden to establish a pretextual disguise
for invidious age discrimination. None, but Bartram herself, dispute that insensitive

comments were made at Plaintiff’s expense. However, Plaintiff has not pointed to
any credible evidence that Bartram’s perceived animus in any way influenced
Meckley’s decision to terminate Plaintiff, or that Meckley ever made derogatory, agist
remarks towards Plaintiff. In fact, Meckley made the decision, certainly aware of
Plaintiff’s age, to hire Plaintiff in the first place. See Pl.’s Dep. at 269. Although, our
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to treat “same actor” evidence as
presumptive in ADEA claims, courts are still permitted to consider it as an important
indication of the unlikeliness of the same decision maker firing a plaintiff for a reason
that was plain at the time of their hiring. Carroll v. Guardant Health, Inc., 511 F.

Supp. 3d 623, 644 n.97 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (Kearney, J.). The record evidence
demonstrates that Plaintiff’s ongoing performance issues, including issues that could
put the licensure of the entire recovery center at risk, are the animating factors in
Plaintiff’s termination. Accordingly, RHD is entitled to summary judgment on
Counts 1 and 12 for age discrimination.
b. Disability

Plaintiff also alleges that RHD failed to accommodate her disability and
ultimately terminated her employment because of the same. A claimant can establish
discrimination under the ADA by way of either a pretext theory or a mixed-motive
theory. Under a pretext theory, Plaintiff must establish: (1) that she has a disability
as defined by the ADA; (2) she is a qualified individual and could perform the

essential function of the position; and (3) her disability was a determinative factor in
the adverse employment decision. Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604,
611 (3d Cir. 2006). The traditional McDonnell Douglas paradigm also applies to the
pretext theory of ADA discrimination.
In a mixed-motive case, a plaintiff must prove that her protected status was a
motiving factor in the employer’s decision making-process. A claimant may do this
by proffering “evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that the decision makers

placed substantial negative reliance” on the plaintiff’s protected status. Brown v. J.
Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 2009). This may be done through examples of
the decision makers making statements that reflect a discriminatory attitude. Id.
Under either theory, Plaintiff must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such
impairment, or that they are regarded as having such impairment. Bialko v. Quaker
Oats Co., 434 F. App'x 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff’s asserted disability is related to an April 20, 2023 workplace fall that
occurred when Plaintiff collided with a patient in a wheelchair and injured her right
knee, pelvis, and back.3 See Pl’s Br. in Opp’n 15-16 (“[Plaintiff] is disabled or at the
very least Meckley perceived her to be disabled. As a result of the accident at work,

[Plaintiff] suffered serious injuries, which continue to cause her pain”); Pl.’s Dep. at
275-277. However, this theory of the case is undermined by Plaintiff’s own deposition
testimony. One exchange is particularly illustrative:
Q: Did anybody at RHD make any comments, statements, to you about
medical conditions in a derogatory way?

A: I think Donna called me a gimp one time.

Q: Is that because you use a cane or is that because of the injury at the
fall?

A: Because of the cane … And I don’t carry it all the time…

Q: So the ADA claim, we have an -- allegations of – I guess of failure to
accommodate, discrimination, retaliation and harassment, but I think
you’ve just told me that nobody said anything to you about -- ?

3 Notably, when Plaintiff was first asked about her disability claim at her deposition, she stated
that it was associated with her Multiple Sclerosis (MS) and not her workplace fall. Plaintiff’s MS is
not mentioned a single time in her Amended Complaint, or her Opposition Brief See Pl.’s Dep. at 271-
272. Plaintiff further stated that she did not require accommodations at the workplace
because of her M.S. See Pl.’s Dep. at 273.
A: Other than Donna calling me a gimp.

Q: It was Donna Bartram?

A: It’s always Donna Bartram.

Pl.’s Dep. at 282-283.
This Court agrees with RHD that there is simply no evidence in the record that
Plaintiff’s termination, under a pretext theory or a mixed motive theory, was
motivated by her workplace fall or resultant injuries. Assuming, in Plaintiff’s favor,
that she has established her prima facie case, there is no indication that her knee and
hip injuries impacted at all Meckley’s termination decision. Plaintiff was treated and
released to full duty as of June 2023. See Pl.’s Ex JJ. Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition,
which is generally heavy on legal conclusions and light on record facts, seems to
suggest that Meckley questioned Plaintiff’s request for leave beyond what was
indicated by her Workers Compensation discharge. See Pl’s Br. in Opp’n at 19.
However, Meckley ultimately granted Plaintiff’s additional leave. See Meckley Decl.
at ¶ 19.
Again, this Court sees the far more likely explanation for Plaintiff’s
termination as her repeated workplace failures described above. There is no evidence
that Meckley had any animus towards Plaintiff’s injury. In fact, Plaintiff’s deposition
testimony demonstrates that Meckley was one of the few who helped her when she
fell. Pl.’s Dep. at 337-338. Accordingly, RHD is entitled to summary judgment on
Counts 2 and 13.
Plaintiff also asserts that RHD denied her an accommodation under the ADA
and PHRA. This claim centers around a May 10, 2023, team building cooking
demonstration scheduled by Meckley.4 Plaintiff contends that, due to the workplace

injury described above and the standing/sitting restrictions associated with her
injures, she was unable to meaningfully participate because the demonstration
required staff to stand to see. See Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 97; Def.’s Br. at 15.
To state a failure to accommodate claim, Plaintiff must establish that (1) she
had a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) RHD had notice of this disability;
(3) she can perform the essential functions of her position with reasonable
accommodation; and (4) RHD failed to provide an accommodation. Campo v. Mid-

Atl. Packaging Specialties, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 3d 362, 388 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (Marston,
J.). To establish the last element (that RHD failed to accommodate) Plaintiff must
prove that (1) RHD knew about the employee's disability; (2) she asked for an
accommodation or assistance; (3) RHD did not make a good-faith effort to
accommodate the employee; and (4) she could have been accommodated. Id.
Again assuming that Plaintiff has established that she had a disability that

required an accommodation under the ADA, Plaintiff never requested an
accommodation to sit during the team building exercise. Plaintiff attended the event
and when she became tired, she began to walk away for the demonstration, at which
point a chair was provided for Plaintiff to participate. Pl’s Dep. at 278-280.

4 There is some indication that this demonstration was scheduled before Plaintiff’s workplace
injury – preventing Meckley from considering Plaintiff’s needs at the time the demonstration was
scheduled.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to make out a claim that RHD denied her a
reasonable accommodation in Couts 2 and 13.
c. Religion

Plaintiff alleges, under both a pretext theory and a mixed motive theory, that
that RHD terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of her religion. As discussed
above, the pretext theory is analyzed under McDonnell Douglas. To state a prima
facie case, Plaintiff must first demonstrate that she was terminated under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Sarullo v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s Title VII claims similarly fail
because RHD has advanced significant evidence demonstrating that the decision
maker, Meckley, had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to terminate Plaintiff’s
employment.
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding discrimination based on religion seem to
center around unkind exchanges between Plaintiff and co-workers Bartram, Brooke

Moats, Alex Scharf, and Marisa Palencar. Pl.’s Dep. at 106-107. In one instance,
multiple staff were participating in a teambuilding icebreaker exercise where
Plaintiff happened to disclose that she was raised Mennonite. In response, Bartram
stated that this may explain all of Plaintiff’s “peculiarities” and that she “knew
[Plaintiff] was weird.” Pl.’s Dep at 300-301. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony
continued:
Q: …and did she make that statement also noting your religion when
she said you were weird?
A: She didn’t specifically say because you were raised Mennonite you’re
weird.

Q: Did you ask her why she would always say that?

A: No

Q: So you’re sort of taking [] your interpretation of that she said you
were weird, you think that she saying that because she knows you were
Menonite?

A: After saying I was peculiar…

Q: Did she make any other comments to you about your religion, or about
… being Mennonite?

A: Probably not specifically, just kind of little innuendo about because I
don’t cuss, I make words up [instead], she cusses all the time…And then
shed say things like, well there you go again, you know.

Q: Okay. Is she making fun of you because you don’t cuss[?]

A: Because that’s part of the culture … we just don’t talk that way … I
will warn people, if you hear a cuss word come out of my mouth there’s
something serious going on.

Q: Okay. Do you --- I know you were aised Mennonite, are you active in
the church now?

A: In the Mennonite church, no. Methodist, yes…

Q: …So did [Bartram] make comments about you being a Methodist?

A: I don’t think I ever mentioned the Methodist part.[5]

Id. at 301-304. When asked directly if Meckley (the decision maker in this case) or
any other staff member, ever made a comment about her religion, Plaintiff stated

5 Here, Plaintiff appears to assert a claim of religious discrimination on behalf of a religion she
no longer practices. Although Plaintiff was raised Mennonite, she is currently a practicing Methodist,
and the Complaint contains no allegations of discrimination based on her Methodist faith. This
circumstance raises the interesting question as to whether Plaintiff may properly assert such a claim.
But as this claim fails on the allegations as pleaded, it is not a question this Court need address.
that she did not. Id. at 310. For the same reasons discussed above regarding the
ADA claims, Plaintiff has no evidence that her religious beliefs were a motivating
factor in Meckley’s decision to terminate her employment. In fact, by Plaintiff’s own

admission, Meckely never made any statements or engaged in any conduct that
reflected a discriminatory attitude toward Plaintiff based on her religious beliefs.
Accordingly, RDH is entitled to summary judgment on Counts 6 and 15.
d. Hostile Work Environment.
Plaintiff has also asserted Hostile Work Environment Claims related to Counts

1, 2, 6, 12, 13, and 15. The standard of an employer’s liability for a hostile work
environment depends on whether the alleged harasser is a co-worker or the
employee’s supervisor with a authority to affect the terms and conditions of the
employee’s employment. As an initial matter, Bartram and others that are alleged
to have been unkind to Plaintiff did not supervise Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim
must be evaluated consistent with Vance v. Ball State Univ. holding that “supervisor”

for purposes of vicarious liability is one empowered to take tangible employment
actions against the complaining employee. 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
To establish a hostile work environment claim where the actor is not a
supervisor, Plaintiff must show: (1) she was subjected to intentional discrimination
that was motivated by her protected class; (2) the discrimination was severe or
pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected Plaintiff; (4) the
discrimination or conduct was would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like

circumstances; and (5) management level employees knew or should have known of
the conduct and failed to take prompt an adequate remedial action. Mandel v. M &
Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013). To determine whether remedial
action is adequate the Court must evaluate whether the action was reasonably

calculated to prevent further harassment. Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 412-
413 (3d Cir. 1997). The PHRA evaluates hostile work environment claims through
an identical standard. Griswold v. Drexel Univ., No. CV 22-0568, 2024 WL 921390,
at *6 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2024) (Quiñones Alejandro, J.)
With respect to Plaintiff’s age-related claims, Plaintiff conceded during her
deposition that the age comments stopped after she reported them to Meckley. See
Pl.’s Dep. at 265-266. Accordingly, a management level employee took remedial steps,

and those steps achieved the desired workplace result. Thus, RHD is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s age-based hostile work environment claims.
Plaintiff’s ADA based hostile work environment claims fail as well. Plaintiff
testified at her deposition that Bartram “called [her] a gimp one time.” Id. at 282.
This single instance of name calling, while unkind, does not meet the severity or the
pervasiveness prong required to establish an actionable claim. Lamb v. Montgomery

Twp., 734 F. App'x 106, 112 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming summary judgment where
claimant was subjected to one incident of harassment overtly based on protected
classification). Separately, there is no record evidence that RHD knew or had reason
to know that Bartram called Plaintiff a gimp. Thus, RHD is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim as well.
Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims related to religion similarly fail.
Plaintiff only recalled a single incident where her religion was even disclosed, with a
single comment in response from Bartram. See Pl.’s Dep. at 299-301. And although

Plaintiff testified that Bartram would on occasion call her “weird,” Plaintiff conceded
that these comments were prompted by her largely associated with her manner of
speaking as opposed to anything overtly religious. See Pl.’s Dep. at 302-303. Finally,
while there is some evidence that Meckley may have been present during the initial
exchange where Plaintiff disclosed her religious upbringing, Plaintiff never reported
the incident to human resources. Accordingly, RHD is entitled to summary judgment
on the hostile work environment claims based on religion.

e. Retaliation
Plaintiff has asserted retaliation claims with respect to her ADEA, ADA and
Title VII religious discrimination claims, as well as her Title VII racial discrimination
claims and claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for racial discrimination. To establish

unlawful retaliation for making internal reports and complaints, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) they engaged in protected employee activity; (2) adverse action
between the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected
activity and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the
employer’s adverse action. E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir.
2015).
As with most of Plaintiff’s claims, retaliation claims are viewed through the

prism of McDonnell Douglas. Accordingly, Plaintiff must establish a causal link
between protected conduct and workplace antagonism. Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of
Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2015). Additionally, plaintiff must
demonstrate that the employer’s asserted reasons for the adverse employment action

are unusually week, presenting inconsistencies, implausibilities or contradictions.
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).
This Court has already articulated its view that the record evidence, including
multiple written warnings documenting complaints against Plaintiff and her failure
to complete tasks, was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s
termination. RHD has carried its burden in objectively establishing that it would
have terminated Plaintiff based on her performance alone. Separately, there is no

record evidence that Plaintiff made any internal reports or complaints with respect
to her age, disability, or religious claims.
Plaintiff’s claims for race discrimination (Counts 4, 5, and 14), have a bit more
heft, but are still unavailing. Plaintiff alleges that in June of 2023 she was
affectionately discussing her son’s souped-up muscle car when two of her white co-
workers referred to her as a “redneck” and “white trash.” Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-

47. Plaintiff informed HR that she was filing a formal complaint and advised that
she would be taking PTO for the next several days as hostility and harassment was
affecting her mental health.6
What Plaintiff fails to acknowledge is that by June of 2023, she had already
received two written warnings for deficient performance and numerous one-on-one

6 Plaintiff has not made an emotional damages claim as part of her Amended Complaint.
supervisions with Meckley. Plaintiff completely fails to challenge the believability
with RHD’s asserted reasons for her termination. Confusingly, Plaintiff continues to
maintain that the record evidence shows she completed her all of her required tasks

and that she did not perform her job poorly. See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n. at 7. That
assertion ignores the multiple written warnings discussed and cited above. Plaintiff
simply fails to demonstrate that RHD terminated her employment because she filed
a formal complaint. Accordingly, RHD is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
race discrimination retaliation claims.
f. Workers Compensation Retaliation

In Count 3 of her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that her termination
was an act of retaliation in violation of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act
(PWCA). 77 P.S. § 1 et seq. The PWCA makes it unlawful for an employer to
discharge an at-will employee in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim.
Kieffer v. CPR Restoration & Cleaning Serv., LLC, 200 F. Supp. 3d 520, 539 (E.D. Pa.

2016) (Beetlestone, C.J.), aff'd sub nom. Kieffer v. CPR Restoration & Cleaning Servs.,
LLC, 733 F. App'x 632 (3d Cir. 2018). Thes claims are similarly addressed under the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Applying the McDonnell Douglass
framework, Plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he
suffered an adverse employment action either after or contemporaneous with the
protected activity; and (3) a causal connection exists between his protected activity
and the employer's adverse action. Id. A claimant may establish this causal nexus
by relying on temporal proximity or other circumstantial evidence concerning the
employers motivation. Id. at 540.
Here, Plaintiff certainly engaged in protected activity when she filed her claim.

Plaintiff was subsequently terminated from her employment for (again) what the
Court sees as patently legitimate non-discriminatory reasons. The temporal
proximity between Plaintiff’s injury/claim and her subsequent termination does not
support her PWCA claim either. Plaintiff’s fall occurred on April 20, 2023 – shortly
after her second written warning for performance issues. Plaintiff was terminated 5
months and 12 days later, on October 2. Multiple courts across jurisdictions have
recognized that the persuasive value of temporal proximity in this context dissipates

quickly. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir.
2007) (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)) (holding that
a gap of 3 months is not indicative of animus or causation). Accordingly, the 5 month
gap in this matter does support causation and Plaintiff has failed to make her prima
facie case.
Even assuming Plaintiff had established a prima facie case, Plaintiff had

several supervisions and formal warnings predating her fall and workers’
compensation claim. Plaintiff has failed to establish any contradictions in the
legitimate reasons RHD has proffered for her termination. Thus, RHD is entitled to
summary judgment on this species of retaliation as well.
g. FMLA Retaliation
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that Meckely ordered her to discipline
one of her direct reports (Joanne Beauregard) for taking intermittent leave under the
Family and Medical Leave Act. See Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 126-130. Plaintiff asserts

that when she complained that it was unlawful to discipline the employee for taking
FMLA-qualifying leave, she was the target of increased animosity which ultimately
led to her termination on October 2.
“When employees invoke rights granted under the FMLA, employers may not
interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or attempt to exercise these rights.
Nor may employers discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful.” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of

Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). To advance this species of retaliation, Plaintiff must establish that
(1) she engaged in protected activity by having a reasonable, good-faith belief that
she was ordered to discipline the employee for taking FMLA; (2) she as subjected to
a materially adverse action after her protected conduct; and (3) a causal connection
exists between the protected activity and RHD’s decision to terminate her

employment.
This claim, much like the bulk of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ignores the
reality of the record evidence. Shortly after she was hired, Plaintiff was made aware
that Beauregard had productivity issues and that Plaintiff would need to engage
Beauregard to address those issues. Compare Def.’s Stmt. Undisputed Facts at ¶ 21
with Pl.’s Resp. Since December of 2022, it was clear that Meckley’s instruction to
supervise and discipline Beauregard was specifically due to her productivity issues –
not her lawful use of FMLA. When asked whether she believed she was ever
disciplined due to taking FMLA, Beauregard answered “Absolutely not ... I do admit

[ ] my productivity was slow.” Beauregard Dep. at 42. Beauregard further testified
that in March, Plaintiff herself stated that she faced discipline for low productivity.
Id. at 35-36. In light of Plaintiff’s acknowledged understanding that she was
instructed to discipline Beauregard for productivity issues, and Beauregard’s own
view that FMLA was not the reason for this discipline, it is unclear how Plaintiff
would have a good faith belief that Meckely was asking her to discipline Beauregard
in violation of the FMLA.

Again, assuming for Plaintiff’s sake that she did have a good faith belief that
Meckley was asking her to issue discipline violative of the FMLA, her termination in
October, after she was instructed to discipline Beauregard in March, is not
sufficiently proximate to establish a causal connection. See Leboon, supra.; see also
Harrison-Harper v. Nike Inc., 788 F. App'x 846, 850 (3d Cir. 2019) (clear, documented
pattern of performance issues prior to complaints of harassment weigh negatively on

causation). Plaintiff herself was on a disciplinary track since February of 2023. Thus
RHD is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s FMLA claim as well.
h. Adult Protective Services Act Retaliation
In Count 8, Plaintiff alleges that her termination, at least in part, was due to
retaliation for her reporting to management her concerns that the nursing staff was

arbitrarily, unlawfully and improperly withholding life-sustaining medication from
patients and that this amounted to a form patient abuse. See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n at 10.
RHD asserts that this claim is dead in the water, as the Adult Protective Services
Act, 35 P.S. § 10210.101 et seq., does not include outpatient facilities, like the one

RHD operates, in its definitions. Defendant’s argument follows that the Act does not
apply in this instance. See 35 P.S. § 10210.103.
The Act defines facility in expressly non-exhaustive terms with the proviso
“includes, but is not limited to[.]” Id. However, Plaintiff provides absolutely no
argument on this point.7 The Court will not manufacture an argument on Plaintiff’s
behalf for this state law claim. Even if Plaintiff had spotted this issue, she would be
unlikely to overcome the fact that RHD terminated her employment for a legitimate,

non-retaliatory reason as evidenced by her record of warnings and supervisions.
Thus, RHD is entitled to summary judgment on Count 8.8
i. Pennsylvania Whistleblower Act
In Count 9, Plaintiff asserts that she was terminated in violation of the

Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. § 1421 et seq.9 The statute provides that:
No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or
retaliate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation,
terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because the
employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee makes a good
faith report or is about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer
or appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste by a public

7 As previously mentioned, it is tough to parry even weak arguments when your own filings are
overbroad and unfocused.

8 Assuming further that Plaintiff had spotted the issue and had established some pretextual
motive on the part of RHD, this Court would be disinclined to retain jurisdiction over this state law
claim absent some other federal basis for jurisdiction.

9 The activity that precipitated this alleged retaliation is the same activity that undergirds
Plaintiff’s Adult Protective Services claim. See Pl’s Resp. in Opp’n 9-10.
body or an instance of waste by any other employer as defined in this
act.

43 P.S. § 1423(a) (emphasis added). The statute defines “public body” as any “body
which is created by Commonwealth or political subdivision authority or which is
funded in any amount by or through Commonwealth or political
subdivision[.]” 43 P.S. § 1422 (emphasis added). Accordingly, to maintain this
claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that RHD is a public body within the meaning of
the statute. See Adams v. HCF Mgmt., No. CV 18-47, 2018 WL 3388404, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. July 12, 2018) (“Plaintiff cannot prevail on her Whistleblower Law claim unless
she can demonstrate that HCF is a public body within the meaning of the statute.”).
The law in this area is mixed. Defendant appears to concede that RDH receives
some public funds due to the heavily regulated nature of its mission and/or Medicaid
reimbursements. See Def.’s Stmt. Undisputed Facts at ¶¶ 3-5; Def.’s Br. at 20-22.

Assuming that some state monies are received by RHD, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has not specifically passed on whether this alone would make it a public body
in the meaning of the statute. But see Harrison v. Health Network Lab'ys Ltd.
Partnerships, 232 A.3d 674, 677 n.3 (Pa. 2020) (the court acknowledged without
deciding that the parties agreed health care provider receiving Medicare funds was a
public body within the meaning of the Whistleblower Law). RHD points to a handful
of district court cases explaining that “Medicaid reimbursements do not, without

more, constitute funding by or through the Commonwealth.” Lampenfeld v. Pyramid
Healthcare, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-0283, 2015 WL 926154, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2015)
(cleaned up); see also Adams v. HCF Mgmt., No. CV 18-47, 2018 WL 3388404, at *5
(W.D. Pa. July 12, 2018); but see Bailer v. Shipley Energy Co., 338 A.3d 1026, 1032
(Pa. Super. 2025), reargument denied (July 29, 2025) (a recipient of Medicaid funding
qualifies as a public body because the law clearly indicates that it is intended to be

applied to bodies that receive public money that passes through the Commonwealth.).
Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard are relatively undeveloped. Nowhere in
her response to RHD’s brief does she push back on RHD’s contention that its funding
regime brings it within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Act.10 This
Court is unwilling to divine nuanced areas of Pennsylvania regulatory law where one
or both of the parties has failed to marshal substantive legal support for their claims.
See Wonlah v. Domus, Inc., No. 2:24-CV-04725-GAW, 2025 WL 1139268, at *3 (E.D.

Pa. Apr. 16, 2025) (Weilheimer, J.). The Court’s decision not to wade into this space
is buttressed by the fact that Plaintiff was clearly terminated for legitimate, non-
retaliatory reasons. Accordingly, RHD is entitled to summary judgment on Count
9.11
j. Pennsylvania Common Law

Count 10 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that her firing violated
Pennsylvania’s public policy prohibiting wrongful termination. Specifically, Plaintiff
asserts that she was terminated for her refusal to comply with several illegal acts.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff points to no record evidence of her being required to

10 This is odd considering Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint string cites several cases which she
believes speak to this issue. See Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 145. String cites without argument or direction
are generally unhelpful, especially when a party brings 15 claims.

11 The Court would also be disinclined to retain jurisdiction over this state law claim absent
some other federal basis for jurisdiction.
participate in any unlawful conduct. Additionally, Defendant leans on what this
Court has already determined are legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for Plaintiff’s
discharge.

“[A]n employee may bring a cause of action for termination of an at-will
employment relationship where the termination implicates a clear mandate of public
policy.” Eaves-Voyles v. Almost Fam., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 403, 410 (M.D. Pa. 2016)
(emphasis added). Pennsylvania courts have recognized that the public policy must
be expressly regained in legislation, regulation, or judicial decisions. Id. This
exception to the at-will employment relationship is limited to circumstances where
the employer: (1) requires an employee to commit a crime; (2) prevents and employee

from complying with a statutorily imposed duty; or (3) discharges an employee when
specifically prohibited from doing so by statute. Brennan v. Cephalon, Inc., 298 F.
App'x 147, 150 (3d Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff’s briefing makes zero argument that she was requested to participate
in any illegal acts. In her response, Plaintiff has heaved more than a page of single-
spaced bullet pointed regulations in her opposition brief related to the legal

obligations of nurses in the Commonwealth. See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n 10-12. Plaintiff
has never claimed to be a nurse. As such, these regulations plainly do not apply to
her. It is also not clear that the nurses at RHD were breaking the law or violating
any public policy. Even if they were, Plaintiff has not articulated how she would have
been required to participate in that scheme. RHD did not require or request that
Plaintiff commit any crime. Finally, and most critically, Plaintiff was discharge for
legitimate non-retaliatory reasons detailed above. Accordingly, RHD is entitled to
summary judgment Claim 10.12
k. Wage Payment and Collection Claim

Finally, Count 11 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts that RHD failed to
pay a $1000 portion of a sign-on bonus she was promised, that RHD failed to pay her
for accrued but unused paid time off upon her termination, and that it also failed to
pay her for her last week of employment. See Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 156-163. There
may be legitimate issues of fact with respect to whether Plaintiff was paid all that

she was owed upon her departure. On this claim, which the Court notes is untethered
to the reason Plaintiff was actually terminated, the record is not wholly clear.
This Court is unwilling to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what is
certainly a meaningful amount of money to Plaintiff, but what amounts to an
arbitration level dispute. See generally Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109 (district courts
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims after the dismissal of

all claims over which the court had original jurisdiction.). If Plaintiff so chooses, she
may bring this cause of action in state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
V. Conclusion
The Court wishes to emphasize that the outcome of this matter was not born

out of malice or frustration with the Plaintiff’s stated experience. It is clear from the
record that her co-workers probably harbored some poor feelings for Plaintiff. They
were likely unkind, and Plaintiff was likely not the best social fit for Defendant’s

12 See nn. 7, 10, supra.
organization. But non-discrimination statutes do not codify a general code of civility
and Plaintiff simply could not prove, based on this record, that any invidious
discrimination took place. What this matter makes clear is the cautionary tale in
that in a borderline case, the parties would do well to focus on their best arguments
taking an acute and sharpened approach, as opposed to a broad one.
For the foregoing reasons all of Plaintiffs claims except for her wage payment
and collection claim are dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order will follow.

BY THE COURT:

GAIL A. WEILHEIMER, J.
Dated: 2/2/26

36

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274456. Public record. Not legal advice.