# Dunn

> District Court, N.D. Texas · February 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274437

## Case

- **Full name:** Edrick Jamar Dunn v. Jim Bob Darnell, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** February 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274437

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that a dismissal with prejudice is generally considered a final adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION

EDRICK JAMAR DUNN,
Institutional ID No. 01896519

Plaintiff,

v. No. 5:25-CV-00132-H

JIM BOB DARNELL, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Edrick Jamar Dunn, a self-represented state prisoner, filed this civil-rights
action in state court against former state-court District Judge Jim Bob Darnell, former
Lubbock County District Clerk Barbara Sucsy, and current Lubbock County District Clerk
Sara L Smith. Defendants Sucsy and Smith promptly filed a notice of removal under
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).1 Dkt. No. 1. Soon after removing this case, they filed a notice of
related cases, listing five earlier lawsuits that Plaintiff filed in this Court against the same
defendants and asserting the same or similar claims. Dkt. No. 6. All three defendants then
moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata and
because they are entitled to absolute and qualified immunity. Dkt. Nos. 7, 8. Additionally,
Defendants Sucsy and Smith assert that Plaintiff’s claims against them are subject to
dismissal for insufficient service, failure to state a claim, and as barred by the statute of
limitations. Dkt. No. 7.

1 Defendant Darnell consented to the removal. See Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff filed four responses to the motions to dismiss.2 Dkt. Nos. 10, 12, 14, 16. He
also filed an objection to the removal, Dkt. No. 20, a motion for appointment of counsel,
Dkt. No. 21, and three motions for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction,
Dkt. Nos. 17, 29, and 30. He also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.3 Defendants

Sucsy and Smith replied in support of their motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 23, and responded
to each of Plaintiff’s other requests, Dkt. Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 33.
Now, as explained below, after reviewing the parties’ pleadings and the applicable
law, the Court finds that, among other defects, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata
and in any event, each of the defendants are entitled to immunity from suit. Thus, the
Court grants Defendants’ motions, Dkt. Nos. 7, 8, and dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint.
Likewise, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection to the removal of this case and denies
Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief and appointment of counsel. Dkt. Nos. 17, 20, 21,
29, and 30.
1. Background

A. Plaintiff’s claims and history
Plaintiff sues Defendants Darnell, Sucsy, and Smith for their alleged mishandling of
his state habeas case between 2017 and 2022. Dkt. No. 2 at 17. He asserts that Defendant
Judge Darnell disregarded an order from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals requiring

2 Plaintiff labels his first response, Dkt. No. 10, as a motion for summary judgment, but it does not
comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 or the applicable local rules.
Moreover, because this case remains at the pleading stage and no scheduling order has issued, a
motion for summary judgment would be premature. Thus, the Court considers Plaintiff’s arguments
only in response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

3Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is unnecessary here because the defendants paid the
filing fee upon removal. But in any event, as discussed below, Plaintiff is ineligible to proceed in
forma pauperis under the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Thus, the Court denies the
motion.
him to refer Plaintiff’s motion for recusal to a supervisory judge. Id. at 18–19. Then, he
asserts that Defendant Sucsy concealed the denial of his motion to recuse by not sending
him a copy of the order. And he contends that when he later attempted to purchase copies
from his habeas record, Defendant Smith sent him the wrong documents. Altogether,

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Darnell, Sucsy, and Smith conspired to violate his
constitutional rights and prevent him from obtaining the habeas relief to which he was
entitled. He seeks compensatory damages calculated at a rate of $50 per day, as well as
punitive damages and other monetary relief. He also seeks wide-ranging declaratory relief
and injunctive relief related to his state-court criminal proceedings and habeas proceedings.
Plaintiff expands on his requests for relief in his motions for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction. Dkt. Nos. 17, 29, 30. In each motion, Plaintiff requests,
essentially, that he be released from prison and that the defendants—or at least Defendant
Darnell—be placed in jail. See id.
These claims are not new. Plaintiff has brought each of these claims in this Court

multiple times, and he has been unsuccessful each time. See Dunn v. Smith, No. 5:22-cv-178
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2023) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Dunn v. Sucsy, No. 5:22-cv-
190 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2023) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Dunn v. Darnell, No.
5:22-cv-191 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2023) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Dunn v.
Darnell, et al., No. 5:23-cv-140 (N.D. Tex. July 14, 2023) (dismissed under the three-strikes
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Dunn v. Darnell, et al., No. 5:23-cv-180 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
17, 2023) (dismissed under the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). And, in
addition to his unsuccessful civil-rights cases, Plaintiff also raised these claims in an
unsuccessful habeas action before this Court. See Dunn v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 5:17-cv-
187 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2020) (denied and dismissed with prejudice).
B. Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal
Given this history, Plaintiff understandably objects to the removal of his complaint

and asks that the Court remand it to the state court. Dkt. No. 20. Defendants removed the
case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction because it predominantly raises a
“claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441(c), 1331. “After removal, a case may be remanded to state court based on (1) lack
of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect.” Banda v. City of McAllen, Texas, No. 24-40508,
2025 WL 3094122, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). “The
removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal
was proper.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts that he believes the state court may be more amenable to his claims

because it did not dismiss the complaint before it was removed. Dkt. No. 20. And he
argues that the state court is capable of adjudicating his claims. Id. But he makes no
argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims—indeed, he reaffirms that he
believes the defendants have violated his constitutional and federal rights. See id. Nor does
he identify any other defect in the removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In other words, he
objects to the removal of his case because he would prefer to proceed in state court, but he
fails to make any argument that the removal was improper. Moreover, Defendants have
satisfied their burden to show that the Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s constitutional
claims and that the removal was proper. Thus, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled, and the

Court declines to remand the case to state court.
C. Defendants’ motions
Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. All three defendants assert
that they are each entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged actions or omissions in the
adjudication of Plaintiff’s state habeas proceedings. Dkt. Nos. 7, 8. They also argue that

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. They contend that Plaintiff’s history here shows
that he has raised the same claims against the same defendants before, and his claims were
fully adjudicated in this Court.
In addition to these fatal defects, Sucsy and Smith assert that Plaintiff’s claims
against them are also subject to dismissal for insufficient service of process under Rule
12(b)(5) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 7. Specifically, Sucsy
and Smith contend that Plaintiff failed to properly serve them because he issued his own
citation instead of going through the clerk’s office, and he failed to deliver it to them
personally or to a designated agent for service. They also argue that Plaintiff’s claims are

subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim for the same reasons as before, he has failed to
overcome their assertion of qualified immunity, and that in any event, his claims are now
time barred. Finally, Sucsy and Smith argue that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims must fail
because he complains about an isolated incident rather than a recurring pattern or custom.
In sum, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no right to bring these repetitive claims
against them again, and even if he did, his claims must fail for a number of reasons. Thus,
they ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint and all of his claims against them.
Plaintiff’s responses do little more than repeat his claims and insist they have merit. Dkt.
Nos. 14, 16.
2. Legal Standards
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff “fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court must

accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff’s favor. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). In
reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must generally examine
only the complaint and any attachments to the complaint. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). But a court may consider extrinsic documentary
evidence if (1) the document is attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss, (2) the
document is referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint, and (3) the document is “central” to the
plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 498–99.
The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[T]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but must provide
the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to relief–including factual allegations that when
assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503
F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, at 555)).
A claim is facially plausible when it asserts facts that allow the court “to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This determination is context-specific and requires the
court to draw upon its own experience and common sense. Id.
B. Res Judicata
Res judicata “insures the finality of judgments and thereby conserves judicial
resources and protects litigants from multiple lawsuits.” Oreck Direct, LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 560
F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir.

1994)). “The preclusive effect of a prior federal court judgment is controlled by federal res
judicata rules.” Ellis v. Amex Life Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted). Those rules bar “the litigation of claims that either have been litigated or should
have been raised in an earlier suit.” Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571
(5th Cir. 2005).
In the Fifth Circuit, res judicata applies if four conditions are present: (1) the parties
in the subsequent action are identical to, or in privity with, the parties in the prior action;
(2) the judgment in the prior case was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) there has been a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action

is involved in both suits. Id. Courts in this circuit use a “transactional test,” when
considering the fourth condition—“[t]he critical issue is whether the two suits are based on
the ‘same nucleus of operative facts.’” Chalmers v. City of Dall., No. 3:14-cv-36-N, 2014 WL
7174289, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2014) (quoting Test Masters, 428 F.3d at 571); see also
Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 522 (5th Cir. 2016) (“True res judicata
bars recovery when a party seeks to relitigate the same facts even when the party argues a
novel legal theory.” (citing Agrilectric Power Partners, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 20 F.3d 663, 665
(5th Cir. 1994))).
3. Discussion
A. Res Judicata
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. They contend
that Plaintiff’s history in this Court satisfies each of the four required conditions, and he is

precluded from attempting to relitigate the same issues against the same defendants.
Plaintiff does not dispute that the defendants here are identical to those named in his
prior suits. Nor does he refute that he raises the same claims—based on the same nucleus of
operative fact—as before. And he makes no argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction
when it adjudicated his earlier cases. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that the Court’s prior
judgments were not final and have no preclusive effect. Dkt. No. 14 at 9–10; Dkt. No. 16 at
10. Specifically, he argues that because some of his cases were dismissed without prejudice,
he cannot be barred from refiling now. Id.
Plaintiff is correct that “dismissals without prejudice are not typically considered

decisions on the merits.” Pie Dev., L.L.C. v. Pie Carrier Holdings, Inc., 128 F.4th 657, 662 (5th
Cir. 2025). But when a plaintiff declines to amend after a dismissal without prejudice, “the
dismissal without prejudice converts to a dismissal with prejudice and constitutes a final
judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes.” Id. “Res judicata applies when litigants
have either ‘failed to persuade a tribunal of the merit of their claims or ... [have] slept on
their rights.’” Id. (quoting Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 674 F.2d 379, 384–85 (5th Cir. 1982)).
Here, Plaintiff’s first federal lawsuit against Defendant Sucsy—in both her individual
and official capacities—was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. See Dunn v.
Sucsy, No. 5:22-cv-00190, at Dkt. Nos. 25, 26 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2023). Specifically, the

Court found that Plaintiff’s claims against Sucsy were barred by the statute of limitations,
and that in any event, his allegations failed to support a viable cause of action. See id. at
Dkt. No. 24. There can be no doubt that the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice
was a final judgment on the merits that precludes Plaintiff from relitigating his claims
against Defendant Sucsy. See Oreck Direct LLC, 560 F.3d at 401 (noting that a dismissal with

prejudice is generally considered a final adjudication on the merits for purposes of res
judicata) (citing Fernandez-Montez v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F2d. 278, 284 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff named Defendant Sucsy in two more lawsuits based on the same
facts and issues. See Nos. 5:23-cv-00140; 5:23-cv-00180. Each of those lawsuits was
dismissed without prejudice as barred under the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
Plaintiff also fully litigated his claims against Defendants Smith and Darnell. See
Dunn v. Smith, No. 5:22-cv-00178; Dunn v. Darnell, No. 5:22-cv-00191. In each of those
cases, the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim. No. 5:22-cv-00178 at Dkt.

No. 18; No. 5:22-cv-00191 at Dkt. No. 12. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff’s
allegations against Smith did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and his claims
against Darnell were untimely and barred by judicial immunity. See id. And the Court
noted that there was no indication that Plaintiff failed to plead his best case against each of
these defendants. Id. But given Plaintiff’s status as a self-represented prisoner, the Court
dismissed the two cases without prejudice “to allow Plaintiff to attempt to amend his
complaint within a reasonable time to try and cure the deficiencies in his pleadings.”
No. 5:22-cv-00191 at Dkt. No. 12 (citing Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.
1998).
Plaintiff did not attempt to amend his pleadings in either case. Nor did he appeal the
dismissals. He tried to refile his claims twice in later lawsuits against all three defendants.
See Nos. 5:23-cv-00140; 5:23-cv-00180. But because of his history of frivolous filings, he
could not proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, and the cases were dismissed.

The record in Plaintiff’s earlier cases demonstrate that his claims against Defendants
Sucsy, Smith, and Darnell have all been fully—and finally—adjudicated by the Court.
Plaintiff pled his best case, but he repeatedly failed to persuade the Court that his claims had
merit. The Court gave Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to amend his pleadings against
Defendants Smith and Darnell, but he declined to do so. Thus, the dismissal of those claims
operates with prejudice for purposes of res judicata. And because his claims are barred by
res judicata, Plaintiff cannot show a plausible entitlement to relief. Simply put, Plaintiff is
not entitled to keep relitigating the same issues against the same defendants in hopes of a
different result.
B. Absolute Immunity

Next, Defendants argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged
acts or omissions in processing and adjudicating Plaintiff’s state habeas case. Dkt. Nos. 7,
8.
As the Court concluded in Plaintiff’s earlier lawsuit, Defendant Darnell is entitled to
absolute immunity for the performance of his judicial duties. See No. 5:22-cv-00191 at Dkt.
No. 12. Judges are absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983 for acts taken in the
performance of their judicial functions. Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1995).
“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges

from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). The Supreme Court determined more than 150 years ago
that judges may not be sued for damages for any act taken within the performance of their
judicial functions. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). This immunity is absolute
and applies “however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its

consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” Id.
Likewise, absolute immunity has been extended to officials who work in “quasi-
judicial” roles—such as court clerks who act in accordance with court orders, court rules, or
at a judge’s discretion. See Kibbey v. Collin Cnty. Det. Facility, No. 4:21-CV-799, 2023 WL
2541465, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2023) (collecting cases), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 4:21-CV-799, 2023 WL 2527858 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2023). Defendants Sucsy
and Smith assert that they are entitled absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for the performance
of their official duties as the Lubbock County District Clerk. They contend that Plaintiff has
not shown, and cannot show, that their alleged acts or omissions were not taken pursuant to

court rules, court order, or at a judge’s discretion.
The Court agrees. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendants Sucsy and Smith
acted in “conspiracy” with Judge Darnell to “transact[] business incorrectly.” Dkt. No. 16
at 7–8. In other words, he sues them for doing their jobs at the discretion of the judge.
Thus, the Court finds that they are entitled to the protection of absolute, quasi-judicial
immunity. And because Defendants Darnell, Sucsy, and Smith are immune from this suit,
Plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim for relief against them.
C. Other Defects
In addition to res judicata and the defendants’ absolute immunity—each of which

alone warrants dismissal—Plaintiff’s claims suffer from a number of other fatal defects.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he properly served Defendants Sucsy or Smith with
legally sufficient process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). He created his own citation rather
than requesting clerk-issued citation, and, rather than personally serving either Sucsy or
Smith, he had his citation delivered to a third party who was not a designated agent for

service. Thus, as argued by Defendants Sucsy and Smith, Plaintiff’s claims against them are
subject to dismissal for insufficient service under Rule 12(b)(5). See Dkt. No. 7 at 12–13.
He also repeats his claims here with the same fatal defects that the Court noted
before. Most, if not all, of Plaintiff’s claims are time barred. And although he litters each
page with conclusory legal terms, he has wholly failed to allege sufficient facts to
demonstrate that any of these defendants violated his constitutional or federal rights. As a
result, he has failed to overcome Defendants Sucsy and Smith’s assertion of qualified
immunity.
Finally, he has failed to state a cognizable claim against the defendants in their
official capacities. See Dkt. No. 7 at 16–17; see also Dunn v. Sucsy, No. 5:22-cv-00190, Dkt.

No. 24 at 11 & n.10 (explaining that Plaintiff failed to establish a cognizable policy claim for
the purpose of municipal liability because he failed to state an underlying constitutional
violation).
4. Conclusion
For these reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. Plaintiff’s complaint
and all claims alleged within it are dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s requests for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.4 Dkt. Nos.

4A party seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order must establish the four
prerequisites for a restraining order, including (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of
17, 29, 30. And the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel as moot.
The Court denies all relief not expressly granted and any pending motions.
Dated February 6, 2026.

his case; (2) a substantial threat that the failure to grant an injunctive order will result in irreparable
injury; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunctive order might cause the
defendant; and (4) that the order will not be adverse to the public interest. Women’s Med Ctr. v. Bell,
248 F.3d 411, 418-20 (5th Cir. 2001); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d
1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1979). A failure to prove any of the four elements will result in the denial of
injunctive relief. Enter. Int’l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th
Cir. 1985). The Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint and all claims within it. Thus, he cannot
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Moreover, to the extent he seeks
release and attempts to challenge his state-court conviction, he cannot do so without first obtaining
permission from the Fifth Circuit to file a successive habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see
Moran v. Stalder, 121 F.3d 210, 211 (5th Cir. 1997). Finally, he is not entitled to criminally prosecute
Defendant Darnell or have him jailed. Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 655 (5th Cir. 2021)
(collecting cases); Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1990).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274437. Public record. Not legal advice.