# McKenstry

> District Court, D. Maryland · February 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274356

## Case

- **Full name:** Lamar T. McKenstry v. Raphael Gamble, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** February 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing affidavit requirement of former Rule 56(f)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

LAMAR T. McKENSTRY, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. DKC-24-1636

RAPHAEL GAMBLE, et al., *

Defendants. *
***
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Self-represented Plaintiff Lamar T. McKenstry (“Mr. McKenstry”), an inmate presently
incarcerated at Western Correctional Institution (“WCI”) in Cumberland, Maryland, filed the
above-captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Robert Dean,
Lieutenant Eric Walker, Sergeant Fred Hinneh, Correctional Officer Raphael Gamble,
Correctional Officer Bridget Atud, Correctional Officer Melvin Norman, Detective Erick
Patterson, Hearing Officer Shannon Singleton, Deputy Director Robin Woolford, and Kimberly
Redditt.1 ECF No. 11. Mr. McKenstry alleges that his property was confiscated improperly, that
he was subjected to excessive force, denied medical care thereafter, and denied due process during
the resulting disciplinary proceedings. ECF No. 11. He seeks injunctive relief and compensatory
and punitive damages. Id.
Defendants Warden Dean, Lieutenant Walker, Sergeant Hinneh, Correctional Officers
Gamble, Atud, and Norman, Detective Patterson, Hearing Officer Singleton, Deputy Director
Woolford, and Kimberly Redditt filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. ECF No. 30. The court informed Mr. McKenstry, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison,

1 The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the full and complete names of Defendants.
528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that the failure to file a response in opposition to the motion could
result in the dismissal of the complaint. ECF No. 33. Mr. McKenstry filed responses in opposition
(ECF Nos. 34 and 37),2 as well as motions for discovery (ECF Nos. 35 and 38) and for the
appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 36).

Having reviewed the submitted materials, the court finds that no hearing is necessary. See
Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ motion will be
granted in part and denied in part. Mr. McKenstry’s Complaint will be dismissed as to Defendants
Warden Dean, Kimberly Redditt, Deputy Director Woolford and Hearing Officer Singleton. Mr.
McKenstry’s official capacity, due process, lost property, and conspiracy claims will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim. Summary judgment will be granted to Defendants Correctional Officers
Gamble, Norman, and Atud, Sergeant Hinneh, and Lieutenant Walker as to Mr. McKenstry’s
claims regarding denial of medical care. Summary judgment will be denied to Defendants
Correctional Officers Gamble, Norman, and Atud, Sergeant Hinneh, and Lieutenant Walker as to
Mr. McKenstry’s claims regarding excessive force. Mr. McKenstry’s motion to appoint counsel

will be granted and his other motions denied.
BACKGROUND
A. Mr. McKenstry’s Allegations
In his unverified Second Amended Complaint, which serves as the operative pleading, Mr.
McKenstry names as Defendants Warden Robert Dean, Lieutenant Eric Walker, Sergeant Fred
Hinneh, Correctional Officer Raphael Gamble, Correctional Officer Bridget Atud, Correctional

2 Mr. McKenstry’s responses in opposition were docketed as a “Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and Suppression of Evidence” (ECF No. 34) and
“Objections” (ECF No. 37). The documents are responses to Defendants’ dispositive motion and
motions to seal, and have been considered as such. Mr. McKenstry’s “Motion to Dismiss” is
therefore denied.
Officer Melvin Norman, Detective Erick Patterson, Hearing Officer Shannon Singleton, Robin
Woolford, and Kimberly Redditt. ECF No. 11 at 1. He explains that on the morning of October
24, 2023, while confined at Jessup Correctional Institution (“JCI”), Correctional Officer Norman,
Sergeant Hinneh, and Officer Fredericks conducted a search of his cell and improperly confiscated

a mattress that he was authorized to have. Id. at 7. Correctional Officer Norman issued Mr.
McKenstry a “ticket” for possessing/passing contraband and for possessing/tampering
with/destroying security equipment or property. Id. Mr. McKenstry attempted to explain to the
officers that he was authorized to have the two mattresses. Id.
Later, Mr. McKenstry walked past Correctional Officers Norman and Atud and called them
“corrupt.” Id. at 8. Mr. McKenstry then took his medical order for two mattresses to the control
room and asked for the return of his mattress. Id. The officer directed Mr. McKenstry to go to
property. Id. On his way, Mr. McKenstry came upon Correctional Officer Gamble and as Mr.
McKenstry spoke to Correctional Officer Gamble, Lieutenant Walker and Sergeant Hinneh rushed
out of the building and threw Mr. McKenstry to the ground. Id. at 10. They reported that

Correctional Officers Norman and Atud claimed that Mr. McKenstry spat on them and then ran
off the tier and out of the building. Id. Mr. McKenstry attempted to explain that he did not spit
on anyone. Id. During the altercation, Mr. McKenstry’s medical order was destroyed. Id.
Mr. McKenstry was escorted to medical by Defendants Sergeant Hinneh, Lieutenant
Walker, and Officer Gamble. ECF No. 11 at 10. During the escort, Sergeant Hinneh’s grip
tightened, causing the handcuffs to cut into Mr. McKenstry’s wrist. Mr. McKenstry asked
Sergeant Hinneh to loosen his grip, but he refused to do so and cursed Mr. McKenstry. Id.
Lieutenant Walker refused Mr. McKenstry’s request for assistance. Id. When they arrived at the
medical unit, Mr. McKenstry leaned to the left to try to alleviate the pressure on his wrist, but he
was thrown against the walls by Officer Gamble and “beaten ferociously.” Id. Mr. McKenstry
was punched in the face and suffered a swollen and bruised lip and lacerations and bruises on his
wrist. Id.
As a result of the incidents, Mr. McKenstry wrote an administrative remedy procedure

(“ARP”) to Warden Dean which was dismissed. ECF No. 11 at 10. Mr. McKenstry’s appeal of
the Warden’s decision was dismissed by Kimberly Redditt at the Commissioner’s office. Id. at
11. Both Warden Dean and Kimberly Redditt dismissed Mr. McKenstry’s complaint because the
matter was “under investigation.” Id. Mr. McKenstry’s appeal to Deputy Director Woolford at
the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”) was also unsuccessful. Id. Initially, Deputy Director
Woolford dismissed the appeal because the matter was under investigation and then subsequently
dismissed the appeal because Mr. McKenstry was found guilty of engaging in a disruptive act,
assaulting officers, and being in an area without authorization. Id.
Mr. McKenstry explains that on November 3, 2023, a disciplinary hearing was conducted
by Hearing Officer Singleton. Despite his pleading not guilty, Hearing Officer Singleton, after

reviewing the video footage and Mr. McKenstry’s explanation of events, found him guilty. Id.
His appeals of the disciplinary hearing decision were denied. Id. As a result of the hearing, he
lost good conduct credits, was confined to disciplinary segregation, and suffered loss of privileges.
Id. at 12. He asserts that Warden Dean, Deputy Director Robin Woolford, and Kimberly Redditt
“caused [him] harm” because they “failed to do their job” and “dismissed” his ARP complaints,
appeals, and grievances. Id. at 13.
On December 12, 2023, Mr. McKenstry was served with a criminal summons filed by
Detective/Sergeant Patterson charging him with assault on Correctional Officers Norman, Atud
and Gamble. ECF No. 11 at 12-13.
Mr. McKenstry seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive and
declaratory relief. ECF No. 11 at 8.
B. Defendants’ Response
As a result of the incident, the Internal Investigation Division (“IID”) was contacted and

Deputy Sergeant Valerie Johnson and then Sergeant Patterson were assigned to investigate the
matter. ECF No. 31-1 at 3-7. The use of force/serious incident reports prepared by the officers, as
well as information provided to the IID investigator, confirm the information in the officers’
affidavits supporting the Notice of Inmate Rule Violations (“NOIRV”) and provide additional
details. ECF No. 31-3 at 3-60 (serious incident report). As a result of the IID investigation,
Detective Patterson submitted an application of charges and Mr. McKenstry was issued a criminal
summons charging him with the second-degree assault of Correctional Officers Norman, Gamble,
and Atud. ECF No. 31-1 at 37-39.3
Mr. McKenstry was housed at JCI on October 24, 2023. ECF No. 30-1 at 4. On that day,
Correctional Officer Norman, Sergeant Hinneh, Correctional Officer Gamble, and Officer

Hendricks conducted a random search of Mr. McKenstry’s cell. ECF No. 31-1 at 25. As a result
of the search, an extra mattress4 and torn sheets, used to obscure viewing inside the cell, were
confiscated and a broken heater with missing parts discovered. Id. Mr. McKenstry was advised
that he would receive NOIRV regarding the property. Id.
As to Mr. McKenstry’s altercations with the officers, Correctional Officer Atud submitted
a NOIRV regarding the incident. ECF No. 31-1 at 16. In her notice, Correctional Officer Atud

3 Ultimately, those charges were nolle prosed on July 25, 2024. See State of Maryland v.
McKenstry, Crim Case D-07-CR-23-20992 (Anne Arundel Co. Dist. Ct.)
https:/mdecportal.courts.state.md.us (last visited Feb. 10, 2026).

4 There is no evidence in Mr. McKenstry’s medical records that he had a medical order in
place requiring the use of a second mattress. ECF No. 30-2, ¶ 3.
averred that on October 24, 2023, Mr. McKenstry walked toward her and spat on her right wrist
and leg and then walked off the tier. Id. Correctional Officer Atud ordered Mr. McKenstry to stop
but he continued to walk away. Id. Correctional Officer Atud notified Sergeant Hinneh and
Lieutenant Walker of the incident. Id.

In his NOIRV, Lieutenant Walker averred that Correctional Officers Atud and Norman
notified him that Mr. McKenstry spat on them and then fled the scene. ECF No. 31-1 at 20. Mr.
McKenstry met Officer Gamble on the compound walk but refused orders to be handcuffed and
“snatched away” from Lieutenant Walker as he attempted to handcuff him. Id. Mr. McKenstry
was taken to the ground to gain control and apply the restraints. Id. After he was secured, he was
assisted to his feet and taken to medical. Id.
Correctional Officer Gamble confirmed that he saw Mr. McKenstry on the compound and
asked what was wrong. Mr. McKenstry replied that he was trying to go to medical and
Correctional Officer Gamble stopped him. ECF No. 31-1 at 6. Lieutenant Walker and Sergeant
Hinneh advised Correctional Officer Gamble that Mr. McKenstry was going to lock-up because

he spat on two officers. Id. Mr. McKenstry was combative, refused orders, and pulled his hand
away from Lieutenant Walker. Id. Mr. McKenstry was taken to the ground so that leg irons and
handcuffs could be applied. Id. Lieutenant Walker handcuffed Mr. McKenstry’s left arm to his
waist because his right arm was in a cast. Id. Additionally, Correctional Officer Gamble reported
that while being escorted, Mr. McKenstry spat on him and attempted to punch him, Sergeant
Hinneh, and Lieutenant Walker. They then held Mr. McKenstry against the wall to avoid assault
and to gain control. ECF No. 31-1 at 20; ECF No. 31-1 at 8. Medical evaluated and cleared Mr.
McKenstry. ECF No. 31-1 at 20.
The tier videos, which do not have any audio,5 generally confirm the officers’ descriptions
of the October 24 incident. Surveillance Video Part 1, (filed separately at Exhibit C),6 shows Mr.
McKenstry (wearing a gray hood, white shirt & blue trousers) walk out of his cell toward the front
of the tier. Id. at B-1 Merged 9:47:16.7 As he walks past one officer near his cell door, he turns

and goes back toward the officer and may appear to spit at the officer (id. at C-1 Merged, 10:04:16)
and as he approaches the officer at the end of the hall he turns and may appear to spit on that
officer. Id. at B-1 merged at 9:47:16-09:47:20. The officers are identified in Defendants’ papers
as Correctional Officers Norman and Atud. Each officer reacts as though he or she were spit at.
Id. at C-1 Merged at 10:04:16; B-1 Merged at 9:47:20.
Surveillance Video, Part 2 (ECF No. 30-7, Ex. E, filed separately, 208 Door 6.49),8 shows
officers identified by Defendants as Sergeant Hinneh and Correctional Officer Gamble escorting
Mr. McKenstry (with the hood off) down the hall while holding his upper arms. Id. at 9:45:05-
9:45:17. Mr. McKenstry drags his feet and pushes and pulls away from the officers. A person
Defendants say is Lieutenant Walker comes to assist. Id. at 9:45:18-9:45:45. As Mr. McKenstry

and the officers arrive at the end of the hallway, a scuffle takes place. Id. at 9:45:40-9:45:46.
Eventually, Mr. McKenstry was pinned to the wall. Id. at 9:45:47. Another officer also arrived to
assist as Mr. McKenstry continued to be combative and continued to pull away from the three

5 Mr. McKenstry was shown the videos on February 21, 2025. ECF No. 30-4, ¶¶ 3-6 (Clise,
Decl.).

6 Surveillance Video Part 1, filed separately as Exhibit C, ECF No. 31, contains two videos
labeled “B-1 Merged” and “C-1 Merged”.

7 The video time stamps are different than those cited by Defendants.

8 Surveillance Video Part 2, filed separately as Exhibit E, ECF No. 30-7, contains three
videos labeled “208 Door 6.49”, “Medical Treatment Front Ent. 6.38”, and “MPB 208 Inner Dr
and Med Ent 6/48.”
officers. Id. at 9:45:48. One correctional officer again attempted to push Mr. McKenstry against
the wall. Id. at 9:45:49. After Mr. McKenstry was brought under control by the four officers, (id.
at 9:46:20) the officers sat Mr. McKenstry on a bench and then, a few minutes later, continued his
escort to medical. Id. at 9:46:20-9:51:28. The second camera angle (ECF No. 30-Ex. E, filed

separately, Medical Treatment Front Ent. 6.38), shows Mr. McKenstry being brought onto the
medical unit at 9:51:48. He is escorted by four officers, two holding his upper arms, one in front
of him, clearing the corridor, and one behind. Id. He is compliant and walks down the hallway
and into a treatment room without any apparent difficulty. Id. at 9:51:48-9:52:03; see also ECF
No. 30-Ex. E, MPB 208 Inner Dr and Med Ent 6.48 at 09:51:41 (filed separately). He is
subsequently escorted, without incident, off of the medical unit. ECF No. 30-Ex. E, Medical
Treatment Front Ent 6.38 at 10:11:42 (filed separately).
As a result of the incident, Mr. McKenstry was served NOIRVs on October 26, 2023. ECF
No. 31-1 at 15. He was charged with violating a number of rules including violating: Rule 100 -
engage in a disruptive act; Rule 101 - commit assault or battery on staff; Rule 316 - disobey an

order; and Rule 402 - entering or being in a location without authorization. Id.
The disciplinary hearing was held on November 3, 2024. ECF No. 31-1 at 23-28. In ruling
on the charges, Hearing Officer Singelton considered the sworn NOIRVs, Mr. McKenstry’s
testimony, the officers’ testimony, and the video evidence presented by the institutions. Id. Mr.
McKenstry was found guilty of committing assault and/or battery on staff, engaging in a disruptive
act, and entering a location without authorization. Id. Mr. McKenstry was sanctioned to sixty
days disciplinary segregation and ninety days of good conduct credits were revoked. Id.
Mr. McKenstry appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Warden, who denied the
appeal. ECF No. 30-9, ¶ 2. His appeal to the IGO was dismissed on January 30, 2024, based on
a finding that Mr. McKenstry “failed to effectively challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying the finding of guilty.” ECF No. 30-9 at 6; ECF No 30-9, ¶ 3.
Additionally, Mr. McKenstry filed three administrative remedies (ARPs) regarding the use
of force and alleged denial of medical care. ECF No. 30-9 at ¶¶ 4, 5, 6; ECF No. 30-9 at 13. The

ARPs were each dismissed at the institutional level. Id. Mr. McKenstry appealed the dismissal of
the ARPs to the IGO which dismissed each grievance as lacking in merit. ECF No. 30-9 at ¶¶ 4,
5, 6.
Mr. McKenstry’s medical record demonstrates that after he was escorted to medical, he
was evaluated by Kelsey Robinson, RN. ECF No. 31-2 at 5-6. Mr. McKenstry reported being
assaulted by officers, including being punched in the face, and that he had lacerations on his wrist
due to the handcuffs being tight. Id. at 6. He was described as agitated, but Nurse Robinson did
not observe any “obvious injury to any part of the body.” Id. Mr. McKenstry insisted he had a
cut on his lip, but Nurse Robinson could not see one. Id. She did note a small laceration on his
inner left wrist where the handcuffs were placed. Id. No other injuries on Mr. McKenstry’s face

or body were observed. Id.
On November 16, 2023, Mr. McKenstry was seen by NP Emelogu due to his complaints
of left-hand injury. Id. at 7. Mr. McKenstry reported that he was beaten by officers on October 28,
2023, and his left hand slammed on the wall. Id. (Emphasis added). No swelling or redness was
noted but there was tenderness with healed skin lacerations. He was provided ibuprofen and x-
rays were ordered. Id. at 9. The results of the x-ray were reviewed with Mr. McKenstry on
December 1, 2023. Id. at 11. No evidence of acute fracture was shown on the x-ray. Id. Because
Mr. McKenstry continued to complain of pain, the provider indicated he would be referred to the
orthopedist. Id. at 13.
C. Mr. McKenstry’s Responses
In both papers responding to Defendants’ motions, Mr. McKenstry reiterates that his 8th
Amendment claim is based on his being slammed against the wall several times and being beaten
and punched while he was already subdued and restrained, causing him physical harm. ECF No.

34 at 1; ECF No. 37 at 1. He argues that a reasonable person would view the surveillance footage
as showing that officers punched him multiple times while he was restrained/pinned to the wall by
other officers. ECF No. 34 at 2-3; ECF No. 37 at 2-3. Mr. McKenstry asserts that there are
numerous material facts in dispute. ECF No. 34 at 3; ECF No. 37 at 2. In particular, he denies
running off the tier or building without permission and disputes that he was combative and/or
refused orders. Id.
Mr. McKenstry explains that, although he was evaluated by medical staff shortly after
being assaulted, medical staff and/or prison officials refused to take photos of his injuries. ECF
No. 34 at 2; ECF No. 37 at 2. He says the photographs would have shown a laceration on his left
wrist with swelling and discoloration and swelling/laceration on the inside of his lip with

discoloration. Id. He says that the medical records contain discrepancies, although he does not
detail them. Id.9
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the factual allegations of a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations

9 Mr. McKenstry agrees that only the individual capacity claims asserted against Defendants
can proceed. ECF No. 34 at 1; ECF No. 37 at 1.
omitted). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not ‘forecast’ evidence sufficient to prove the
elements of the claim. However, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish those
elements.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
When the moving party styles its motion as a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,

motion for summary judgment, as is the case here, and attaches additional materials to the motion,
the nonmoving party is, of course, aware that materials outside the pleadings are before the court,
and the court can treat the motion as one for summary judgment. See Laughlin v. Metro.
Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260–61 (4th Cir. 1998).
Nevertheless, summary judgment is generally inappropriate “where the parties have not
had an opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont De Nemours and Co. v. Kolon
Industries, Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2012); see Shaw, 2023 WL 1486310, at *4; Putney
v. Likin, 656 F. App’x 632, 638-39 (4th Cir. July 14, 2016) (per curiam); McCray v. Maryland
Dep’t of Transportation, 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2015). However, “the party opposing
summary judgment ‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery

unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was
needed for discovery.’” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir.
2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996)).
To raise the issue that discovery is needed, the nonmovant typically must file an affidavit
or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)), explaining why, “for specified reasons,
it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,” without needed discovery. See Shaw,
2023 WL 1486310, at *4; Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 526 (4th Cir. 2021); Harrods, 302 F.3d
at 244-45 (discussing affidavit requirement of former Rule 56(f)).
“[T]o justify a denial of summary judgment on the grounds that additional discovery is
necessary, the facts identified in a Rule 56 affidavit must be ‘essential to [the] opposition.’” Scott
v. Nuvell Fin. Servs., LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (D. Md. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Gardner v. Ally Fin., Inc., 514 Fed. App’x 378 (4th Cir.

2013) (per curiam). A nonmoving party’s Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery is properly
denied “where the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Strag v. Bd. of Trs., Craven
Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995); see McClure v. Ports, 914 F.3d 866, 874-75 (4th
Cir. 2019); Gordon v. CIGNA Corp., 890 F.3d 463, 479 (4th Cir. 2018); Amirmokri v. Abraham,
437 F. Supp. 2d 414, 420 (D. Md. 2006), aff’d, 266 F. App’x. 274 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
555 U.S. 885 (2008).
If a nonmoving party believes that further discovery is necessary before consideration of
summary judgment, the party who fails to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit acts at his peril, because “the
failure to file an affidavit . . . is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for

discovery was inadequate.” Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (citations and quotations omitted). But, the
nonmoving party’s failure to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit cannot obligate a court to issue a summary
judgment ruling that is obviously premature. And a court “should hesitate before denying a Rule
56(d) motion when the nonmovant seeks necessary information possessed only by the movant.”
Pisano v. Strach, 743 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 2014).
Although the Fourth Circuit has placed “‘great weight’” on the Rule 56(d) affidavit, and
has said that a mere “‘reference to Rule 56(f) [now Rule 56(d)] and the need for additional
discovery in a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is not an
adequate substitute for [an] affidavit,’” the appellate court has “not always insisted” on a Rule
56(d) affidavit. Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (internal citations omitted). According to the Fourth
Circuit, failure to file an affidavit may be excused “if the nonmoving party has adequately informed
the district court that the motion is premature and that more discovery is necessary” and the
“nonmoving party’s objections before the district court ‘served as the functional equivalent of an

affidavit.’” Id. at 244-45 (internal citations omitted); see also Putney, 656 F. App’x at 638; Nader
v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 961 (4th Cir. 2008). Moreover, “[t]his is especially true where, as here, the
non-moving party is proceeding pro se.” Putney, 656 F. App’x at 638.
Mr. McKenstry has not requested discovery under Rule 56, nor has he filed an Affidavit in
compliance with Rule 56(d). Nevertheless, he filed motions for discovery after Defendants filed
their dispositive motion. In his first Motion for Discovery, Mr. McKenstry states that he is entitled
to discovery pursuant to “Rule 12(b)(1)”, which he argues requires “each party to produce certain
information even if no one asks for it.” ECF No. 35. He requests that the surveillance footage,
medical records, and investigative reports be emailed to his Power of Attorney. Id. There is no
requirement that the court provide documents to non-parties. More importantly, Mr. McKenstry

was directly provided with copies of the documents and access to the videos he requested be sent
to his attorney in fact.
In his second “Motion for Discovery/Discovery Tools”, Mr. McKenstry proposes
interrogatories. ECF No. 38. The “interrogatories” propounded concern information already in
Mr. McKenstry’s possession either because it is within his personal knowledge or because it has
already been supplied to him by Defendants as exhibits to their dispositive motion. For example,
in regard to the criminal charges filed against him as a result of the IID investigation, he asks
whether IID filed criminal charges against him, who participated in the investigation, and the
ruling of the state court in regard to those charges. But as evidenced by both Mr. McKenstry’s
complaint and Defendants’ dispositive motion, he already has this information.
Mr. McKenstry also asks whether any officer punched him while he was against the wall;
whether there was DNA testing to confirm he spat on Defendants; whether any officers were

reprimanded; whether Defendant Singleton reviewed all of the video evidence during his
disciplinary hearing; and whether medical staff treated or merely observed him after the incident.
Id. He also asks why he was not immediately subdued after he spat on the officers and whether
the video actually showed spit coming out of his mouth. Id. at 3. Mr. McKenstry offers no
argument as to why this information is essential to his opposition. Nor does he explain how that
information would create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
As such, to the extent that Mr. McKenstry has requested additional information, his request is
denied, and the court shall consider Defendants’ motion, in part, as one for summary judgment.
Rule 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphases added). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d
308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir.
2012)). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’”
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Accordingly, “the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48 (emphasis in original).
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d
514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1042 (2004).
Because Mr. McKenstry is self-represented, his submissions are liberally construed. See

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). At the same time, the court must “prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)).
The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Tolan
v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted), and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (citations
omitted); see also Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568–69 (4th Cir.
2015). Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit
has repeatedly cautioned against misuse of Scott's “narrow exception” to the
general rule that a court must adopt “the plaintiff's version of the facts” when
considering a summary judgment motion. Lewis v. Caraballo, 98 F.4th 521, 529
(4th Cir. 2024) (first quote); Scott, 550 U.S. at 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (second quote).2
A court may not disregard contrary evidence just because there is a video that lines
up with “a governmental officer's version of events” or “even makes it unlikely that
the plaintiff 's account is true.” Witt v. West Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d
272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011) (first quote); Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 276 (4th
Cir. 2019) (quotation marks removed) (second quote). Instead, a court considering
a defendant's summary judgment motion may discount a plaintiff 's first-hand
account “only [1] when there is evidence ... of undisputed authenticity that [2]
shows some material element of the plaintiff 's account to be blatantly and
demonstrably false” [3] such “that no reasonable jury could” credit the plaintiff's
version of events. Harris, 927 F.3d at 276 (emphases added and quotation marks
removed) (first quote); Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (second quote).

Alexander v. Connor, 105 F.4th 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2024).
DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint or for summary judgment in their favor,
arguing that: (1) under the Eleventh Amendment they are immune from suit for claims asserted
against them in their official capacity; (2) Mr. McKenstry fails to state an Eighth Amendment

Claim as to alleged use of excessive force and alternatively they are entitled to summary judgment;
(3) Mr. McKenstry fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, and
alternatively they are entitled to summary judgment; (4) Mr. McKenstry has not alleged sufficient
personal participation as to Defendants Warden Dean, Deputy Director Robin Woolford, or
Kimberly Redditt and failed to state a claim of supervisory liability; (5) Mr. McKenstry failed to
state a claim for violation of his due process rights, and alternatively they are entitled to summary
judgment; (6) Mr. McKenstry failed to state a claim of conspiracy; (7) Mr. McKenstry’s claims
regarding his personal property do not state a constitutional claim; and (8) Defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies, and
departments are immune from citizen suits in federal court absent state consent or Congressional
action. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Claims against
state employees acting in their official capacities are also subject to Eleventh Amendment
immunity because a suit against the state actor is tantamount to a suit against the state itself.
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1985). While the State of Maryland has waived its
sovereign immunity for certain types of cases brought in state courts, see Md. Code Ann., State
Gov’t § 12-204(a), it has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal
court. Accordingly, Defendants are immune from suit for actions against them in their official
capacities and such claims for monetary damages asserted against them in their official capacity
must be dismissed. Mr. McKenstry agrees.
B. Respondeat Superior
Under Section 1983, a plaintiff may file suit against any person who, acting under color of

state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself
a source of substantive rights, but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir.
2009).
The defendant’s own action—or failure to act—is required for liability under § 1983. See
Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928
(4th Cir. 1977). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at

782. Liability of supervisory officials “is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior,
but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of
subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on
those committed to their care.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)). Supervisory liability under § 1983 must be
supported with evidence that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his
subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so
inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the
particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th
Cir. 1994).
Here, Mr. McKenstry has not alleged that Defendants Warden Dean, Deputy Director

Robin Woolford or Kimberly Redditt personally participated in the alleged constitutional
violations. Mr. McKenstry simply names Warden Dean, Deputy Director Robin Woolford, and
Kimberly Redditt, as defendants and complains that they had a hand in dismissing his
administrative grievances and appeals to the IGO, without providing any additional specific
allegations against them. However, the mere receipt or denial of Mr. McKenstry’s grievances does
not alone impose liability. See Chukwurah v. Corizon Health Care, No. CV PX-22-212, 2023 WL
4268556, at *6 (D. Md. June 29, 2023) (citing Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th
Cir. 2009) (allegation that warden “rubber stamped” grievances was not enough to establish
personal participation) (citing Whitington v. Ortiz, 307 F. App’x 179, 193 (10th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (“denial of the grievances alone is insufficient to establish personal participation in

the alleged constitutional violations.”)), aff’d, No. 23-6716, 2024 WL 1405885 (4th Cir. Apr. 2,
2024). Nothing in the complaint provides any indication that Mr. McKenstry has a viable claim
against Warden Dean, Deputy Director Robin Woolford, and Kimberly Redditt. Accordingly, they
are entitled to dismissal of the claims against them.
C. Excessive Force
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by virtue of
its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII; Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); King v. Rubenstein,
825 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2016). Notably, it “proscribes more than physically barbarous
punishments.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. The Eighth Amendment “embodies” the “‘concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . .’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, it “protects
inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77
F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996); cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 989 U.S.

189, 199-200 (1989) (stating that when a state holds a person “against his will, the Constitution
imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general
well-being”).
The Fourth Circuit has determined that “not all Eighth Amendment violations are the same;
while some constitute ‘deliberate indifference’ others constitute ‘excessive force.’” Thompson v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 97 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 319–20 (1986)). Whether a prison official used excessive force is determined by inquiring if
“force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). The court must look
at the necessity for the application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force applied, the extent of the injury inflicted, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
inmates as reasonably perceived by prison officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of
the response. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. The absence of significant injury, alone, is not dispositive
of a claim of excessive force. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). While the extent of injury
incurred is one factor in determining the necessity of force in a particular situation, if force is
applied maliciously and sadistically, liability is not avoided simply because the prisoner had the
good fortune to escape serious harm. Id. at 38.
As to the use of force, there are material disputes of fact as to whether Defendants’ use of
force was reasonable. The only uncontroverted evidence is that on October 24, 2023, Defendants
Correctional Officers Norman and Gamble and Sergeant Hinneh were tasked with searching Mr.
McKenstry’s cell. Thereafter the parties’ version of events diverge.
Defendants explain that Mr. McKenstry, apparently upset by the confiscation of his
mattress and/or the knowledge that he would receive a rule violation regarding property found in

his cell, spat on officers and left the housing unit without permission. Mr. McKenstry denies both
spitting on the officers or leaving the housing unit without permission.
Once on the compound, Defendants contend that Mr. McKenstry was directed to submit to
being restrained, but he refused to do so, and the officers took him to the ground in order to apply
restraints. Mr. McKenstry denies being combative or refusing orders. ECF No. 37 at 2. During
the escort to medical, Mr. McKenstry explains that he was slammed against the wall several times
and beaten and punched after he was subdued and restrained. He explains that when they arrived
at the medical unit, he leaned to the left to try to alleviate the pressure on his wrist, but was thrown
against the walls by Officer Gamble and “beaten ferociously.” ECF No. 11 at 10. Defendants
dispute this, explaining that they used only the force necessary to gain Mr. McKenstry’s

compliance with their orders and escort and that he was non-compliant and assaultive during the
escort.
The video evidence does not clearly and unequivocally support either version of events.
First the video evidence of the “spitting” is open to interpretation. While it appears that Mr.
McKenstry spits on the officers, it may be that he moved toward them calling them “corrupt” as
he asserts. Next, the video evidence shows Mr. McKenstry walk to the end of the housing unit,
but there is no video of him leaving the unit and entering the compound, nor is there any video of
what transpired on the compound. Defendants assert that Mr. McKenstry’s entry onto the
compound was unauthorized, but he claims that he was told to go to property to retrieve his
mattress.
Lastly, the videos of Mr. McKenstry’s escort to the medical unit are also open to
interpretation, particularly given that most of the altercation occurs at the end of the hallway which

is at the end of the camera range. While it appears that Mr. McKenstry is resisting the escort, it
may be, as he claims, that he only did so to alleviate the pressure on his wrist and that Defendants
unnecessarily pushed him into the wall. There is no sound accompanying the video to discern what
Mr. McKenstry or the officers said to each.
The court cannot determine on this record whether the application of force was necessary,
where as here, the parties dispute the basis of the need for force e.g. whether Mr. McKenstry
assaulted staff by spitting on them and/or was out of bounds. While Mr. McKenstry’s submissions
are unverified, Defendants do not object to them or argue that they could not be made admissible
at trial, and the court is mindful that exhibits need not be in admissible form to be considered at
the summary judgment stage, provided they could be put in admissible form. Fed. R. Civ. Pr.

56(c)(2); see also Sanchex Carrera v. EMD Sales, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 128, 139 (D. Md. 2019). Mr.
McKenstry’s evidence is based on his personal knowledge of the events as they unfolded and his
testimony would be admissible at trial. Thus, he has demonstrated that there are material disputes
of facts. Because the record does not clearly establish whether the officers acted “maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm” or “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline,” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21 (internal quotation marks omitted), summary judgment is
not appropriate on this claim
D. Denial of Medical Care
To the extent that Mr. McKenstry alleges that he was denied constitutionally adequate
medical care after the use of force or when his mattress was confiscated, these claims are
unavailing. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by

virtue of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219,
225 (4th Cir. 2016); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2016). “Scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment is not limited to those punishments authorized by statute and imposed by a
criminal judgment.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)); accord Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2017).
To state an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the actions of the defendants, or their failure to act, amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also Anderson, 877 F.3d at
543.

Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that, objectively, the
prisoner plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical need and that, subjectively, the prison staff
were aware of the need for medical attention but failed either to provide it or ensure it was
available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-7 (1994); see also Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2017); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir.
2016); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Objectively, the medical condition at
issue must be serious. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (there is no expectation that
prisoners will be provided with unqualified access to health care); Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d
170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). “A ‘serious medical need’ is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician
as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir.
2017) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 241); see also Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 228 (4th Cir.
2016) (failure to provide diabetic inmate with insulin where physician acknowledged it was

required is evidence of objectively serious medical need).
After a serious medical need is established, a successful Eighth Amendment claim requires
proof that the defendants were subjectively reckless in treating or failing to treat the serious
medical condition. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40. Under this standard, “the prison official must
have both ‘subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm’ and ‘subjectively recognized that
his [/her] actions were inappropriate in light of that risk.’” Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539,
545 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004));
see also Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) (“True subjective recklessness
requires knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of
that risk.”). “Actual knowledge or awareness on the part of the alleged inflicter . . . becomes

essential to proof of deliberate indifference ‘because prison officials who lacked knowledge of a
risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment.’” Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101,
105 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). The subjective knowledge requirement
can be met through direct evidence of actual knowledge or through circumstantial evidence tending
to establish such knowledge, including evidence “that a prison official knew of a substantial risk
from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Scinto, 841 F.3d at 226 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 842).
Here there is no evidence that Mr. McKenstry had a serious medical need. First, as to the
use of force, the only objective evidence of injury was a laceration on his wrist. Although, Mr.
McKenstry states that he also suffered a cut on his lip, a cut or bruised lip is not a serious medical
need. Secondly, as to his need for a second mattress, his medical record does not support his claim
that he had a medical need for the mattress.
Mr. McKenstry’s claims also fail on the subjective prong. As to the use of force, Mr.

McKenstry was immediately taken to the medical unit for evaluation, and it was determined by
medical staff, not any of the named Defendants, that he did not require any additional treatment at
that time and was cleared to return to a housing unit. He does not allege that any of the named
Defendants interfered with or directed what medical care was to be provided. Moreover, he was
subsequently provided follow up care regarding his reported injuries, including an x-ray and
analgesic medication. Thus, Defendants cannot be said to have been indifferent to a serious
medical need. Similarly, there is no evidence that any named Defendant was indifferent to Mr.
McKenstry’s medical need for a second mattress, as there is no evidence he had such a need or
that such a need was obvious. Accordingly, Defendants Correctional Officers Norman, Gamble,
and Atud, Sergeant Hinneh, and Lieutenant Walker are entitled to summary judgment on this

claim.
E. Due Process
Mr. McKenstry claims that his disciplinary hearing based on the October 24, 2023, incident
was unfair. ECF No. 11. Prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause, but prison
disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full array of rights due a
defendant in such proceedings does not apply. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)
(citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). In prison disciplinary proceedings where
an inmate faces the possible loss of diminution credits, he is entitled to certain due process
protections. These include: (1) advance written notice of the charges against him; (2) a written
statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for taking any disciplinary action; (3) a hearing
where he is afforded the right to call witnesses and present evidence when doing so is not
inconsistent with institutional safety and correctional concerns, and a written decision; (4) the
opportunity to have non-attorney representation when the inmate is illiterate or the disciplinary

hearing involves complex issues; and (5) an impartial decision-maker. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-
66, 592. There is no constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to retain and
be appointed counsel. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322 (1976); Brown v. Braxton,
373 F.3d 501, 504-05 (4th Cir. 2004). As long as the hearing officer’s decision contains a written
statement of the evidence relied upon, due process is satisfied. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 322, n.5.
Moreover, substantive due process is satisfied if the disciplinary hearing decision was based upon
“some evidence.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Tyler v.
Hooks, 945 F.3d 159, 171 (4th Cir. 2019) (“the ‘some evidence’ standard is extremely broad in
scope and presents a very low burden for prison officials to meet.”),
Federal courts do not review the correctness of a disciplinary hearing officer’s findings of

fact. See Kelly v. Cooper, 502 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (E.D. Va. 1980). The findings will only be
disturbed when unsupported by any evidence, or when wholly arbitrary and capricious. See Hill,
472 U.S. at 456; see also Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 933 (4th Cir. 1990); Tyler v. Hooks, 945
F.3d at 171-72. Further, a challenge to the validity of a prison disciplinary judgment may not be
raised in a § 1983 civil rights action where, as here, the judgment has not been overturned through
state procedures. Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289, 295 (4th Cir. 2022).
Mr. McKenstry’s disciplinary proceedings have not been overturned. Under Maryland
law, the guilty findings can be challenged through an appeal to the warden and a subsequent
complaint filed with the IGO. See Md. Code Regs. (“COMAR”) 12.03.01.30(A) and (C). Mr.
McKenstry does not allege his disciplinary charges have been overturned and therefore this claim
must be dismissed.
F. Loss of Property
To the extent that Mr. McKenstry’s claim is construed as one regarding the improper

confiscation of his mattress, such a claim is unavailing. In the case of lost or stolen property,
sufficient due process is afforded to a prisoner if he has access to an adequate post-deprivation
remedy. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The right to seek damages and injunctive relief in Maryland
courts constitutes an adequate post deprivation remedy. See Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F. Supp. 574,
579 (D. Md. 1982).10 The Supreme Court extended its Parratt holding to intentional deprivations
of property. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, (1984). Therefore, even though Mr.
McKenstry’s mattress was taken, the claim does not amount to a constitutional violation and must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
G. Conspiracy

To the extent that Mr. McKenstry intended to assert a conspiracy claim, that claim is also
subject to dismissal. Mr. McKenstry asserts that he was harmed by the false reports and infractions
written by Correctional Officers Norman, Gamble, and Atud, and Lieutenant Walker. (ECF No.
11 at 12-13). And Detective Patterson relied on those false reports and infractions to “file false
charges against [him].” Id. To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiff must present
evidence that Defendants acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance

10 Although Juncker dealt with personal injury rather than property loss, its analysis and
conclusion that sufficient due process is afforded through post deprivation remedies available in
the Maryland courts also applies to cases of lost or stolen property, given Juncker’s reliance on
Parratt in dismissing plaintiff’s due process claim.
of the conspiracy, which resulted in deprivation of a constitutional right. See Hinkle v. City of
Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff asserting a claim of conspiracy has a
“weighty burden.” Barret v. Pae Government Services, Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 434 (4th Cir. 2020),
quoting Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 421. An essential element for a claim of conspiracy to deprive a plaintiff

of a constitutional right, is an agreement to do so among the alleged co-conspirators. See Ballinger
v. N.C. Agric. Extension Serv., 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 1987). Without an agreement, the
independent or parallel conduct of two or more wrongdoers does not amount to a conspiracy. See
A Society Without A Name v. Virginia, 639 F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (4th Cir. 2011). “A conspiracy
may . . . be ‘inferred from the things actually done.’” Murdaugh Volkswagen, Inc. v. First Nat.
Bank of S.C., 639 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Imported
Motors Ltd., Inc., 375 F. Supp 499, 532 (E.D. Mich. 1974)). However, circumstantial evidence
consisting of “coincidence piled on coincidence” are insufficient where the “proof of collusion is
simply too attenuated” to conclude there was a conspiracy to violate the law. Murdaugh, 639 F.2d
at 1075. Here, Mr. McKenstry seemingly claims that Defendants conspired to file false charges

against him, but he offers no factual allegations that would raise such a claim above speculation.
The conspiracy claim must therefore be dismissed.
H. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity because, among other things, it
was not clearly established at the time of the incident that their actions constituted an excessive
use of force. ECF No. 30-1 at 21. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
summarized the qualified immunity analysis.
Officers are immune from liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have been known.” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added). This standard leads to two questions: (1)
whether any right was violated, (2) whether that right was “clearly
established” at the time of the alleged violation. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).

“[T]o conclude that a right is “clearly established,” we must inquire whether an
objectively reasonable officer in the defendant's shoes would “understand that
what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
640 (1987). We examine the alleged right at a “high level of particularity.”
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999). . . But, by the
same token, a rejection of excessive generality does not equate to an insistence
on exactitude. Few situations are exactly the same and to require that plaintiffs
produce identical precedent would transform qualified immunity into a grant of
absolute immunity for defendants.

Somers v. Devine, 132 F.4th 689, 696 (4th Cir. 2025).
As discussed, the court finds that Mr. McKenstry, has adequately alleged a violation of a
constitutional right and the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis is met. The second prong
requires the court to determine whether Defendants Correctional Officers Norman, Gamble, and
Atud, Sergeant Hinneh, and Lieutenant Walker should have known that their conduct constituted
an excessive use of force at the time the actions occurred. Defendants do not provide a fact based
legal analysis to support their assertion that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr.
McKenstry’s excessive force claim. Nevertheless, the inquiry here is whether it was clearly
established at the time of the events complained of that Defendants’ conduct as alleged in the
Amended Complaint, was sufficiently clear such that every reasonable official would understand
that what he was doing was unlawful. Mr. McKenstry alleges that while subdued and restrained,
Defendants violently beat him causing him physical harm. The qualified immunity defense which
relies on a factual dispute fails on this record.
I. Appointment of Counsel

Mr. McKenstry also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 36) wherein he states he
is unable to afford counsel, has attempted to retain counsel, his imprisonment limits his ability to
litigate the case, and the issues are complex and serious. Id. at 1. A federal district court judge’s
power to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is a discretionary one and may be
considered where an indigent claimant presents exceptional circumstances. See Cook v. Bounds,
518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975); see also Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982). In

light of the foregoing and the apparent need for a scheduling order and to conduct discovery as to
Mr. McKenstry’s excessive force claim, counsel shall be appointed to represent Mr. McKenstry.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Mr. McKenstry’s official capacity, due process, lost property, and conspiracy claims are dismissed.
His claims asserted against Defendants Warden Dean, Deputy Director Robin Woolford, and
Kimberly Redditt are also dismissed. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants
Lieutenant Walker, Sergeant Hinneh, and Correctional Officers Gamble, Atud, and Norman as to
Mr. McKenstry’s claim of denial of medical care. Summary judgment is denied to Defendants
Lieutenant Walker, Sergeant Hinneh, and Correctional Officers Gamble, Atud, and Norman as to

Mr. McKenstry’s claim of excessive use of force. Pro Bono counsel will be appointed for Mr.
McKenstry.
A separate order follows.

Date: February 26, 2026 /s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11274356. Public record. Not legal advice.