# Brown

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · March 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11273153

## Case

- **Full name:** James P. Brown, et al. v. Kay Palan, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** March 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11273153

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that obvious clarity cases require the plaintiff to show that the officer’s acts were “so egregious that preexisting, fact- specific precedent was not necessary” to give officers fair warning that their actions were unreasonable
- explaining that equitable tolling is appropriate when the plaintiff shows that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing his complaint
- finding a state employee’s § 1983 claim for his suspension accrued when he received notice from his employer that “clearly explained the reasons for [his] suspension, including the Facebook post at issue and how that post violated workplace rules”
- explaining that a request for reinstatement generally constitutes prospective injunctive relief that falls “within the scope of the Ex parte Young exception and thus, [is] not barred by the Eleventh Amendment”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION

JAMES P. BROWN, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 7:24-cv-1069-GMB
)
KAY PALAN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On September 12, 2025, pro se Plaintiffs James P. Brown and Patti McGee
Brown filed an amended complaint against Defendants Kay Palan, Joanne Hale, and
Kristy Reynolds. Doc. 36. Before the court is the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint. Doc. 38. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a
United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Doc. 24. The motion
is fully briefed (Docs. 38, 40 & 41) and ripe for decision. For the following reasons,
the motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “take the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
550 (2007). A claim is “plausible on its face” if “the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual
allegations need not be detailed, but “must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level,” id., and “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted

by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). “This leniency, however, does not
require or allow courts to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain
an action.” Thomas v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th

Cir. 2010).
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
James Brown and his wife, Patti Brown, initially filed a complaint against The

Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama (“the Board”), Kay Palan, Joanne
2
Hale, and Kristy Reynolds on August 6, 2024.1 Doc. 1. The Browns alleged that the
defendants violated their First Amendment rights in deciding not to renew James

Brown’s teaching contract and sought money damages for his lost earnings. Doc. 1
at 8. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing they were
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. Docs. 8 & 23.

The court agreed and dismissed the Browns’ complaint without prejudice while
granting them leave to amend the claims against Palan, Hale, and Reynolds in their
individual capacities. Doc. 29. In the order to amend, the court instructed the
Browns that their amended complaint must comply with Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 8 and 10 and should clearly describe the facts underlying their claims.
Doc. 29 at 14–16.
The amended complaint alleges that the University of Alabama employed

James Brown for 12 years as a Senior Instructor in the Culverhouse College of
Business. Doc. 36 at 2. His employment was subject to “a series of non-tenured,
three-year renewable contracts.” Doc. 36 at 2. At the time of his hiring, Marketing
Department Head Rob Morgan told Brown that the college “had never not renewed

a three-year faculty contract.” Doc. 36 at 2.

1 The parties identify Palan, Hale, and Reynolds as the Dean, Associate Dean, and Marketing
Department Head for the University of Alabama’s Culverhouse College of Business, respectively.
Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 36 at 1; Doc. 38 at 8.
3
From June 2020 to November 2021, Patti Brown posted a number of “opinion
pieces” on Facebook. Doc. 36 at 2. The topics included (1) the “[m]ishandling of

the rape investigation of Megan Rodini by University Officials and local law
enforcement,” (2) “[a]lleged excessive perks for the Board of Trustees,” and
(3) “[s]ystemic prejudice in the University’s sorority system.” Doc. 36 at 2. The

Browns’ former landlord, Jim Johnson, took screenshots of these posts. See Doc. 36
at 3. Between September 2020 and December 2020, Johnson sent these screenshots
to the Browns and “threatened to report Ms. Brown’s speech to the University.”
Doc. 36 at 3. In his threats, he included contact information for Hale and Reynolds.

Doc. 36 at 3. “Between September 2020 and December 2021,” Johnson followed
through with his threats and “forwarded Ms. Brown’s Facebook posts to Reynolds
and Hale in retaliation for the Browns’ not exercising the purchase option in a lease-

purchase agreement.” Doc. 36 at 3.
James Brown had a “record of teaching excellence and multiple student
awards” during his time at the University, but on February 9, 2022, Reynolds and
Hale “verbally informed [James] that his three-year contract would not be renewed.”

Doc. 36 at 4. The nonrenewal was a “depart[ure] from past policy and previous
reassurances,” and “[n]o reason was provided” for it. Doc. 36 at 4. On March 22,
2022, after Brown asked why the University was not renewing his contract,

Reynolds replied, “I don’t think I have to tell you.” See Doc. 36 at 4. One year later
4
in March 2023, Brown “learned that Jim Johnson had openly boasted to third parties
that ‘he was the one who got [Brown] fired by forwarding his wife’s Facebook posts

to the University.’” Doc. 36 at 4.
Based on these facts, the Browns contend that the defendants took an adverse
employment action against James Brown in retaliation for his wife’s Facebook
posts.2 Doc. 36 at 5, 7. On these facts, they bring a First Amendment retaliation

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Palan, Hale, and Reynolds in their individual
capacities. Doc. 36 at 5–7. The amended complaint also states a § 1983 claim for
prospective injunctive relief against the same defendants in their official capacities.3

Doc. 36 at 7–8.

2 As best the court can tell, the Browns both bring a First Amendment retaliation claim in the
public employment context based on the assertion that James Brown’s employers retaliated against
him for her speech. See Doc. 36 at 7 (“Retaliation against Mr. Brown based on his spouse’s
protected speech constitutes actionable First Amendment retaliation.”); Doc. 40 at 8 (“Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants knowingly retaliated against James Brown because of Patti Brown’s
protected speech criticizing university leadership . . . .”). If Patti Brown intended to bring a claim
asserting that Palan, Hale, and Reynolds retaliated against her as a public citizen and not an
employee, see Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005) (highlighting the
differences between a First Amendment claim brought by an employee against his government
employer and one brought by a citizen against a government official), she does not clearly bring
such a claim and the court will not rewrite her pleading to include it. See Thomas, 393 F. App’x at
637.
3 The court acknowledges that the Browns had leave to amend their individual capacity claims but
did not have leave to amend their official capacity claims seeking monetary relief because those
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Doc. 29 at 5–7, 17. The Browns’ claim for
injunctive relief, however, is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the defendants do not
challenge its validity or argue they are immune from this claim. See Lane v. Central Ala. Comm.
Coll., 772 F.3d 1349, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a request for reinstatement generally
constitutes prospective injunctive relief that falls “within the scope of the Ex parte Young
exception and thus, [is] not barred by the Eleventh Amendment”).
5
III. DISCUSSION
Palan, Hale, and Reynolds argue that (1) the amended complaint should be

dismissed because it does not comply with the court’s order to amend; (2) that the
Browns’ claims are time barred; and (3) that they are entitled to qualified immunity
from all claims against them in their individual capacities. Doc. 38 at 4. The court

addresses each argument below.
A. The Order to Amend
Palan, Hale, and Reynolds first urge the court to dismiss the Browns’ amended
complaint because it does not comply with the court’s previous order. Specifically,

the defendants take issue with the Browns’ failure to provide “specific dates of the
posts,” “detailed descriptions of the posts,” or to attach the Facebook posts to their
amended complaint. Doc. 38 at 4.

The court declines to dismiss the complaint on these grounds. The Browns
allege that Patti Brown made Facebook posts from June 2020 to November 2021
that were critical of (1) the University’s rape investigation of Meghan Rodini,
(2) excessive perks given to the Board of Trustees for the University, and

(3) systemic prejudice in the University’s sorority system; and they allege that their
landlord sent these posts to Reynolds and Hale sometime between September 2020
and December 2021. Doc. 36 at 2–3. These allegations adequately provide Palan,

Hale, and Reynolds with notice of the facts supporting the claims against them
6
consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10, see Weiland v. Palm
Beach County Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015), and the court

must accept these facts as true at the pleading stage. Pielage, 516 F.3d at 1284. And
while Rule 10(c) allows a plaintiff to attach an exhibit to his complaint, nothing in
the rules of procedure obligates the Browns to attach copies of these social media

posts to their complaint. See U.S. ex. rel. Chabot v. MLU Servs., Inc., 544 F. Supp.
2d 1326, 1329 (M.D. Fla 2008).
B. Statute of Limitations
The defendants also argue that the Browns’ § 1983 claims are time barred.

Doc. 38 at 5–6. “The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is governed by the
forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Alabama is two
years.” Hines v. Thomas, 604 F. App’x 796, 800 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Ala. Code

§ 6-2-38(l) (1975) (providing that the residual statute of limitations for Alabama
personal injury claims is two years).
The accrual date for a § 1983 claim, however, is a question of federal law.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); White v. Mercury Marine, Div. of

Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Mullinax v.
McElhenny, 817 F.2d 711, 716 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987), and explaining that courts apply
the federal discovery rule to § 1983 actions). Under the discovery rule, the statute

of limitations for a § 1983 claim begins to run when “the facts which would support
7
a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably
prudent regard for his rights.” Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 716 (quotation marks and

citation omitted). Accordingly, a cause of action will not accrue “until the plaintiffs
know or should know (1) that they have suffered the injury that forms the basis of
their complaint and (2) who has inflicted the injury.” Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d

1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003).
Once a limitations period runs, the action is barred regardless of the merits of
the plaintiff’s claims. See Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2006).
However, “[a] statute of limitations defense often is poorly suited for resolution on

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) because ‘a statute of limitations bar is an
affirmative defense, and plaintiffs are not required to negate an affirmative defense
in their complaint.’” Jennmar of Ky., Inc. v. Wilson, 2021 WL 3421403, at *4 (N.D.

Ala. Aug. 5, 2021) (quoting La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845
(11th Cir. 2004)). For that reason, dismissal is appropriate “only if it is ‘apparent
from the face of the complaint’ that the claim is time-barred.” LaGrasta, 358 F.3d
at 845, abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (quoting

Omar v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003)). If the resolution of the
motion “would depend either on facts not yet in evidence or on construing factual
ambiguities in the complaint in [the defendant’s] favor,” the court should deny it.

Omar, 334 F.3d at 1251–52.
8
The defendants here argue that the Browns’ § 1983 claims accrued on
February 9, 2022, when Hale and Reynolds told James Brown that his contract

would not be renewed, and so the complaint came outside of the two-year statute of
limitations since the Browns filed it on August 9, 2024.4 Doc. 38 at 6. But it is not
readily apparent from the face of the Browns’ complaint that their claims are time

barred. See LaGrasta, 358 F.3d at 845. The Browns allege that their landlord
threatened to send Patti Brown’s posts in December 2020, James’ non-renewal came
two years later in February 2022, the University did not give him any reason for it,
and he did not learn that their landlord actually forwarded the Facebook posts to the

defendants until March 2023. Doc. 36 at 4. Accepting these facts as true and drawing
all reasonable inferences in the Browns’ favor, the court cannot readily conclude
they knew or should have known that a constitutional right had been violated and

that a cause of action existed until March 2023. Cf. Johnson v. City of Bessemer, 180

4 The defendants insist that Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); Anderson-
Free v. Steptoe, 970 F. Supp. 945, 953 (M.D. Ala. 1997); and Yearwood v. Holloway, 2005 WL
1926605, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2025), support their argument that the Browns’ claim accrued
on the date they informed James Brown that his contract would not be renewed. Doc. 41 at 6–7.
Even if “in public employment cases, claims are often found to accrue when an employment
decision is made and communicated to the plaintiff,” Yearwood, 2005 WL 1926605, at *5, these
opinions are distinguishable from the case at hand. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 259–62 (concluding that
a professor’s Title VII claim accrued when the university informed him that his contract would not
be renewed and not on his final day of employment); Anderson-Free, 970 F. Supp at 953 (denying
a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff argued her § 1983 claim accrued on the day she received
her notice of nonrenewal and her complaint was filed within two years of that date); Yearwood,
2005 WL 1926605, at *5–6 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that her § 1983 claim did not accrue
until she had exhausted all of her administrative remedies).
9
F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1023 (N.D. Ala 2016) (finding a state employee’s § 1983 claim
for his suspension accrued when he received notice from his employer that “clearly

explained the reasons for [his] suspension, including the Facebook post at issue and
how that post violated workplace rules”). Accordingly, the court will not dismiss
the Browns’ claims as time barred at this stage of litigation.5

C. Qualified Immunity
Finally, the defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from
the § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities. Doc. 38 at 6–
10. Qualified immunity “protects government officials performing discretionary

functions from suit in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.
2003)). The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit “have ‘repeatedly stressed the
importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.’” Miller v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Off., 129 F.4th 1329, 1333 (11th

Cir. 2025) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001)) (cleaned up).

5 Because the court declines to find that the complaint is untimely at this stage, it does not address
the parties’ arguments about equitable tolling. Doc. 40 at 5–7; Doc. 41 at 3–7; see Arce, 434 F.3d
at 1261 (explaining that equitable tolling is appropriate when the plaintiff shows that extraordinary
circumstances prevented him from timely filing his complaint).
10
At the first step in the qualified immunity analysis, the defendants must
establish they were acting within their discretionary authority when they decided not

to renew James Brown’s employment contract, see id., which the parties do not
dispute. See Doc. 38 at 8–9; Doc. 40 at 7–8. Therefore, the burden shifts to the
Browns to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Miller, 129 F.4th at

1333. To do so, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) the defendant violated a
constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To survive a
qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must satisfy both showings,” Gaines v.

Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jones v. Fransen, 857
F.3d 843, 851 (11th Cir. 2017)) (cleaned up), and the court may exercise its
discretion in determining which prong to consider first. Maddox v. Stephens, 727

F.3d 1109, 1120–21 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
(2009)) (“[W]e are afforded the flexibility to determine that the right allegedly
violated was not clearly established without deciding whether a constitutional
violation occurred at all.”).

Exercising this discretion, the court first considers whether the Browns have
met their burden to show that their First Amendment rights were clearly established
at the time of the defendants’ actions. “A right is clearly established when it is

‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he
11
is doing violates that right.’” Johnson v. City of Miami Beach, 18 F.4th 1267, 1273
(11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)); Gaines, 871 F.3d

at 1208 (explaining that courts consider whether officers had “fair warning” that
their conduct violated a constitutional right). This “standard is a demanding one,”
Cantu v. City of Dothan, Ala., 974 F.3d 1217, 1235 (11th Cir. 2020), and in the First

Amendment context, a defendant “will only rarely be on notice that his actions are
unlawful.” Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks
and citation omitted); Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1210 (“It is particularly difficult to
overcome the qualified immunity defense in the First Amendment context.”).

A plaintiff nevertheless can show that a government official was on notice
that his actions were unlawful in one of three ways. The first is by pointing to a
“materially similar case decided at the time of the relevant conduct by the Supreme

Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the relevant state supreme court.” Stalley v. Cumbie,
124 F.4th 1273, 1284 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This
path “looks at the relevant case law at the time of the alleged violation that would
have made it obvious to the officer that his actions violated federal law.” Id. A

plaintiff does not need to identify “a case directly on point, but existing precedent
must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

The two remaining approaches are known as “obvious clarity” cases, which
12
are “rare” and “narrow exceptions.” Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1209; Moore v. Pederson,
806 F.3d 1036, 1049 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that obvious clarity cases require

the plaintiff to show that the officer’s acts were “so egregious that preexisting, fact-
specific precedent was not necessary” to give officers fair warning that their actions
were unreasonable). In the second approach, the plaintiff may identify a “broader,

clearly established principle that should govern the novel facts of the situation.”
Stalley, 124 F.4th at 1284 . And in the third, “the plaintiff can show that the conduct
at issue so obviously violated the Constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.”
Id. In any event, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned lower courts “not to

define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at
742.
Here, the Browns contend that “a reasonable university official would have

known that punishing an employee because of his spouse’s constitutionally protected
speech was unlawful” (Doc. 40 at 2), but they do not identify any materially similar
caselaw from the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Alabama
Supreme Court to support this contention. While the Browns point to Lane v.

Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), and Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1986),
(see Doc. 40 at 7–8), these two cases are inapposite. In Lane, 573 U.S. at 238–42,
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected an employee from

suffering adverse employment consequences for providing truthful subpoenaed
13
testimony outside the course of his ordinary job duties. And in Adams, 784 F.2d at
1078–82, the Eleventh Circuit remanded a case back to the district court to address

whether two prisoners, who had been trained as law clerks, had stated a First
Amendment retaliation claim for receiving a transfer to another prison after one
prisoner attempted to send a letter to the media about a case and the other took case

papers from his supervisor’s desk. Because neither involved retaliation against an
employee for a family member’s speech, these cases do not amount to existing
precedent that places the “constitutional question beyond debate.”6 Ashcroft, 536
U.S. at 741.

In addition, the Browns do not establish that their claim is an obvious clarity
case under the second or third approaches. See Doc. 40 at 7–8. The nonrenewal of
James Brown’s contract because of his wife’s speech is not so egregious as to violate

the First Amendment on its face, and caselaw does not clearly and broadly establish
that all reasonable officials in the same situation would know they were violating

6 Notably, the Eleventh Circuit in Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1207–08 & 1210–12, addressed whether a
school superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity from a teacher’s First Amendment claim
that he denied the teacher a promotion in 2013 after her father criticized the superintendent in a
local paper. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that the right to be free from an
adverse employment action for her father’s speech was clearly established at the time the
superintendent denied the teacher’s promotion. Id. at 1210–12 (rejecting the teacher’s argument
that a Title VII case from the Supreme Court, Thompson v. N.A. Stainless, 562 U.S. 170 (2011),
or a district court case, Lewis v. Eufaula City Bd. of Ed., 922 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Ala. 2012),
clearly established the teacher’s constitutional right).

14
the Browns’ First Amendment rights. See Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1209; Moore, 806
F.3d at 1049.

Accordingly, the court finds that Palan, Hale, and Reynolds are entitled to
qualified immunity from the Browns’ § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims
against them in their individual capacities. The court therefore dismisses these
claims with prejudice.7

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 38) is GRANTED to the extent that the

Browns’ § 1983 claims against the defendants in their individual capacities are
DISMISSED with prejudice, and otherwise DENIED.
2. The case will proceed with the Amended Complaint (Doc. 36) as the

operative pleading, but the only surviving claim is Count Two for prospective
injunctive relief.

7 While the court is mindful of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)’s direction to freely grant
leave to amend, the Browns have had an opportunity to amend their complaint and did not request
leave to amend their complaint a third time. Additionally, a district court need not allow an
amendment where (1) “there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure
to cure deficiencies” through prior amendments; (2) amending the complaint would prejudice the
opposing party; or (3) “amendment would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th
Cir. 2001); see Johnson v. Broussard, 2017 WL 2687464, at *6–7 (N.D. Ala. June 22, 2027)
(“There is no reason to require defendants to expend additional time and money defending claims
that cannot possibly succeed.”). The Browns have attempted to cure the deficiencies in their claims
against the defendants in their individual capacities, and any amendment of these claims would be
futile for the reasons discussed above.
15
DONE and ORDERED on March 9, 2026.

GRAY FED
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11273153. Public record. Not legal advice.