# Hu

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · February 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11272339

## Case

- **Full name:** Huanfang Hu v. Kevin Raycraft, Acting Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Detroit Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** February 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11272339

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing habeas corpus as the “‘appropriate remedy to’” determine the legality of a person’s custody
- applying the balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
- explaining that allegations in a Notice to Appear, like those in a complaint, are judicial admissions
- describing the pleadings standard and applying to the § 2243 stage in a § 2241 petition

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

HUANFANG HU, CASE NO. 4:26-cv-113

Petitioner DISTRICT JUDGE
JAMES R. KNEPP II
vs.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Acting Director of JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
Enforcement and Removal Operations,
Detroit Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, et al., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Respondents.1

Petitioner Huanfang Hu has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. The Court referred this matter to a Magistrate
Judge under Local Rule 72.2 for the preparation of a Report and
Recommendation. For the following reasons, I recommend that the Court grant
Hu’s petition.

1 The proper respondent in an immigration habeas for a noncitizen
detained in this District is the Field Director of the Detroit Field Office for U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Mendoza v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-
2183, 2025 WL 3157796, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2025). The Court should
therefore dismiss from this action the Attorney General and the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security. See Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314,
320 (6th Cir. 2003).
Background
Factual background and Immigration Court proceedings2
Hu is 44 years old and a Chinese citizen. Doc. 1, at 1 ¶1.3 She entered

the United States without being inspected through Mexico, at or near Otay
Mesa, California, on April 8, 2024. Id. The next day a Border Patrol agent
issued Hu a Notice to Appear (NTA), placing her in immigration removal
proceedings, Doc. 1-2, and released her, Doc. 9-1, at 1.
The Notice to Appear did not allege that Hu was an arriving alien.
Rather, it alleged that she was “an alien present in the United States who ha[d]

not been admitted or paroled.” Doc. 1-2, at 1. The Notice to Appear directed Hu
to appear for a removal hearing on June 6, 2025, in New York City. Id.
In June 2024, Hu, through counsel, filed in the New York Immigration
Court a written pleading conceding the truth of the allegations in the Notice to
Appear. Doc. 9-2. Hu also filed an I-589 asylum application. Doc. 1, at 1, ¶2.
On July 11, 2025, Hu was taken into custody during an enforcement
operation in Parma Heights, Ohio. Doc. 1, at 5, ¶22. She was not given bond.

2 “At this stage of proceedings, allegations in the Petition are accepted as
true and construed in Petitioner’s favor.” See Alexander v. N. Bureau of
Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545-46 (6th Cir. 2011) (describing the pleadings
standard and applying to the § 2243 stage in a § 2241 petition). In addition,
“documents attached to the pleadings become part of the pleadings and may be
considered” by the Court. Id. at 546 (quoting Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v.
Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007)). Gaps in Hu’s
recitation of events have been filled in by documents that the government has
attached to its opposition brief.

3 The Court cites the CM/ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the
parties’ filings.
Id. On July 18, Hu requested a bond hearing. Doc. 9-5, at 1–2. On July 21, the
government issued Hu a Form I-261, alleging an additional ground of
removability. Doc. 9-3 (Form I-261, Additional Charges of

Inadmissibility/Deportability). On July 24, the Immigration Judge denied
Hu’s bond eligibility because, under Matter of Q. Li, 26 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025),
the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction to determine bond.4 Doc. 9-5, at 9. In
September, Hu appealed this ruling. Doc. 1, at 5–6, ¶22. Hu’s appeal remains
pending. Doc. 1, at 5–6, ¶22. Hu has filed subsequent motions for bond
hearings, which have all been denied. Id. at 5–6, ¶22. Meanwhile, Hu has not

yet had an asylum hearing because the Immigration Court has no access to the
Hebei interpreter that Hu needs. Id. at 14–15, ¶65. Hu has thus remained in
custody at Mahoning County Jail since July 11, 2025. Doc. 1, at 2, ¶4; Doc. 9-
4. Hu’s Immigration Court venue changed from New York to Cleveland and
proceedings remain pending on the Cleveland Immigration Court docket. Doc.
1, at 1–2; Doc. 9-4.

4 In Matter of Q, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), Board of Immigration
Appeals held that “[a]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained
without a warrant while arriving in the United States … and subsequently
placed in removal proceedings is detained under … 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) … and
is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under … 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”
See also Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 216 (BIA 2025) (finding
that “Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond
to aliens who are present in the United States without admission” based on the
“plain language of … 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).”
Hu’s habeas petition
On January 15, 2026, Hu filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. Hu states that she is being detained unlawfully and

seeks “enforcement of her rights as a member of the Bond Eligible Class
certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM
(C.D. Cal.).” Id. at 2, ¶3; see also id. at 12 (describing count one of her petition
as a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act). Alternatively, she asks
the Court to order her release “unless Respondents provide a bond hearing
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days.” Id. at 3, ¶13. In count two, Hu

alleges a due process violation for her detention without bond and the
government’s failure to provide her with an asylum hearing. Id. at 14–15.
Respondents filed an opposition. Doc. 9. They contend that the Court
lacks jurisdiction to review Hu’s claims. Id. at 5–10. Respondents also argue
that the Bautista case “has no preclusive effect here”; Hu has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, which should not be excused due to futility; and that
Hu’s due process claim fails. Id. at 10–14.

Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may grant a writ of habeas
corpus to any person who demonstrates that she is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). An alien
may challenge the lawfulness of immigration detention through a writ of
habeas corpus. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (observing that “the
writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of
Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
strongest.”); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
Although the Court lacks jurisdiction in habeas over issues such as
challenges to the legality of a removal order, see Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d
869, 876 (6th Cir. 2018), it has jurisdiction to consider whether a noncitizen is
lawfully detained, see Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103,
117 (2020) (describing habeas corpus as the “‘appropriate remedy to’”

determine the legality of a person’s custody) (quoting 3 Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1333, p. 206 (1833)).
Discussion
1. The Court has jurisdiction over Hu’s petition.
Respondents argue that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9) and (g), this
Court lacks jurisdiction to review Hu’s petition. See Doc. 9, at 5–6, 8–10. Before
discussing these provisions, it is worth noting that Section 1252 is entitled

“judicial review of orders of removal.” While “section headings cannot limit the
plain meaning of a statutory text, ‘they supply cues’ as to what Congress
intended.” Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 380
(2018) (citations omitted). So it is questionable at the start whether any of the
provisions in Section 1252 would apply to Hu, who is not challenging an order
of removal.
In any event, Respondents argue that “Section 1252(g) … categorically
bars jurisdiction over ‘any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising
from the decision or action by the [Secretary of Homeland Security] to

commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien.’” Doc. 9, at 10 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). Respondents also argue that
“[u]nder § 1252(b)(9), ‘judicial review of all questions of law … including
interpretation and application of statutory provisions … arising from any
action taken … to remove an alien from the United States’ is only proper before
the appropriate court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final

removal order.” Id, at 8 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)).
Respondents are mistaken. See Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d
896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (the right of a “person detained by the
government” to “challenge the legality of h[er] confinement through a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus …. extends to those persons challenging the
lawfulness of immigration-related detention”) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
688, and Demore, 538 U.S. at 517).

First, Section 1252(g) does not bar, categorically or otherwise, Hu’s
claims. Section 1252(g) provides in relevant part that:
[e]xcept as provided in this section and
notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241
of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, …
no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under this chapter.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Based on this statute, Respondents argue that the Secretary
of Homeland Security’s “decision to commence removal proceedings includes
the decision to detain pending such removal proceedings.” Doc. 9, at 10.
Respondents’ position, however, ignores the Supreme Court’s caution that the
jurisdictional limits detailed in Section 1252(g) have a “narrow” reach, and
apply only to “review of cases ‘arising from’ decisions ‘to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020) (explaining that the
Supreme Court has “previously rejected as ‘implausible’ the Government’s
suggestion that § 1252(g) covers ‘all claims arising from deportation
proceedings’ or imposes a ‘general jurisdictional limitation’”) (quoting Reno v.

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that Section 1252(g)
“applies” “narrow[ly] … only to three discrete actions that the Attorney
General may take:” the “‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm, 525 U.S. at 482. Outside of these three categories, the
Supreme Court has noted that there are “many other decisions or actions that

may be part of the deportation process,” such as “the decisions to open an
investigation, to surveil the suspected violation, to reschedule the deportation
hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of
the adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order.” Id. In this way,
Section 1252(g) is “not relevant” to the consideration of a court’s jurisdiction to
consider an immigration habeas petition beyond the three enumerated events.

See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 311 n.34 (relying on American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm).
A three-justice plurality of the Supreme Court has more recently
affirmed the narrow construction of Section 1252(g). See Jennings v.
Rodriquez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (plurality opinion). The plurality
reiterated that the Court “did not interpret [the phrase ‘arising from’] to sweep

in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions
of the Attorney General. Instead, [the Court] read the language to refer to just
those three specific actions themselves.” Id. at 294.
Here, the Respondents submit that the Department of Homeland
Security commenced removal proceedings against Hu because Hu filed an
asylum application and is currently in removal proceedings. Doc. 9, at 10. But
Hu’s “detention does not arise from the government’s ‘commenc[ement] of

proceedings,’ which begins with the filing of an NTA in an immigration court.”
Mahdawi v. Trump, 136 F.4th 443, 450–51 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Ozturk v.
Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 396–97 (2d Cir. 2025)). Indeed, Respondents did not
detain Hu until more than a year after they initiated her removal proceedings.
Respondents’ jurisdictional argument, regarding Section 1252(g), thus
fails. See Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 615 (1st Cir. 2023) (“there is no
way to read [Section 1252(g)’s] legislative history as evincing ‘a clear statement
of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction’ over all detention claims.
To the contrary, § 1252(g) was passed with the understanding that collateral

challenges to the legality of a petitioner’s detention would not constitute
‘cause[s] or claim[s]’ that ‘aris[e] from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to ... execute removal orders.’”) (citation omitted).
Next, Respondents argue that Sections 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) bar
this Court’s “review of decision to detain and/or remove.” Doc. 9, at 8. Section
1252(a)(5) states that the court of appeals is the “sole and exclusive means for

judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of
this chapter” except for subsection (e). Under Section 1252(b)(9):
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact,
including interpretation and application of
constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from
any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an
alien from the United States under this subchapter
shall be available only in judicial review of a final
order under this section. Except as otherwise
provided in this section, no court shall have
jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under Section 2241 of
Title 38 or any other habeas corpus provision, by
section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to
review an order or such questions of law or fact.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
The Supreme Court has “described § 1252(b)(9) as a ‘zipper clause’ which
“consolidate[s] ‘judicial review’ of immigration proceedings into one action in
the court of appeals.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313.5 But the Court has made clear
that “it applies only ‘[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under
subsection (a)(1).’” Id. (emphasis added). As a result, “§ 1252(b)(9) does not

clearly apply to actions brought pursuant to the general habeas statute, and
thus cannot repeal that statute either in part or in whole.” Id. at 314; see id.
at 302 (noting that the writ of habeas corpus historically “encompassed
detentions based on errors of law, including the erroneous application or
interpretation of statutes”); see also Ozturk, 136 F.4th at 399. Here, Hu is not
challenging an order of removal. Respondents therefore have not shown that

section 1252(b)(9)’s jurisdictional-bar applies to Hu’s petition.
For all of the reasons stated, the Court should find that it possesses
jurisdiction to consider Hu’s Petition challenging the constitutionality of her
detention.
2. Hu is excused from administrative exhaustion
Respondents state that Hu must exhaust her administrative remedies
and assert that she has not done so. Doc. 9, at 12–14. Hu does not disagree that

exhaustion is required and that she has not done so. Rather, Hu argues that

5 Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act in response to
St. Cyr, to eliminate habeas as a method to review final orders of removal for
criminal aliens. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13. Div. B, § 106, 119
Stat. 231; Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 580 (2020). Importantly, although
“the Real ID Act eliminate[d] a district court’s jurisdiction over habeas
petitions challenging final orders of removal,” it “did not eliminate a district
court’s jurisdiction to review habeas petitions challenging an alien’s
detention.” Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006).
her failure to exhaust should be excused on futility grounds. Doc. 1, at 11,
¶¶45–46; Doc. 10, at 15–16.
“When ‘Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial

discretion governs’ whether or not exhaustion should be required.” See
Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
“[E]xhaustion may not be required when the administrative remedy ‘does not
serve the purposes behind the exhaustion doctrine[],’ if the ‘administrative
remedies are inadequate or not efficacious,’ or ‘where pursuit of administrative
remedies would be a futile gesture.’” Id. at 594 (quoting Shawnee Coal Co. v.

Andrus, 661 F.2d 1083, 1093 (6th Cir. 1981)). “Additionally, ‘[e]xhaustion of
administrative remedies may not be required in cases of non-frivolous
constitutional challenges to an agency’s procedures.’” Id. (quoting Bangura v.
Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Even assuming that exhaustion is required, Hu has shown that
exhaustion would be futile.
Hu explains that the Board of Immigration Appeals “‘has predetermined

the disputed issue’ by having a ‘clearly stated position’ that [Hu] is not eligible
for the relief sought.” Doc. 10, at 16 (quoting Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 and
citing Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-2304, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 8, 2025); see also Doc. 1, at 11–12, ¶46. This is true; the Board of
Immigration Appeals has determined that petitioners like Hu are not eligible
for bond hearings. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 216 (BIA
2025); Matter of Q, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025). Exhaustion therefore would
be futile. See Alvaro Ramirez Moreno v. Lynch, No. 4:26-cv-275, 2026 WL
496634, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2026) (“This Court cannot think of anything

more clearly amounting to a ‘futile gesture’ than requiring Petitioner to spend
time appealing the Immigration Court’s decision to deny him a bond hearing
to the very agency that passed down that unequivocal directive [in Hurtado]”).
And the fact that Hu has a pending appeal in the Board of Appeals doesn’t
change this result. See Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-cv-6582, -- F.Supp.3d
--, 2025 WL 3295903, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (“To force [Petitioner] to

request a bond hearing from an immigration judge … and then appeal that
denial to the same BIA that has prevented immigration judges from hearing
bond requests in the first place, all before allowing [Petitioner] to seek judicial
review of his [detention]...would be ‘Kafkaesque.’”).
For all of the reasons stated, the Court should determine that Hu is not
required to exhaust her administrative remedies.
3. Mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) does not apply to Hu
because she is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

Having concluded that this Court has jurisdiction and that exhaustion
would be futile, I turn to the merits of Hu’s claim.6 The parties dispute whether
Hu falls under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) or 1226(a). Under Section 1225, a noncitizen

6 Respondents present this issue as a jurisdictional bar. Doc. 9, at 6–8. I
evaluate the issue on the merits, and, to the extent jurisdiction would be
implicated, the outcome here would not bar this Court’s jurisdiction.
“who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not
been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’” Jennings, 283 U.S.
at 287. There are two categories of applicants for admission described in

Section 1225, “those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).”
Id.
Section 1225(b)(1) covers the “[i]nspection of aliens arriving in the
United States and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled.”
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Respondents argue that this provision “authorizes
mandatory detention pending a final determination of credible fear of

persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.” Doc. 9, at 6
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV)). But Section 1225(b) covers inspections
and describes events occurring at the time the non-citizen arrives in this
country. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (“Screening”); § 1225(b)(1)(B)
(“Asylum interviews”). The specific subsection that the Respondents rely on
references mandatory detention in the context of an asylum interview, which is
conducted by an asylum officer when the non-citizen arrives in the United

States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). Here, there is no evidence showing that
officers conducted an asylum interview with Hu when she arrived at the
border. Indeed, Hu’s Notice to Appear shows that this did not occur. Doc. 1-2,
at 1 (NTA showing the box for this option is unchecked). Hu didn’t express an
intent to apply for asylum until nearly three months after she arrived in this
country. Doc. 9-2. Respondents therefore have not shown that Hu’s detention
is required under Section 1225(b)(1).
As for Section 1225(b)(2)(A), it provides that “in the case of an alien who

is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines
that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to
be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a
of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (emphasis added). By contrast, under Section
1226(a) “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

(emphasis added). And immigration authorities “may release the alien on …
bond … or … conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A), (B). Further, 8
U.S.C. § 1229a sets out the manner in which removal proceedings should occur
but does not impose a detention requirement.
Respondents argue that Hu is subject to mandatory detention based on
application of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) because she is an “applicant for
admission.” Doc 9, at 6. They also claim that Hu is subject to detention and

ineligible for a bond hearing under 1229a because she in “currently in removal
proceedings.” Id., at 7. Hu contends that individuals like her “who have not
been inspected and authorized by an immigration officer lack the trait to be
categorized as ‘applicants for admission.’” Doc. 10, at 7.
The heart of the parties’ dispute comes down to Respondents’ contention
that aliens seeking admission are the same as aliens who are applicants for
admission. Doc. 5, at 20. An applicant for admission is defined as “[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an

alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in
international or United States waters).” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). By contrast, the
term seeking admission is not defined by statute. So the Court turns to the
phrase’s plain or “ordinary meaning,” which is often determined with reference
to “grammar and dictionary definitions.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155,
168–69 (2021).

The word “seek” means “to ask for,” “to try to acquire or gain,” or “to
make an attempt.” Seek, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/seek (last visited Feb. 25, 2025). Because the word
seeking is the present participle of the verb seek, its use “‘implies some sort of
present-tense action.’” Curillo v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1340, 2025 WL 3235737, at
*5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2025) (quoting Martinez v. Hyde, No. CV 25-11613,
2025 WL 2084238, at *6 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025)). “‘Seeking’ requires

something more than just passively being present in the United States.”
Chavez v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., No. 4:25-cv-2061, 2025 WL 3187080, at *5
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2025).
And the thing the alien must be seeking is “admission.” Admission is
defined as “lawful entry ... into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). “Entry” is
not defined but a commonly referenced dictionary says that it means “the act
of entering.” Entry, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited Feb. 25, 2025). And Black’s Law

Dictionary says that in this context, it means “[a]ny entrance of an alien into
the United States, whether voluntary or involuntary.” Entry, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
The Board has long defined “entry” into our country
for immigration purposes to require (1) a crossing
into the territorial limits of the United States; (2)
inspection and admission by an immigration officer
or actual and intentional evasion of inspection; and
(3) freedom from official restraint.

Lopez v. Sessions, 851 F.3d 626, 630 (6th Cir. 2017), abrogated on other grounds
by Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020). Putting all of this together,
seeking admission means presently trying to cross into the United States. See
Campbell v. Almodovar, No. 1:25-cv-09509, 2025 WL 3538351, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 10, 2025) (citing cases), opinion clarified, 2025 WL 3626099 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
15, 2025). But see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, -- F.4th --, 2026
WL 323330, at *5 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (reaching the opposite conclusion).
And Hu was not at the time she was detained trying to cross into the United
States—she had been in the United States for over a year.
Respondents say that their reading is compelled by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Jennings. See Doc. 9, at 6. Other courts have dispatched this
argument:
Binding Supreme Court precedent further supports
the petitioner’s read of the statute. In Jennings v.
Rodriguez, the Supreme Court analyzed Sections
1225, 1226, and 1227 to determine whether
“detained aliens have a statutory right to periodic
bond hearings.” 583 U.S. at 285. The Court made it
clear that “Section 1225 authorizes ‘the Government
to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the
country,’ while Section 1226 ‘authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens already in the
country pending the outcome of removal
proceedings.’” Sarmiento Guerrero, 2025 WL
3214787, at *5 (quoting Jennings, 582 U.S. at 288)
(emphasis in Sarmiento Guerrero); see also Nielsen
[v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 396–97 (2019] (holding that
Section 1226(a) applies to noncitizens “present in
this country”).

The government claims that Jennings stands for the
proposition that “[a]pplicants for admission fall into
one of two categories, ‘those covered by § 1225(b)(1)
and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).’” (ECF No. 8 at 11
(quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287).) The
government’s interpretation is not persuasive,
because it takes the above language out of context.
The quote upon which the government rests its
theory appears in a discussion about “decid[ing] (1)
who may enter the country and (2) who may stay
here after entering.” Jennings, 538 U.S. at 286.
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, explained:

That process of decision generally begins at the
Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the
Government must determine whether an alien
seeking to enter the country is admissible.
Under § 302, 110 Stat. 3009–579, 8 U.S.C. §
1225, an alien who “arrives in the United
States,” or “is present” in this country but “has
not been admitted,” is treated as “an applicant
for admission.” § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for
admission must “be inspected by immigration
officers” to ensure that they may be admitted
into the country consistent with U.S.
immigration law. § 1225(a)(3).
As relevant here, applicants for admission fall
into one of two categories, those covered by §
1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).

Id. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225). Read in context,
the quoted language clearly refers to the “process ...
at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry.” Id.; see
also id. (“As relevant here, applicants for admission
fall into one of two categories ...” (emphasis added)).
Any possible doubt about the Court’s meaning is
erased by the Court's summary:

In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens seeking
admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1)
and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government
to detain certain aliens already in the country
pending the outcome of removal proceedings
under §§ 1226(a) and (c).

Id. at 289. Thus, the government's argument that all
“[a]pplicants for admission fall into one of two
categories” under Section 1225 is inconsistent with
the broader statutory scheme and with the Supreme
Court's recent, clear explanation of that statutory
scheme.

Ye v. Maldonado, No. 25-cv-6417, 2025 WL 3521298, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8,
2025).
Tellingly, immigration authorities in Hu’s Notice to Appear alleged, by
checking a box, that she is: “an alien present in the United States who has not
been admitted or paroled.” Doc. 1–2, at 1 (emphasis added). Authorities did not
check the box immediately above that box, which provides “You are an arriving
alien.” Respondents’ choice amounts to a judicial admission that Hu is not an
arriving alien. See Hakopian v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that allegations in a Notice to Appear, like those in a complaint,
are judicial admissions); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003)

(“the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are judicial admissions by
which [Plaintiff] was bound throughout the course of the proceeding”) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted)); El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United
States, 750 F.3d 863, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194,
1198 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995).
Under the plain text of Hu’s Notice to Appear, Hu was simply passively

present in the United States without being admitted or paroled––and nothing
more. “[A]s an immigrant arrested and detained while ‘already in the
country[,]’ Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, [Hu] falls … within § 1226(a)’s default
rule,” Chavez, 2025 WL 3187080, at *4. Section 1226(a) gives immigration
judges broad discretion to permit or deny release on bond and “makes no
distinction between admitted and unadmitted immigrants.” Chavez, 2025 WL
3187080, at *5. The key is that Section 1226(a) makes discretionary bond

available, rather than imposing mandatory detention. Respondents have not
explained to whom they think Section 1226(a) might apply, or why Hu would
not fall under this section.
Because Hu should have been, but was not, considered for release on
bond under Section 1226(a), the Court should grant her petition and order the
immigration court to conduct a bond hearing.
4. Hu has not shown that the Bautista decision is binding on this
Court

In late 2025, a California district court issued a series of orders in a case
similar to this one. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-1873, -- F.Supp.3d -
-, 2025 WL 3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). The court also certified a
Rule 23(b)(2) Bond Eligible Class for:
All noncitizens in the United States without lawful
status who (1) have entered or will enter the United
States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be
apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not
be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), §
1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department of
Homeland Security makes an initial custody
determination.

Id. at *32.
Hu contends that she falls within this class and that this Court “must
apply the Maldonado Bautista final judgment.” Doc. 10, at 10 (emphasis
added). Respondents argue that “a district court in California has no
jurisdiction over custodians located in other districts” and list other reasons
that counsel against applying to Hu’s case the judgment in the California case.
Id. at 10–12.
The only legal authority that Hu cites to support her argument that this
Court must take action based on the California court’s judgment is Velasco-
Sanchez v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-13730, 2025 WL 3553672, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 11, 2025). Doc. 10, at 11. The court in Valasco-Sanchez discussed the
Maldonado Bautista case and agreed with its reasoning regarding the
application of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a). 2025 WL 3553672, at *2–4. The
court did not find that the judgment in Maldonado Bautista must be applied
in that case. See id. Because Hu has not shown that this Court is bound by the

judgment in Maldonado Bautista, her argument fails.
5. Alternatively, Hu is entitled to relief on her due process claim
Even if the Court finds that Hu is subject to mandatory detention under
Section 1225(b)(2), it should grant her petition and direct the immigration
court to conduct a bond hearing under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. The Fifth Amendment right to due process applies to all persons,

including noncitizens, who are present in the United States. Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 693.
Generally, Hu claims that her continued detention absent a bond
hearing represents a violation of her right to due process. Doc. 1, at 14, ¶64;
15, at ¶¶69, 71. She also argues that the Immigration Court has not and cannot
provide her with an asylum hearing because it doesn’t have an interpreter who
speaks the Hebei dialect that Hu speaks. Id. at 14–15, ¶¶65, 69.

Respondents’ counter to Hu’s argument that her detention without bond
violates her due process rights “are tied to her failure to exhaust and are not
plausible because she continues to file motions and appeals of the denial of
bond.” Doc. 9, at 13. But as already explained, Hu’s exhaustion of remedies
would be futile. Respondents assert that Hu is not entitled to a bond hearing
under Section 1225, id., at 14, but this argument fails, as explained above.
Respondents contend that “even considering cases on prolonged
detention,” Hu would not be entitled to a bond hearing and accuse Hu of
purposefully delaying her asylum hearing. Doc. 9, at 14. But the cases they cite

are not on point. Zadvydas concerned detention after an alien receives a final
order of removal. 533 U.S. at 682. Demore concerns mandatory detention for
certain criminal aliens. 538 U.S. at 513. Hu has not received a final order of
removal and no one has alleged that she is a criminal. And Martinez v. Larose,
968 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2020), the last case Respondents rely on, Doc. 9, at 14,
is inapplicable. That case concerns an alien with a reinstated removal order

who was subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which is not at issue here.
Martinez, 968 F.3d at 558.
Further, the merits of Gualpa’s due process claim under the applicable
balancing test justify relief. See United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d
848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020) (applying the balancing test established in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). Under this test the Court weighs: (1) the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of

erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest,
including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedures entail. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
First, Hu’s liberty is at stake. Second, Respondents’ position has been
inconsistent. Hu was previously released and permitted to go about living for
over a year in the United States during the pendency of her immigration
proceedings before being detained in 2025. These contradictions tend to show
that Hu is at risk of being erroneously deprived of her freedom. The second
factor thus weighs in her favor.

Lastly, based on the information described throughout this
recommendation, Respondents have not and likely cannot show that it has any
significant interest in Hu’s continued detention. Indeed, the fact that they
released Hu for over a year weighs against any potential argument by
Respondents regarding this third factor.
Based on the above, I recommend that that the Court grant Hu’s

Petition and that the immigration court be ordered to conduct a bond hearing.
Conclusion
Because Section 1225(b) is inapplicable to Hu, Respondents may not
now impose mandatory detention pending her removal decision. I recommend
that the District Court grant Hu’s petition and require the immigration court
to conduct a hearing to determine whether, consistent with this Court’s
determination, Hu is entitled to discretionary bond under Section 1226(a).

Dated: February 26, 2026

/s/James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure
to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–31 (6th
Cir. 2019).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11272339. Public record. Not legal advice.