# McCann-McCalpine

> District Court, D. Maryland · February 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11272212

## Case

- **Full name:** Lydon McCann-McCalpine v. Director Gail Watts
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** February 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11272212

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[g]enerally, a failure to supervise gives rise to § 1983 liability . . . only in those situations in which there is a history of widespread abuse”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

LYDON MCCANN-MCCALPINE,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. BAH-23-2039

DIRECTOR GAIL WATTS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Lydon McCann-McCalpine (“McCann-McCalpine” or “Plaintiff”) filed this civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations occurring during
his arrest and subsequent detention at the Baltimore County Detention Center (“BCDC”). ECF 1.
Director Gail Watts is the sole defendant remaining in this action. Pending is her motion for
judgment on the pleadings. ECF 47. Plaintiff opposes the motion. See ECF 49 (response); ECF
61 (supplemental opposition). The Court finds a hearing unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.
Md. 2025). For the reasons stated below, Defendant Watts’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
will be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court summarized Plaintiff’s allegations and procedural developments in prior orders.
See ECF 26, 45, 60. While the Court assumes familiarity with these prior orders, it will highlight
relevant facts and procedural history here.
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff originally sued numerous individuals associated with the Baltimore County Police
Department and BCDC and claimed that he was unfairly arrested and detained at BCDC. ECF 1,
at 3. He alleges that while at BCDC, the defendants failed to protect him from an assault on April

25, 2021, and from additional abuses. Id. at 3–4.
Previously, all defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint. See ECF 10 (Defendant
Aramark); ECF 15 (all other defendants). On July 12, 2024, the Court granted the pending motions
to dismiss in whole or in part, leaving only Plaintiff’s claims against Watts. See ECF 26
(memorandum opinion); ECF 27 (order). The Court allowed claims against Watts to proceed
because the Baltimore County Defendants’ motion to dismiss failed to adequately address the
allegations against her. ECF 26, at 17–18. On July 23, 2024, Plaintiff noted an appeal of the
Court’s July 12, 2024 memorandum opinion and order. ECF 28. The appeal was subsequently

dismissed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for lack of jurisdiction.
ECF 42. The mandate issued on January 2, 2025. ECF 43.
Defendant Watts answered the complaint and then filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. ECF 39 (answer); ECF 47 (motion). In response to the motion, Plaintiff filed an
“[o]pposition to defendant[’]s summary judgement” (sic). ECF 49. The Court determined that
Plaintiff had misconstrued the nature of Defendant’s motion as one for summary judgment and
thus provided him with an additional 21 days to file a supplement to his opposition, which he has
now done. ECF 60 (order permitting the filing of a supplemental response); ECF 61 (supplemental
opposition to motion for judgment on the pleadings).
B. McCann-McCalpine’s Allegations
The Court provides the following summary of Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint as set
forth in the memorandum opinion issued on July 12, 2024:
Plaintiff alleges that his interactions with Detective Fisher began in 2020,
when Fisher questioned Plaintiff as a witness to a homicide. ECF 1, at 2. He alleges
that Fisher wanted him to “help” with a case [Plaintiff] “knew nothing about.” Id.
He states that Fisher wanted him to say he gave the homicide suspect (“Fogg”) his
car on the night of the murder. Id. He maintains that Fisher indicated that if
Plaintiff did not “help” in the investigation of Fogg, he would charge Plaintiff with
murder and attempted murder. Id. He maintains that Fisher “was desperate to solve
the high-profile case even if it meant [Plaintiff] testifying and lying on the stand
about something he knew nothing about.” Id. Plaintiff states this threat became a
“promise made” in 2021 when Fisher arrested Plaintiff and made him a “suspect in
the death of his sister’s boyfriend.” Id. at 2–3. He states that Fisher sought an
arrest warrant and arrested him without probable cause. Id. at 3. Similarly, Plaintiff
states that no forensic evidence tied him to the crime. Id. He states that Fisher
sought a warrant without probable cause to check Plaintiff’s phone, which Plaintiff
maintains was intended to make him “pay for not cooperating as a witness in the
2020 case.” Id. Plaintiff was arrested and “locked up” on March 31, 2021, and was
subsequently a “victim of torture and had a target put on his back by detective
Fisher.”1 Id.

While at BCDC, on April 25, 2021, Plaintiff was attacked by “5 BGF gang
members” who stabbed him in the head, which required staples and hospitalization.
Id. He states that Defendant Director Gail Watts “showed deliberate indifference
by not turning the situation over to internal affairs [and] not calling the Police
department.” Id. Upon return from the hospital, he was placed on “another
population tier with fresh staples in his head defenseless to suffer as much severe
emotional stress as possible or even die.” Id. He maintains it was unreasonable of
Watts and BCDC to place him back in general population right away. Id. He notes
that he was previously attacked by an inmate in the shower, on whom he “pressed
charges.” Id. He states that he “never missed a court date while locked up, but
BCDC purposely ignored taking [him] for charges filed against the inmate who
attacked” him. Id. Plaintiff states that the “pattern of inflicting as much pain on
[him] as possible got worse as time went on” which is “exactly what Fisher
conspired with the help of Baltimore County officers to keep [him] from fighting
[his] case.” Id. at 4.

1 In support of his contention that Detective Fisher sought warrants without probable cause, lacked
evidence tying Plaintiff to the crime for which he was arrested, and acted in a retaliatory manner,
Plaintiff includes copies of pro se motions to dismiss and to suppress evidence which he filed in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. ECF 1-3.
Next, on August 6, 2022, Plaintiff alleges he found “a coated unknown large
pill shape capsule” hidden in his dinner tray. Id. Plaintiff informed Defendants
Walo and Carter about the unknown object found in his food. Id. Plaintiff wanted
the Officers to acknowledge what they had seen on the tray, but instead, Carter took
the tray to the kitchen to be examined by Defendant Mrs. Heard. Id. Carter then
“fabricated” a “200 form” stating that Officer Walo opened the tray before giving
it to Plaintiff. Id. The tray was taken to the kitchen, and Mrs. Heard, who works
for Aramark, stated “it’s possibly from staff wearing gloves when they prepare the
food.” Id. Plaintiff states that Mrs. Heard’s “observation was a lie” and the
comments on the 200 form were “fabricated with the intent to deceive investigating
what drugs was on [his] tray.” Id.

Plaintiff maintains that “Director Gail Watts, Sergeant C. Carter, Officer
Walo [and] Aramark’s staff Mrs. Heard reached a meeting of the minds by
permitting, encouraging, facilitating & concealing their actions.” Id. at 5. He states
that Carter and Mrs. Heard lied about the substance found on the tray and that Carter
persuaded Walo to say he opened the tray before giving it to Plaintiff. Id.; see also
ECF 1-1 (documents related to Plaintiff’s inmate complaint forms dated August 6
and August 29, 2022). He concludes that “all defendants’ actions were enough to
show that they conspired in serving me drugs on my food tray & trying to cover it
up once I didn’t eat the drugs.” ECF 1, at 5. Further, he says Carter did not handle
the situation properly because he should have called one of BCDC’s K-9 units. Id.
Plaintiff states that he notified Watts by email and through two separate 200 forms
(inmate complaint forms) on August 6 and August 29, 2022, asking her to
investigate “all people who took part in trying to kill [him] by poisoning.” Id. As
an exhibit to his complaint, Plaintiff includes copies of the inmate complaint forms
filed in response to this incident. See ECF 1-1. The complaint forms largely restate
the facts provided in his civil action complaint. There are comments from Sergeant
Carter on the form which, presumably, contain the information Plaintiff contends
is fabricated. Id. at 2. These comments state that there was a “white powdery
substance” on top of Plaintiff’s food, which Officer Walo “did not observe” when
he opened the tray and handed it to Plaintiff. Id. Upon viewing the substance Mrs.
Heard indicated that it was possibly from staff wearing gloves while preparing the
food. Id. Sergeant Carter indicated that another tray was offered to Plaintiff, but it
was refused. Id.

Next, Plaintiff alleges, generally, that there was a plan involving “many
departments in Baltimore County” to “keep [him] from going to trial” in which
“[a]ll defendants took part in playing their role.” ECF 1, at 5–6. He states that he
routinely had visits with his family cancelled when other inmates were permitted
visitation. Id. at 6. He informed Watts, but she “did nothing to fix this situation
because again it was all part of Fisher [and] the state’s attorney plan of keeping
[him] from taking [his] case to trial.” Id. Plaintiff asked his mother to contact
Baltimore County Internal Affairs so that the interrogation in which Detective
Fisher threatened him could be preserved. Id. Internal Affairs never followed up
or investigated his claims. Id. Further, Watts never presented his complaints that
BCDC staff were attempting to kill him to Internal Affairs. Id.

Plaintiff states that both the Baltimore County State’s Attorney and
Detective Fisher knew how difficult his incarceration at BCDC had been, and thus
requested additional postponements of his trial “knowing [he] wasn’t physically or
mentally capable of spending any more time fighting for [his] life in that jail.” Id.
He states that after the postponement “instead of giving [him his] fair trial or
dismissal,” they “used the corner they bullied [him] into” to convince him to plead
guilty to manslaughter, with a sentence of time served. Id.

On July 16, 2023, Plaintiff contacted Baltimore County Internal Affairs to
inquire about why no one had investigated his concerns. Id. He was told that
Internal Affairs had no record of him or his family contacting them for assistance.
Id. He states that this was “all lies” and part of a “cover up” for the misconduct of
colleagues. Id. at 7. As an exhibit to his complaint, Plaintiff submits a print-out of
the online Internal Affairs form completed by his mother. See ECF 1-2.

ECF 26, at 2–5.
B. Defendant Watts’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Defendant Watts moves for judgment on the pleadings alleging that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim against her. ECF 47-1, at 4. Watts argues that the complaint should be dismissed
because Plaintiff fails to allege personal involvement or supervisory liability and further argues
that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 5–10.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed – but
early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(c). “A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is decided under the same standard
as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Bierman Fam. Farm, LLC v. United Farm Fam. Ins.
Co., 265 F. Supp. 3d 633, 637 n.5 (D. Md. 2017). In assessing this motion, therefore, the Court
will discount legal conclusions stated in the complaint and “accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff and considers whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face.
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. “The complaint must offer ‘more than labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action[.]’ ” Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App’x 745, 747
(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). At the same time,
a “complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiff's]
claim to show that [the plaintiff] has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.”
Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014).
III. DISCUSSION

The Court previously summarized Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Watts as: 1)
deliberate indifference for failure to contact the police and Internal Affairs following Plaintiff’s
stabbing; 2) deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety by placing him back on a general
population tier following the stabbing; 3) failure to investigate matters or elevate the situation to
internal affairs after being repeatedly informed about the incident with a pill in his food; and 4)
doing “nothing to fix the situation” when Plaintiff was denied family visits. ECF 26, at 17 (citing
ECF 1, at 3, 5–6).
The Court addresses Defendant Watts’ assertion that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against
her because she “never had any personal interaction” with Plaintiff and is not subject to supervisory
liability. ECF 47-1, at 5–10. In his initial opposition response, Plaintiff asserts that Watts had a

policy of “overlooking inmates’ basic human needs” and “inadequately trained, supervised, and
disciplined her subordinates.” ECF 49, at 1. In his supplemental response, Plaintiff asserts that
judgment on the pleadings is improper because “Defendants” exhibited deliberate indifference
after Plaintiff was stabbed multiple times, consciously disregarded a known substantial risk to
Plaintiff’s health and safety, and failed to keep Plaintiff secluded after his injury. ECF 61, at 1.

Plaintiff also includes a copy of the discharge note from his hospital visit which states that he
“[n]eeds to be secluded until Covid test comes back.” Id. at 2. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the
Court erred in denying a motion for leave to file a physical exhibit that shows he spoke to a “cop”
about Defendant “Gail Watts [and] defendants” for not following investigation rules and
procedures. Id. at 1.
The Court construes Plaintiff’s claim as an allegation of cruel and unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment proscribes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by virtue of its
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 173 (1976); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); King v. Rubenstein, 825
F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2016). Notably, it “proscribes more than physically barbarous

punishments.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. It also “embodies” the “concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency.” Id. at 102 (citation omitted). Thus, the Eighth Amendment
“protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).
The Fourth Circuit has observed that “not all Eighth Amendment violations are the same:
some constitute ‘deliberate indifference,’ while others constitute ‘excessive force.’” Thompson v.
Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 97 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1986)).
In general, the deliberate indifference standard applies to cases alleging failure to safeguard the
inmate’s health and safety, including failing to protect inmates from attack, maintaining inhumane
conditions of confinement, and failure to render medical assistance. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Thompson, 878 F.3d at 97.
Because there is no suggestion in the complaint that Watts (or any defendant) utilized force of any
kind, analysis of deliberate indifference is all that is applicable here.

Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee when the events took place, thus his claims of deliberate
indifference to excessive risk of harm fall under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Eighth
Amendment, to the Constitution. See ECF 26, at 16–17. This matters because “pretrial detainees
can state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, based on a purely objective standard, for prison
officials’ deliberate indifference to excessive risks of harm.” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 604–
05 (4th Cir. 2023). Indeed, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects pretrial
detainees from ‘governmental action’ that is not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive
governmental purpose’ or that is ‘excessive in relation to that purpose.’” Id. at 608–09 (citations
omitted) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)). “Now, it is sufficient that
the plaintiff show that the defendant’s action or inaction was, in Kingsley’s words, ‘objectively
unreasonable,’. . . that is, the plaintiff must show that the defendant should have known of that
condition and that risk, and acted accordingly . . . it is enough that the plaintiff show that the
defendant acted or failed to act ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known
or so obvious that it should be known.’” Id. at 611 (citations omitted). However, “it is still not
enough for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right
by the detainee.” Id. at 611–12.
Additionally, in a suit arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine of respondeat superior
generally does not apply and liability attaches only upon a defendant’s personal participation in
the constitutional violation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985); see also
Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004). A supervisory official cannot be held
liable for the acts of a subordinate unless the supervisor’s “indifference or tacit authorization of
subordinates’ misconduct” can be deemed to have caused the injury to the plaintiff. Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.
1984)). For a supervisor to be found liable for such acts, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the
supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that the subordinate was engaged in conduct that

posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to individuals like the plaintiff;
(2) the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the subordinate’s misconduct; and (3) there was an
affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Here, taking Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in his favor, Plaintiff has failed to allege Watts’ personal participation in any alleged
wrongdoing. Plaintiff does not allege that Watts had any knowledge, either actual or constructive,
that the stabbing had taken place or that it was recommended that Plaintiff not be housed in general
population following the stabbing. Plaintiff provides only conclusory statements that Watts
somehow failed to act without alleging that Watts had the required knowledge to act in the first
place. Watts cannot have acted with deliberate indifference without this requisite knowledge.2
Plaintiff has also not stated a claim against Watts related to the incident with the pill in his
food. Accepting Plaintiff’s allegation that Watts was notified after the fact that the incident took
place does not change the outcome. ECF 1, at 5. The Court previously held that Plaintiff did not
state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment against the two defendants, Walo and Carter, for
either attempting to harm Plaintiff by placing an unknown substance in his dinner tray or for failing

2 Further, although Plaintiff makes much of his being housed in general population and not in
seclusion following his release from medical treatment, the recommendation that he be housed in
seclusion was related, at least in part, to his Covid symptoms and not his injury. ECF 61, at 1. In
either event, Plaintiff does not allege that Watts was aware of this medical recommendation.
to summon the K-9 unit to investigate the substance. See ECF 26, at 15. As with his claims
against Walo and Carter, Plaintiff similarly fails to allege that Watts’ inaction following the
incident amounted to a violation of the law.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he notified Defendant Watts of the issues with his food and
thereafter his family “visits were cancelled manually by [the] jail after [he] received confirmation.”
ECF 1, at 6. He further alleges that Watts “did nothing to fix the situation.” Id. Plaintiff does not

allege, however, that Watts herself took action to cancel his family visitation. Plaintiff seeks to
hold Watts accountable solely based on his allegation that the “jail” manually cancelled visits. Id.
This vague allegation is insufficient to state a claim against Watts.
Plaintiff also fails to adequately allege supervisory liability on the part of Defendant Watts.
Plaintiff’s allegations against all other defendants were dismissed for failure to state a claim. See
ECF 26. Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that any of Watts’ subordinates acted in a manner to
violate his rights, or that Watts was aware of any such acts by subordinates. Further, Plaintiff does
not allege any pattern of widespread abuse necessary to establish supervisory action or inaction
giving rise to § 1983 liability. See Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating
that “[g]enerally, a failure to supervise gives rise to § 1983 liability . . . only in those situations in

which there is a history of widespread abuse”). As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
Defendant Watts. In addition, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s recent effort to amend his complaint
against Watts was denied as futile. ECF 60, at 5.
Finally, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s renewed effort to have the Court consider his
request to file a physical exhibit. ECF 61, at 1. Plaintiff states that the exhibit shows he spoke to
a “cop” about Defendant “Gail Watts [and] defendants” for allegedly not following “investigation
rules and procedures.” Id. For the same reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s generalized
allegations regarding a conversation with an unidentified “cop” fails to adequately allege Watts’
personal involvement or invoke supervisory liability.
Plaintiff has not provided sufficient information to allow his claims against Defendant
Watts to proceed.3 The motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted, and the case

dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Watts’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF
47, is GRANTED. A separate order follows.

Date: February 24, 2026 /s/
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge

3 The Court declines to address Watts’ qualified immunity argument, as the motion for judgment
on the pleadings will be granted.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11272212. Public record. Not legal advice.