# Hougham

> District Court, N.D. New York · February 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11272168

## Case

- **Full name:** Brad Hougham v. Trustees of Ithaca College
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** February 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________

BRAD HOUGHAM,

Plaintiff,

-v- 3:25-CV-00529 (AJB/MJK)

TRUSTEES OF ITHACA COLLEGE,

Defendant.
_____________________________________

Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:

DECISION & ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Brad Hougham (“Hougham”) brings Title IX employment discrimination claims
against Defendant Ithaca College Board of Trustees (“College”). Compl., Dkt. No. 1. The
College moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 9-1. The Court disagrees with the College that
Hougham’s claims are precluded by Title VII; however, it agrees that Hougham’s deliberate
indifference claim fails. For the following reasons, the College’s motion to dismiss will be
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
II. BACKGROUND1
Hougham is a tenured professor of music performance at Ithaca College. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 6.
In 2019, the provost at the time, La Jerne Terry Cornish (“Dr. Cornish”), appointed Hougham as

1 The following facts are taken from the complaint, Dkt. No. 1, and will be assumed true for the purpose of
assessing the motion to dismiss.
an associate provost. Id. ¶ 7. This newly created role was “an elevated position with high
visibility and access to leaders at [Ithaca College].” Id. ¶ 38. Hougham served in this role for a
three-year term, beginning on July 1, 2019, and ending June 30, 2022. Id. ¶ 7. For the first two
years, from July 2019 until August 2021, Hougham served directly under Dr. Cornish. Id. ¶ 15.

In that time, Hougham scanned documents, updated the faculty handbook and “various policies,”
and solicited leadership approval for those changes. Id. ¶ 40. Between fall 2020 and spring
2021, Hougham also assisted with the College’s Academic Program Prioritization (“APP”)
process, designed eliminate academic programs and faculty positions that were no longer viable
due to the College’s financial difficulties. Id. ¶ 41. For his dedication and work, Hougham
received praise from then-President Shirley Collado, Dr. Cornish, and the College’s board of
trustees. Id. ¶ 42.
Shortly after, President Collado resigned, and in July 2021, Dr. Cornish was appointed as
the College’s interim president. Id. ¶ 43. As a result of Dr. Cornish’s appointment, in August
2021, Melanie Stein (“Dr. Stein”), the Dean of the School of Humanities & Science, was chosen

as interim provost. Id. ¶ 16. Thus, Dr. Stein became Hougham’s direct supervisor from then
until June 30, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 16, 43.
Although Hougham’s term as associate provost was for three years and set to end July
2022, he asserts that it “came with the highly likely prospect for renewal for an additional three
years[,]” given his “indisputable merit and accomplishments[.]” Id. ¶ 39. At least, that was the
case until Dr. Stein took over.
Within a month or two, Hougham noticed Dr. Stein had a supervisory approach when it
came to him that differed from her approach with the other two associate provosts, both of whom
were heterosexual. Id. ¶ 45. Hougham found that Dr. Stein prioritized tasks assigned to him and
micro-managed those tasks. Id. When Hougham explained school policies Dr. Stein didn’t “like
or comprehend” she “often rais[ed] her voice in anger or frustration.” Id. Under Dr. Cornish’s
management, Hougham could work remotely from New York City for a week each month. Id. ¶
46. Dr. Cornish assured Hougham that “this arrangement could continue” after she left. Id.

However, Dr. Stein told Hougham that, while he might receive her approval for remote work a
day or two at a time, she was unlikely to approve week-long blocks. Id. Dr. Stein also indicated
that Hougham would need permission in advance. Id. Neither of the other associate provosts
needed to receive advance permission for remote work. Id.
Hougham also alleges that, during meetings, Dr. Stein “continually interrupted” him—
“often contorting her face and looking around the room to elicit similar reactions from . . .
subordinate staff and deans.” Id. ¶ 49. And at various times Dr. Stein told Hougham that he was
“too sensitive,” “too thin skinned,” “too dramatic,” and that if he wanted to do this work, he
“need[ed] to be tougher[.]” Id. ¶ 50. Hougham contends these appraisals were unrelated to his
performance, but simply “code phrases for ‘You are too gay[.]’” Id.

Once, when Dr. Stein again said he was being too sensitive, Hougham rejoined that, were
he heterosexual, she would not have used that phrasing. Id. ¶ 51. Dr. Stein became angry and
defensive, denied her language was problematic, and stated she had supervised other gay men in
the past. Id.
At some point in the Fall 2021 semester, a dean’s position opened in the College’s School
of Music, Theatre and Dance. Id. ¶ 54. Hougham says he was “nominated” for the role and feels
he was highly qualified for it. Id. However, Dr. Stein told Hougham “that he could certainly
apply[,] but wouldn’t be given an interview.” Id. “Dr. Stein stated that she ‘needed someone in
that role who was ‘stronger’ and ‘less thin-skinned.’” Id.
At a meeting between the two in December 2021, while attempting to relate something
Hougham had said before, Dr. Stein began imitating him. Id. ¶ 52. This impression, Hougham
alleges, involved a raised pitch and exaggerated volume, frantic movements, and Dr. Stein
waving her hands around her head with a limp-wrist. Id. Believing this impression to be

homophobic and sexual harassment, Hougham reported it to President Cornish, the Dean of the
School of Humanities and Science, and Kirra Franzese, the Associate Vice President for Human
Resources. Id. ¶ 57. Yet, when Dr. Stein met with Dr. Cornish to discuss this matter, she
“disingenuously” told Cornish that Hougham was “creating ‘dysfunction’ in the provost’s office,
impairing its smooth operation.” Id. ¶ 53.
By the end of 2021, Dr. Stein no longer sought Hougham’s counsel or advice. Id. ¶ 47.
At that point, Hougham concluded that Dr. Stein did not want him on her team—“not for any
deficiency in work performance or its timely completion, but . . . because [he was] a gay man.”
Id.
At an undated meeting during the spring or summer of 2022, Dr. Cornish brought up

Hougham’s “alleged dysfunctional behavior, as related by Dr. Stein.” Id. ¶ 55. In turn,
Hougham “recited the homophobic behaviors he was subjected to by Dr. Stein[.]” Id. To these,
Dr. Cornish curtly remarked, “[Dr.] Stein will never have been accused of any of these things
before.” Id. Rather than “directly and informally intervening” to curtail Dr. Stein’s behavior, Dr.
Cornish placed responsibility for ending it solely on Hougham. Id. ¶ 56. Dr. Cornish advised
Hougham “to use certain language when addressing his perceived sexual discrimination with Dr.
Stein.” Id.
In light of Dr. Cornish’s lack of assistance, Hougham contacted Franzese and reported Dr.
Stein for continuing sexual harassment. Id. ¶ 57. Yet “Franzese stated, nothing could be done.”
Id. ¶ 58. She acknowledged Hougham was having interpersonal problems with Dr. Stein. Id.
However, Franzese determined there were no actionable violations of the school’s policies. Id.
In essence, “she told [Hougham] she wouldn’t do anything.” Id.
Despite this, “in an apparent attempt to informally resolve [his] claims of sexual

discrimination,” Franzese attended one of Hougham and Dr. Stein’s weekly meetings. Id. ¶ 59.
There, Hougham related the instances in which he felt Dr. Stein had sexually discriminated
against and bullied him. Id. In response, at some point, Dr. Stein “announced ‘she was so angry
right now[.’]” Id. Their discussion ended without resolution of Hougham’s concerns. Id. And
after the meeting, when the two were alone, Franzese shared with Hougham that “she worried
Dr. Stein was actually angry with her[.]” Id. ¶ 60.
“Shortly after” that meeting, Dr. Stein offered Hougham professional coaching with an
outside consultant. Id. ¶ 61. Her stated goals for this coaching included “[a]ssuming good
intentions [from] co-workers, resolv[ing] professional disagreements with co-workers . . .
collegial[ly],” and “balanc[ing] adherence to established processes and protocols . . . with

flexibility and compromise where needed[.]” Id.
Hougham found this offer audacious—no goals were included “as to improvement of the
interpersonal relationship between Dr. Stein and [Hougham],” nor was there mention of “any
‘coaching’ of Dr. Stein[.]” Id. Because his underlying complaints of sexual harassment
continued to go unaddressed, Hougham rejected the coaching offer “as mere ‘window dressing’
and an exercise in futility.” Id. ¶ 62. Following Hougham’s rejection, Dr. Stein “advised [him]
that she was not contemplating renewal of his associate provost position for a second, three-year
term.” Id. ¶ 63. Dr. Stein then hired a heterosexual man as his replacement. Id.
Thus, on July 1, 2022, Hougham returned to the teaching faculty, as a part of the newly
created School of Music, Theatre and Dance. Id. ¶¶ 21, 64. As he was no longer an associate
provost, Hougham sustained “a large cut in salary and a black mark on his resume.” Id. ¶ 64.
To add insult to injury, “after [Hougham’s] demotion, [Dr. Stein] reported negatively

about him to Ann Hogan, the . . .dean of the School of Music, Theatre and Dance.” Id. ¶ 66.
Still, the alleged harassment did not end there. In fact, Hougham asserts, it continued, if not
worsened.
For instance, until Hougham requested it fixed, his name was not shown besides those of
students he had recruited in the “faculty contact” column of the school’s tracking document. Id.
¶ 72. It had, though, appeared if a recruited student chose not to enroll. Id. And during the
admissions process, Hougham’s recommendations on pre-screened candidates were routinely
overturned in favor of heterosexual faculty’s recommendations. Id. ¶ 73. When he sought an
explanation from the admissions office, his inquiries were either rebuffed or ignored. Id. In
faculty meetings, Hougham was constantly interrupted, and he would be “remonstrated if he

interjected his opinions on matters under discussion.” Id. “Additionally, meetings were
scheduled in accord with the itineraries of straight colleagues.” Id. ¶ 74. Consequently,
Hougham was often forced to attend virtually to participate. Id.
Around this time, the College developed a committee named the Faculty Advisory Group,
of which Hougham was one of the original appointees. Id. ¶¶ 77, 78. According to Hougham,
“it is common on campus for committees to become known by their acronyms.” Id. ¶ 77. Yet
“no one noticed” the problematic nature of this committee’s acronym, “F.A.G.,” until Hougham
pointed it out. Id. “[C]ertain committee members and the Dean agreed that the committee
should not be referred to by its acronym.” Id. ¶ 79. However, despite acknowledging that it
should not be used, “various straight members of the committee continued to employ that term.”
Id. “Given this atmosphere, [Hougham] had to continually address the difference between
‘offensive’ and ‘harmful’ when the acronym was used.” Id. ¶ 80.
As they worked to change its name, “Dean Hogan reported to the committee that Dr.

Stein . . . requested she continue with the public process required by the new bylaws for
changing a committee’s name”: a motion, discussion, and voting. Id. Thus, “[d]uring the
discussion phase, [Hougham] was required to explain the need for the change[,] [and] the
acronym was repeatedly brought up in [Hougham’s] presence.” Id. ¶ 81. Hougham believes this
was intended to offend him. Id. Although the committee’s name was changed, Hougham found
the process humiliating and painful. Id.
The Spring 2023 semester was Hougham’s first teaching after a three-year hiatus. Id. ¶
68. But his name was not included in that semester’s choral concert programs. Id. After
Hougham pointed this out to Dean Hogan, Dr. Sean Linfors, the interim director of choral
activities, contacted him. Id. ¶¶ 68, 69. Dr. Linfors stated this omission was “entirely

inadvertent,” attributing the error to “a ‘cut and paste’ of an earlier program template.” Id. ¶ 69.
Yet Hougham notes, another faculty member who was also on sabbatical that prior fall did not
have her name left off. Id. ¶ 70. She was heterosexual. Id. Eventually, the archival concert
programs were amended. Id. ¶ 71. Still, Hougham found this experience painful and demeaning.
Id.
At some point that spring, during a conversation Dean Hogan made an impromptu
request to Hougham asking him to list the homophobic microaggressions he was experiencing.
Id. ¶ 75. “Having no advance warning that this topic was going to be discussed [Hougham] had
to relive very triggering experiences, describing these in detail including criticism of [his] mode
of speech, as being ‘gay’ because of a perceived lisp.” Id. As Hougham recounted each
example, Dean Hogan retorted that he was “wrong to perceive homophobia in that conduct or
response by others.” Id.
The following semester, the school’s music performance department sought to hire a new

tenure-track faculty member. Id. ¶ 83. Hougham served as a member of the search committee.
Id. Though there were several internal candidates, none were among the finalists identified by
the committee in mid-December 2023. Id. At that time, Dr. Kay served as the search
committee’s chair. Id. However, Dr. Kay did not continue as chair, taking medical leave for the
spring 2024 semester. Id. ¶ 84. Dean Hogan asked Hougham to head the committee, which he
accepted. Id. During Dr. Kay’s leave, Dr. Martin was appointed interim chair of the Department
of Music Performance. Id. When Dr. Martin learned that no internal candidates were finalists,
she, without Hougham’s prior knowledge, contacted Dean Hogan. Id. ¶ 85. Dr. Martin told
Dean Hogan that Hougham had problems with certain internal candidates. Id. She felt this was
evidenced by Hougham’s reporting those individuals to human resources for alleged policy

violations and to the Title IX office for accusations of sexual harassment. Id. Subsequently,
Dean Hogan and Dr. Martin asked Hougham to justify the finalists. Id. ¶ 87. Specifically, they
inquired why the internal candidates were not finalists. Id. “Put more succinctly,” Hougham
says, “the gay member of the search committee, not the [two] straight members from [Dr.
Martin’s] department, was the one called upon to justify the finalist list[.]” Id. Hougham told
the two that the finalists had been chosen in December 2023, when Dr. Kay chaired the search
committee. Id. ¶ 86. He also noted that two of the three search committee members had
previously recommended the finalists to Dean Hogan and Dr. Stein. Id. And that the list of
finalists had been approved by Dean Hogan and Dr. Stein. Id. ¶ 87.
Perturbed, Hougham asked Dr. Martin why she made accusations against him. Id. ¶ 88.
She did not answer. Id. Hougham answered for her: “he was being targeted as a member of a
marginalized group.” Id. ¶ 89. She responded that she, as an evangelical Christian and
Republican living in Ithaca, New York, she was also marginalized. Id. Hougham “reiterate[d]

that being a member of a political minority in the college community and being a member of a
systematically marginalized and protected group were two entirely distinct matters.” Id.
“Nevertheless, Dr. Martin didn’t agree, and neither Dean Hogan nor Associate Dean Lubriel
supported [Hougham’s] position.” Id.
Hougham also alleges that, at the beginning of the Spring 2024 semester, Dean Hogan
coerced him into teaching a course for which he had no prior notice, experience, or time to
prepare. Id. ¶ 92. In “requesting” that Hougham teach the course, Dean Hogan told him that he
would be “alleviat[ing] some of the ill-will exhibited against him by certain faculty in the school,
arising from his alleged actions while sitting as replacement chair of the [] search committee.”
Id. ¶ 93. “Important in this vein,” Hougham says, “is the irrefutable fact that no [] straight

faculty member was coerced into teaching a course for which [they] had no prior curriculum
experience, let alone on a single day’s notice.” Id. ¶ 94.
Towards the end of the spring, in May 2024, Hougham emailed Franzese regarding the
allegedly discriminatory events he experienced since returning to the teaching faculty. Id. ¶ 95.
But she did not respond to Hougham for twelve days. Id. “Franzese did not undertake any
action on [his] behalf.” Id. ¶ 96. Channeling his frustration, Hougham wrote the following as
part of his 2024 self-evaluation:
[I] am having a hard time surviving the toxic hetero-normative and anti-gay
atmosphere at Ithaca College and in my school. I am the only person in meetings
that anyone interrupts without apology. I have my words either ignored or needing
reaffirmation from a white straight before they are considered. I am constantly
asked to explain why I ‘feel’ that this environment of predominantly progressive
straight white folks is homophobic, which requires me to relive painful interactions
with colleagues and allows the straight white folks to play judge about whether
something is homophobic or not. I show up and I work very hard, and I make
difficult decisions based on evidence. I fall under a different lens of scrutiny than
my straight colleagues. In other instances, during committee meetings with lots of
lively discussion and overlapping commentary, I am scolded by faculty members
for interrupting. ‘You didn’t let me finish!’ and similar (in raised voice, meant to
shame me). No one else is scolded. Just me, the gay man in these conversations.
I could recount endless other instances of this, but I won’t. I have to accept that
Ithaca College will not follow up with this. Still, I show up with a positive attitude
and a smile on my face . . . I am an excellent teacher. I want to continue to grow
and develop my knowledge and pedagogy, and I have been and will continue so to
do. My students appreciate me and my work, even though I am gay . . .
Id. ¶ 97.
In response, “the Dean” thanked Hougham for sharing with them that he was “having a
hard time surviving the atmosphere at [the College], and that you feel that [the College] will not
follow up.” Id. The unnamed dean encouraged him to reach out to those he felt could support
him “and to consider the resources at [the College] that are available to [him.]” Id.
“Following up on the Dean’s suggestion,” Hougham contacted the Title IX office. Id. ¶
98. There, he spoke with Linda Koenig, and on April 2, 2024, he sent her “[a] detailed written
narrative of [his] harassment[.]” Id. Koenig told Hougham “that[,] while she could take action,
it wouldn’t result in anything significant because of the individuals involved.” Id. “Instead,
Koening suggested a non-Title IX avenue to pursue[.]” Id. ¶ 99. However, Hougham deemed
that avenue “unavailable because of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.” Id.
Then, in March 2025, Hougham found several recorded auditions of prospective
applicants to the school that had not been processed. Id. ¶ 100. Some had been evaluated only
by one faculty member. Id. Others had not been evaluated by any faculty member. Id.
Hougham proposed that he evaluate the unreviewed auditions. Id. ¶ 101. “In response to
[Hougham’s] offer of assistance, the Associate Dean replied that every audition required a
second faculty evaluator. Id. ¶ 102. Hougham continued evaluating the auditions with another
faculty member, which [Hougham] accepted.” Id. But Hougham learned later that a
heterosexual colleague of his, one with fewer years of teaching and faculty experience, had been
permitted to be the sole evaluator on several auditions. Id. ¶ 103. “In other words,” Hougham

says, the College “required the second opinion of a straight colleague for an application . . . to be
processed by [him], but this same requirement was not imposed on his heterosexual colleagues.”
Id. ¶ 105. In his next annual self-evaluation, Hougham again made his voice heard:
[I]’m an outstanding faculty member. I believe that my teaching is head and
shoulders above the standard of excellence that is expected of others in our school.
As a member of the LGBTQIA + community, I continue to have to deliver at a level
that far exceeds expectations in order to be valued, and it is exhausting . . . I hope
to manage the discrimination I face daily from the college so that I can continue to
do my job. As a result of this toxic environment, my mental health continues to
challenge me, but I have sought professional support, at great personal financial
cost, and I hope to make headway . . . I arrived at further clarity about how I am
often treated. When I muster up the courage to mention how I’ve been mistreated
by colleagues, my supervisor might say- ‘I’m sorry you feel that way.’ This
response, of course, suggests that I am imagining my lived experience.
Microaggressions and discrimination aren’t imagined. They are real. . . . My
previous dean encouraged me to reach out to campus resources that are available to
me, which I was grateful for. However, those resources are impotent and the college
continues to deny that I am suffering. They continue to harm me and allow me to
be harmed by others. It is a toxic environment. I am scapegoated in the voice area.
My questions raised in my area are often perversely twisted and then weaponized
against me, so as to create mistrust among our group . . . I am vilified. I live in a
culture where my voice is constantly vilified. I am grateful to Steve (Dean
TenEyck) and Luis (Associate Dean Lubriel) for their support and help[.]

Id. ¶ 106.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must provide
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Kumpf v. N.Y. State United
Tchrs., 642 F. Supp. 3d 294, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 2022) (Scullin, J.) (citing Mayor & City Council of
Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2013)). “A court must accept as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Lancaster v. Am. Textile Co., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 3d 204, 214 (N.D.N.Y. 2024) (citing EEOC v.
Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2014)). However, “the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions.” Smith v. Adidas Am., Inc., 691 F. Supp. 3d 564, 572–73 (N.D.N.Y. 2023)
(Sannes, C.J.) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Title VII Does Not Preclude Plaintiff’s Title IX Claims
The College argues that Title VII precludes the Title IX claims in this case; therefore,
Hougham’s complaint should be dismissed. Much of the College’s argument centers around the
Second Circuit’s opinion in Vengalattore v. Cornell University, 36 F.4th 87 (2d Cir. 2022).
There, a male former tenure-track professor alleged that, in disciplining him in response to a
female graduate student aide’s allegation of their having an inappropriate sexual relationship, the
university discriminated against him based on gender in violation of Title IX. See id. at 94–100.

The College concedes that in Vengalattore “the Second Circuit held . . . ‘Title IX allows a
private right of action for a university’s intentional gender-based discrimination against a faculty
member[.]’” Defs. Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 9-1 at 17 (quoting Vengalattore, 36 F.4th at 101).
But the College believes Vengalattore is distinguishable. In Vengalattore, the circuit panel’s
“analysis focused on whether the process and outcome of Cornell’s Title IX investigation, and
the resulting disciplinary proceeding, was infected by bias on the basis of gender.” Id. (citing
Vengalattore, 36 F.4th at 106–09). The College stresses, though, that the panel “did not directly
opine on whether Title VII’s applicability to employment discrimination claims bars an
employee’s private cause of action under Title IX when that Title IX claim seeks relief unrelated
to an allegedly faulty or biased Title IX process.” Id. The College contends that, had the Second
Circuit “considered the question[,] [its] answer would be in the affirmative.” Id.
In its consideration, the Vengalattore panel found guidance in Doe v. Mercy Catholic
Medical Center. See generally 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017). “In Mercy[,] the Third Circuit

reversed the ruling of the district court which had concluded that Title IX could not apply to a
hospital’s medical residents[.]” Vengalattore, 36 F.4th at 105. The Mercy panel rejected an
argument like the College’s here. It noted the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ categorical holdings
“that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for individuals alleging employment discrimination
on the basis of sex in federally funded educational institutions.” Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr.,
850 F.3d 545, 563 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995) and
Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 861–62 (7th Cir. 1996)). Nevertheless, it openly
“question[ed] the continued viability of Lakoski and Waid[.]” See Doe, 850 F.3d at 563. Instead,
the Third Circuit held that “a private retaliation claim [and] a private quid pro quo claim exist[]
for employees of federally-funded education programs under Title IX notwithstanding Title VII’s

concurrent applicability.” Doe, 850 F.3d at 563–64.
Ultimately, the Vengalattore panel “agree[d] with Mercy” that it “must honor the breadth
of Title IX’s language.” 36 F.4th at 106. The Second Circuit panel “thus h[eld] that Title IX
allows a private right of action for a university’s intentional gender-based discrimination against
a faculty member, and that [the] Title IX claim should not have been dismissed on the ground
that [the plaintiff] complained of such discrimination with respect to employment.” Id. Given
this context and the opinion’s expansive language, the Court does not read Vengalattore as
supporting the limitation that the College now wishes for it to impose. Accordingly, the Court
will not dismiss the complaint on the basis that Hougham’s Title IX claims are precluded by Title
VII.
Still, the Court acknowledges that the Third Circuit in Mercy did not decide whether Title
VII’s applicability rendered a Title IX claim for hostile environment inviable. See Doe, 850 F.3d

at 566; see also id. (“It’s an open question in [the Third Circuit] whether [the] [continuing
violations] doctrine applies under Title IX.”) (listing cases). As the College highlights, the
Eleventh Circuit recently joined the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ categorical approach. See Dkt.
No. 9-1 at 18; Dkt. No. 12 at 9 (citing Joseph v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 121
F.4th 855, 869 (11th Cir. 2024)); Joseph, 121 F.4th at 869 (“It is unlikely that Congress intended
Title VII’s express private right of action and Title IX's implied right of action to provide
overlapping remedies.”); Joseph, 121 F.4th at 869 (holding Title IX does not create an implied
right of action for sex discrimination in employment); but see Joseph v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 133 F.4th 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2025) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]oday we shirk our obligation. It’s telling that in the [last] two

decades[,] every one of our sister circuits that has considered whether a teacher may sue under
Title IX has found they may—the opposite conclusion of our Court.”) (citing Vengalattore and
collecting cases). The Court is also aware that this is a developing area of law. Cf. Invitation for
Solicitor General to file brief expressing views of the United States, Crowther v. Board of
Regents, 25-183 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2025).2 Should it be warranted, the College may reassert their
arguments at a later stage of this case.

2 The Eleventh Circuit’s Joseph opinion consolidated the appeals of Crowther v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
Sys. of Georgia, 2023 WL 4915078 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2023) and Joseph v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia,
2023 WL 2393974 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2023). As of August 2025, the plaintiffs’ writ of certiorari remains pending
before the United States Supreme Court.
B. Plaintiff’s Claims
Hougham alleges “a sole count” against the College. Dkt. No. 1 at 32. That “sole” count
is divided into three “branches”: “Sexual Harassment/Hostile Educational Environment” ¶¶ 114–
19, “Deliberate Indifference” (¶¶ 120–22), and “Retaliation” (¶¶ 123–28). These “branches”

appear to be three claims. See Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 11 at 10–11 (“[C]ontrary to defendant’s legal
position . . . court decisions in the [S]econd [C]ircuit support plaintiff’s contention that Title IX’s
broad reach . . . permits his separate claims of: a hostile educational environment in which
plaintiff was sexually harassed by one of the most senior members of Ithaca College’s
administration (Provost Stein), along with other faculty members; deliberate indifference
exhibited by senior administration and designated Title IX officials to plaintiff's multiple
complaints of the sexual harassment; and retaliation in response to plaintiff's protected activity of
reporting the sexual harassment he was experiencing, in conformity with defendant's policies and
Title IX regulations.”).
The Court will consider the three claims in turn.

1. Hostile Educational Environment
Hougham brings a claim for “hostile educational environment” against the College. See
Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 114–19. “A private action for damages against an educational institution is only
available under Title IX ‘where the funding recipient [in this case, the University] engages in
intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the statute.’” Doe v. Yeshiva Univ., 703 F.
Supp. 3d 473, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999)). “In [Title IX] cases of . . . sexual harassment, an action
for damages against an institution is not premised ‘on principles of respondeat superior or
constructive notice.’” Id. (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285
(1998)). Therefore, the College “may only be held ‘directly liable’ for its own ‘deliberate
indifference to discrimination’ and ‘its own failure to act.’” Id. quoting (Davis, 526 U.S. at 645–
46).
Moreover, “a Title IX hostile education environment claim is ‘governed by traditional

Title VII ‘hostile environment’ jurisprudence.’” Doe v. Sarah Lawrence Coll., 453 F. Supp. 3d
653, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633
F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2011)). “Making a ‘hostility’ determination in the educational context, as in
the employment context, entails examining the totality of the circumstances, including: ‘the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with’ the
victim's academic performance.” Doe v. Sarah Lawrence Coll., 453 F. Supp. 3d 653, 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 745 (2d Cir. 2003)).
“The Second Circuit has ‘cautioned against setting the bar too high’ for hostile . . .
environment claims.” Farmer v. Shake Shack Enters., LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 309, 335 (S.D.N.Y.

2020) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 148 (2d Cir. 2003)); see Sanderson v. Leg
Apparel LLC, 2020 WL 3100256, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020) (“[T]o avoid dismissal under
FRCP 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only plead facts sufficient to support the conclusion that she was
faced with harassment of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the
conditions of her employment altered for the worse, and [the Second Circuit has] repeatedly
cautioned against setting the bar too high in this context.”) (quoting Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d
106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Construing the complaint liberally, and mindful of the Second Circuit’s admonition, the
Court finds that Hougham’s allegations are adequate to plead a hostile environment claim.
Reading the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Hougham alleges that he was repeatedly
refused advancement opportunities and was subjected to disproportionate workloads, mimicry,
slurs, and higher performance standards because of his sexuality—in addition to “other unfair
treatment that, while facially neutral and not actionable as a disparate-treatment claim per se,

supplements [his] allegations[.]” Byvalets v. New York City Hous. Auth., 2017 WL 7793638, at
*14 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1067732
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2018); see Rys v. Davis, 2025 WL 896844, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2025)
(“Allegations of a heavier workload alone can support a viable hostile work environment claim if
the plaintiff was subjected to disproportionately burdensome work assignments.”) (quoting
Kirkland-Hudson v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 3d 412, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2023));
Cardwell v. Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 2020 WL 6274826, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2020)
(“The same logic applies to allegations that a plaintiff received less work than similarly situated
coworkers, at least when, as here, the plaintiff alleges that his career prospects suffered because
he received less work.”).

At the pleading stage, this is sufficient to state a hostile work environment claim. “That
plaintiff has raised only a minimal inference of discriminatory motive and may have difficulty
making the requisite showing on the merits . . . are arguments for summary judgment, not
dismissal.” Byvalets, 2017 WL 7793638, at *14.
2. Deliberate Indifference
Hougham also brings a cause of action for “deliberate indifference.” See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶
120–22. For this claim to withstand dismissal, Hougham asserts that he “must plausibly allege . .
. (a) sexual harassment so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it deprived him of
access to the [College’s] educational benefits and opportunities; (b) [the College] had actual
knowledge of the sexual harassment; and (c) [the College] was deliberately indifferent to this
harassment.” Dkt. No. 11 at 18–19 (citing Doe v. Union Coll., 2020 WL 1063063, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020)). Yet Hougham’s hostile environment claim also alleges sexual
harassment “so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive . . . that it denied [him] equal

educational access and opportunities” at the College. Dkt. No. 11 at 16. Moreover, as noted
above, “[a] finding of deliberate indifference is necessary to impute liability against an institution
under Title IX.” Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 107 F. Supp. 3d 481, 489 (D. Md. 2015).
Because deliberate indifference is a necessary element of plaintiff’s hostile environment
claim, and the two claims are otherwise identical, plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is
dismissed as duplicative. See, e.g., Daly by & through Daly v. Miller Place Union Free Sch.
Dist., 2025 WL 3470167, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2025) (collecting cases).
3. Retaliation
Lastly, Hougham asserts that the College, “through the actions of Dr. Stein, retaliated
against [him] after he . . . report[ed] Dr. Stein’s sexual harassment to Dr. Cornish and Ms.

Franzese.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 123. That retaliation “consisted of [Dr. Stein’s] unjustified refusal to
renew plaintiff as Associate Provost” and her “blocking [his] candidacy for appointment as a
dean within the School of Music, Theatre and Dance, by her refusal to allow [him] an interview
for that position.” Id. ¶¶ 124, 125.
Hougham filed this suit on April 30, 2025. See Dkt. No. 1. Both Hougham and the
College “agree on one thing[—]the statute of limitations for [his] claims is three (3) years and is
reckoned from the filing of [the] complaint[.]” Dkt. No. 11 at 20–21; see Dkt. No. 9-1 at 19; see
also Hauff v. State Univ. of New York, 425 F. Supp. 3d 116, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Claims
brought pursuant to Title IX are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.”). “Thus, acts or
omissions occurring prior to April 30, 2022, are nonactionable.” Dkt. No. 9-1 at 19; see also
Dkt. No. 11 (“[I]n the absence of other considerations, liability based on claimed wrongful
actions by defendants antedating April 24 [sic], 2022, might technically be unenforceable.”).
The College argues that “at a minimum” Dr. Stein’s alleged blocking of Hougham’s

candidacy for appointment as a dean within the School of Music, Theatre and Dance “fall[s]
outside the applicable limitations period, and therefore [is] not actionable.” Dkt. No. 9-1 at 19–
20 (citing Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 54, 125).
Without doubt, the complaint’s timeline is poorly presented. In lieu of giving specific
dates, or even—at points—specific months in which certain key events occurred, the complaint
offers vague subheadings covering arbitrary date ranges. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at 16 (5-month
period of “August 2021 – December 2021”); id. at 20 (7-month period of “January 2022 – July
2022”); id. at 22 (11-month period of “August 2022 – June 2023”); id. at 28 (15-month period of
“January 2024 – March 2025”). Presumptively, these headers are intended to suggest that the
events in the paragraphs that follow occurred sometime within those spans.

Both discrete acts that Hougham’s retaliation claim is founded upon are left undated in
his complaint. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 54 (“When a dean’s position opened in the School of Music
Theatre and Dance, for which plaintiff was highly qualified and nominated for, Dr. Stein told
plaintiff that he could certainly apply for that position but wouldn’t be given an interview. Dr.
Stein stated that she ‘needed someone in that role who was ‘stronger’ and ‘less thin-skinned’.’”);
id. ¶ 63 (“Following plaintiff’s rejection of Dr. Stein’s offer of professional coaching, she
advised plaintiff that she was not contemplating a renewal of his associate provost position for a
second, three-year term.”); see also id. ¶¶ 61–62 (providing no hint of when the coaching offer
was made).
Construing the complaint according to its own internal logic, Hougham’s allegation
regarding Dr. Stein’s blocking his candidacy for a dean position would appear to have occurred
outside the statute of limitations. The paragraph of the complaint making that allegation,
paragraph 54, is contained under the subheading “August 2021 – December 2021.” See id. at ¶¶

44–54; see id. at 19 (placing the subheading “January 2022 – July 2022” after paragraph 54 but
before paragraph 55); see also id. at 36 (citing solely paragraphs from subsections contained
entirely outside the statute of limitations in support of retaliation claim); Dkt. No. 11 at 20
(same). Similarly, when exactly it was that Dr. Stein notified Hougham about the associate
provost position nonrenewal is unclear: this allegation is made under the complaint’s subheading
“January 2022 – July 2022.” See id. at 19–22. Given that the statute of limitations excludes
discrete retaliatory actions occurring prior to April 30, 2022, the Court does not highlight this
imprecision for the sake of mere pedantry.
Still, although perhaps inadvisable, Hougham’s tendency to brush with such broad
strokes is not—at this stage—fatal. “[T]he statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and

the defendant bears the burden of proving it applies.” Myers Indus., Inc. v. Schoeller Arca Sys.,
Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 107, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)). “[S]urvival of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds requires only allegations
consistent with a claim that would not be time-barred.” Medcenter Holdings Inc. v. WebMD
Health Corp., 2021 WL 1178129, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021) (quoting Harris v. City of
N.Y., 186 F.3d 243, 251 (2d Cir. 1999)). “The rule ‘in the statute of limitations context is that
dismissal is appropriate only if a complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.’” Id. (quoting
Harris, 186 F.3d at 250) (emphasis added).
It may well be that these discrete incidents predate April 30, 2022, and are time-barred
with respect to Hougham’s claim of retaliation. But at this stage, despite the College’s assertion
otherwise, that is not clear. Therefore, Hougham’s retaliation claim may proceed.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is
ORDERED that
1. Defendants’ motion (Dkt. No. 9) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
a. Plaintiff’s Title [X deliberate indifference claim is DISMISSED.
b. Plaintiff’s Title IX hostile environment and retaliation claims remain.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2026 .
Utica, New York /
Anthony J. Brindisj
U.S. District a

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11272168. Public record. Not legal advice.