# SHELTON

> District Court, D. Maine · March 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11271915

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher A. Shelton v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** March 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11271915

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
- finding that convenience fees qualify as an “amount” under the FDCPA
- holding that a law firm’s letter demand for payment on a promissory note was debt- collection activity within the meaning of the FDCPA

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

CHRISTOPHER A. SHELTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 2:25-cv-00236-SDN
)
REAL TIME RESOLUTIONS, INC., )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Address: 314 Cousins Street, Yarmouth, ME 04096
This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss by Defendant Real Time
Resolutions, Inc. (“RTR”). ECF No. 18. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Christopher A. Shelton is a resident of Maine, and RTR is a corporation
with a principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 9–10. On May 12, 2025,
Mr. Shelton brought suit against RTR, alleging RTR is impermissibly seeking to collect on
a mortgage note for real property located at 314 Cousins Street, Yarmouth, ME 04096
(“the Property”) to which it does not have any enforceable rights. See id. at ¶ 1. Because
Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court “take[s] the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the
complaint, extending the plaintiff every reasonable inference in his favor.” Pihl v. Mass.
Dep’t of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1993).
In his Complaint, Mr. Shelton alleges the following. On or around December 8,
2006, Plaintiff borrowed $73,600 from Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc. (“MLN”)
pursuant to a promissory note (“the Note”). ECF No. 1 at ¶ 20. To secure the Note, Plaintiff
granted a mortgage on the Property (“the Mortgage”) to Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as a nominee for MLN. Id. at ¶ 21. The Mortgage was

subsequently recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds, book 24660, page
205. Id. at ¶ 22. In 2007, MLN filed for bankruptcy, and the loan made to Plaintiff was
sold. Id. at ¶¶ 24–25. Mr. Shelton alleges the Mortgage was not properly assigned to a
successor in interest. Id. at ¶ 26. Mr. Shelton believes the Mortgage was charged off (i.e.,
the lender moved the debt from its active assets to the loss column) at some unspecified
point in time, either by a previous owner or servicer of the loan, or by Defendant RTR. Id.
at ¶ 31.
On or about November 8, 2023, Defendant RTR filed an “Affidavit Regarding Lost
or Misplaced Assignment” in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds in book 40468,
page 131 (“the Affidavit of Lost Assignment”), which purports to establish that RTR has a
secured interest in the Note and Mortgage. Id. at ¶¶ 46–47. Mr. Shelton contends the

Affidavit of Lost Assignment does not comply with relevant Maine state law, which
requires an attachment of the original deed and support within ninety days by depositions
establishing the instrument was lost. Id. at ¶ 48; see 33 M.R.S. § 204. On September 9,
2024, MERS, as a nominee for RTR, assigned its interests in the Mortgage to RTR in an
assignment at book 40982, page 186, of the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds. ECF
No. 1 at ¶ 49.
On April 18, 2023, the United States filed suit against Mr. Shelton and his wife
(“the 2023 Action”), seeking to collect significant unpaid federal tax liabilities. Id. at ¶ 56;
see United States v. Shelton, et al., No. 23-cv-00173 (D. Me. 2023).1 RTR was a defendant
in the suit2 and was ultimately determined to be the fourth party-in-interest for the
outstanding Mortgage balance of $115,000.00.3 See ECF No. 18-2 at 3.
In July 2024, following the filing of the 2023 Action, Mr. Shelton and his wife filed
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District of

Maine. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 51; see In re Shelton, No. 24-20136 (Bankr. D. Me. 2024). RTR filed
proof of claim in the bankruptcy action. See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 53. RTR filed an objection to
confirmation of the bankruptcy plan, claiming to be the holder of the Note and Mortgage
on the Property and seeking $180,015.68. Id. at ¶ 52. Mr. Shelton subsequently dismissed
the bankruptcy action and entered into a stipulation in the 2023 Action with the United
States and the other lienholders to sell the Property by June 30, 2025, with the proceeds
being used to satisfy various liens on the Property, including RTR’s mortgage. Id. at ¶ 59;
see ECF No. 18-2 (“the Stipulation”). Under the Stipulation, Mr. Shelton owes $1,025.00
a month to RTR. See id. at 4; ECF No. 1 at ¶ 60.
In May 2025, Mr. Shelton brought the instant suit against RTR, asserting five
causes of action. First, he seeks a declaratory judgment that RTR does not have an

enforceable right to collect the debt or enforce any security interest in the Property. Id. at

1 Generally on a motion to dismiss, the Court is constrained to considering only “documents attached to the
complaint or incorporated by reference therein.” Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 231 (1st
Cir. 2013). However, when “a complaint’s factual allegations are expressly linked to—and admittedly
dependent upon—a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), that document effectively
merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss.” Beddall v. State
St. Bank & Tr. Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1998). The Court therefore considers the Stipulation Regarding
Priority of Lienholder Parties (“the Stipulation”), the order adopting the Stipulation, and the post-judgment
stipulation from the 2023 Action, which are referenced in and integral to the Complaint in this case. See
ECF Nos. 18-1, 18-2, 18-4.

2 MLN was initially named as a defendant; RTR filed a motion to substitute itself as the party in interest,
which the court granted. See ECF No. 18 at ¶¶ 9–10.

3 The original balance owed to RTR was $110,000.00. ECF No. 18-1 at 6. In the event the Property sold after
October 15, 2024, which it did, the amount owed increased to $115,000.00. Id.
10–11. Second, he alleges violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601,
et seq., and its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026, for failing to
provide Plaintiff with required periodic balance statements for ten years, despite RTR
accruing interest and late fees on the outstanding balance. ECF No. 1 at 11–12. Third, he
asserts violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692,

et seq., by RTR acting as a debt collector and falsely representing the character, amount,
and legal status of the debt. ECF No. 1 at 12–14. Fourth, he asserts violations of the
mortgage servicer’s duty of good faith under 14 M.R.S. § 6113 when RTR, among other
things, falsely claimed to be the holder of the Mortgage, recorded insufficient documents
with the Registry of Deeds, and opposed Plaintiff’s bankruptcy claim without a good-faith
basis to assert a secured claim in the Property. ECF No. 1 at 14–16. Finally, Plaintiff brings
one count of slander of title for publishing false statements with the Registry of Deeds. Id.
at 16–17.
ANALYSIS
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court engages in a two-
step analysis. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.

2012). First, the Court must “isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply
offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements.” Id. Second,
taking the well-pleaded factual content as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff’s favor, the Court must determine whether the complaint plausibly narrates
a claim for relief. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011)
(discussing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007)).
I. Res Judicata
As a threshold matter, the Court must address Defendant’s argument that
Plaintiff’s claims against RTR are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. ECF No. 18 at
11–14. An affirmative defense such as res judicata may be raised in the first instance in a
motion to dismiss “when the facts establishing the defense are clear on the face of the

plaintiff’s pleadings.” Medina-Padilla v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 815 F.3d 83,
85 (1st Cir. 2016); see Fed R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). When a federal court exercises federal
question jurisdiction, as it does here, the applicability of res judicata is a question of
federal law. Maher v. GSI Lumonics, Inc., 433 F.3d 123, 126 (1st Cir. 2005); see also
Apparel Art Int’l, Inc. v. Amertex Enters. Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Federal
law principles of res judicata govern the preclusive effect of a prior federal court’s
judgment on a subsequent action brought in federal court.”).
“Under the federal law of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties from relitigating claims that were raised or could have been raised
in that action.” Porn v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 1996). RTR
asserts the judgment in the 2023 Action precludes Mr. Shelton’s current claims because

Mr. Shelton had the opportunity to contest RTR’s claim to the Property in the original
action but chose not to. ECF No. 18 at 11–13. In response, Mr. Shelton cites to the
Stipulation, which included the following language: “The Sheltons have not responded to
an inquiry as to whether they will object [to the stipulation] and, in any event, this
stipulation is not intended to preclude any claims or defenses they may be otherwise
entitled to raise.” ECF No. 18-1 at 1. He also points to the post-judgment stipulation,
wherein the parties, including RTR, stated “the Sheltons may still challenge RTR’s
interest in the Property.” ECF No. 18-4 at 4 n.1.
Collateral estoppel, the form of res judicata which RTR argues bars adjudication of
this claim, applies “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by
a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment.”
Restatement (2d) of Judgments § 27 (1982). However, the First Circuit acknowledges
there are “many reasons a party may choose not to raise an issue,” so courts should

generally “err on the side of not finding an issue precluded when it is not clear that it was
fully litigated.” De Prins v. Michaeles Tr. of Donald Belanger Irrevocable Tr. Dated Oct.
28, 2008, 942 F.3d 521, 525 (1st Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original). For that reason,
stipulations and consent judgments are not usually given preclusive effect. See id. Here,
the two statements in the Stipulation and the post-judgment stipulation indicate the
parties have not manifested an intention for RTR’s interest in the Property to be deemed
conclusively litigated. If the parties had intended the Stipulation to be binding as to RTR’s
interest, the Court expects they would have spoken clearly to that effect, rather than to
say the opposite. See Restatement (2d) of Judgments § 27, cmt. e (“The judgment may be
conclusive, however, with respect to one or more issues, if the parties have entered an
agreement manifesting such an intention.”). Therefore, Mr. Shelton’s claims in the case

at hand are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
II. Declaratory Judgment (Count I)
Mr. Shelton seeks a declaration that RTR does not have an enforceable right to any
security interest in the Property because (1) MERS’s assignment of the Note to RTR was
improper, and (2) the Affidavit of Lost Assignment does not comply with Maine state law
regarding lost instruments for real property. ECF No. 1 at 10–11. RTR seeks dismissal of
this count for lack of an actual controversy, arguing that Plaintiff has no claim to the funds
at issue (the $115,000.00 on the outstanding Mortgage) because the Court holds the funds
from the sale of the Property pursuant to the Stipulation Order. ECF No. 18 at 15.
Therefore, RTR argues, Mr. Shelton could not successfully challenge RTR’s claim to the
funds because even a successful result of that challenge would require redistribution of
the proceeds to the other lienholders, rather than a return of the money to Mr. Shelton.
Id. at 16.

The Declaratory Judgment Act, under which Mr. Shelton brought suit, limits a
court’s ability to grant declaratory relief to cases of “actual controversy” under Article III.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). To determine whether an actual controversy exists, the Court
examines “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” In re Fin.
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 919 F.3d 638, 645 (1st Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). The linchpin of
the analysis is the nature of the relief requested: the controversy must admit to “‘specific
relief through a decree of conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’” State of R.I. v. Narragansett

Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 693 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford,
Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937)). Generally, courts grant declaratory
judgment when it (1) clarifies and settles the legal relations at issue and (2) terminates
the “uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy” giving rise to the proceeding. Pena Real
Est. Invs., LLC v. One Hardt, LLC, No. 22-cv-11544, 2023 WL 3997038, at *10 (D. Mass.
June 14, 2023) (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 325 (4th Cir.
1937)).
The Court disagrees with RTR’s contention that determining its interest in the
Property is irrelevant to the Plaintiff simply because a Stipulation for the sale of the
Property and its proceeds already exists. See ECF No. 18 at 15. As RTR’s own briefing
indicates, Mr. Shelton owes significant sums of money to other lienholders, including the
United States government. See id. at 15–16. A declaratory judgment would serve the

“useful purpose” of clarifying RTR’s actual interest in the Property such that the priority
of lienholders could be more readily ascertained and reorganized as necessary. Pena Real
Est., 2023 WL 3997038, at *10 (quoting Aetna Cas., 92 F.2d at 325). As the Stipulation
and post-judgment stipulation indicate, the parties in the 2023 Action acknowledged that
Mr. Shelton might want to further challenge RTR’s interest in the Property,
demonstrating the “uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy” giving rise to these
proceedings. Id. Determining whether MERS validly assigned the Mortgage to RTR and
whether RTR’s Affidavit were proper provides “practical assistance in setting the
underlying controversy to rest.” Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 693. Therefore, RTR’s motion
to dismiss Count I is DENIED.
III. Truth in Lending Act (Count II)

RTR moves to dismiss Mr. Shelton’s TILA claims (Count II) for two separate
reasons. The Court will address each in turn.
A. Substantive Truth in Lending Act Claim
Mr. Shelton alleges RTR violated the TILA by failing to provide him with periodic
statements of the amount due on the Mortgage for approximately ten years. ECF No. 1 at
11–12. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1638(f), mortgage servicers—such as RTR—must provide
periodic billing statements to the obligor. While a servicer may be exempt from this
requirement if it has charged off the loan and ceases to charge any additional fees or
interest, see 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(e)(6), Mr. Shelton contends RTR continued to charge
interest, late fees, and other fees throughout the period it withheld those billing
statements. ECF No. 1 at 12. RTR moves to dismiss the TILA count, arguing that since the
date the Court approved the Stipulation in the 2023 Action—March 8, 2024—“RTR has
not charged any additional fees or interest” on the Mortgage. ECF No. 18 at 17–18.

The Court’s standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss bears repeating. Accepting
all well-pleaded facts as true, the Court “giv[es] the party who has pleaded the contested
claim the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24,
27 (1st Cir. 2006). In his Complaint, Mr. Shelton alleges either RTR or the previous
lienholder charged off the Mortgage ten years ago. See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 31. He further alleges
he never received the periodic billing statements he was due, id. at ¶ 79, and that RTR
continued to charge interest and other fees despite failing to send the required
statements, id. at ¶ 80.
The Court cannot resolve factual disputes at this stage. Instead, whether dismissal
is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) depends upon the Complaint’s compliance with Rule
8(a)(2), which “requires sufficient detail in the complaint to give a defendant fair notice

of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 8; see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief”). The Court finds Mr. Shelton’s Complaint provides RTR
with fair notice of the TILA claim because the factual allegations—specifically that RTR
continued to accrue fees after the charge-off—are “enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.4 Accordingly, the Court denies RTR’s
motion to dismiss Count II on this basis.
B. Statute of Limitations
RTR also seeks dismissal of Count II under the statute of limitations, asserting a
one-year limitation for filing TILA claims. ECF No. 18 at 18–19; see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e)

(“[A]ny action under this section may be brought . . . within one year from the date of the
occurrence of the violation . . . .”). A defendant may raise a statute of limitations defense
in a motion to dismiss only if the facts establishing the defense appear clearly “‘on the face
of the plaintiff’s pleadings.’” Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d
315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Blackstone Realty LLC v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 193, 197 (1st
Cir. 2001)). Dismissal is appropriate only where the complaint “leave[s] no doubt that an
asserted claim is time-barred.” LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 509
(1st Cir. 1998). To make this determination, the Court examines only the dates included
in the complaint to determine whether the limitations period has been exceeded. See
Trans-Spec, 524 F.3d at 320.
As RTR’s own briefing acknowledges, the specific dates for which RTR allegedly

failed to provide billing statements remain unclear. See ECF No. 18 at 18 (noting Plaintiff
did not “identify[] the purported 10-year period.”); ECF No. 1 at ¶ 79 (alleging a failure to
provide statements for “approximately 10 years.”); id. at ¶ 33 (alleging RTR failed to send

4 Mr. Shelton’s response also directs the Court’s attention to the Stipulation, which indicates that RTR holds
fourth in priority for the $115,000.00 outstanding Mortgage balance but drops to seventeenth in priority
“for the outstanding balance on RTR’s claim . . . after crediting the [$115,000.00] amount received.” See
ECF No. 18-2 at 2, 4. According to Mr. Shelton, “[t]aken together, these documents show RTR continued to
treat the account as accruing interest and to demand payments after March 8, 2024, which places RTR’s
conduct squarely within the rule that a servicer that charges additional interest or fees on a charged-off
account must send periodic statements.” ECF No. 19 at 8. The Court need not consider the implications of
the Stipulation’s language at this time because the face of the Complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief.
statements “for many years, if ever”). Because the Complaint does not establish the exact
timeline of the alleged violations, the Court cannot determine at this stage whether the
limitations period bars Mr. Shelton’s TILA claim.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES RTR’s motion to dismiss Count II.
IV. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Count III)

Mr. Shelton brings one claim against RTR for violation of the FDCPA. He argues
RTR engaged in unfair or deceptive practices by falsely representing the character,
amount, and legal status of the Mortgage—specifically by claiming to hold both the debt
and a secured interest in the Property when it lacked legal standing to enforce those
claims. ECF No. 1 at 12–14. RTR moves to dismiss, contending its challenged conduct
does not constitute “collection” activity under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ECF No. 18 at 19–20; see
15 U.S.C. § 1692e (“A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”).
While RTR does not dispute its status as a debt collector, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6),
it argues that the three actions it took in relation to the Plaintiff—(1) substituting itself for
MERS in the 2023 Action, (2) filing proof of claim Mr. Shelton’s bankruptcy, and (3) filing

pleadings in the current case—are not “collection activities” within the meaning of the
statute. See id. at 19–20.
“The FDCPA is a landmark piece of consumer credit legislation designed to
eliminate abusive, deceptive, and other unfair debt collection practices.” Arruda v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692). A private cause
of action under the FDCPA arises when there are “legal actions against a debtor, . . . for
the benefit of a creditor, . . . conducted by persons within the scope of [] the . . . Federal
FDCPA.” Hamilton v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 13-cv-00414, 2014 WL
4594733, at *18 (D. Me. Sept. 15, 2014). To assert an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege “(1) he was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt,
(2) the defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the statute, and (3) the
defendant engaged in a prohibited act or omission under the FDCPA.” Poulin v. The
Thomas Agency, 760 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D. Me. 2011) (quotation modified).

A debt is “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising
out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the
subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes[.]” 15
U.S.C.A. § 1692a(5). “At a minimum, therefore, a complaint must allege a scenario
involving the collection (or attempted collection) of a debt.” Arruda, 310 F.3d at 23.
Federal courts have consistently held the FDCPA does not apply to the filing of
proofs of claim in bankruptcy cases, even if the underlying claim is alleged to be invalid
or stale. See In re Martel, 539 B.R. 192, 195–96 (Bankr. D. Me. 2015) (noting the
Bankruptcy Code provides its own remedies for the filing of invalid claims, which
generally displaces the FDCPA in this context); see also In re Claudio, 463 B.R. 190, 193
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir.

2010) (collecting cases). To the extent Mr. Shelton’s claim rests on RTR filing a proof of
claim as a secured creditor in the bankruptcy action, see ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 93–94, 99, that
portion of his claim fails as a matter of law.5
Mr. Shelton next asserts RTR engaged in deceptive practices when it obtained the
MERS Assignment and filed the Affidavit of Lost Assignment with the Registry of Deeds.
ECF No. 1 at ¶ 95. The statutory provision Mr. Shelton cites, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10),

5 For these same reasons, Mr. Shelton’s claim that RTR violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) “by threatening to take
an action that cannot legally be taken” by asserting a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding is insufficient to
state a claim for relief. See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 94.
prohibits “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt
to collect any debt.” The Complaint fails to explain how a defective assignment in a chain
of title—administrative acts involving the Registry of Deeds—amounts to an interaction
with the consumer for the purpose of collecting a debt. Without more than “labels and
conclusions,” these activities do not constitute debt collection activity. See Jones v. Bank

of N.Y., No. CIV.A. 12-11503, 2013 WL 3728382, at *2 (D. Mass. July 12, 2013) (dismissing
an FDCPA claim based on activity related to the chain of title for failure to allege a
connection to debt collection). Accordingly, that portion of Mr. Shelton’s FDCPA claim
also fails as a matter of law.
Mr. Shelton also alleges RTR violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) and § 1692e(2)(A) by
collecting interest and fees while failing to send the periodic billing statements required
by the TILA. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 97–98. Section 1692f(1) of title 15 prohibits the “collection
of any amount” not authorized by agreement or law. The operative term is “collecting,”
which refers to the affirmative act of seeking or receiving payment. See Glover v. Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC, 127 F.4th 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2025) (Section 1692f(1)
“most logically prohibits the ‘conduct’ of collecting ‘any amount’ not authorized by the

debt-creating agreement or permitted by law, while a debt collector is collecting a debt.”);
id. at 1288 (“[D]ebt collectors violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) when they use a payment
processor that collects a convenience fee from a consumer and remits to the debt collector
any amount in connection with that fee.”); cf. Alexander v. Carrington Mortg. Servs.,
LLC, 23 F.4th 370, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2022) (finding that convenience fees qualify as an
“amount” under the FDCPA). Mr. Shelton’s grievance with RTR is an omission—the
failure to send a notice—rather than the affirmative collection of an unauthorized fee.
While the failure to send a statement might violate the TILA, it does not, without more,
constitute an “unfair or unconscionable” collection practice under the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692f. The FDCPA is not a vehicle to litigate every technical TILA notice violation unless
that violation is coupled with an actual attempt to collect an unauthorized sum. Cf.
Lamirand v. Fay Servicing, LLC, 38 F.4th 976, 980 (11th Cir. 2022) (“The Truth in
Lending Act requires a servicer to send periodic statements, and the FDCPA requires

those statements to be fair and accurate when they contain language that would induce a
debtor to pay.”); Gonzalez v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 691 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1176
(C.D. Cal. 2023) (“The breach of an obligation to provide monthly statements does not
somehow make the interest disallowed or unlawful.” (quotation modified)).
Finally, Mr. Shelton claims the same failure to send periodic statements
constitutes a “misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of
any debt” by falsely representing the amount of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; see ECF No.
1 at ¶ 97. It is not clear from the Complaint how the failure to provide billing statements
transforms RTR’s conduct into a “misleading representation.” Generally, a violation of
this section requires an affirmative misstatement, such as sending a bill for the wrong
amount. See, e.g., McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C., 911 F. Supp. 2d

1, 59 (D. Mass. 2012), amended in part on other grounds, 969 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Mass.
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded on other grounds, 775 F.3d 109 (1st Cir.
2014) (“Stating an incorrect amount of the debt undeniably violates section
1692e(2)(A).”); Amezcua v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, No. 21-cv-01641, 2022 WL
18142543, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2022) (dismissing a claim for failing “to allege that there
is any false, misleading, or inaccurate information on Defendants’ account statements”);
cf. Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir. 2012)
(holding that a law firm’s letter demand for payment on a promissory note was debt-
collection activity within the meaning of the FDCPA). Mr. Shelton does not allege that
RTR sent him inaccurate information; rather, he alleges it sent no information. The
Complaint does not explain how silence or a lack of statements constitutes a “misleading
representation” of the debt’s character.
In sum, because the Complaint fails to allege facts showing that RTR’s

administrative filings or its failure to provide TILA notices constitute “collection activity”
or “prohibited acts” under the statute, the FDCPA count fails to state a claim. RTR’s
motion to dismiss Count III is GRANTED.
V. Violation of Mortgage Servicer’s Duty of Good Faith (Count IV)
In Cout IV, Mr. Shelton alleges RTR violated its duty of good faith under Maine’s
mortgage servicer statute, 14 M.R.S. § 6113. Mr. Shelton contends RTR breached this duty
by falsely claiming to be the holder of the Mortgage, recording deficient title documents,
and opposing the Sheltons’ bankruptcy plan. ECF No. 1 at 14–16. The Complaint pleads
damages including Mr. Shelton’s loss of opportunity to save his home through
bankruptcy, increased costs and fees associated with the sale of the Property, emotional
distress, and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 16; see 14 M.R.S. § 6113(4)(A) (“A homeowner or

obligor injured by a violation of the duty of good faith may bring an action against the
mortgage servicer for all actual damages sustained by the homeowner or obligor.”). RTR
moves to dismiss this count on two grounds: first, that Mr. Shelton failed to allege “actual
damages” resulting from the purported breach, ECF No. 18 at 20; and second, that he
failed to plead facts establishing a “pattern or practice” of such violations, id. at 22; see 14
M.R.S. § 6113(4)(B).
Under 14 M.R.S. § 6113(4)(A), a homeowner injured by a violation of the duty of
good faith may bring an action for “all actual damages sustained.” RTR argues the
damages alleged are insufficient to state a claim. However, at the pleading stage, an injury
“must actually exist,” but it does not necessarily need to be “tangible.” See Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016). Accepting all reasonable inferences in Mr. Shelton’s
favor, the Court finds the Complaint adequately pleads damages. Mr. Shelton avers that
RTR’s bad-faith assertion as a lienholder directly interfered with both his bankruptcy

proceedings and the sale of the Property, causing him to incur additional attorneys’ fees
and costs. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 109. Under Maine law, these types of specific financial and
procedural setbacks are sufficient to constitute actual damages. See Ross v. New
Residential Mortg., LLC, No. 23-cv-00255, 2024 WL 2187489, at *6 (D. Me. May 14,
2024).
RTR further contends Count IV must be dismissed because the Complaint does not
establish a “pattern or practice” of misconduct. See 14 M.R.S. § 6113(4)(B) (permitting
recovery of up to $15,000 “for a pattern or practice of the mortgage servicer’s violating
the duty of good faith”). The Court disagrees. Mr. Shelton has alleged that RTR’s business
model has historically drawn numerous consumer complaints, regulatory actions, and
lawsuits alleging similar consumer protection violations. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 44. Taking those

allegations in Mr. Shelton’s favor, they are sufficient at this stage to plausibly suggest a
broader pattern of conduct. See McKay v. Fay Servicing, LLC, No. 23-cv-00361, 2024
WL 3738302, at *4 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2024) (holding allegations of a defendant’s conduct in
factually similar matters are relevant to pleading a pattern or practice under Maine
mortgage servicer duty of good faith).
Accordingly, because Mr. Shelton has plausibly alleged both injury and a pattern
of misconduct, the Court DENIES RTR’s motion as to Count IV.
VI. Slander of Title (Count V)
The fifth and final count in Mr. Shelton’s Complaint alleges RTR committed
slander of title by improperly filing the Affidavit of Lost Assignment with the Registry of
Deeds. ECF No. 1 at 16–17. RTR moves to dismiss this count, arguing that its claim to the
Property did not impede Mr. Shelton’s ability to sell it and noting RTR eventually agreed

to discharge the Mortgage pursuant to a post-judgment stipulation in the 2023 Action.
ECF No. 18 at 22.
To state a claim for slander of title under Maine law, a plaintiff must allege: “(1)
there was a publication of a slanderous statement disparaging claimant’s title; (2) the
statement was false; (3) the statement was made with malice or made with reckless
disregard of its falsity; and (4) the statement caused actual or special damages.”
Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405, 409 (Me. 1996). The Court finds Mr. Shelton has
satisfactorily pleaded each of these four elements.
The Complaint alleges RTR asserted an invalid claim to the Property and failed to
comply with Maine’s statutory requirements for filing affidavits for lost assignments. See
ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 69–72. Mr. Shelton points to RTR’s own legal billing statements as

evidence that RTR knew it lacked a valid assignment; this supports a plausible inference
that RTR’s subsequent filings with the Registry of Deeds were, at a minimum, made with
reckless disregard for the truth. See id. at ¶¶ 54–55.
Furthermore, Mr. Shelton has plausibly alleged damages. He asserts RTR’s cloud
on the title diminished the value of the Property during its sale, see id. at ¶ 116, and
impaired his ability to reorganize his debts in the 2023 Action and bankruptcy action, see
ECF No. 19 at 13. Unlike other cases where the plaintiff fails to provide “any facts to
support that these statements were made with malice or reckless disregard,” Mr. Shelton
has asserted sufficient facts to move past the pleading stage on this count. Stine v. Bank
of Am., N.A., No. 16-cv-109, 2016 WL 5135607, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2016).
Accordingly, the Court DENIES RTR’s motion to dismiss Count V.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

ECF No. 18. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the FDCPA claim (Count III) is GRANTED.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to all other counts.
SO ORDERED.

Dated this 6th day of March, 2026.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11271915. Public record. Not legal advice.