# Carbo v. Board of Tax Assessors

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · March 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11271256

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** March 5, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Bankruptcy
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11271256

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that valuation methods adopted by bond-for-title agreements are invalid if they are “arbitrary or unreasonable”
- noting that documents incorporated by referenced “are treated as if a part of the document making the reference”

## Opinion text

Case: 24-20439 Document: 57-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/05/2026

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
____________
March 5, 2026
No. 24-20439 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk

In the Matter of Carbo Ceramics, Incorporated, Et al.

Debtor,

Carbo Ceramics, Incorporated,

Appellant,

versus

Board of Tax Assessors for Wilkinson County, Georgia;
Wilkinson County, Georgia,

Appellees.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:24-CV-728
______________________________

Before Jones and Graves, Circuit Judges, and Rodriguez, District
Judge. *
Per Curiam: **

_____________________
*
District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
**
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 24-20439

For years, business was booming for CARBO Ceramics. In 2014,
however, CARBO lost its largest client and experienced significant
economic downturn. Then, the Wilkinson County Board of Tax Assessors
(“Assessors”) in Wilkinson County, Georgia, stopped giving CARBO tax
incentives under a bond-for-title arrangement between CARBO and the
Development Authority of Wilkinson County (“Authority”). After years of
disputes and even a settlement in 2017, the ad valorem tax controversy
persists, boiling down to a singular point of contention: Are the Assessors
required to consider obsolescence and inutility based on the economic
downturn when calculating what CARBO owed for tax years 2018 to 2022?
The correct answer is yes. Because the bankruptcy and district courts held
otherwise, the judgments of the bankruptcy court and district court are
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
CARBO Ceramics manufactures ceramic proppants, which are solid,
spherical beads that fracture oil and gas wells and “prop[] open the
reservoir.” Government entities in Wilkinson County, Georgia, 1 wanted
CARBO to build its manufacturing plants in the county to stimulate
investments and create more jobs. The Authority thus offered CARBO
various incentives to locate facilities there.
Providing incentives in Georgia is tricky because the state constitution
forbids it from “grant[ing] any donation or gratuity or to forgive any debt or
obligation owing to the public.” Ga. Const. art. III, § VI, para. VI. To

_____________________
1
In addition to the Authority and the Assessors, these entities include the Board of
Commissioners of Wilkinson County (“County”) and the Wilkinson County Board of
Education.

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work around this provision, the Authority and CARBO entered into a
“bond-for-title” arrangement. 2 The Authority issued a bond to CARBO,
and in return, CARBO transferred title to its manufacturing facilities to the
Authority and then leased them back from the Authority. With this
stratagem, the Authority’s ownership interest would be exempt from
property taxes, and only CARBO’s leasehold interest would be taxable.
Even then, however, CARBO did not technically pay ad valorem taxes or
actual taxes on its leasehold interest; it instead owed the County “Payments
in Lieu of Taxes” (“PILOTs”). The PILOTs were calculated to reduce
CARBO’s tax burden to the County.
More specifically, to calculate the PILOTs, the plants’ machinery
and equipment were taxed on 40% of their assessed value, the default
percentage in Georgia. Ga. Stat. Ann. § 48-5-7. That result (40% of the
assessed value) was multiplied by the applicable “value percentage,” a
number that increased from 30% in year one to 100% from year ten onward.
That value-percentage multiplier represented the tax benefit to CARBO.
Relevant here, the 2008 MOU explained how to calculate the
assessed-value component of that equation:
Machinery and Equipment falls in Economic Life Group III (as
defined in the applicable Department of Revenue rules and
regulations), shall be operated on a continuous 24 hour per day
basis and shall be valued for ad valorem tax purposes at cost
less depreciation; depreciation shall be calculated based on
Department of Revenue requirements.
The Department of Revenue requirements are memorialized in an
Appraisal Procedures Manual (“APM”), which prescribes that economic
_____________________
2
This arrangement is memorialized in a 2008 Memorandum of Understanding
(“2008 MOU”) and a 2008 Lease Agreement (“2008 Lease”).

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life groups are valued by the “cost approach.” The cost-approach
methodology determines the current value of an asset as the product of the
“original cost new” multiplied by a “composite conversion factor” that is
based on the item’s “life group” (i.e., how long it should last) and its age.
The APM then requires appraisers to consider “further depreciation,” if
any, for “physical deterioration,” “functional obsolescence,” and
“economic obsolescence.”
To receive and retain tax benefits under these calculations, CARBO
had to create and maintain certain employment levels at its plants. And if
CARBO failed to meet a given year’s job goals, it had to make a “shortfall
payment.” 3 In the early years of the bond-for-title and tax incentives
agreements, CARBO’s operations seemed successful. From 2008 to 2014,
CARBO’s ceramic proppants were in high demand. During that period,
demand often exceeded the capacity of CARBO’s plants, and the company
had to turn down many customer orders.
But in 2014, one of CARBO’s largest clients announced that it was
moving away from ceramic proppant to a cheaper proppant. This cheaper
proppant was created with frac sand at “a tenth of the cost” of a ceramic
product, but it was still effective because the industry was “now producing”
from formations of shale, “a very permeable rock.” To make matters worse,
CARBO experienced another downturn after the collapse of the oil and gas
market.
Facing a devastating downturn, CARBO turned to a force majeure
clause found in the 2008 MOU. Under this clause, each year’s job goals

_____________________
3
CARBO opened its McIntyre Plant in 1997 after entering into an agreement with
the Authority. CARBO then opened its Toomsboro plant after a new agreement in 2003.

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No. 24-20439

were subject to reduction upon the occurrence of a “force majeure.” 4 For
each year that a force majeure existed, CARBO’s job goals would “be
reduced by the number of jobs” that “were not filled as a result.”
In 2015, CARBO alleged that this economic decline was a force
majeure event that excused it from meeting its job goals under the 2008
MOU. CARBO also alleged that the machinery and equipment at the
facilities should be assessed at a lower value because of “obsolescence and
inutility” caused by this drop in demand.
Instead of agreeing, however, the Assessors—the entity responsible
for appraising CARBO’s taxable property for Wilkinson County ad valorem
taxes—stopped giving tax abatements or incentives to CARBO. After a
couple of years, CARBO appealed the Assessor’s valuation for tax years
2015, 2016, and 2017, arguing that a force majeure event had taken place.
Ultimately, in July 2017, the parties entered into a settlement agreement,
whereby the Assessors agreed to “assess all properties related to this
Settlement Agreement at their fair market values” going forward.
But the disputes continued for each tax year starting with 2018.
CARBO contested tax years 2019 through 2022 and attempted to appeal in
Georgia. Despite the disputes, CARBO still paid tax at the agreed-upon
2017 amount in each of the following years.

_____________________
4
According to the agreement, a force majeure included “any unexpected event”
preventing CARBO’s satisfaction of its job goals, such as acts of God, natural disasters,
wars, civil commotion, explosions, strikes, walkouts, other labor unrest, any economic
conditions amounting to a recession or depression, and terrorist acts. To qualify as a force
majeure event, the event must satisfy three elements: (1) it must be beyond CARBO’s
“reasonable control”; (2) it must be an event that CARBO cannot overcome through
“due diligence and reasonable efforts”; and (3) it must have “a material adverse effect
on the employment at the” facilities.

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Before CARBO appealed the Assessor’s valuations of tax years 2021
and 2022, CARBO filed for Chapter 11 reorganization in the Southern
District of Texas in March 2020. The Assessors and the Authority then filed
a Proof of Claim in the bankruptcy court for unpaid ad valorem taxes covering
tax years 2018–2020.
Around eight months later, CARBO initiated this adversary
proceeding in which it (1) objected to the Assessors’ claims for unpaid taxes,
(2) sought a refund for its overpayments, and (3) claimed that the Assessors
denied CARBO due process by refusing to forward CARBO’s appeals to the
Board of Equalization as Georgia law requires.
In the adversary proceeding, the parties’ agreed Joint Pretrial
Statement recited only three issues of fact: (1) the amounts of “functional”
or “economic” obsolescence, if any; (2) the appropriate inutility penalty, if
any; and (3) whether the Assessors’ litigation conduct “warrant[s] an award
of litigation expenses in favor of CARBO.” The only issues of law were
whether CARBO was entitled to attorneys’ fees and whether the County
had a “right to recover penalties.” Based on these premises, CARBO
sought a refund of $2,616,399.38, and the Assessors sought an additional tax
payment of $1,723,545.89.
At the bench trial, the bankruptcy court sua sponte inquired whether
the 2008 MOU even “allow[s] for obsolescence,” and at his request, the
parties filed briefing on this issue. The trial was halted.
After digesting the parties’ briefing, the bankruptcy court ruled
against CARBO, holding that CARBO could not take additional
depreciation for economic obsolescence or inutility under the 2008 MOU.
The bankruptcy court acknowledged that the 2008 MOU adopted the cost
approach in the APM and thus “allow[ed] an economic obsolescence
deduction” and “additional depreciation” to be taken “[u]nder some

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No. 24-20439

circumstances.” But the APM was inapplicable, the bankruptcy court held,
because the 2008 MOU contained an express “exclusion” foreclosing any
economic-obsolescence deduction—an exclusion stating that machinery and
equipment “shall be operated on a continuous 24 hour per day basis.”
Reading this clause in the assessed-value provision, the bankruptcy court
reasoned that, if it “was a covenant, it would be a covenant without
consequence.” As a result, it held that the “24-hour-per-day” language was
a “stipulation” for assessment purposes that foreclosed CARBO’s claim of
economic obsolescence or inutility.
CARBO unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Then, the
bankruptcy court applied its interpretation of the MOU and concluded that
CARBO owed the County $3,395,872.59—more than the County sought—
but it did not owe attorneys’ fees. With pre-judgment interest, CARBO’s
liability tops $4,400,000.
CARBO appealed to the district court, and finding no relief there,
CARBO appealed to this court.
II. Standard of Review
On appeal, this court applies “the same standard of review as did the
district court.” In re Mercer, 246 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
This court thus reviews the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error
and its legal conclusions and mixed questions of fact and law de novo. Id.
III. Discussion
The parties dispute whether the 2008 MOU allows CARBO to claim
inutility or economic obsolescence. 5 CARBO argues that, by incorporating
_____________________
5
The parties separately dispute whether the 2008 MOU even applies or whether
the 2017 settlement agreement modifies or supersedes it. The bankruptcy court held that
the 2008 MOU applies and that the 2017 settlement agreement did not modify or

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No. 24-20439

the Department of Revenue regulations and the APM’s cost approach into
the 2008 MOU, the MOU required the Assessors to consider obsolescence
and inutility when determining the fair market value of the machinery and
equipment. The Assessors contend that the MOU’s incorporation of the
Department of Revenue regulations did not specifically mention the cost
approach and that other provisions of the MOU expressly foreclose
consideration of obsolescence.
To resolve this dispute, the court must interpret the 2008 MOU.
Under Georgia law, 6 “[t]he cardinal rule of contract construction is to
ascertain the intention of the parties, as set out in the language of the
contract.” Overlook Gardens Props., LLC v. Orix, USA, LP, 884 S.E.2d 433,
440 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Emory Healthcare, Inc. v. van Engelen, 870
S.E.2d 223, 226 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)). Contract interpretation is a question
of law, and courts interpret contracts in three analytical steps. Id. First,
courts “decide whether the language of the contract is clear and
unambiguous.” Id. (quoting Emory Healthcare, Inc., 870 S.E.2d at 226). If it
is, courts enforce the contract “according to its plain terms, and the contract
alone is looked to for meaning.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Emory
Healthcare, Inc., 870 S.E.2d at 226). Second, if the language is ambiguous,
courts must apply “‘the rules of contract construction . . . to resolve the
ambiguity.’” Id. (quoting Emory Healthcare, Inc., 870 S.E.2d at 226). Third,
“if ambiguity remains,” then “the issue of what the ambiguous language

_____________________
supersede it. That bankruptcy court’s reasoning is persuasive, and because both
agreements adopt the fair-market-value standard, this court assumes without deciding that
the 2008 MOU applies.
6
The Court looks to Georgia law because the 2008 MOU states that Georgia law
governs, and this court generally “look[s] to state law for rules governing contract
interpretation.” FDIC v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, 109 F.3d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted).

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means and what the parties intended must be resolved by a jury or the trial
court at a bench trial.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Emory Healthcare,
Inc., 870 S.E.2d at 226–27).
Based on these principles, the 2008 MOU requires the Assessors to
consider obsolescence for three reasons. First, the 2008 MOU textually
incorporates the APM’s cost approach. Second, the APM’s cost approach
requires the Assessors to consider obsolescence. And third, the 24-hour-per-
day provision does not preclude the Assessors from considering
obsolescence. This court addresses each in turn.
A.
To begin, the 2008 MOU incorporates the APM generally and its
cost approach specifically. Considering the APM generally, the 2008 MOU
specifies the valuation method for the property at issue. That valuation
method expressly references regulations from the Department of Revenue
when it states that the property “falls in Economic Life Group III (as defined
in the applicable Department of Revenue rules and regulations)” and “shall be
valued . . . at cost less depreciation,” with depreciation being calculated
according to “Department of Revenue requirements.”
By incorporating those regulations, the 2008 MOU incorporates the
APM into its valuation method. Georgia law provides that “[t]he
commissioner [of the Department of Revenue] shall . . . maintain an
appropriate procedural manual for use by county property appraisal staff in
appraising tangible real and personal property for ad valorem tax purposes.”
Ga. Code Ann. § 48-5-269.1(a) (emphasis added). The manual “shall be
utilized by county property appraisal staff . . . .” Ga. Code. Ann. § 48-5-
269.1(b) (emphasis added). In light of this mandate, Georgia’s Department
of Revenue compiled its regulations into the APM “to assist county tax
officials in appraising tangible real and personal property for . . . ad valorem

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tax purposes.” Barsamian v. Glynn Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 897 S.E.2d 893,
896 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 560-11-10-
.01(1)). The APM itself confirms that it was “developed in accordance with
[Ga. Code. Ann. § 48-5-269.1] which directs the Revenue Commissioner
to . . . maintain an appropriate procedure manual for use by the county
property appraisal staff in appraising tangible real and personal property for
ad valorem tax purposes.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 560-11-10-.01(1).
Indisputably, the Department of Revenue’s regulations include the
APM, and the “reasonably clear and ascertainable meaning” of the 2008
MOU’s reference to the regulations is that the MOU effectively
incorporates the APM by reference. Therefore, the Assessors are supposed
to use the APM generally when determining the value of CARBO’s
property. Bowman v. Walnut Mountain Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 553 S.E.2d
389, 393 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“As a matter of contract law, incorporation by
reference is generally effective to accomplish its intended purpose where the
provisions to which reference is made have a reasonably clear and
ascertainable meaning.” (brackets omitted) (quoting Goldman v. Vinson, 535
S.E.2d 305, 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000))). The incorporated APM is part of the
2008 MOU itself. Id. (noting that documents incorporated by referenced
“are treated as if a part of the document making the reference”).
Further, the 2008 MOU specifically incorporates the cost approach
found in the APM. The MOU states that the property falls into “Economic
Life Group III.” Although the APM supplies a variety of methodologies, it
only uses economic life groups in the cost approach. Indeed, the MOU
expressly stated that “depreciation shall be calculated based on Department
of Revenue requirements,” and the cost approach is the only methodology
that discusses depreciation.

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Pitted against the text of the 2008 MOU, the Assessors’ contention
that it does not adopt the APM is unpersuasive. It is also contrary to their
repeated concessions in the bankruptcy court. For instance, in the Joint
Pretrial Statement, they stipulated that “county boards of tax assessors shall
require their appraisal staffs to follow the procedures set out in the Georgia
Appraisal Procedures Manual . . . when assessing ad valorem tax on tangible
property.” The parties appended the APM to their Joint Pretrial Statement
as Joint Exhibit 1. The Assessors referenced the APM in their answer to
CARBO’s complaint. Finally, the Assessors’ memorandum of law stated
that “the parties agreed, in effect, to be bound by the Basic Cost Approach
set forth in Revenue Rule 50-11-10-.08 of the [APM] . . . .” The Assessors’
litigation conduct relying on or citing with approval the APM undermines
their arguments to the contrary.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Georgia has signaled the APM’s
importance to valuation methods when it held that a valuation method is
suspect if it does not “follow[] an authorized appraisal approach,” even in a
bond-for-title arrangement. Sherman v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors, 701
S.E.2d 472, 474–76 (Ga. 2010). The court noted that any method must aim
to “determine[e] the fair market value of the property.” Id. at 475; see also
DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. W.C. Harris & Co., 282 S.E.2d 880, 884
(Ga. 1981) (noting that valuation methods adopted by bond-for-title
agreements are invalid if they are “arbitrary or unreasonable”).
B.
Next, because the 2008 MOU incorporates the APM’s cost approach
to assessed value, that methodology requires the Assessors to consider
obsolescence and inutility. Generally, the APM’s cost approach “allow[s]
for physical deterioration, functional [obsolescence,] and economic
obsolescence.” A section of the APM’s cost approach is titled, “Further

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depreciation to basic cost approach value.” That section states that
appraisers “shall consider any evidence” of “[p]hysical deterioration,”
“[f]unctional obsolescence,” and “[e]conomic obsolescence.”
In addition, the fact that 2008 MOU adds that “depreciation shall be
calculated based on Department of Revenue requirements” confirms the
centrality of obsolescence in the depreciation analysis. After all, the APM
defines “depreciation” as “the loss of value due to any cause,” i.e., “the
difference between the market value of . . . a piece of equipment and its
reproduction or replacement cost,” and it divides depreciation into the three
categories of “physical deterioration, functional obsolescence, and economic
obsolescence.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 560-11-10-.02(1)(d); see also
Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 560-11-10-.02(1)(f), (j), (t) (defining “economic
obsolescence,” “functional obsolescence,” and “physical deterioration” as
“form[s] of depreciation”). Taken together, the 2008 MOU and its
incorporation of the APM show that obsolescence is not optional; it’s a
requirement for the Assessors.
C.
Finally, the clause about 24-hour operations does not change the fact
that CARBO may claim obsolescence under the 2008 MOU. The
bankruptcy court determined that this 24-hour-per-day clause prohibited
CARBO from claiming obsolescence or inutility. According to the
bankruptcy court, if the 24-hour-per-day provision “was a covenant, it would
be a covenant without consequence.” Instead, the court characterized the
clause as a “stipulation” contained within the assessed valuation provision,
and as such, it foreclosed a claim of economic obsolescence or inutility
otherwise required by the APM.
We disagree with the bankruptcy court’s interpretation. First, despite
its location within the valuation provision, the 24-hour clause does not

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explain how it impacts valuation. There is also nothing in the 24-hour
provision prohibiting the consideration of economic obsolescence or inutility.
Second, even if the clause did create an express covenant, by depriving
CARBO of a significant feature of the APM’s cost approach, the
bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the 2008 MOU would exact a forfeiture
of CARBO’s rights. Forfeitures generally occur when a party to contract
“forfeit[s] contractual benefits” after breaching a provision or failing to
satisfy a condition. Hon. John K. Larkins III, Ga. Contracts
Law and Litigation § 9:10 (2d ed. 2025). Contract forfeiture is
disfavored in Georgia, and courts resolve any ambiguity in a contract against
forfeiture. A.L. Williams & Assocs. v. Faircloth, 386 S.E.2d 151, 153 (Ga.
1989). Because forfeitures are disfavored, they cannot be implied. Rodriguez
v. Miranda, 507 S.E.2d 789, 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (citing King Indus.
Realty, Inc. v. Rich, 481 S.E.2d 861, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)).
The 24-hour clause, as the bankruptcy court acknowledged, is
ambiguous. Unlike other provisions of the 2008 MOU, 7 it “comes with no
such explanations of any repercussion for not actually operating on a
continuous basis.” If interpreted as “a covenant, it would be a covenant
without consequence.” But as a “stipulation,” the court concluded, the
clause prevented CARBO from arguing economic depreciation or inutility.
The court’s reasoning is contradicted by Georgia law.
Looking to Georgia law, the foremost caution is that forfeitures have
only been allowed when a contract provided for forfeiture in “clear and
unmistakable terms.” See, e.g., Russell v. KDA, Inc., 425 S.E.2d 406, 408 (Ga.
_____________________
7
For example, the MOU stated that, if CARBO failed to meet the job goals, then
the Authority would require CARBO to make a “shortfall payment.” That shortfall-
payment calculation may require CARBO to remit part of the tax benefits it received from
preceding year under the valuation section of the MOU.

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Ct. App. 1992) (contract provided for forfeiture because it was
“unambiguous” and written in “clear and unmistakable terms”); see also id.
(“all ambiguities in a contract are to be resolved against the[] existence” of
forfeitures except where provided for “in unmistakable terms” (quoting
Equitable Loan, etc., Co. v. Waring, 44 S.E. 320, 321 (Ga. 1903)). When
“‘there are no express words of defeasance, forfeiture, or reversion, the
words employed will be construed as words of covenant, and not words of
condition.” Fulton County v. Collum Props., Inc., 388 S.E.2d 916, 919 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989) (emphasis in original) (quoting Gordon v. Whittle, 57 S.E.2d 169,
171 (Ga. 1950)). And in those cases, “the remedy for a breach
thereof . . . would be an action thereon for damages, and not a forfeiture of
the estate [or usufruct] for condition broken.” Id. (brackets in original)
(quoting Gordon, 57 S.E.2d at 171). The bankruptcy court’s admission that
the 24-hour clause is ambiguous alone suffices to prevent its interpretation as
a forfeiture provision.
In addition, even a “stipulation” may result in an unlawful forfeiture.
See, e.g., Bailey v. Martin, 112 S.E.2d 807, 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960) (pointing
to McDaniel v. Mallary Bros. Mach. Co., 66 S.E. 146, 147 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909),
and noting that “a stipulation in a contract,” “in effect, works a forfeiture of
the plaintiff’s rights to recover” under the contract). Thus, the attempt to
describe the 24-hour clause as a stipulation fails to insulate it from working a
forfeiture of CARBO’s rights.
Finally, the court’s purported reliance on equity was error. The court
held that “even if the parties intended to create a covenant,” “CARBO
cannot benefit from its own breach by factoring inutility into its PILOT
payment.” And though this circumstance may violate “[p]rinciples of
equity,” Georgia law does not always excuse one party’s performance
because of another party’s nonperformance. Rather, Georgia law makes
clear that the Assessor’s performance of the contract here may be excused

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only if CARBO’s failure to operate the facilities on a continuous basis caused
the Assessor’s failure to consider obsolescence. See Ga. Code Ann. § 13-
4-23 (“If the nonperformance of a party to a contract is caused by the conduct
of the opposite party, such conduct shall excuse the other party from
performance.” (emphasis added)). Put simply, CARBO’s failure would not
excuse the Assessor’s failure unless causation is present. Because causation
is absent, the bankruptcy court erroneously concluded that CARBO’s
alleged breach excused the Assessor’s duty to consider obsolescence and
inutility.
***
In sum, the 2008 MOU by its terms requires the Assessors to
consider obsolescence and inutility when appraising CARBO’s property for
the challenged tax years. The bankruptcy court’s and district court’s
contrary interpretations were incorrect.
IV. Conclusion
The judgments of the bankruptcy court and district court are
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11271256. Public record. Not legal advice.