# Riley

> District Court, N.D. Georgia · March 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11270684

## Case

- **Full name:** Cordero Riley v. Clayton County, Georgia, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Georgia
- **Decided:** March 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

Cordero Riley,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:24-cv-1567-MLB
v.

Clayton County, Georgia, et al.

Defendants.

________________________________/

OPINION & ORDER
In April 2022, Plaintiff Cordero Riley spent six days in the Clayton
County jail. Other inmates beat him severely, the medical staff provided
minimal care, and he left the jail with a fractured rib and collapsed lung.
Plaintiff sued several Clayton County officials and an outside contractor
for violating his constitutional rights. (Dkt. 176.) Some Defendants move
to dismiss. (Dkts. 187, 197, 198.) Plaintiff moves to add additional
parties and claims and for judicial notice of certain facts. (Dkts. 196,
218.) The Court grants the motions to dismiss in part, denies the motion
for judicial notice, and stays the motion to add parties.
I. Background
Plaintiff entered the jail on April 19, 2022 for violating probation.

(Dkt. 176 ¶ 163.) Jail staff placed him in Housing Unit 7, a “max security
pod” for violent offenders. (Id. ¶ 178.) He was one of 189 inmates housed
in the unit that night. (Id. ¶ 189.) Defendant Stokes Williams was the

only officer in the unit’s observation tower. (Id. ¶¶ 191–92.)
Around 10:30 p.m., an inmate entered Riley’s cell and demanded

his flip-flops. (Id. ¶¶ 196–97.) Riley refused, and the inmate left but
returned with several others. (Id. ¶ 199.) The group beat Riley for about
ten minutes, knocked him unconscious, and moved him to another cell.

(Id. ¶¶ 200, 215.) Riley remained in that cell—“beaten, swollen, and
bloodied”—until a guard found him early the next morning. (Id. ¶¶ 238–
241.)

Guards took Riley to the jail infirmary. (Id. ¶¶ 242–49.)
CorrectHealth, a private medical care contractor, operated the infirmary
and employed its nurses. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 64–75.) Despite Riley saying he

needed to go to the emergency room, nurses treated him with Motrin and
ice. (Id. ¶¶ 255–59.) Two days later, he sought more medical assistance,
telling the nurses he was having difficulty breathing, thought he had a
collapsed lung and broken ribs, and wanted to go to the emergency room.
(Id. ¶¶ 267–71.) Again, they gave him only Motrin and ice. (Id. ¶ 275.)

Despite continuing to complain about his condition, the jail provided no
further treatment. (Id. ¶ 280.) When the jail released him on April 25,
Plaintiff went to a hospital and learned he had a broken rib, a collapsed

lung, and hydropneumothorax (fluid in the lungs). (Id. ¶¶ 290-293.)
Riley sued 39 Defendants (including 11 unnamed parties) under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his constitutional rights and Georgia state
law. (Dkt. 1.) He filed an amended complaint, and the Court dismissed
it as a shotgun pleading. (Dkts. 102, 173.) Riley then filed his second

amended complaint, dropping eight Defendants and adding six others.
(Dkt. 176.) Relevant to this motion, Plaintiff claims his cell door should
have been locked on the night he arrived at the jail, the inmates who beat

him should have been locked in their cells, but the jail had an on-going—
and well known—problem with broken or “rigged locks” that allowed
inmates to leave their cells without permission, chronic understaffing,

and rampant violence. (Id. ¶ 201, 335-37, 342-43, 363, 394.) He says the
jail staff’s failure to address those problems led to his assault. (Id.)
Defendants Clayton County, Interim Sheriff Roland Boehrer (the
Clayton County Sheriff at the time), Sheriff Levon Allen (the current the

Sheriff), Major Brandon Criss (Commander of the Sheriff’s
Administrative Operations Division), and Officer Williams move to
dismiss.1 (Dkts. 187, 197, 198.)

II. Standard of Review
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must

contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667-78
(2009). A court may dismiss a pleading for “failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. At the stage of a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded facts
are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are

1 A note to Plaintiff: Plaintiff’s opposition briefs contain pages of single-
spaced text in violation of Local Rule 5(C)(2). (See, e.g., Dkt. 205 at 5–6;
Dkt. 209 at 5–7; Dkt. 210 at 4–11.) Had his briefs been properly spaced,
they would have exceeded the Court’s page limitations. See Local Rule
7.1(D). The Court will strike his brief if he does this again.
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice
Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court may
take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute” because

it “(1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction;
or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2).
But the taking of judicial notice is “a highly limited process” because it
“bypasses the safeguards which are involved with the usual process of

proving facts by competent evidence in district court.” Shahar v. Bowers,
120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus “the kinds of things about which
courts ordinarily take judicial notice are (1) scientific facts: for instance,

when does the sun rise or set; (2) matters of geography: for instance, what
are the boundaries of a state; or (3) matters of political history: for
instance, who was president in 1958.” Id.

Six months after Defendants moved to dismiss—and almost four
months after briefing ended—Plaintiff filed a Motion Requesting Judicial
Notice of Certain Facts, asking the Court to take judicial notice of 56 facts
contained in a verified complaint Sheriff Allen filed against the Clayton
County Board of Commissioners in September 2025. (Dkt. 218.) He

includes facts about infrastructure problems at the jail (including failing
locks), overcrowding and understaffing, poor medical services, and the
Board of Commissioner’s alleged awareness of those problems. (Id.)

Despite Sheriff Allen having filed a “verified complaint,” the
allegations are unproven and disputed. They certainly are not “generally

known” or “accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” as Federal Rule of Evidence
201 requires. Moreover, the Court may only “take judicial notice of a

document filed in another court [] for the limited purpose of establishing
the existence of such litigation … and not for the truth of the matter
asserted.” O’Neal v. Allstate Indem. Ins. Co. Inc., 2021 WL 4852222, at

*5 (11th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021); United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553
(11th Cir. 1994) (“a court may take judicial notice of a document filed in
another court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other

litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related
filings.”). Yet Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of the truth
of Sheriff Allen’s allegations and use them to “draw the reasonable
inference that the [Defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged.”
(Dkt. 218 at 12.) The Court cannot do that.

The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice.
IV. Interim Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss’s Motion to Dismiss
In Count 2, Plaintiff alleges Interim Sheriff Boehrer and Major

Criss violated his Eight Amendment rights by being deliberately
indifferent to the dangerous conditions of confinement at the jail that led

to his injuries.2 (Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 387–415.)3 Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss
contend qualified immunity shields them from this claim.
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for individual

public officials performing discretionary functions insofar as their

2 Plaintiff relies on the Eighth Amendment, but it is the Fourteenth
Amendment that protects against mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial
detainees in custody. See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th
Cir. 1996). His oversight, however, is of no consequence because the
Court “may properly analyze [Plaintiff’s] claim under the Eighth
Amendment as certainly states may not impose on pretrial detainees
conditions that would violate a convicted prisoner’s Eighth Amendment
rights.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995).
3 In Counts 14 and 16, Plaintiff brought § 1983 and state law claims
against Officers Anwar Fullerton and Kevin Roper. They moved to
dismiss those claims as part of the motion filed by Sheriff Boehrer, Major
Criss, and Officer Williams. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed those claims
in his response brief, removing them from this case. (Dkt. 209 at n. 1.)
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sherrod v.

Johnson, 667 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 2012). The qualified immunity
doctrine is generous—“it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743

(2011). The qualified immunity analysis begins with the threshold
question of whether Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss were “acting within

[their] discretionary authority” during the events in question. Skop v.
City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff does not
dispute claims by Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss that they were acting

within their discretionary authority in maintaining the jail. So, to avoid
qualified immunity, Plaintiff must present evidence that these
Defendants violated his statutory or constitutional rights and that it was

“clearly established at the time” that their conduct did so.
A. Constitutional Violation
Restrictive, harsh, or unsafe prison conditions only “rise to the level

of an Eighth Amendment violation [] when they involve the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289
(11th Cir. 2004). To assert an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions
of confinement (or a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to conditions of
pretrial confinement), a plaintiff must show the conditions “pose[d] an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his [or her] future health” or
safety. Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)); Hale v.
Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (courts consider

conditions of confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees—
protected by Fourteenth Amendment—under Eighth Amendment

framework). That requires a plaintiff to show the conditions are “so
grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose
anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Id. Put differently, a plaintiff “must

show that the risk of which he [or she] complains is not one that today’s
society chooses to tolerate.” Id. This is called the “objective component”
of an Eighth Amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement.

A plaintiff must also show the prison officials “acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind” with regard to the condition at issue.
Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289. “The proper standard is that of deliberate

indifference.” Id. A prison official is deliberately indifferent to a
dangerous condition of confinement when he or she “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he [or she] must also draw

the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The
deliberate indifference standard requires more than simple or even gross
negligence by the prison official. Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289. This is

called the “subjective element” of an Eighth Amendment claim.
A prisons official who knows of a substantial risk to an inmate’s

health or safety can avoid liability for deliberate indifference by
responding reasonably to abate that risk, even if his or her efforts fail.
Farmer, 511 U.S. Id. at 844. Finally, to succeed on an Eighth

Amendment claim, a plaintiff must also show the prison official’s
deliberate indifference caused his or her injuries. Goodman v.
Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff argues his complaint alleges a “confluence” of several
dangerous conditions that satisfies the objective component of his Eighth
Amendment claims. This includes his allegations of “unlockable cells,

makeshift weapons, inmate-on-inmate violence and extortion, the lack of
a formal security plan, overcrowding, understaffing, poor officer training,
and a poor (or poorly enforced) inmate classification system.” (Dkt. 209
at 15; Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 390–96.) Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss don’t
challenge Plaintiff’s contention that these conditions created an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health while incarcerated. So
the Court assumes they do and finds Plaintiff plausibly alleges the
“objective component” of his claim.

Plaintiff also argues he has presented evidence to show Sheriff
Boehrer and Major Criss knew of these dangerous conditions before his

confinement in April 2022. (Dkt, 176 ¶¶ 390–96.) As part of this, he
points to internal jail communications he attached to his complaint. The
documents include an August 2021 email from a correctional officer to

the jail’s “Command Staff,” explaining “[officers in the jail] have low
security awareness,” “multiple doors in [a housing unit] aren’t fixed [and]
inmates are able to go in and out as they please and pop a door and attack

someone,” “weapons are constantly being found on inmates,” “and “there
still hasn’t been a major shake down of the facility after multiple weapons
and stabbing incidents.”4 (Dkt. 176-4.) The officer concludes the email

4 Though Boehrer and Criss’s names are not explicitly listed as recipients
of the email, it is reasonable to infer they received the email—or at least
notice of it—as two of the top officials on the “Command Staff” overseeing
the facility. See St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th
by repeating that “multiple housing units have doors that are rigged and
or broken allowing inmates to come and of out of cells as they please” and

warning “the jail is not a safe place right now.” (Id.)
He also includes an August 2021 email addressed to Sheriff Boehrer
and Major Criss in which a jail official reported that a nurse feared for

her safety while helping an inmate in Unit 1 because—after a guard left
her in the unit—several inmates began “popping out of their cells.”5 (Dkt.

176-3 at 2.) In an email chain from October 2021 that Plaintiff also
attached, Sheriff Boehrer recognized the danger and prevalence of
inmates “popping out.” In a discussion of the need for officers to close

and lock doors, a correctional officer wrote that when he had gone into
the housing units he “noticed a lot of inmates popping out of the cells”
and that “this [is] starting to become a regular thing.” (Dkt. 176-7 at 2.)

Sheriff Boehner responded to all command staff—including Major

Cir. 2002) (In reviewing motion to dismiss, the Court must draw all
reasonable inference in the plaintiff’s favor). Boehrer and Criss also do
not suggest they did not see the email.
5 The Complaint explains that “popping” or “sheeting” is “when an inmate
jams something into hinges or the locking mechanism of the cell door to
prevent it from locking.” (Dkt. 176 ¶ 99.)
Criss—that “[i]f any door is left open the potential for rigging and
tampering is always a possibility … the popping occurs when cell doors

are not being shut and inmates have rigged those cell door locks by
jamming paper or other items into the locking mechanism. That’s why
we must shut doors!” (Dkt. 176-7 at 1.) Sheriff Boehrer also attached a

previous email he sent on June 6, 2021, reminding his command staff to
“shut, secure or lock all doors … if a door cannot be secured, send

notification and get it fixed immediately!” (Id. at 3.)
These emails plausibly establish that Sheriff Boehrer and Major
Criss were on notice that inmates were capable of “popping” their

cell-door locks and roaming free—an obvious security issue. Sheriff
Boehrer and Major Criss hardly grapple with these exhibits or otherwise
argue they did not know about the dangerous conditions at the jail,

particularly the ability of inmates to pop doors and roam free. Instead,
they contend they were not deliberately indifferent because they knew
nothing about Plaintiff specifically. (Dkt. 198-1 at 9; Dkt. 215 at 6–7.)

Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss maintain they could not have known
Plaintiff faced any danger because he was booked into the jail between
9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. and attacked around 10:30 p.m., leaving too
little time for them to become aware of any risk he faced. (Id.) The
Eleventh Circuit foreclosed a similar line of reasoning in Hale. 50 F.3d

at 1583. In that case, a defendant sheriff argued that, despite evidence
he knew about generally dangerous conditions at a prison, he was not
deliberately indifferent because he did not know the specific plaintiff

feared an attack from specific inmates. Id. The Eleventh Circuit
explained a jailer “may not escape liability merely by showing that he [or

she] did not know the claimant was likely to be assaulted” or that “a
specific inmate would commit an assault.” Id. Rather, a plaintiff can
establish the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim by

showing the jailer “had subjective knowledge of a generalized,
substantial risk of serious harm from inmate violence” and took no
reasonable steps to abate the risk. Id. (internal citations omitted).

Considering the allegations in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff—and in the absence of any real engagement by Sheriff Boehrer
and Major Criss—the Court concludes the emails attached to the

complaint and Plaintiff’s other allegations reasonably infer that both
Defendants knew cell doors were highly susceptible to tampering,
inmates frequently “popped out” of their cells to roam the housing units,
the defective locks gave rise to inmate violence, prison officials did not
feel safe operating within the facility, and all of this created “an excessive

[and intolerable] risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837.
Plaintiff claims he has plausibly alleged Sheriff Boehrer and Major

Criss failed to respond reasonably to this substantial risk. He points to
his complaint allegations that Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss, despite

knowing about the dangerous conditions failed to increase staffing, create
a formal security plan, implement new training, institute policies to
combat the possession and making of shanks, or request funding to fix

cell-door locks and hinges. (Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 399–405.) Again, Sheriff
Boehrer and Major Criss neither dispute these allegations nor seriously
argue they responded to the dangerous conditions of confinement in a

reasonable manner. (Dkt. 198-1 at 9.) They pay only lip service to this
element of Plaintiff’s claim, arguing—in a single conclusory sentence—
that Plaintiff “fails to show that they responded in an objectively

unreasonable manner, as required.” (Dkt. 198-1 at 13.) Taking Plaintiff’s
allegations as true—and noting Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss cursory
response—the Court finds Plaintiff plausibly alleged these Defendants
failed to address reasonably the dangerous conditions.

Finally, causation. Taking his allegations as true, Plaintiff would
not have been beaten but for the broken or popped locks that allowed
other inmates to get out of their cells and enter his, lax supervision over

inmates roaming freely throughout cell blocks, and unchecked inmate
violence—all risks he claims Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss

deliberately ignored. See Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014,
1029 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Conditions ... where violent prisoners are allowed
free reign of a [prison] with easy access to weapons without proper

supervision by guards could be found to have caused the assault.”). Once
more, Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss do not dispute Plaintiff’s
allegations or argument on causation, and the Court finds Plaintiff

satisfies this element.
Plaintiff plausibly alleges Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss violated
his Fourteenth Amendment rights through their deliberate indifference

to dangerous conditions of confinement at the jail.
B. Clearly Established Right
To establish a violation of clearly established law, a plaintiff must

show preexisting law was so clear that, under the facts at issue “every
reasonable official” would have understood that what he or she was doing
violated the Constitutional right at issue. Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d

1290, 1302 (11th Cir. 2018). “[T]he clearly established law must be
particularized to the facts of the case” and not “defined at a high level of

generality.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017). A plaintiff can meet
this burden by “(1) citing case law with indistinguishable facts that
clearly establishes the constitutional right; (2) pointing to a broad

statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that
clearly establishes the constitutional right; or (3) alleging conduct so
egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the

total absence of case law.” Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Georgia, 69 F.4th
1277, 1300 (11th Cir. 2023).
When a plaintiff relies on case law to demonstrate a clearly

established right, “the critical inquiry is whether the law provided the
[defendant official] with fair warning that [his or her] conduct violated”
a constitutional right. Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir.
2011). “Fair warning is most commonly provided by materially similar
[binding] precedent from the Supreme Court, [the Eleventh Circuit], or

the highest state court in which the case arose.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296.
The materially similar standard is met when the specific circumstances
facing the defendant officials are “enough like the facts in the precedent

that no reasonable, similarly situated official could believe that the
factual differences between the precedent and the circumstances facing

the [defendant] official might make a difference to the conclusion about
whether the official’s conduct was lawful or unlawful, in the light of the
precedent.” Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 559 (11th Cir. 2015).

“Exact factual identity with a previously decided case is not required,”
Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1013, but “[m]inor variations between cases may
prove critical,” Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff relies on Marsh v. Butler County, Ala. and Hale v.
Tallapoosa County to show Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss violated
clearly established law by subjecting him to the conditions at the jail.

Hale came first. In that case, a pretrial detainee sued a sheriff and a
jailer for violating his Eighth Amendment rights after he was attacked
by another detainee. 50 F.3d at 1580. He presented evidence that
“[o]vercrowding had existed at the jail for about two years at the time of
[the plaintiff’s] detention,” “inmate-on-inmate violence was occurring on

a regular basis during [the month the plaintiff was detained] and other
periods of overcrowding,” and plaintiff shared a cell “with assorted other
detainees and inmates, who were not segregated based on their proclivity

for violence or the reasons for their confinement.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1581–
83. He also presented evidence the sheriff and jailer were aware of this

“generalized, substantial risk of serious harm,” took no reasonable steps
to abate the condition, and the condition caused the plaintiff’s injury. Id.
at 1584-85. The Eleventh Circuit found that evidence sufficient to avoid

summary judgment on plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. Id.
Then came Marsh. In that case, two inmates claimed the sheriff’s
deliberate indifference to unreasonably dangerous conditions at the jail

allowed other inmates to assault them, thus violating their Eighth
Amendment rights. 268 F.3d at 1023. To establish the dangerous
conditions, the plaintiffs presented evidence nearly identical to the

evidence at issue here. Specifically, the Marsh plaintiffs showed “the
locks on the cell doors were not functional, allowing inmates to roam
freely at all hours of the day;” “homemade weapons were readily available
by fashioning weapons from material torn from the dilapidated structure
of the jail;” “the jail was routinely understaffed;” and “there was no

segregation of nonviolent inmates from violent inmates, [or] pretrial
detainees from convicted criminals.” Id. at 1029. The Marsh court
concluded those allegations “presented an objectively substantial risk of

harm.” Id. at 1029. The plaintiffs also presented evidence the sheriff
was “aware of the risks,” that she “did nothing to alleviate the conditions”

at the jail, and that the dangerous conditions caused the plaintiffs’
injuries. Id. Turning to qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit—citing
Hale and other cases—determined the sheriff violated clearly established

law. Id. at 1034. The Court of Appeals explained “it was clearly
established in this Circuit [at the time of the case] that it is an
unreasonable response for an official to do nothing when confronted with

prison conditions—like the conditions alleged in this case—that pose a
risk of serious physical harm to inmates.” Id. Denying qualified
immunity, the Court of Appeals explained “plaintiffs adequately allege

facts which (if true) show that, at the time of the incident, the sheriff's
acts were not even arguably reasonable in the light of the clearly
established law.” Id. at 1034.
In the light of these cases, the Court finds Plaintiff alleges Sheriff
Boehrer and Major Criss violated clearly established law in failing to take

reasonable steps to abate the substantial and dangerous jail conditions
that they knew about. Plaintiff—like the plaintiff in Marsh—alleges,
among other dangerous conditions, that cell-door locks were

nonfunctional, inmates roamed freely in Unit 7, lax conditions allowed
prisoners easily to obtain and use weapons, the jail was overcrowded and

understaffed, and nonviolent inmates were not reliably separated from
violent ones. (Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 387–415.) He further alleges Sheriff Boehrer
and Major Criss knew of these conditions and failed to act on that

knowledge. (Id.) The alleged conditions and response by Sheriff Boehrer
and Major Criss, taken as true, are sufficiently similar to those alleged
in Marsh and Hale to conclude they had “fair warning” that their conduct

violated clearly established law. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
(2002); see also Brown v. Dunn, 760 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1337–8 (M.D. Ala.
2024) (relying on Hale and Marsh, finding plaintiff plausibly alleged

defendant violated clearly established right where he allegedly failed to
remedy understaffing, faulty locks, the proliferation of makeshift
weapons, and poor supervision.).
Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss make no meaningful effort to
distinguish Hale or Marsh from this case or offer any contrary precedent.

They include only one sentence in response: “although Plaintiff relies
heavily on Marsh and Hale, both of those cases involved far more serious
circumstances than what Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss faced at the

Clayton County jail on April 19, 2022.” (Dkt. 215 at 11.) They don’t
explain that, and the Court can’t do the work for them. But, factual

identity is not required, what matters is “fair warning.” Hope, 536 U.S.
at 741. The similarities between Hale and Marsh and this case—
particularly with regards to the broken locks, free-roaming inmates, and

prevalence of inmate violence—are strong enough to place any
reasonable officer on warning that his or her failure to take reasonable
steps to abate the dangerous conditions at the jail violated the inmates’

rights. And Sheriff Boehrer’s and Major Criss’s single-sentence response
neither undermines the substantial similarities Plaintiff identifies nor
helps the Court understand how a “reasonable, similarly situated official

could believe that the factual differences between [Hale and Marsh] and
the circumstances [at issue here] might make a difference to the
conclusion about whether” Defendants’ conduct was unlawful. Merricks,
785 F.3d at 559. So Plaintiff has carried his burden of showing Sheriff
Boehrer and Major Criss violated clearly established law.

The Court determines Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss are not
entitled to qualified immunity on Count 2 at this time and denies their
motion to dismiss that count.

V. Officer Williams’s Motion to Dismiss
As explained, Officer Williams was the only corrections officer in

the observation tower on Unit 7 when the other inmates attacked
Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 191–92.) In Count 11, Plaintiff alleges Officer Williams
violated his constitutional rights by failing to intervene in his beating.

In Counts 12 and 13, he brings state law claims against Officer Williams
for failing to intervene and for failing to properly monitor the other
inmates. Officer Williams moves to dismiss.

A. Count 11: Failure to Intervene Against Officer Williams
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Officer Williams argues he is entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiff’s federal failure-to-intervene claim in count 11. (Dkt. 198-1 at
2.) He says he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority

when he allegedly failed to intervene in Plaintiff’s assault while on duty
in the observation tower. (Dkt. 198-1 at 5–6.) To determine whether he
was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the Court must
“assess whether [the acts in question] are of a type that fell within [his]

job responsibilities.” Hollomon ex rel. Hollomon v. Harland, 370 F.3d
1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Since Plaintiff alleges Officer Williams was
assigned to monitor the inmates in Unit 7 when he allegedly violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the Court concludes he was acting within
the purview of his job responsibilities when he allegedly watched, or

failed to watch, or failed to intervene. See Howard v. Gee, 538 F. App’x
884, 887 (11th Cir. 2013) (correctional officer was acting within his
discretionary authority while supervising inmates and maintaining

security).6 This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to show qualified immunity
does not apply.
Plaintiff fails to carry his burden. Although he contends he

plausibly alleged Officer Williams violated his constitutional rights,
Plaintiff makes no argument or allegation that those rights were “clearly

6 The Court recognizes Howard is unpublished and not binding. The
Court cites it and other unpublished decisions nevertheless as
instructive. See Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 902 F.3d 1342, 1355
n.5 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Unpublished cases do not constitute binding
authority and may be relied on only to the extent they are persuasive.”).
established.” (See Dkt. 209 at 20–21.) He doesn’t even address Officer
Williams’s claim that he is entitled to qualified immunity.7 Plaintiff

cannot overcome Officer Williams’s qualified immunity and count 11 is
dismissed.8

7 It’s possible Plaintiff failed to address Officer Williams’s assertion of
qualified immunity because Officer Williams only gives cursory attention
to it. The Court, however, finds he did enough to make the threshold
showing that he was engaged in a discretionary function and thus shift
the burden to Plaintiff. Defendants’ motion to dismiss twice says all the
moving Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity—necessarily
including Officer Williams. (Dkt. 198-1 at 2, 5.) And the Motion also
states “these Defendants” acted within the scope of their discretionary
authority, including Officer Williams, and provides authority for that
claim. That was enough to put Plaintiff on notice Officer Williams was
claiming qualified immunity and that he needed to address the issue.
8 Because the Court finds Plaintiff did not carry his burden of
demonstrating a “clearly established” right, it need not address whether
he alleged a constitutional violation by Officer Williams. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“The judges of the district courts and
the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the
particular case at hand.”).
B. Count 12 and 13: State Law Claims Against Officer
Williams
Counts 12 and 13 assert state law claims against Officer Williams.
(Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 480–94.) Under Georgia’s doctrine of official immunity,

state officers “are subject to suit only when they negligently perform or
fail to perform their ministerial functions or when they act with actual

malice or intent to cause injury in the performance of their [discretionary]
functions.” Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007); see
Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 485–86 (11th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff never

alleges Officer Williams acted with “actual malice or intent to cause
injury.” Instead, he seeks to avoid official immunity on Counts 12 and 13
by alleging Officer Williams negligently failed to perform ministerial

duties and that his negligence caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Specifically, in
Count 12, he alleges Officer Williams saw inmates entering his cell, saw
them beating him, and failed to stop the attack or end it sooner. (Dkt.

176 ¶¶ 481-89.) He claims Officer Williams thus violated a ministerial
duty under Georgia law “to stop the unauthorized movement into and
out” his cell by other inmates and “to stop the attack” on him. (Id. ¶ 487.)

In Count 13, he alleges Officer Williams failed adequately to monitor
inmates on Unit 7, did not see the inmates enter his cell, and thus did
not intervene to stop the attack. (Id. ¶ 493-94.) He says Officer Williams
thus violated a ministerial duty under Georgia law to monitor visually

the movement of inmates by available cameras and observation windows.
(Id. ¶ 492.) Officer Williams moves to dismiss, arguing he was exercising
discretion in monitoring the housing unit and (in the absence of malice)

is entitled to official immunity. (Dkt. 198-1 at 24.)
A ministerial function is “simple, absolute, and definite, arising

under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the
execution of a specific duty.” Murphy v. Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Ga.
2007). A discretionary function on the other hand requires “the exercise

of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining
the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not
specifically directed.” Id. For detention officers, “the acts of following

established policies of inspecting and monitoring detainees are
ministerial tasks.” Brantley v. Jones, 871 S.E.2d 87, 96 (Ga. Ct. App.
2022) (emphasis added). “The determination of whether the acts or

omissions of [Williams] were ministerial or discretionary is a legal
question for the court.” Kelly v. Lewis, 471 S.E.2d 583, 586 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996)
Officer Williams fails to address Plaintiff’s claim in Count 12 that
he violated a “ministerial duty under Georgia decisional law” to stop the

“unauthorized movement . . . and to stop the attack.” (Dkt. 176 ¶ 487.)
While he argues Plaintiff has not alleged malice, he does not argue he
performed a discretionary function in this regard. (Dkt. 198-1 at 23.)

But, under Georgia law, he must show “that the specific acts he
performed were discretionary” to obtain immunity. Howell v. Willis, 729

S.E.2d 643, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). Officer Williams’s only arguments
regarding a discretionary function appear in the context of Count 13, not
Count 12. He makes no other arguments regarding Count 12 (other than

a reference to a nonexistent section of his motion). He thus has not
carried his burden of showing official immunity applies as to Count 12.
For Count 13, Plaintiff relies on the Sheriff’s Standard Operating

Procedure (SOP) 4.06(3) which states that “Central Control shall visually
monitor the inmate(s) movement through the facility by available camera
monitors and observation windows.” (Dkt. 209 at n. 14; Dkt. 176-24.)

Plaintiff says this is an “established policy,” rendering Officer Williams’s
supervision of inmates a ministerial function. (Dkt. 176 ¶ 491.) Although
not stated clearly, Plaintiff seems to suggest Officer Williams would have
been carrying out SOP 4.06 on the night in question and that policy
created a ministerial duty because it was “simple, absolute, and definite

… requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.” Murphy, 647 S.E.2d
at 57.
There are two problems with Plaintiff’s argument. First, Plaintiff

has not plausibly alleged the SOP applied to Officer Williams on the night
in question. The provision upon which Plaintiff relies directs the conduct

of “Central Control,” but Plaintiff alleges Officer Williams was stationed
in the “Control Tower” for Unit 7, never alleging this was part of Central
Control. (Dkt. 176 ¶ 191.) The Court does not know—and Plaintiff does

not explain—whether his location was part of Central Control.9 Building

9 Plaintiff contends the issue of whether SOP 4.06 applied to officers (like
Williams) in the Unit 7 control tower and not just to officers in the
Central Control tower is a question of fact. (Dkt. 209 at 21.) While the
Court takes the facts Plaintiff alleges plausibly as true, he has not done
so with regards to this one. Plaintiff argues SOP 4.06 requires “Central
Control to monitor inmate movement through camera monitors and
observations windows,” and because “the inmates in Unit 7 can only be
observed through the ‘observation windows,’” this is somehow “evidence
that the term “Central Control in SOP 4.06 refers to all the control
towers.” (Id.) This conclusion does not follow. In fact, his reasoning cuts
against his conclusion; if the inmates in Unit 7 can only be observed
through observation windows, that would suggest a policy requiring
supervision via “camera monitors” would not apply to that tower. This
assertion also directly contradicts Plaintiff’s allegation that Williams
on that, SOP 4.06—attached to Plaintiff’s complaint and thus subject to
consideration at this stage—seems to address the intended movement of

inmates throughout the facility, not a process for monitoring inmates
when they are supposed to be locked in their cells (as happened here). It
starts with a policy that the jail “shall ensure inmate movement through

the facility is accomplished with a minimum disruption to the daily
operations” and that “[d]uring inmate movement the staff shall also

strive to maintain a safe environment for all employees and inmates.”
(Dkt. 176-24.) It then sets “Procedures” for accomplishing that, including
officers telling “Central Control” when they are moving inmates outside

a housing unit, requiring inmates who are being moved “to walk in a
single file line with their hands behind their back[s] without speaking
and on the right side of the hallway,” and requiring officers to “escort

inmates known to be extremely violent or considered an escape risk”
whenever those inmates leave their housing area. (Id.) The duty for
“Central Control” to monitor inmate movement is included among these

could monitor security cameras from Unit 7 control tower. (Dkt. 176 ¶
206.) All of this shows he has not plausibly alleged Officer Williams
observation tower was part of “Central Control.”
other procedures—suggesting this is a process for the orderly, safe, and
intentional movement of inmates throughout the jail. This suggests

Central Control is not the same as an observation tower in one housing
unit and the procedure was not applicable to Officer Williams’s conduct
when he was supposed to be monitoring the unit on the night in question

while the inmates were supposed to be in their cells.
Second, even if it applied to Officer Williams, SOP 4.06 is not “a

written policy … [that is] so clear, definite and certain as merely to
require the execution of a relatively simple, specific duty” at least not in
regards to Officer Williams’s conduct on that night. Roper v. Greenway,

751 S.E.2d 351, 353 (Ga. 2013). The procedure does not explain how often
the officers in “Central Control” must visually monitor inmates, the
manner in which they must do so, or which inmate movements must be

monitored. It simply does not explain how an officer is supposed to
monitor against inmates popping their doors and leaving their cells
without authorization. These omissions leave ample room for “the

exercise of personal deliberation and judgment” that are inconsistent
with ministerial duties. See Murphy, 647 S.E.2d at 57. Comparable jail
operating procedures that Georgia courts have found to create
ministerial duties typically prescribe specific inmate-monitoring
schedules and leave much less room for interpretation. See, e.g., Lundy

v. Hancock Cnty., 890 S.E.2d 92, 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023) (prescribing
highly detailed suicide prevention procedures including requirement that
officers observe inmates designated “Close Observation . . . at staggered

intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes” and those designated “Constant
Observation . . . on a continuous, uninterrupted basis.”); Brantley v.

Jones, 871 S.E.2d 87, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) (inmate monitoring regimen
that mandates “in-person surveillance of at least every 15 minutes” for
certain inmates); Clark v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 572 S.E.2d 342, 348

(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (policy required prison guards to “inspect[] the cells
in the unit according to the prescribed schedule and document[]
detainees’ location and status.”).

The Court concludes both that Plaintiff has failed to allege
plausibly the procedure at issue in Count 13 applied to Officer Williams’s
conduct on the night in question and that SOP 4.06 is too general to

create a “simple, absolute, and definite” duty. See Murphy, 647 S.E.2d at
57. Accordingly, Officer Williams was performing a discretionary
function while monitoring the housing unit and is entitled immunity
under Georgia law as to Count 13.

VI. Sheriff Allen’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff brings three claims against Sheriff Allen in his official
capacity.10 In Count 1, he alleges Sheriff Allen was deliberately

indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm to inmates because he
knew about problems with the “compromised locks” but failed to tell the

County Commissioners about the problems or otherwise address them.
(Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 377–386.) In Count 2, he alleges Sheriff Allen was
deliberately indifferent to all the dangerous conditions of confinement at

the jail, including (among other things) the broken locks and hinges,
increased inmate violence and weapon possession, an inmate extortion
ring, understaffing, poor training, and overcrowding. (Id. ¶¶ 387–415.)

Finally, in Count 15, he alleges Sheriff Allen was deliberately indifferent
to inmates’ medical needs by contracting with a medical provider known

10 Though Plaintiff refers to the “Sheriff’s Office” in these counts and not
Sheriff Allen, he clarifies he is suing the latter. (Dkt. 210 at 14.) He used
this term because Sheriff Allen was not Sheriff at the time of Plaintiff’s
assault. The Court will call him “Sheriff Allen”—because that is who
moves to dismiss—but notes the relevant conduct is that of the Sheriff’s
Office prior to Allen’s arrival.
to deliver inadequate care. (Id. ¶¶ 503–14.) Sheriff Allen contends he is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on all three claims. (Dkt.

197-1 at 8–20.)
“Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits brought in federal
court when the State itself is sued and when an ‘arm of the State’ is sued.”

Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). “To receive
Eleventh Amendment immunity, a defendant need not be labeled a ‘state

officer’ or ‘state official,’ but instead need only be acting as an ‘arm of the
State,’ which includes agents and instrumentalities of the State.” Id.
Sheriff Allen was acting as “an arm of the state” when he allegedly

engaged in the conduct at issue in counts 1, 2, and 15.
As relevant to counts 1 and 2, a Georgia county sheriff functions as
an arm of the State—not of the county—“when promulgating policies and

procedures governing conditions of confinement” at a county jail. Purcell
ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir.
2005); see also Andrews v. Biggers, 996 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2021) (relying

on Purcell, finding sheriff immune in challenge to policy of “cross-gender
supervision of inmates” at county jail); Holloway v. Pritchett, 2024 WL
5701788 (N.D. Ga. August 8, 2024) (relying on Purcell, finding sheriff
immune to conditions of confinement and medical deliberate indifference
claims where inmate complained of “brutal attacks by other inmates”);

Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1343 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (sheriff
immune where plaintiff challenged policies of inadequate training and
understaffing at county jail). The allegations in counts 1 and 2 flow

directly from Sheriff Allen’s administration of the jail—particularly his
alleged “implement[ation] [of] a custom of deliberate indifference to jail

maintenance.” (Dkt. 210 at 21.) This fits the bill of a “polic[y] or
procedure[] governing conditions of confinement” at the jail. See Purcell,
400 F.3d at 1325.

A Georgia sheriff also acts as an “arm of the state and is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the particular function
of providing medical care” to pretrial detainees. Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1296;

see also McDaniel v. S. Corr. Med. LLC, 2024 WL 4471063, at *4 (11th
Cir. Oct. 11, 2024) (reaffirming Myrick). So Sheriff Allen’s decision to
select a medical provider he believed could deliver cost-effective care—

the decision Plaintiff attacks in Count 15—is precisely the sort of conduct
for which he “wears a state hat.” 69 F.4th at 1296; see also England v.
Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 2025 WL 4058244 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 18, 2025)
(relying on Myrick, finding Eleventh Amendment immunity, and
dismissing deliberate indifference to medical need claim where plaintiff

alleged substandard care by CorrectHealth).
Plaintiff does really dispute Sheriff Allen’s argument that Purcell
and Myrick support a finding of Eleventh Amendment Immunity on

Counts 1, 2, and 15. He instead insists Purcell misread the Eleventh
Circuit’s en banc opinion in Manders when it concluded “a sheriff acts as

an arm of the State when promulgating policies and procedures that
govern the conditions of confinement at a county jail.” (Dkt. 210 at 14–
19.) He insists Manders was not that expansive and Purcell should be

overruled. In support of this argument, he points to concurring opinions
in Andrews v. Biggers—one asserting Purcell was “incorrectly decided”
and the other calling for the Eleventh Circuit to “reevaluate” its

application of Eleventh Amendment immunity and “in particular [its]
decision in Purcell.” Andrews, 996 F.3d at 1236–43 (Wilson, J., and
Rosenbaum, J., separately concurring). But the Eleventh Circuit panel

in Andrews recognized the continued viability of those decisions. See id.
at 1236 (“[Plaintff] wants Purcell overruled and our Court to revisit the
factors discussed in Manders … Of course, we as a panel cannot overrule
Manders or Purcell”). Certainly this Court cannot overrule Eleventh
Circuit precedent. See McDaniel, 2024 WL 4471063, at *4 (“Indeed,

[plaintiff] devotes almost the entirety of his reply brief to arguing that
Myrick was wrongly decided. Of course, only a decision by this court
sitting en banc or by the United States Supreme Court can overrule a

prior panel decision.”).
Finally, in a last-gasp effort to avoid dismissal of counts 1, 2, and

15, Plaintiff argues Ҥ 1983 clearly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity.” (Dkt. 210 at 16.) He is incorrect. The Supreme Court has
long held that Ҥ 1983 does not ... abrogate the Eleventh Amendment

immunity of the States.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979); see
also Carr v. City of Florence, Alabama, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.
1990) (“Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in

section 1983 cases.”).
Because Sheriff Allen is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
as to Counts 1, 2, and 15, the Court dismisses those claims against him

without prejudice.11

11 The parties dispute whether the Court should dismiss these claims
with or without prejudice. (Dkt. 210 at 17; Dkt. 214 at 6.) The law
VII. Clayton County’s Motion to Dismiss
“The Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal

liability under § 1983.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329
(11th Cir. 2003). A county’s liability under § 1983 may not be based on
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Indeed, a county is liable only when the county’s
“official policy” causes a constitutional violation. Id. A plaintiff can

establish an official policy of a county by identifying (1) an officially
decreed policy, (2) an unofficial custom or practice that is so well settled
and widespread that it constitutes a custom with the force of law, or (3)

a county official with final policymaking authority who made a decision
that violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Chabad Chayil, Inc. v.
Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1229 (11th Cir. 2022).

Plaintiff seeks to hold Clayton County liable—via the “final
policymaker” avenue—for the Sheriff Office’s alleged custom of deliberate
indifference to prison maintenance (Count 1) and for CorrectHealth’s

requires dismissal without prejudice. See Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999,
1008 (11th Cir. 2024) (“Because the dismissals were based on sovereign
immunity grounds, the jurisdictional nature of the dismissal requires it
to be entered without prejudice.”).
alleged custom of deliberate indifference to inmate health (Count 15).
(Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 344–86, 502–14.). Clayton County contends it cannot be

held liable for either. The Court agrees.
A. Count 1: Failure to Maintain Prison
A key concept in municipal liability is that “local governments [such

as counties] can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of those
[officials] whom the local government has no authority to control.” Grech,

335 F.3d at 1331. That’s a problem for Plaintiff because Clayton County
did not have “direct control” over the Sheriff’s Office’s actions in
administering or maintaining the jail. See id. (“The inquiry [] ask[s]

which government body, under state law had direct control over how the
sheriff fulfilled the duty at issue.”) As discussed above, the Sheriff acted
as an “arm of the state”—not of Clayton County—when he allegedly

“implement[ed] a custom of deliberate indifference to jail maintenance.”
(Dkt. 210 at 21.) The Sheriff’s “authority and duty to administer the jail
in his jurisdiction flows from the State, not [Clayton] County.” Manders,

338 F.3d at 1315. This makes sense—“Georgia’s Constitution [] makes
the sheriff’s office a constitutional office independent from the county
entity itself, precludes all county control, and grants only the State
control over sheriffs.” Id. at 1312. Because Clayton County does not
exercise control over the Sheriff—much less “direct control”—in

“promulgating policies and procedures governing conditions of
confinement” at the jail, he is not a “policymaker” for whom Clayton
County can be liable on the facts alleged in Count 1. See Purcell, 400

F.3d at 1325; see also Nimmons v. Gwinnett Cnty., Ga., 2014 WL
4230914, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 2014) (“To the extent that Plaintiff

seeks to attribute … [sheriff’s] actions (or inaction), to Gwinnett County,
Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the County under Section 1983
because the County does not exercise control over the Sheriff’s personnel

decisions, or the policies and procedures established by the Sheriff that
governed the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement.”); Youngs v. Johnson,
2008 WL 4816731, at *9 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008) (finding county not

liable under Monell for prison policies of sheriff because, under Purcell,
sheriff was acting on behalf of the state); Robinson v. Houston Cnty., 2010
WL 2464901, at *8 (M.D. Ga. June 14, 2010) (same).

Though the parties largely focus on whether various Georgia
statutes impose a non-delegable duty on Clayton County to maintain the
jail, the Court need not delve into those arguments. They address the
wrong question for Monell purposes. To determine whether the Sheriff’s
Office was a “policymaker” acting on behalf of the County, the question

is not whether Georgia law statutorily confers some—or even most—
responsibility on Clayton County to maintain the jail. Rather, the
question is whether, under Georgia law, Clayton County exercised “direct

control” over the Sheriff when he engaged in the alleged conduct at issue.
See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1331–32. (“Thus, the appropriate § 1983 inquiry

under federal law is whether defendant Clayton County, under Georgia
law, has control over the Sheriff in his law enforcement function.”). As
discussed, the County did not.

The Court dismisses Count 1 as to Clayton County.
B. Count 15: Inadequate Medical Care
In Count 15, Plaintiff alleges Clayton County, through

CorrectHealth as a final policymaker, “implemented a custom of
deliberate indifference to inmate health.” (Dkt. 205 at 20; Dkt. 176
¶¶ 502–14.) Clayton County raises two arguments for dismissal of this

count. First, it argues it satisfied its statutory duty under O.C.G.A. § 42-
5-2 to “maintain the inmate” by simply funding medical care at the jail
and that only the Sheriff can be liable for the policies of CorrectHealth
because, under Georgia law, the Sheriff has exclusive authority to select
medical contractors for the county jail. (Dkt. 213 at 10–15 (citing Bd. of

Comm’rs of Spalding Cty. v. Stewart, 668 S.E.2d 644, 645 (Ga. 2008).)
Second, the County argues Plaintiff’s isolated incident, standing alone, is
insufficient to establish CorrectHealth maintains a custom of deliberate

indifference to inmate health. (Dkt 187-1 at 17.) Because the Court
agrees with Clayton County’s second contention, it does not address the

first.
Plaintiff fails to allege plausibly that CorrectHealth (even if a final
policymaker) had a custom of deliberate indifference to inmate health.

Plaintiff argues the Court can discern CorrectHealth’s custom from just
two instances—his own plight in April 2022 and that of another inmate
who allegedly received inadequate medical care from CorrectHealth in

January 2023. (Dkt. 205 at 20.) As an initial matter, the Court cannot
consider the January 2023 incident because that information appears
neither within the four corners of the Second Amended Complaint nor as
an exhibit attached to it.12 Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 584 n. 27
(11th Cir. 2023) (“In general, courts only consider the four corners of a

complaint and the complaint’s attached exhibits when analyzing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”). And even if the Court did consider it,
CorrectHealth’s subsequent conduct, postdating Plaintiff’s incident by

nine months, cannot plausibly suggest a custom of deliberate indifference
existed at the time Plaintiff was treated by CorrectHealth. See Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63 n. 7 (2011) (“[C]ontemporaneous or
subsequent conduct cannot establish a pattern of violations that would
provide notice to the cit[y] and the opportunity to conform to

constitutional dictates ....”).
That leaves just Plaintiff’s isolated incident as the basis for finding
CorrectHealth maintained a custom of deliberate indifference to inmate

health. But the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[a] single incident of a
constitutional violation is insufficient to prove a policy or custom.” Craig
v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011); see Grech, 335

12 Though the January 2023 incident is referenced in an exhibit attached
to Plaintiff’s original Complaint (Dkt. 1-2), he removed that exhibit when
he amended it. So, it is not properly before the Court.
F.3d at 1330 n.6 (“A single incident would not be so pervasive as to be a
custom.”). In Craig, the plaintiff—like Plaintiff here—sought to hold a

Georgia county liable for a private contractor’s alleged “custom of
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainees”
in a county jail. Id. at 1308. The plaintiff’s “proof of a policy or custom

rest[ed] entirely on a single incident of alleged unconstitutional
activity”—his own medical care while incarcerated. Id. at 1312. The

Eleventh Circuit held that was not enough to establish the private
contractor had a policy for which the county could be liable under
Monell.13 This Court follows suit.14

13 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “[the
contractor] had a policy or custom of using the least costly means of
treating patients and that this custom deprived him of his constitutional
right.” Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312. Plaintiff makes more or less the same
allegation in Count 15. (Dkt. 176 ¶ 551.) The Eleventh Circuit expressed
doubt that such a policy—similar to CorrectHealth’s alleged “cost
containment policy”—was constitutionally violative: “[E]ven on the
highly questionable assumption that the alleged policy or custom would
amount to a constitutional violation, Craig again relies on his experience
alone to prove a policy or custom.” Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312.
14 The Court recognizes “municipal liability may be imposed for a single
decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.”
Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997). But
Plaintiff does not travel under this theory, instead insisting it was
CorrectHealth’s policy or custom of “cost containment”—not a one-off
Plaintiff fails to allege CorrectHealth had a custom or practice of
deliberate indifference to inmates’ medical needs. See id. Accordingly,

the Court dismisses Count 15 as to Clayton County.
VIII. Punitive Damages and Attorneys’ Fees
In addition to the underlying claims against them, Defendants

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages and attorneys’

decision—that led to the violation of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. 176
¶¶ 508–13; Dkt. 205 at 16 (“[Riley] has plausibly pleaded facts showing
that CorrectHealth had a custom that constituted deliberate indifference
to his constitutional rights. Since this custom of CorrectHealth may
fairly be said to represent official policy of the County, it is also the
County’s custom of deliberate indifference.”)
And even if Plaintiff did go the “single decision” route, he does not allege
facts that would support it. A county can only be liable for the decisions
of a final policymaker when that official’s decisions are not subject to
“meaningful administrative review.” See Chabad-Chayil, 48 F.4th at
1230. Further, whether an official has final policymaking authority is
determined by state law and, where the “party at issue [] is a corporation
contracting with the state, the relevant ‘state law’ for policymaking
determinations are the contracts between [the corporation], the state,
and [the corporation’s] employees.” Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 724
(11th Cir. 1991). Neither Plaintiff’s complaint nor opposition brief
address whether the challenged decisions of CorrectHealth were subject
to “meaningful administrative review” or whether CorrectHealth’s
contract with the Sheriff’s Office gave it final policymaking authority on
behalf of Clayton County. Thus, even if Plaintiff did allege Clayton
County was liable for a single decision of CorrectHealth as its final
policymaker, his claim in Count 15 would still fall short.
fees. (Dkt. 187-1 at 14; Dkt. 197-1 at 20; Dkt. 198-1 at 24.) Because the
Court dismisses Plaintiff’s underlying claims against Sheriff Allen and

Clayton County, his claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees
against those Defendants are dismissed as well. See Popham v.
Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 798 S.E.2d 257, 264 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)

(“[A]wards of punitive damages and attorney fees are derivative of
underlying claims, where those claims fail, claims for punitive damages

and attorney fees also fail.”). However, because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
will proceed against Sheriff Boehrer, Major Criss, and Officer Williams,
his claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees remain viable against

them.
IX. Motion to Add Parties
The final matter the Court must address is Plaintiff’s Motion to Add

Defendants (Dkt. 196). He seeks to amend his complaint—for a third
time—to add six jail officials as defendants and an additional seven
counts. (Id. at 5–6.) Defendants argue against the addition of these

parties and claims on the grounds they are time-barred. The Court,
however, believes Plaintiff may be able to proceed under Georgia’s crime-
victim exception, which tolls the statute of limitations for claims “that
may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime which arises out of the
facts and circumstances relating to the commission of such alleged crime

... until the prosecution of such crime ... has become final or otherwise
terminated, provided that such time does not exceed six years.” O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-99.15

Nevertheless, the Court has concerns with how Plaintiff wishes to
proceed with this case. Although he may generally prosecute the case as

he sees fit, the Court fears Plaintiff is simply trying to throw the “kitchen
sink” at Defendants in a manner that will burden both the parties and
the Court and unnecessarily delay the resolution of this matter.

Importantly, many of the proposed claims are subsumed by or duplicative
of the claims against Interim Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss in Count
2. Because the Court finds those claims survive dismissal, it offers

Plaintiff the opportunity to re-evaluate whether he believes it necessary
to bring all—or even some—of the claims against the prospective
defendants. To that end, the Court STAYS Plaintiff’s Motion to Add

15 Even if the statute of limitations does not bar the new claims, the
requirements of Rule 15 might. The Court reserves judgment on that
question pending the hearing discussed below.
Parties (Dkt. 196) pending a hearing on the matter. At that hearing, the
parties will discuss the most efficient and just path forward. The Court

SETS the hearing for March 31, 2026, at 2:00 p.m., in Courtroom 1906,
Richard B. Russell Federal Building, 75 Ted Turner Drive, SW, Atlanta,
Georgia 30303.

X. Conclusion
Here’s where things stand. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion

for Judicial Notice (Dkt. 218). The Court GRANTS Clayton County’s
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 187) and Clayton County is DISMISSED from
this action. The Court also GRANTS Sheriff Allen’s Motion to Dismiss

(Dkt. 197) and Sheriff Allen is DISMISSED from this action. The Court
GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Interim Sheriff Boehrer,
Major Criss, and Officer Williams’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 198). Counts

11 and 13 against Officer Williams are dismissed, while Count 12 may
proceed. Count 2 may proceed as to Interim Sheriff Boehrer and Major
Criss. Plaintiff’s Motion to Add Parties (Dkt. 196) is STAYED and

ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED pending the hearing on the
matter.
SO ORDERED this 4th day of March, 2026.

Ma L. BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

49

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11270684. Public record. Not legal advice.