# WROMAS

> District Court, N.D. Florida · February 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11270673

## Case

- **Full name:** Keith Wromas, Jr. v. Z. Scruggs, Officer Wentz, Fendalson
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11270673

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “the proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to the provisions of § 1915(g
- finding the word “imminent” in the statute to indicate congressional intent to prevent only “impending harms, not those harms that had already occurred”
- affirming dismissal without prejudice when Plaintiff failed to truthfully disclose his litigation history by completely omitting one case and by failing to disclose another case even though it was cited elsewhere in the complaint form
- stating that after three meritless suits, a prisoner must pay the full filing fee at the time he initiates suit

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION

KEITH WROMAS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:26cv632-MW-HTC

Z. SCRUGGS,
OFFICER WENTZ,
FENDALSON,

Defendants.
______________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Keith Wromas, Jr., a prisoner at Okeechobee Correctional Institution
at the time he filed this suit on January 6, 2026,1 filed a pro se civil rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an excessive use of force while Wromas was a
prisoner at Santa Rosa Correctional Institution in 2023. Doc. 1. Wromas did not
pay the $405.00 filing fee. After reviewing Wromas’ complaint and litigation
history, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) because Wromas is a three-striker who failed to pay the full filing fee and
for Wromas’ failure to truthfully disclose his litigation history.

1 Wromas filed a Notice of Change of Address on January 26 – while he was still at Okeechobee
CI – indicating that he would be moving to a non-FDOC address in Miami. Doc. 4. The FDOC
Corrections Offender Network online records indicate that Wromas was released on January 28,
2026. Available at https://pubapps.fdc.myflorida.com/OffenderSearch/Search.aspx.
I. THREE-STRIKER STATUS
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding IFP under

certain circumstances:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in
a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3
or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility,
brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.

A prisoner who is barred from proceeding IFP must pay the filing fee at the
time he initiates his lawsuit, and his failure to do so warrants dismissal of his case
without prejudice. See Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir.
2001) (stating that after three meritless suits, a prisoner must pay the full filing fee
at the time he initiates suit). The only exception is if the prisoner alleges he is “under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Brown
v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004).
The three-strike rule (28 U.S.C. 1915(g)) applies to Wromas because he was
a prisoner when he filed this action, regardless of his later change in status. See
Thompson v. Adkinson, No. 3:17CV132-LC-HTC, 2020 WL 592343, at *4 (N.D.
Fla. Jan. 15, 2020) (citing Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 2010)
(applying § 1915(g) to plaintiff even though plaintiff had been released after the

complaint was filed)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17CV132-LC-
HTC, 2020 WL 586864 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2020), aff’d, 861 F. App’x 806 (11th Cir.
2021).

Wromas is a three-striker. In September and October of 2025, Wromas had
three cases dismissed for failure to state a claim. Wromas v. Food Service Director,
et al., 2:25-cv-14288-JB (S.D. Fla.) (closed 09/04/2025: “For the reasons discussed

below, the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”); Wromas v. Dougan, et al., 2:25-
cv-14289-RS (S.D. Fla.) (dismissed on 09/18/2025: “Plaintiff Has Failed to State a
Claim Against the Defendants in their Official Capacities” and “Plaintiff Has Failed

to State a Claim Against the Defendants in their Individual Capacities”); Wromas v.
Cuveilje, et al., 2:25-cv-14315-WPD (S.D. Fla.) (dismissed on 10/27/2025: “The
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [ECF No. 12] is DISMISSED without prejudice

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”).
Moreover, Wromas has not shown he is in imminent danger of serious
physical injury. His allegations relate only to conduct that occurred in the past. Doc.

1. Complaints about past threats are insufficient to meet the imminent danger
exception to § 1915(g). See Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[A] prisoner’s allegation that he faced imminent danger sometime in the

past is an insufficient basis to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
the imminent danger exception to the statute.”); see generally Abdul-Akbar v.
McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding the word “imminent” in the

statute to indicate congressional intent to prevent only “impending harms, not those
harms that had already occurred”), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001).
Because Wromas’ allegations do not show he is in imminent danger of serious

physical injury, he is precluded from proceeding IFP and his complaint should be
dismissed under § 1915(g) for failing to pay the filing fee with the initiation of this
action. See Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
“the proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint without

prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
the provisions of § 1915(g)” because the prisoner “must pay the filing fee at the time
he initiates the suit”).

II. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
As an additional and independent basis for dismissal, Wromas also failed to
truthfully disclose his litigation history on the complaint form he submitted to the
Court. The form specifically advised Wromas to “err on the side of caution” and

that a failure to disclose “all prior state and federal cases” “may result in a dismissal
of this case.” Id. at 9.
In Question VIII.A., he was directed to disclose any federal cases he filed

previously which were dismissed as frivolous, as malicious, for failure to state a
claim or simply prior to service. In response, he listed only partial, incorrect
information about three cases. First, he listed a Southern District case “21-20706

DPG” which was dismissed on July 10, 2025. Doc. 1 at 10. However, a CM/ECF
search of the Southern District dockets reveals no such case. Second, he lists 21-
11824 and 20-11433 as being in the Northern District and Southern District,

respectively. No such cases exist, but the Court notes that these are the case numbers
of Wromas’ two appeals in the Eleventh Circuit. He disclosed no other cases as
being dismissed for failure to state a claim or dismissed prior to service.
However, as noted above, he had accrued three dismissals for failure to state

a claim and failed to disclose them under Question VIII.A. Also, Wromas failed to
identify eight other cases which were dismissed prior to service in response to
Question VIII.A. Although Wromas identified seven of those cases in response to

Question VIII.C., which asks about cases that challenge his conviction or his
conditions of confinement, that is not sufficient. Each question in the complaint
form serves a different purpose. See Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 491 F. App’x
129, 132 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal without prejudice when Plaintiff

failed to truthfully disclose his litigation history by completely omitting one case
and by failing to disclose another case even though it was cited elsewhere in the
complaint form).
Also, upon independent investigation, the Court takes judicial notice that
Wromas also filed the following action, Wromas v. Dougan, et al., 2:25-cv-14442-

AHS (S.D. Fla.), which was dismissed prior to service and dealt with the conditions
of his confinement, but he failed to disclose it anywhere in his complaint.
Despite these omissions, Wromas signed the complaint “under penalty of

perjury, that all of the information stated above and included on or with this form,
including my litigation history, is true and correct.” Id. at 13. District courts have
the inherent power to dismiss a suit based on a plaintiff’s failure to truthfully disclose
his litigation history. See McNair v. Johnson, 143 F.4th 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2025).

As one judge in this District has stated, “[i]f the requirement for prisoner plaintiffs
to disclose their prior lawsuits is to serve its purpose, a plaintiff must provide
accurate information. If word got around the prisons that inaccurate or incomplete

information could be provided with no effective sanction, the form would serve little
purpose.” Rodriguez v. Inch, et al., No. 4:19cv191-RH-HTC, Doc. 52 at 1–2 (N.D.
Fla. June 7, 2020).
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

1. That this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) because Wromas is a three-striker who failed to pay the full filing
fee and also under this Court’s inherent power for Wromas’ failure to truthfully

disclose his litigation history.
2. That the clerk be directed to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 4th day of February, 2026.

/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation.  Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control.  An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties.  A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions.  See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11270673. Public record. Not legal advice.