# Minter

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · March 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11270139

## Case

- **Full name:** Jose Eduardo Dominguez Perez v. Trinity Minter, Warden of West Tennessee Detention Facility; Scott Ladwig, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the New Orleans Field Office of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations Division; Todd Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
JOSE EDUARDO DOMINGUEZ PEREZ, )
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
)
TRINITY MINTER, Warden of West
)
Tennessee Detention Facility; SCOTT
)
LADWIG, in his official capacity as Acting No. 2:26-cv-02166-SHL-cgc
)
Director of the New Orleans Field Office of
)
ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations
)
Division; TODD LYONS, in his official
)
capacity as Acting Director of U.S.
)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
)
PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General,
)
Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION

On February 19, 2026, Petitioner Jose Eduardo Dominguez Perez filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after he was held in immigration detention without a
bond hearing. (ECF No. 1.) He seeks release, or a bond hearing, in addition to attorney’s fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Id. at PageID 1, 22.) On February 23, the
Court issued an order requiring Respondents to respond. (ECF No. 6.) Respondents responded
four days later. (ECF No. 8.) Dominguez Perez replied on March 2. (ECF No. 9.) For the
reasons explained below, Dominguez Perez is entitled to immediate release, and the Petition is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Dominguez Perez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States at an unknown location
around twenty years ago. (ECF Nos. 1 at PageID 10; 8 at PageID 48.) According to Dominguez
Perez, he “was not apprehended by immigration officials upon entry into the country nor at any
other time after his entry and has never had deportation or removal proceedings.” (ECF No. 1 at
PageID 10.) There is no indication that he has any criminal history, and he “previously held
DACA status until 2016 when it expired.” (Id.) He “lives in Shelby County, Tennessee[,] with

his fiancé and two children who are U.S. citizens.” (Id.)
On November 15, 2025, Dominguez Perez was pulled over by patrol officers on his way
home from work. (Id.) He was then taken into ICE custody and remains at the West Tennessee
Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee. (Id.) The present Petition followed, the crux of which
argues that Dominguez Perez was detained without a bond hearing.
Indeed, under recently adopted guidance from DHS and ICE, Dominguez Perez is subject
to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA and was allegedly declared
ineligible to be released on bond. Until recently, however, most noncitizens in this situation
were given bond hearings under a different provision, § 1226(a). See Godinez-Lopez v. Ladwig,
No. 25-CV-02962, 2025 WL 3047889, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). Section 1226(a)

allows immigration authorities to release immigrants from detention on a bond of $1,500 or
more, unless they require detention for certain reasons. For example, noncitizens with certain
criminal records may not be released on bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A), on the other hand, prohibits a bond for all “applicants for
admission” who are “seeking admission.” “Applicants for admission” has been interpreted to
mean recent arrivals, including those who have not been “physically present in the United States
continuously” for the previous two years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (“An alien
described in this clause is an alien who . . . has not affirmatively shown . . . that the alien has
been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior
to the date of the determination of inadmissibility . . . .”).
But, on July 8, 2025, ICE, in coordination with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), issued
a new policy with a novel interpretation of §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a). Interim Guidance

Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission, AILA (July 8, 2025),
https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-
for-admission (“For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that
‘arriving aliens’ have historically been treated.”). The policy reclassified all undocumented
immigrants, even those who have lived in the United States for years, as “applicants for
admission.” And all “applicants for admission” are required to be detained for removal
proceedings without a bond hearing under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Thus, ICE’s new legal interpretation makes § 1225(b)(2)(A), not § 1226(a), the statute
governing removal proceedings for all immigrants without legal status. As a result, all
undocumented immigrants awaiting removal are detained without a bond hearing. This new

interpretation was later adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in a published
decision, Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220 (B.I.A. 2025). (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2–3.)
Dominguez Perez faces the risk of continued detention without a bond hearing. (Id. at
PageID 10–11.) His Petition alleges a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and a procedural due
process violation under the Fifth Amendment. (Id. at PageID 19–21.) He seeks his immediate
release, or a bond hearing and reasonable attorney’s fees under the EAJA. (Id. at PageID 21–
22.)
In response, Respondents contend that Dominguez Perez failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies; that the Fifth Circuit’s recent opinion in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), provides persuasive authority for denying the petition; that
Dominguez Perez should be treated for due process purposes as if stopped at the border; and that,
if the Court finds that § 1226(a) applies to him, he should be granted a bond hearing and not
immediately released. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 48–54.)

ANALYSIS
“Habeas relief is available when a person is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.’” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12486, 2025 WL
2496379, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). Dominguez Perez
challenges his detention without bond as violative of his constitutional rights. (ECF 1 at PageID
2.) The Court first considers the threshold question of whether Dominguez Perez should be
required to exhaust his administrative remedies. Then, the statutes are construed to determine
whether §1225 or § 1226 is applicable. A due process analysis follows. Finally, the request for
attorney’s fees is addressed.
I. Exhaustion

If Congress “specifically mandates” exhaustion of administrative remedies, a petitioner
must pursue relief through those administrative processes before seeking habeas relief.
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). When Congress is silent on administrative
exhaustion, “sound judicial discretion governs.” Id. Thus, the doctrine of prudential exhaustion
holds that, in the absence of a textual exhaustion requirement, courts can use discretion to refuse
to hear habeas petitions that challenge bond determinations until a petitioner exhausts available
administrative remedies. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144. The Sixth Circuit has previously applied
this doctrine to dismiss petitions for lack of jurisdiction. See Rabi v. Sessions, No. 18-3249,
2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at 1–2 (6th Cir. July 16, 2018). In the context of immigrant
detention, some district courts require detained immigrants to exhaust their administrative
remedies—by appealing bond decisions to the BIA and receiving adverse decisions—before the
courts will review their habeas petitions. E.g., Villalta v. Greene, No. 25-cv-01594, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 169688, at *6–7 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025).

In some cases, however, exhaustion is excused, and courts review habeas petitioner
claims. Courts have reached these conclusions when (1) “the legal question is fit for resolution
and delay means hardship, or (2) exhaustion would prove futile.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation modified).
An issue is fit for judicial resolution when it presents a purely legal question. Contreras-
Lomeli v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12826, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207162, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21,
2025) (citing Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024)). Further, when
administrative procedures involve “an indefinite or unreasonable timeline,” such delays result in
hardship. Id. If there is a risk of extended, “potentially unlawful detention” during such delay,
then exhaustion is excused. Id.

As for futility, waiver of exhaustion “is appropriate when an administrative agency ‘has
predetermined the disputed issue’ by having a ‘clearly stated position’ that the petitioner is not
eligible for the relief sought.” Id. at *9 (quoting Cooper v. Zych, No. 09-CV-11620, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 75423, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2009)).
Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss the Petition based on prudential
exhaustion, as Dominguez Perez has not appealed to the BIA and received an adverse decision.
(ECF No. 8 at PageID 50.) They recognize that Congress has not imposed an administrative
exhaustion requirement, and that “sound judicial discretion governs” the Court’s decision. (Id. at
PageID 49 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)).) But they point to the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion in Rabi v. Sessions, No. 18-3249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at *1–2 (6th
Cir. July 16, 2018), and certain decisions in the Northern District of Ohio, e.g. Monroy Villalta
v. Greene, 794 F. Supp. 3d 528 (N.D. Ohio 2025), which required petitioners to appeal to the
BIA before seeking habeas relief under “prudential principles of exhaustion.” (ECF No. 8 at

PageID 49.)
But neither 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 nor 1226 contain a textual exhaustion requirement for
immigrants in ICE custody. Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 lacks an exhaustion requirement. And
the Sixth Circuit has not yet spoken on the issue of prudential exhaustion in these recent cases.
See Castaneda-Mondragon v. Acuna, No. 25-cv-03044, ECF No. 13 at PageID 101 (W.D. Tenn.
Dec. 30, 2025). Therefore, exhaustion may only be required here based on “sound judicial
discretion.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144. But, exhaustion may be excused if “the legal question
is fit for resolution and delay means hardship, or exhaustion would prove futile.” Shalala, 529
U.S. at 13.
Dominguez Perez’s failure to exhaust is excused. First, the question he poses in the

Petition is fit for resolution and undue delay would impose hardship on him. The Parties do not
dispute any material facts. (See ECF Nos. 1 at PageID 10–11; 8 at PageID 48.) Thus, deciding
which statute applies to Dominguez Perez’s detention is a purely legal question, “which is right
in a federal court’s wheelhouse.” Contreras-Lomeli, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207162, at *8.
Further, if Dominguez Perez is required to pursue an appeal with the BIA, his appeal process
would likely take six months or more. See id. (citing Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-
12546, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175767, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025)). Bond hearings were
designed to prevent prolonged detention during removal proceedings, which are often lengthy.
Reyes, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175767, at *9 (citations omitted). Therefore, denying Dominguez
Perez the chance to have a bond hearing merely because he did not appeal to the BIA1 may force
him “to endure six months or more of potentially unlawful detention and thus would cause him
great hardship.” Contreras-Lomeli, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207162, at *8.
Furthermore, the futility of exhaustion is an independent reason to excuse exhaustion

here. The BIA stated in Yajure Hurtado that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to detained illegal
immigrants who “have been residing in the United States for years.” 29 I. & N. Dec. at 220–21.
Thus, any appeal would be futile, and exhaustion is excused.
II. Statutory Interpretation
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part
will be inoperative or superfluous, void[,] or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S.
303, 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)). Each word within a statute
must be given “‘its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ while keeping in mind that
‘statutory language has meaning only in context.’” Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th
Cir. 2022) (citation modified) (citing Walters v. Metro. Edu. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207,

(1997)).
Custody over noncitizens during removal proceedings is generally governed by two
statutes, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (entitled “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing”) and § 1226 (entitled “Apprehension and
detention of aliens”). Section 1225(b) requires mandatory detention, providing in relevant part:
(b) Inspection of applicants for admission
. . .
(2) Inspection of other aliens
(A) In general

1 There is no evidence that Dominguez Perez has received an appealable decision from
the immigration court. Thus, the risk of undue delay is even greater here than in cases where, for
instance, an IJ held a bond hearing and denied bond.
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien
who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). An “applicant for admission” is a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Under this
section, all applicants for admission “shall be detained.” Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Section 1226(a), on the other hand, allows for discretionary detention, providing in
relevant part:
(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such
decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General .
. . .

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). The exception in § 1226(c) prohibits releasing on bond a
noncitizen found to be inadmissible, who also,
is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft,
larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime
that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person . . . .

Id. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). “Noncitizens arrested and detained under § 1226 have a right to request a
custody redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) before an [Immigration Judge (‘IJ’)].” Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)) (citation modified).
“The IJ evaluates whether there is a risk of nonappearance or danger to the community.” Id.
(citing Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006)). Thus, except for those noncitizens with a
record of certain criminal offenses, § 1226(a) allows immigration authorities to choose to release
or detain noncitizens, subject to a hearing before an IJ on the issue.2
Dominguez Perez argues that ICE’s new interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates
§ 1226(a) and due process under the Fifth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 19–21.) He

argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to his detention because § 1225(b)(2)(A) “cannot be read
to apply to those who are accused of residing in the United States for many years prior to
apprehension and removal proceedings.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 20.) Thus, he seeks his
immediate release. (Id. at PageID 22.)
Respondents argue that § 1225(b)(2)(A), not § 1226(a), applies to Dominguez Perez
because he “entered the United States without inspection or parole” and thus remains “an
‘applicant for admission’ who is treated, for constitutional purposes, as if stopped at the border.”
(ECF No. 8 at PageID 50–51.) As a result, they assert that “he is subject to mandatory detention
and not entitled to a bond hearing.” (Id. at PageID 51.) They incorporate by reference their
statutory arguments from previous cases such as Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889. (Id.)

The plain text of §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) do not support Respondents’ contention
that Dominguez Perez is “seeking admission.” Beginning with the titles, the title of § 1225 is
“Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral
for hearing.” The title of § 1226(a) is “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” Although titles of
statutes are not controlling, they are “tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the

2 See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1) (“Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest
may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien . . . . After an initial custody determination . . .
the respondent may . . . request amelioration of the conditions under which he or she may be
released. . . . [T]he immigration judge is authorized . . . to detain the alien in custody, release the
alien, and determine the amount of bond, if any, under which the respondent may be released . . .
.”).
meaning of a statute.” Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 121 (2023) (citation modified).
Here, § 1225’s title describes “arriving aliens” who are placed into “expedited removal”
proceedings. But Dominguez Perez was not “arriving” when he was detained far away from the
United States border, after having been in this country for twenty years. (ECF No. 1 at PageID

10.) Also, the record does not show that he was eligible for expedited removal proceedings.
Thus, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225 does not apply to him.
Further, the subject matter of § 1225 undercuts Respondents’ reading of the statute.
Section 1225 describes the process of inspecting and removing immigrants actively crossing the
border. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (“That process of decision
[described in § 1225] generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the
Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.”). And
Respondents’ reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A) ignores several words and phrases within the statute
itself. “If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect.” Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012). But to apply

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) to Dominguez Perez would render the following underlined words superfluous:
[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The record does not show that Dominguez Perez
was seeking admission at the time of his detention, and nor does it show that he had received a
determination by an immigration officer that he was “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to
be admitted.” The language of § 1225(b)(2)(A) makes sense in the context of the border, but not
in a situation like this, when a noncitizen has been physically present, albeit unlawfully, for
twenty years. To interpret “alien seeking admission” using its ordinary meaning but outside the
context of the provision, as argued by Respondent, is untenable.
Also, Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) would render § 1226(c)
superfluous. That subsection carves out an exception to the general rule that an arrested

noncitizen is eligible for a bond. Under subsection (c), a noncitizen with a certain criminal
history must be mandatorily detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) (“The Attorney General shall
take into custody any alien who . . . is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits
having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any
burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime
that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person . . . .”). But, under Respondents’
reading of § 1225, all arrested noncitizens must be detained without bond. Thus, § 1226(c)
would have no purpose. Yet, courts must “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). Dominguez Perez’s reading of the
statute is the only one compatible with the presence of § 1226(c). What is more, Dominguez

Perez has no criminal record in the United States, so this mandatory detention provision cannot
conceivably be applied to him. See § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii).
The plain language of § 1226(a) describes Dominguez Perez’s situation. That section
applies to the “apprehension and detention of aliens,” providing that, upon “a warrant issued by
the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested or detained pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Dominguez Perez was
charged with being removable and detained in west Tennessee. Thus, the Attorney General has
discretion under this section. She “may continue to detain [him]” or she “may release [him] on
bond.” (Id.) But the Attorney General may not deny him the bond hearing to which he is
entitled. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).
Not only is the plain language of §§ 1225 and 1226 sufficient to support a finding in
Dominguez Perez’s favor, but the Congressional intent behind § 1226(a) is also supportive. In

2025, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, adding a subsection to § 1226(c) to preclude
persons with criminal histories from receiving bond. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).
Congress would not have added exceptions to the broad rule of § 1226(a) if, as Respondents
assert, it intended § 1226(a) to give way to § 1225(b)(2)(A) in all cases. See Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010) (“The fact that Congress
has created specific exceptions to [a rule] hardly proves that the [rule] does not apply generally.
In fact, it proves the opposite.”). On the contrary, Congress’s recent attention to § 1226 points to
its approval of the interpretation prevailing before July 2025. After all, “[i]f § 1225(b)(2)
already mandated detention of any alien who has not been admitted, regardless of how long they
have been here, then adding § 1226(c)(1)(E) to the statutory scheme was pointless.” Lopez-

Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (quoting Maldonado v. Olsen, No. 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL
237441, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025)).
Finally, Respondents point to a newly published Fifth Circuit opinion which reached an
opposite conclusion on these issues. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 50–52 (citing Buenrostro-Mendez,
166 F.4th 494).) Particularly relevant to Dominguez Perez’s arguments, the Buenrostro-Mendez
court found that “seeking admission” is equivalent to being an “applicant for admission.” 166
F.4th at 502–06. As a result, the Fifth Circuit held that all those who have crossed the border
unlawfully fall under § 1225, not § 1226, and thus are ineligible for bond hearings. Id. at 508.
Buenrostro-Mendez does not bind this Court, and its reasoning is not persuasive here.
First, because it conflates the terms “seeking admission” with “applicant for admission,” it
renders the two phrases redundant. The canon against surplusage, and common sense, dictate
that these terms should have different meanings because the statute includes them both in the

same provisions and even in the same sentences. See Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 510
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 170). Second, the holding in
Buenrostro-Mendez makes superfluous the existence of § 1226(c)(1), a part of the Laken Riley
Act, which lists certain crimes that render an applicant ineligible for a bond hearing. If a
criminal record makes a bond hearing impossible, it makes little sense that all bond hearings for
unlawful entrants are impossible. See Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 512 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Thus, given the plain language of §§ 1225 and 1226, the arrest and detention of an illegal
immigrant who has been continuously present in the United States for twenty years is governed
by § 1226(a), and is subject to the discretionary bond process in that provision.

III. Due Process
The Fifth Amendment protects every person from being “deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The Due Process Clause extends
to all ‘persons’ regardless of status, including non-citizens (whether here lawfully, unlawfully,
temporarily, or permanently).” Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)). In the context of civil immigration detention, the Sixth Circuit
applies the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to evaluate the level of
process owed a noncitizen. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th
Cir. 2020). Those factors include (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Dominguez Perez argues that Respondents violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment by detaining him “without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he
is a flight risk or danger to others.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 21.) Respondents, however, assert
that Dominguez Perez’s due process rights were not violated because, without a lawful entry, he
should be “‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border.’” (ECF No. 8 at
PageID 53 (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020)).)
Here, because § 1226(a) applies to Dominguez Perez, he is owed the process given to
him under that statute. As for the Mathews factors, (1) Dominguez Perez has a strong private
liberty interest, (2) there is a high risk of erroneous deprivation if no IJ evaluates his risk of flight
and danger to the community, and, (3) given Dominguez Perez’s clean criminal record, it will be
difficult for the Government to demonstrate an interest in his detention. Indeed, before he was

apprehended, Dominguez Perez was present in the United States for twenty years “and lives in
Shelby County, Tennessee[,] with his fiancé and two children who are U.S. citizens.” (ECF No.
1 at PageID 10.) These facts indicate his ties to the United States, his desire to remain, and his
expectation that he would remain free from government custody. Also, he was not otherwise
incarcerated when ICE detained him.
As a result, his detention without bond violated his liberty interest, which cannot be
casually tossed aside. Thus, Dominguez Perez is entitled to immediate release. See Villafranca
Lara v. Ladwig, No. 26-CV-02079-SHL-tmp, 2026 WL 401204, at *10 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 12,
2026) (“Because ICE purported to detain [petitioner] under § 1225(b)(2)(A), which includes no
provision for a bond hearing, the Court will not now order a bond hearing under § 1226(a).”).
Accordingly, his detention under the mandatory detention framework of § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates
his due process rights. Thus, consistent with the Court’s decision in Godinez-Lopez, and after
consideration of the record, Dominguez Perez’s petition is GRANTED.

IV. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Dominguez Perez seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 22.) Section 2412(b) allows a court to award
“reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded
pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). The Federal Rules require that claims for attorney’s fees
and related expenses be made by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). So Dominguez Perez
must timely file a motion that complies with Local Rule 54.1(b) to seek attorney’s fees and costs.
See LR 54.1(b).
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are ordered to
release Dominguez Perez immediately. Respondents are ENJOINED from pursuing
Dominguez Perez’s detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Respondents are further
ORDERED to file a Status Report with this Court on or before March 6, 2026, to certify
compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of March, 2026.
s/ Sheryl H. Lipman
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11270139. Public record. Not legal advice.