# Leckrone

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · February 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11268686

## Case

- **Full name:** Jeffrey Leckrone v. Jost Chemical Company
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** February 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JEFFREY LECKRONE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 4:25-cv-01660-AGF
)
JOST CHEMICAL COMPANY, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jost Chemical Company’s motion to
strike Paragraphs 47 through 50 of the complaint (ECF No. 8) and motion to dismiss
Count I of the complaint (ECF No. 7). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
grant the motion to strike and deny the motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination action in which Plaintiff Jeffrey Leckrone
alleges that he was wrongfully terminated by Defendant on the basis of race. The
complaint sets forth the following facts, which are taken as true for the purposes of
Defendant’s motion to dismiss:1
Plaintiff alleges that on May 19, 2025, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s
employment as a chemical line operator after he experienced and reported racial
discrimination at work. Following his termination, Plaintiff requested a service letter

1 McShane Constr. Co., LLC v. Gotham Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2017).
explaining the reasons he was discharged, and Defendant responded by stating that
Plaintiff was “a poor culture fit” and had misused a company forklift. ECF No. 4 at 5;
ECF No. 4-1. Plaintiff believed that the reasoning provided by Defendant was pretext for

race discrimination, prompting him to pursue a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
The EEOC received Plaintiff’s charge on July 3, 2025. See ECF No. 7-1
(Plaintiff’s charge). Fifty-four days later, on August 26, 2025, the EEOC issued Plaintiff
a notice of right to sue. The notice is titled “Notice of Right to Sue (Issued on Request)”

and states as follows:
The EEOC has granted your request that the agency issue a
Notice of Right to Sue, where it is unlikely that EEOC will be
able to complete its investigation within 180 days from the date
the charge was filed. The EEOC is terminating its processing
of this charge.
ECF No. 4-2 (notice of right to sue attached as exhibit 2 to complaint). Importantly, the
notice goes on to state that “[t]his is official notice that the EEOC has dismissed your
charge.” Id. (emphasis added). Thereafter, Plaintiff timely filed a petition in state court
alleging that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) in Count I and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Count II. The action was
removed to this Court on November 12, 2025.
Defendant first moves to strike paragraphs 47 to 50 of the complaint, which
Defendant argues are irrelevant allegations related to a theory of discrimination not raised
in the complaint. This motion is unopposed.
Defendant also moves to dismiss Count I, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, for failure to
properly exhaust administrative remedies. Defendant argues that the notice of right to
sue issued to Plaintiff by the EEOC was invalid, as it was not issued on the timeline

permitted by Title VII. Defendant points to statutory language allowing the EEOC to
issue a notice of right to sue only after the EEOC dismisses the charge or 180 days have
passed without conciliation or civil action by the EEOC. The EEOC’s own regulations
allow the agency to issue a notice of right to sue on request if the agency finds it probable
that it will be unable to complete investigation or conciliation of the charge within 180

days. Defendant contends that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), this EEOC regulation should be scrutinized
and found invalid, as it imposes additional grounds not authorized by Title VII under
which a right to sue notice may issue.
After Defendant filed its motion to strike and partial motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

failed to respond to either motion within the time permitted to do so. As such, on
December 9, 2025, the Court issued an order in which Plaintiff was instructed to respond
to Defendant’s motions and show cause as to why Count I should not be dismissed and
why paragraphs 47-50 should not be stricken. On December 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a
response to both motions (ECF Nos. 12, 13). Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to

strike. Plaintiff also provided minimal response to the motion to dismiss, citing no
authority or explanation as to why Count I is not procedurally deficient as Defendant
argued. Defendant thereafter replied in support of its motions (ECF No. 14) noting
Plaintiff’s lack of explanation as to why the motion to dismiss should not be granted.
After Defendant replied, on January 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed an untimely amended
opposition, which this Court construed as a request for leave to file a surresponse (see
ECF No. 17, granting this request). In his surresponse, Plaintiff distinguished the

authority cited by Defendant and asserted that the notice of right to sue was not deficient
because it was issued after dismissal of the charge, as permitted by Title VII. The Court
permitted Defendant to file a surreply in response, which Defendant submitted on
January 22, 2026 (ECF No. 19). Defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion to strike are
therefore now ripe for review.

DISCUSSION
A. Defendant’s Motion to Strike
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allows a court to strike from a pleading “any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
Defendant argues that paragraphs 47 to 50 of the complaint are immaterial and

impertinent, as they allude to a disparate impact theory of discrimination not asserted in
the claims of intentional discrimination at issue. Plaintiff “does not oppose this Court
entering an order striking Paragraphs 47 through 50 of Plaintiff’s Petition/Complaint.”
ECF No. 13. Thus, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion, and Paragraphs 47 through
50 of the complaint will be stricken.

B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The
reviewing court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir.
2017).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), a court may not typically
consider matters outside of the pleadings without converting the motion to one for
summary judgment. However, the Court may take judicial notice of items in the public
record, including an EEOC charge. Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007);
Faibisch v. U. of Minn., 304 F.3d 797, 802-03 (8th Cir. 2002). As such, the Court will

consider Plaintiff’s EEOC charge attached to Defendant’s motion to dismiss.2 The Court
will also consider the EEOC’s notice of right to sue, which was attached to the petition
and therefore embraced by the pleadings. The Court will not, however, consider the
email chain attached to Defendant’s reply in support of its motion to dismiss (ECF No.
14-1). Defendant argues that its counsel’s communications with the EEOC investigator

assigned to Plaintiff’s charge reveal the EEOC’s motivation for issuing the notice of right
to sue, which Defendant contends complied only with the EEOC’s own regulation and
not Title VII. However, this email chain is not a matter of public record or necessarily
embraced by the pleadings such that it can be considered on a motion to dismiss.

2 It appears that Defendant attached only part of Plaintiff’s charge (the completed EEOC
Form 5 and pages 1 and 3 of the attached narrative of particulars along with his service
letter). The Court finds this attachment sufficient for the purpose of this motion to
dismiss. The EEOC Form 5 and file-stamped narrative both clearly exhibit the date the
EEOC received the charge, which is the only matter at issue; the content of the charge is
not.
Moreover, the EEOC’s reasoning for issuing the notice of right to sue is stated in the
notice itself, rendering the email communications superfluous at this stage.
To bring a civil action based on race discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff

must first exhaust administrative remedies. Woelbling v. R.C. Wilson Co., 966 F.Supp.
858, 861 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). To do so, a Title VII plaintiff
must timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC “and receive, from the EEOC,
a ‘right to sue’ letter.” Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 1996)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c), (e)). Receipt of a notice of right to sue from the

EEOC is a condition precedent to filing a claim under Title VII. Jones v. Am. State Bank,
857 F.2d 494, 499-500 (8th Cir. 1988). However, the requirement to obtain a notice of
right to sue is curable after commencement of the action and “is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite the lack of which requires dismissal.” Woelbling, 966 F.Supp. at 861 (citing
Jones, 857 F.2d at 499-500).

There is no dispute that Plaintiff timely filed his charge of discrimination and
received a notice of right to sue from the EEOC. Defendant’s argument points only to
the timing of that notice of right to sue—issued fifty-four days after the EEOC received
Plaintiff’s charge—which Defendant contends renders the notice invalid. Title VII
prescribes two circumstances in which a notice of right to sue may issue, one of which is

tied to the passage of 180 days. In relevant part, Title VII states:
If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from
the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of
reference under subsection (c) or (d), whichever is later, the
Commission has not filed a civil action ... or the Commission
has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the
person aggrieved is a party, the Commission ... shall so notify
the person aggrieved [that] within ninety days after the giving
of such notice a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). Simply put, Title VII authorizes the EEOC to issue the notice
of right to sue after: (1) the EEOC has dismissed the charge, or (2) the EEOC does not
pursue a civil action or secure conciliation within 180 days or the stated statutory
timeframes in sections (c) or (d),3 whichever is later. The EEOC’s own regulations
describe a third scenario. According to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2), the EEOC may issue a
notice of right to sue upon request “at any time prior to the expiration of 180 days from
the date of filing of the charge with the Commission” if the EEOC certifies that it “will
be unable to complete its administrative processing of the charge within 180 days from
the filing of the charge.” Defendant contends that this regulation impermissibly expands
the circumstances under which the EEOC is authorized to issue a notice, as it is

inconsistent with the only two grounds explicitly stated in Title VII: (1) dismissal of the
charge, and (2) the passage of 180 days.4

3 Sections (c) and (d) refer to the period of time during which a state deferral agency has
an exclusive right to initial processing of a charge of discrimination.

4 Defendant argues for the first time in its surreply that there is no circumstance under
which Title VII permits the EEOC to issue a notice of right to sue before 180 days have
passed. Defendant reads the section of Title VII quoted above to say that the EEOC may
only issue a notice of right to sue only after dismissing the charge, or waiting 180 days,
“whichever is later.” However, Defendant misreads this section of the statute. The
clause “whichever is later” modifies only the second condition, instructing that with
respect to a charge that has not been dismissed, the EEOC may issue the notice of right to
sue after 180 days “or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or
(d), whichever is later.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) (emphasis added). Defendant cites
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s notice of right to sue was issued only because
Plaintiff requested it, which is insufficient to justify issuance of the notice of right to sue
under Title VII. And indeed, the title of the notice states that it was issued “on request”

and explains that the EEOC determined that it is unlikely it will complete its investigation
within 180 days. ECF No. 4-2. Defendant argues that in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Loper Bright, no deference is owed to the EEOC’s regulations interpreting
Title VII to allow for the notice of right to sue to be issued on request in less than 180
days. In Loper Bright, the Court abrogated the longstanding doctrine requiring federal

courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of federal law and instead mandated
that a court should perform an independent review of a statute to determine whether the
agency’s action aligns with it. 603 U.S. at 395. Defendant argues that the Court should
find 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) invalid applying the standard of review clarified in Loper
Bright. 5 Defendant goes on to cite cases from other circuits that have held, both before

and after Loper Bright, that the EEOC’s regulation permitting the issuance of a right to
sue notice less than 180 days after the charge was filed is contrary to Title VII. See, e.g.,

no authority in support of its interpretation that the phrase “whichever is later” refers to
both circumstances under which Title VII authorizes the EEOC to issue a notice of right
to sue.

5 Defendant further argues that even if 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) is found to be valid, the
notice of right to sue is still invalid because EEOC did not even comply with this
regulation. Defendant argues that the EEOC could not possibly have determined that it
would not complete its investigation within 180 days, as its request for Defendant’s
response to the charge one day before closing its file indicated that no investigation ever
began. However, these facts are not contained in the pleadings or any source that is
properly before the Court on the motion to dismiss, so this additional argument will not
be considered.
Prichard v. Long Island Univ., 23-CV-09269(EK)(LB), 2025 WL 2163390, at *1 (E.D.
N.Y. July 30, 2025); White v. Univ. of Md. Med. Ctr., 642 F.Supp. 3d 504 (D. Md. 2022);
Hardy v. Lewis Gale Med. Ctr., LLC, 377 F. Supp.3d 596 (W.D. Va. 2019); Martini v.

Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n., 178 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1999).6
However, it is not necessary for the Court to decide whether 29 C.F.R. §
1601.28(a)(2) comports with Title VII to allow the EEOC to issue a notice of right to sue
prior to 180 days. This is because the EEOC cited a second reason for terminating its
processing of Plaintiff’s charge, which falls squarely within the statute. The notice states

that “the EEOC has dismissed your charge…” (emphasis added) and later refers to the
letter as “the EEOC’s official notice of dismissal.” ECF No. 4-2. Title VII permits the
EEOC to issue a notice of right to sue if the charge “is dismissed by the Commission”
regardless of whether 180 days have passed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). As Plaintiff
notes, none of the cases cited by Defendant involves this scenario in which the notice of

right to sue was predicated on both the dismissal of the charge and the claimant’s request.
The cases cited by Defendant speak only to the scenario in which the EEOC issued a
notice of right to sue after receiving a request from the claimant and determining it to be

6 The Court notes that there is a circuit split regarding whether 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2)
is valid. While Defendant points only to decisions invalidating the EEOC’s regulation,
the majority of circuits that have spoken to this issue have found the regulation to be
valid, albeit prior to Loper Bright. See Walker v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 240 F.3d
1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001); Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1063 (11th Cir.
1994); Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Tr., 732 F.2d 726, 729
(9th Cir. 1984); see also Backus v. Mena Newspapers, Inc., 224 F. 2d 1228, 1231-32
(W.D. Ark. 2002) (noting that while the Eighth Circuit has not spoken to this issue, “the
Court is convinced that it would follow the majority view” given the principle recognized
in this circuit that failure to obtain a notice of right to sue is curable).
unlikely that it would complete its investigation in 180 days. Defendant argues that this
difference “is one of semantics and irrelevant.” ECF No. 19 at 2. The Court disagrees.
In those cases, because the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue only following the

procedure under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2), the question of whether that regulation truly
aligned with congressional intent was necessarily before those courts. Here, it is not.
Defendant seems to suggest that, notwithstanding the language contained in the
notice, the only real reason the EEOC issued the right to sue letter was because Plaintiff
requested it. And the Court is not unsympathetic to the fact that by presenting multiple,

and perhaps conflicting, reasons for the issuance of the right to sue, the EEOC has left the
parties in the undesirable position of determining which reason truly prompted the EEOC
to close its file. However, Defendant does not argue that the dismissal itself was
somehow defective or not independently sufficient. Defendant also presents no argument
that the EEOC cannot both dismiss a charge and incidentally fulfill a claimant’s request

to issue a notice of right to sue before the passage of 180 days. Whether the latter is
consistent with Title VII is inapposite given that the former is enough. It is not the
province of the Court to ascertain the true intent of the EEOC at this early stage. By
presenting a notice that facially states that the EEOC dismissed Plaintiff’s charge, the
facts pleaded, taken as true, and all reasonable inferences demonstrate that Plaintiff has

done enough to satisfy administrative prerequisites.
Further, even if the EEOC’s stated reasoning invoking 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2)
somehow rendered the notice invalid (it does not), the Court is not convinced that
dismissal would be the appropriate remedy. To the contrary, the Eighth Circuit has made
clear that the failure to obtain a notice of right to sue is defect curable after the
commencement of the claim and not a fatal flaw necessitating its dismissal. Jones, 857
F.2d at 499-500; see also Woelbling, 966 F.Supp. at 861 (citing Jones, 857 F.2d at 499-
500) (failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies “is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite the lack of which requires dismissal’’). For these reasons, Plaintiff has
cleared the initial hurdle to proceed with his Title VII claim.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff has done enough to demonstrate that he has
complied with administrative prerequisites necessary to initiate this action. Because the
EEOC purported to dismiss Plaintiff's charge, it is not necessary to address whether 29
C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) prescribes valid procedures under which the EEOC may issue a
notice of right to sue upon request.
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to strike [ECF No. 8] is
GRANTED, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 7] is DENIED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 18th day of February, 2026.

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11268686. Public record. Not legal advice.