# Rexroad

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · February 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11268511

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Rexroad v. Warden, Southeastern Correctional Institution
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** February 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL REXROAD,

Petitioner,
Case No. 1:24-cv-44
v.
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
WARDEN, SOUTHEASTERN Magistrate Judge Jolson
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
On July 1, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation
(R&R, Doc. 19) advising the Court to dismiss with prejudice pro se Petitioner Michael
Rexroad’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). (Doc. 19, #414). Since the
Magistrate Judge issued the R&R, Rexroad has filed what he styles a “Motion to
Amend Evidence” (Doc. 24), but which the Court construes as objections to the R&R.1

1 Rexroad cites 28 U.S.C. § 2242, which provides that federal habeas petitions may be
“amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.”
In other words, federal habeas petitioners may amend their petition in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). See Kellici v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 416, 418 (6th Cir.
2006). The time has long passed for Rexroad to amend as a matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(1). And to the extent that Rexroad is seeking leave to amend his petition to include
an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, (see Doc. 24, #443), the amendment is
DENIED as futile because the claim is procedurally defaulted. See infra Law & Analysis;
Hopson v. Miller, No. 5:16-cv-1867, 2019 WL 2928746, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2019) (denying
amendment to habeas petition on futility grounds).
Alternatively, giving Rexroad, a pro se petitioner, the benefit of the doubt, he could be seeking
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which permits an evidentiary hearing on claims that the
applicant failed to develop in state proceedings only if the claim relies on (1) “a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable,” or (2) “a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). Additionally, “the
facts underlying the claim” must be “sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
For the reasons stated below, the Court OVERRULES Rexroad’s objections (Doc.
24), and ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 19) in its entirety, thereby DISMISSING Rexroad’s
habeas petition (Doc. 1) WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND
Rexroad is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Southeastern
Correctional Institution. In January 2024, he filed a pro se habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). The concatenation of events that gave rise to the petition
began in June 2020, when the State of Ohio charged Rexroad with “seventeen counts
of rape under Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02; one count of sexual battery under Ohio

Revised Code § 2907.03; and one count of gross sexual imposition under Ohio Revised
Code § 2907.05.” (Doc. 19, #414). After roughly a year of negotiations, Rexroad
entered a plea deal with the state. (Id. at #414–15). And on July 21, 2021, he pleaded
guilty pursuant to that agreement. (State Ct. R., Doc. 12, #51). But the next day,
Rexroad (without informing his court-appointed counsel) filed a pro se motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. (See id. at #56).

Because the procedural history of the guilty plea and its attempted withdrawal
is central to Rexroad’s claims in habeas, the R&R describes it in some detail. It seems
that during in-person pretrial proceedings that occurred in January and March 2021,
the state trial court stressed the gravity of Rexroad’s charges. (Doc. 19, #415).

that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.” Id. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Rexroad does not meet this standard.
He identifies no new rule of constitutional law that would provide for his release. And, as
explained below, the “factual predicate” of Rexroad’s request is not new either. See infra note
3.
Rexroad confirmed he understood. (Id.). Then, on July 21, 2021, the day of his plea
hearing, Rexroad signed a guilty plea form. (Id. at #416; see Doc. 12, #51). There, he
waived the reading of the indictment and indicated that he fully understood the rights

the Constitution granted him. (Doc. 19, #415). He further waived those rights and
declared his intent to enter a guilty plea for two sexual-battery counts and a sexual-
imposition count. (Id. at #415–16). Separately, Rexroad affixed his signature to a
document that explained to him the maximum penalties for those offenses. (Id. at
#416).
The R&R further describes that, at the plea hearing, “Rexroad also indicated
that he understood that by pleading guilty to three counts, the state would dismiss

the remaining charges. Rexroad further stated that he understood that since this is
a jointly recommended sentence[,] he waives the right to appeal his sentence.” (Id.).
The state trial court specifically queried whether Rexroad had the opportunity to
review the waiver and maximum-penalty documents with his counsel, and Rexroad
responded that “he had reviewed them, understood them, and signed them.” (Id. at
#416–17). The trial court also separately reminded Rexroad of the constitutional

rights he was waiving by pleading guilty (the same rights listed on the plea form he
had signed), and Rexroad again replied that he understood. (Id.). Finally, the court
again stressed the maximum penalty associated with each offense, as well as the
mandatory post-release control that would form part of Rexroad’s punishment if he
pleaded guilty. (Id. at #417). Rexroad once again confirmed that he understood both
aspects of the punishment that awaited him based on his guilty plea. (Id.). After
relaying this information to Rexroad, the trial court asked whether he wished to
proceed with his plea, and Rexroad again said yes. (Id.). With that, the court accepted
Rexroad’s plea. (Id.).

One day later, though, “Rexroad filed a one-paragraph, unsigned handwritten
document asking to withdraw his plea.” (Id.). And so the sentencing hearing the state
court had set based on the plea instead became a combined motion-and-sentencing
hearing. (See id.). Apparently, neither the state nor Rexroad’s counsel had received a
copy of Rexroad’s handwritten motion in advance of the hearing. (Id.). But Rexroad’s
counsel was aware, due to the online docket, that Rexroad had filed the motion. (Id.).
And Rexroad’s counsel had spoken with Rexroad about it. (Id.).

Among the “several reasons” that Rexroad raised in his motion as a basis for
withdrawing his plea was “a claim of tampering with evidence by the state in
discovery.” (Id.). But while Rexroad’s counsel was aware that Rexroad had included
that argument, he balked at the prospect of actually pressing it on Rexroad’s behalf
at the hearing. According to the attorney, he saw “no good faith basis for that
argument and w[ould] not make it before the Court.” (Id.). So it fell to Rexroad himself

to read his reasons for withdrawal into the record:
I, Michael Rexroad, on July 25th, 2021, request to withdraw my plea of
guilty and instead go to trial for some of the following reasons; one, I
survived a year and a half in jail without signing a time waiver and
believe I have earned the right to have … that right returned to me. I
feel that scare tactics were used to influence my decision. As a 50 percent
disabled veteran that fought the state and the last year and a half after
my injury, I requested I still be allowed to continue to fight for my
innocence. I apologize for pulling the VA card, but I’m at my wits
end … It has been brought to my attention that I do not have to convince
12 people of my innocence, only one … or one that she is faking, or one
that she is lying, which would be easier if I had my motion of discovery.
(Id. at #417–18).
Following Rexroad’s remarks, the trial court asked Rexroad’s counsel if he
wished to present any evidence in support of the motion. (Id. at #418). Counsel
reiterated that he lacked a good-faith basis for pressing the argument:
Scare tactics, Your Honor, everything has been explained to him in the
court … there w[ere] no scare tactics used. He[] … knowingly made the
choice he made … we have went over and discussed the motion of
discovery … So, I cannot put forward any good faith argument for a
motion to withdraw [the] guilty plea.
(Id.).
So the trial court asked Rexroad whether he wished to testify in support of his
motion. (Id.). Rexroad said he did, and he also confirmed that he understood that the
state would have the opportunity to question him regarding any issues raised in his
testimony. (Id.). With that, the trial court administered the oath to Rexroad. (Id.).
Then, after Rexroad completed his testimony and cross examination, the trial court
declared, “I am going to find that this was a request filed by the Defendant
individually and not through counsel. This Court did choose to proceed with a hearing
on this matter despite that fact.” (Id.).
Following that, the trial court denied the motion. (Id.). The judge found there
was “no reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw the plea.” (Id.). In support of
that conclusion, the trial court pointed out that Rexroad was afforded “a

full … hearing, understood the nature of the charges he was pleading guilty to, and
understood the possible penalties including the jointly recommended sentence.” (Id.
at #418–19). What’s more, the court “held that Rexroad failed to present evidence
supporting his innocence, and, that to [the] contrary, the state presented his
admission of committing the offenses.” (Id. at #419). At bottom, Rexroad’s request

was based on “a change of heart,” and the court “did not find credible his assertion
that the interrogation recording was tampered with.” (Id.). So the trial court
proceeded to sentencing, and the state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
judgment. (Id.). The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over Rexroad’s case.
(Id.).
Undeterred, Rexroad filed for post-conviction relief in the state trial court.
(Id.). He proffered two grounds for such relief: (1) “Ineffective assistance of counsel,

both trial and appellate counsel,” and (2) the “Trial court committed reversible error
when it overruled Defense Rule 29 Motion to Dismiss due to insufficient evidence.”
(Id. (cleaned up)). But the state trial court held (1) that res judicata barred the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim,2 (2) that Rexroad had failed to identify
any “substantive grounds for relief,” as Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21(D) requires, and
(3) that in any event, the petition was untimely under the 365-day limit specified in

Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(A)(2)(a). (Id.). Some two months later, Rexroad moved for

2 Under Ohio law, when a defendant is (1) represented by a new attorney on appeal (as
Rexroad was here), and (2) capable of raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based
on record evidence (as Rexroad was here), he typically must raise that claim on direct appeal.
See infra note 3. Relatedly, while the state trial court did not expressly deny the ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim on res judicata grounds, this Court notes that Ohio law
requires defendants to raise such claims in the first instance by way of a petition under Ohio
Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B). See, e.g., State v. Sellars, No. 28860, 2021 WL 1593196,
at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2021) (noting that an application to reopen under Rule 26(B),
not “a petition for post-conviction relief,” is the appropriate vehicle to raise claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).
post-conviction DNA testing and for production of certain documents, but the state
trial court denied both. (Id.). It appears that Rexroad declined to appeal any of these
post-conviction decisions. (Id.).

That brings the Court to the instant matter. In his federal habeas petition,
Rexroad asserts two grounds for relief: (1) “The trial court erred to the prejudice of
Mr. Rexroad by accepting a plea of guilty that was not made knowingly, voluntarily
[and] intelligently,” and (2) “The trial court erred to the prejudice of Mr. Rexroad by
denying the motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” (Id. at #420).
The petition also lays out “[s]upporting [f]acts” for each ground. (Id.). As for
the first, Rexroad contends that the trial court did not ensure that Rexroad

understood the nature of his charges; that the statement of facts was not read into
the record; that the trial court did not review the elements of the offense with
Rexroad; that the record shows Rexroad was “unsure” if he really wanted to enter a
guilty plea; and that Rexroad was “confused regarding the proceedings,” apparently
because he “believed he was already sentenced.” (Id.). And as for the second, Rexroad
asserts that he filed a pro se motion to withdraw the plea; that he was unsatisfied

with counsel’s performance; that he received no other court-appointed attorney; and
that he “put forth specific reasons why he wanted to withdraw his plea”—namely,
that he was “innocent,” “confused about how a jury trial worked,” and “was prepared
to go to trial but felt backed into a corner.” (Id.). To the extent that Rexroad had
disclosed self-inculpatory information to authorities, he asserts that he made those
disclosures “because he was homeless and the investigation promised him a place to
stay.” (Id.).
After Respondent filed a Return of Writ (Doc. 13), the state court record (Doc.

12), and transcripts (Docs. 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-4, 12-5), and Rexroad filed a Traverse
(Doc. 18), the Magistrate Judge issued her R&R (Doc. 19). There, the Magistrate
Judge started her analysis by noting that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a court may not
issue a writ of habeas corpus on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the adjudication either (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the United States Supreme Court,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the state court proceeding.” (Doc. 19, #420–21 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d))).
Because this case implicates the first prong, the Magistrate Judge elaborated
on its content. “A decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established law when ‘the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on
a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’” (Id. at #421 (quoting Otte v. Houk, 654
F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up))). A state court’s application of clearly
established federal law is unreasonable “when the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. (cleaned up). The burden
of satisfying these standards lays with Rexroad, and the Court’s review is “limited to
the record before the state court.” (Id. (cleaned up)).
The Magistrate Judge found that Rexroad could not make the necessary

showing as to either claim for relief. Recall that his first claim challenges whether his
plea was knowing and voluntary. (Id. at #415). As the Magistrate Judge noted,
Rexroad had already pressed this exact ground for relief on direct appeal in state
court. (Id. at #423). And the state appellate court held that “[t]he totality of the
circumstances here demonstrate that Rexroad was notified of the nature of the
charges and he understood them.” (Id.). Rexroad had access to all the information
regarding the charges pending against him. (Id.). He “was advised” of his crimes

“through several hearings.” (Id.). He reviewed “the guilty plea and maximum penalty
documents” “with counsel,” was “questioned about them at the plea hearing by the
trial court,” and “more than once, indicated he signed them and wished to keep his
signature on them.” (Id.). And although Rexroad attempted to portray one of his
responses to the trial court (“I’m going to have to say, yes”) as “demonstrating
hesitation,” this argument did not persuade the state appellate court. (Id. at #424).

In the Magistrate Judge’s view, this conclusion “was not unreasonable,” largely
for the same reasons that had persuaded the state appellate court. (Id. at #424–25).
So the R&R recommends denying Rexroad’s claim that the state court had committed
an AEDPA-cognizable error in finding that his plea was knowing and voluntary. (Id.
at #425–26).
Turn now to the second ground. The Magistrate Judge likewise concluded that
the state court did not commit an AEDPA-cognizable error in denying Rexroad’s
motion to withdraw his plea. (Id. at #426–32). Like Rexroad’s first ground, a state

appellate court has already rejected this argument. (Id. at #426–27). That court found
that the state trial court should not even have considered Rexroad’s motion because
Rexroad “was represented by counsel who did not join the motion.” (Id. at #426). And
under long-established Ohio law, “[h]ybrid representation is prohibited.” (Id.).
Ultimately, though, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Ohio’s hybrid-
representation rule does not give rise to a procedural default in this matter that
would preclude consideration of the issue in habeas. (Id. at #429). That’s because one

could read the state appellate court’s decision in Rexroad’s direct appeal “as finding
that the state trial court—not [Rexroad]—failed to follow a procedural rule.” (Id.).
That is, the appellate court seemed to fault the trial court for entertaining Rexroad’s
motion to withdraw his plea in the first instance, rather than faulting Rexroad for
failing to comply with the procedural rule. (Id.). Thus, the appellate court’s decision
was “not an express, unequivocal statement that [Rexroad’s] claim was barred on

procedural grounds.” (Id.).
But the Magistrate Judge concluded that Rexroad’s second ground for relief
fails for a different but related reason—namely, that “[s]tate court decisions based on
state law issues are not subject to federal habeas review.” (Id. at #430 (citations
omitted)). As the Magistrate Judge put it, “[t]ime and again, courts have held that
the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is a question of state law insufficient to
warrant habeas relief.” (Id (citations omitted)). And to the extent that Rexroad is
instead endeavoring to raise some kind of freestanding actual innocence claim, “the
Sixth Circuit has repeatedly indicated that such claims are not cognizable on habeas.”

(Id. at #431 (quotation omitted)). So, like the first, Rexroad’s second ground for relief
falls short.
Deeming both of Rexroad’s grounds for relief infirm, the Magistrate Judge
recommends that the Court dismiss Rexroad’s petition with prejudice. (Id. at #432).
The Court granted Rexroad’s request to extend the default 14-day response deadline.
(See 7/15/25 Not. Order (granting Rexroad’s first request for an extension and denying
as moot two subsequent requests for the same relief)). As a result, Rexroad had until

September 2, 2025, to object. (Id.). On July 31, 2025, Rexroad filed what he styled a
“Motion to Amend Evidence” (Doc. 24). There, he seeks to “present additional
evidence” on his second ground for relief (i.e., that the state trial court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea). (Id. at #441). He says that the “trial
judge had an affirmative duty to inquir[e] about a conflict that unfolded right inside
its court room,” though he does not expand on what he means by “conflict.” (Id. at

#443). Perhaps the term is best read as a reference to the next paragraph, where
Rexroad explains that he told his trial counsel at a hearing that counsel had “failed
to investigate” numerous “issues” that Rexroad had “pointed out.” (Id.). Based on
that, Rexroad appears to argue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and also
suggests that the trial court had an independent duty to inquire into the adequacy of
counsel’s representation. (Id. at #443–44). The remainder of Rexroad’s filing is a
series of exhibits—various documents created in connection with the proceedings
described above. (Id. at #447–72). Giving Rexroad, a pro se litigant, the benefit of the
doubt, the Court construes Rexroad’s motion as objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

analysis of Rexroad’s second ground for relief.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “district courts review a[]
[report and recommendation] de novo after a party files a timely objection.” Bates v.
Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
July 5, 2023). But that de novo review requirement extends only to “any portion to

which a proper objection was made.” Id. (citation omitted). In response to such an
objection, “the district court may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)) (cleaned up).
By contrast, if a party makes only a general objection, that “has the same
effect[] as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932

F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A litigant must identify each issue in the report and
recommendation to which he objects with sufficient clarity for the Court to identify
it, or else the litigant forfeits the Court’s de novo review of the issue. Miller v. Currie,
50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The objections must be clear enough to enable the
district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.”).
That said, Rexroad is proceeding pro se. A pro se litigant’s pleadings should be
construed liberally and are subject to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Franklin v. Rose,
765 F.2d 82, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1985). But pro se litigants still must comply with the
procedural rules that govern civil cases. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993). And “[t]he liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient
treatment of substantive law, and the liberal standards that apply at the pleading
stage do not apply after a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage.”
Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010)
(citations omitted).
For any unobjected portions of an R&R, “the advisory committee notes to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) suggest that the Court still must ‘satisfy itself

that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.’” Redmon v. Noel, No. 1:21-cv-445, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting cases).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Finding that dispositive issues bedevil each of Rexroad’s arguments, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court dismiss Rexroad’s habeas petition with
prejudice. (Doc. 19, #414). As noted, the Court construes Rexroad’s so-called “Motion
to Amend Evidence” (Doc. 24) as objecting solely to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis
of Rexroad’s second argument. Accordingly, the Court reviews the R&R’s analysis of
Rexroad’s first argument for clear error, and the R&R’s analysis of the second
argument de novo. Redmon, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1; Bates, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1.

Ultimately, the Court affirms the R&R as to both.
1. The Magistrate Judge did not clearly err in rejecting Rexroad’s first
ground for relief (i.e., his claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary). (Doc.
19, #426). Explaining why that is so, though, involves a closer look at the details

surrounding his plea.
As the R&R correctly observes, in his petition, Rexroad basically argues “that
the trial court did not (1) ‘ensure’ that he understood the nature of the charges against
him or (2) review the elements of the charged offense.” (Id. at #422). To be sure, such
complaints rest on solid legal footing. Because a criminal defendant waives numerous
constitutional rights when he enters a guilty plea, any such plea must be entered into
knowingly and voluntarily. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). “The

longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
open to the defendant.’” Railey v. Webb, 540 F.3d 393, 417 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)). The Court considers the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the plea in applying the standard. Garcia v. Johnson, 991
F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).

A plea is voluntary if the defendant “understands the nature of the charges
against him and the constitutional protections that he is waiving.” Evans v. Jackson,
No. 20-11379, 2022 WL 989321, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2022) (citing Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644–45 n.13 (1976)). A plea is knowing and intelligent if the
defendant has “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. But the mere fact that a defendant “did not
correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision” does not mean the
decision was not intelligent. Id. at 757.
A defendant’s in-court remarks are also germane to the analysis—a “[s]olemn

declaration[]” of guilt in open court carries a “strong presumption of verity.”
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). Consistent with that, the Sixth Circuit
has long held that a petitioner is bound by his in-court statements as to his
understanding of the plea. Ramos v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 560, 563 (6th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986)). Similarly, the Court
must afford a presumption of correctness to a state court’s determination that a plea
was valid. Railey, 540 F.3d at 417 (quoting Garcia, 991 F.2d at 326).

Here, the record provides no backup whatsoever for the notion that Rexroad’s
guilty plea was anything less than the product of a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent choice. (See Doc. 19, #423–24 (describing Rexroad’s plea and its
surrounding circumstances)). And were there any doubt, the state appellate court’s
independent determination on that factual issue would obviate it. After all, a state
court’s determination of fact is entitled to substantial deference in habeas review. See

Railey, 540 F.3d at 417 (quoting Garcia, 991 F.2d at 326). Accordingly, the R&R did
not clearly err in rejecting Rexroad’s first ground.
2. Nor did the Magistrate Judge go awry in analyzing Rexroad’s second
ground. Even reviewing that determination de novo in light of Rexroad’s objections,
Rexroad says nothing that warrants a different conclusion.
Recall that Rexroad asserts that the state trial court erred by denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Doc. 1, #7). Respondent, meanwhile, challenges
this contention on two grounds. First, as the R&R notes, Respondent says that the

argument is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 19, #427). And second, the Warden says
that the argument is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. (Id.). The
Magistrate Judge rejected Respondent’s first contention, but accepted the second. (Id.
at #426–32). Because the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of
Respondent’s second argument—which is dispositive here—the Court does not reach
Respondent’s first argument.
As a general matter, state court decisions based on rules of state law are not

subject to federal habeas review. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)
(“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”). Unsurprisingly,
then, federal courts routinely reject challenges to the denial of a motion to withdraw
a plea, finding that such denials are questions of state law that do not give rise to
habeas relief. See, e.g., Bingham v. Haviland, No. 3:20-cv-1846, 2023 WL 6383684, at
*6 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 29, 2023) (citation omitted); Goodwin v. Buchanan, No. 5:19-cv-

888, 2022 WL 1152782, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2022). True, if the denial were to
amount to a due process violation, things may be different. But that generally “hinges
on whether the plea was knowing and voluntary.” Bingham, 2023 WL 6383684, at *6
(citations omitted). And the Court has already determined above that Rexroad failed
to show that his plea was constitutionally infirm on those grounds here. That finding
largely precludes this avenue of relief. See Dunlap v. Warden, No. 2:21-cv-5849, 2022
WL 16950956, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2022) (rejecting an argument based on the
denial of a motion to withdraw a plea where the court had already determined that
the petitioner’s plea was constitutionally permissible). Indeed, even in the unlikely

event that the state trial court somehow abused its discretion in denying Rexroad’s
motion, an abuse of discretion alone does not ineluctably give rise to a due process
violation. See Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1995).
Rexroad’s objections—(1) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate Rexroad’s theory that the state suppressed evidence, and (2) that the trial
court had an independent duty to inquire into the supposed “conflict” between
Rexroad and his trial counsel, (see Doc. 24, #443–45)—wither in light of these

conclusions. As for the former, while it is true that “a guilty plea can be involuntary
as a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel,” United States v. Gardner, 417 F.3d
541, 545 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59), a state court has already
determined that res judicata bars Rexroad’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim,3 (see Doc. 12, #183). So the claim is procedurally defaulted, as the Sixth Circuit

3 In Ohio, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every ground for relief
in the first action, or be forever barred from asserting it.” Brown v. City of Dayton, 730 N.E.2d
958, 962 (Ohio 2000). The doctrine requires ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be
brought on direct appeal so long as the defendant “[1] had new counsel on direct appeal and
[2] the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could have been raised on direct appeal
without resorting to evidence outside of the record.” State v. Dempsey, No. 76386, 2000 WL
777003, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. June 15, 2000). Admittedly, the state court post-conviction
decision holding that Rexroad’s claim is barred on res judicata grounds is rather conclusory
and does not apply this two-part test. (See Doc. 12, #183). But the record nonetheless reflects
that it is satisfied. Rexroad had new counsel on direct appeal. (See id. at #75; Doc. 12-5, #310).
And Rexroad’s theory—that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate an
allegedly tampered-with and suppressed video interrogation, (see Doc. 24, #444)—could have
been advanced on direct appeal. At his sentencing hearing, Rexroad testified in support of
his motion to withdraw the guilty plea that he “strongly fe[lt] that the interrogation video
has “repeatedly” held that “res judicata is an adequate and independent state ground
to foreclose” review of a federal habeas claim.4 Gerth v. Warden, Allen Oakwood Corr.
Inst., 938 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

As for Rexroad’s argument that the trial court had an independent duty that
it failed to meet, the three cases that Rexroad cites—Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(1980), United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), and Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162 (2002)—are inapposite. Cuyler held that a criminal defendant who does not object
to a potential conflict of interest stemming from multiple representation at trial must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s

that was shown to me … had been modified and key segments were removed.” (Doc. 12-5,
#319). Jodi Conkel, a detective from the Scioto County Sheriff’s Office who investigated
Rexroad’s case, then took the stand to testify as to the Sheriff’s Office’s procedure for
recording interviews. (Id. at #331–35). Conkel testified that evidence tampering of the sort
Rexroad had alleged is “physically impossible” given the Sheriff’s Office internal procedure
for storing digital video and audio files. (Id. at #333, 336). “Once [the Sheriff’s Office] record[s]
something,” it is “store[d] on [a] hard drive.” (Id. at #333). And once it’s there, Sheriff’s Office
personnel have no ability to alter the files. (Id. at #333, 336). Thus, in light of this record
evidence, Rexroad’s trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the matter was “known at
the time of trial and could have been raised on direct appeal based solely on the trial record.”
Dempsey, 2000 WL 777003, at *7.
4 The four-part test for determining whether a state procedural rule precludes a habeas claim
articulated in Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986), is met here. That test
requires the Court to ask whether (1) Rexroad failed to comply with Ohio’s res judicata
doctrine, (2) Ohio courts enforce that doctrine, (3) res judicata is an adequate and
independent state ground for denying review of a federal constitutional claim, and
(4) Rexroad can show cause and prejudice excusing the default. Id.; Gerth, 938 F.3d at 829.
Rexroad failed to comply with Ohio’s res judicata doctrine by declining to raise his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in his initial state appeal. See, e.g., State v. Franklin, No. 05-ca-
9, 2006 WL 648352, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2006) (citations omitted) (“If a petitioner
fails to bring a first appeal as of right, he cannot raise in a postconviction relief petition issues
that should have been raised in that appeal.”); (Doc. 12, #183 (noting that Rexroad failed to
raise the issue in his initial appeal)). The Sixth Circuit has categorically held that Ohio courts
enforce Ohio’s res judicata doctrine. Gerth, 938 F.3d at 830 (citations omitted). As already
noted, res judicata is an adequate and independent state ground to bar habeas relief. Id. And
Rexroad identifies no reason why he could not have raised the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim in his appeal of right.
performance. 446 U.S. at 350. Cronic held that, outside a few narrow circumstances—
namely, (1) a complete denial of counsel, (2) a complete failure “to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” or (3) other circumstances so

likely to prejudice the defendant that even competent counsel could not provide
effective assistance—the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. 466
U.S. at 658–59. And Mickens held that a trial court’s failure to inquire into a potential
conflict of interest, even when it knew or should have known about the conflict, does
not necessitate reversal; rather, the defendant must still demonstrate that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance. 535 U.S. at 170–73. None
of these authorities help Rexroad’s argument here. Multiple representation is not at

issue. And Rexroad has not shown a conflict of interest, meaning he cannot
demonstrate an adverse effect from such a conflict. Thus, on de novo review,
Rexroad’s second objection fails, too.
In sum, evaluating Rexroad’s first argument under a clear error standard, and
his second argument de novo, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that
Rexroad’s habeas petition fails.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 19) in its entirety.
The Court OVERRULES Rexroad’s Motion to Amend Evidence (Doc. 24) and
DISMISSES this matter WITH PREJUDICE. Consistent with that, the Court
DIRECTS the Clerk to TERMINATE this matter on the Court’s docket.
SO ORDERED.

February 3, 2026 ;
DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11268511. Public record. Not legal advice.