# 729 W. 130th St., L.L.C. v. Hinckley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals

> Ohio Supreme Court · February 25, 2026 · 2026 Ohio 595

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266791

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Supreme Court
- **Decided:** February 25, 2026
- **Citations:** 2026 Ohio 595
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Fischer, J.
- **Cited by:** 1 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 729
W. 130th St., L.L.C. v. Hinckley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-595.]

NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-595
729 WEST 130TH STREET, L.L.C., ET AL. v. HINCKLEY TOWNSHIP B OARD OF
ZONING APPEALS.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as 729 W. 130th St., L.L.C. v. Hinckley Twp. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-595.]
Zoning—Appeals—Powers of township zoning boards under R.C. 519.15—An
email sent to one of a property’s owners was not a “decision” that triggered
deadlines for owner to pursue his rights in his property’s use—Board of
Zoning Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain appeal—Court of appeals’
judgment affirmed.
(No. 2024-1419—Submitted September 16, 2025—Decided February 25, 2026.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County,
No. 2023CA0020-M, 2024-Ohio-3349.
__________________
FISCHER, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

FISCHER, J.
{¶ 1} We accepted this discretionary appeal filed by appellant, Hinckley
Township Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”), to determine whether Thomas
Wilson, the township’s zoning inspector, issued a “decision” under R.C. 519.15
regarding the zoning status of property on which sits a closed tavern. The owners
are appellees, 729 West 130th Street, L.L.C., and Brent A. Rumes (collectively,
“the property owners”). We conclude that Wilson did not issue either an appealable
or an enforceable decision. We therefore affirm the Ninth District Court of
Appeal’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The property owners sought clarification about the property’s zoning status as
a nonconforming use under the zoning resolution
{¶ 2} Until April 2019, the property owners operated a tavern, the Adult
Day Care Center, located at 729 West 130th Street, Hinckley, Ohio (“the
property”). While zoned “R 2 residential” under the Hinckley Township Zoning
Resolution (“HTZR”), the property was operated as a tavern under the
nonconforming-use provisions of HTZR Section 8.3. HTZR Section 8.3(D)
authorizes properties with uses that predate the enactment of the zoning resolution
to legally continue their nonconforming use so long as no “voluntary
discontinuance” of that use has occurred for two years or more. The tavern’s liquor
license became inactive in January 2019, and the tavern ceased operations in April
2019.
{¶ 3} After being consulted by a potential buyer interested in reviving the
property’s use as a tavern, on March 4, 2022, Rumes and Thomas Syms, who is a
member of 729 West 130th Street, L.L.C., visited Wilson’s office to inquire about
the property’s zoning status as a nonconforming use. The zoning resolution
encourages such informal questioning:

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January Term, 2026

The Township Board of Trustees, Township Zoning Inspector, and
Township Zoning Commission are at your disposal to answer any
questions you may have. These Township officials are readily
available and most anxious to serve you to make certain your plans
coincide with the Zoning Regulations as well as fit into the Hinckley
Township Comprehensive Plan. Please contact these officials
before taking any action that may be affected by zoning.

HTZR, Preface.
{¶ 4} On March 15, Wilson followed up with Rumes by email, copying an
Ohio Department of Commerce liquor-control compliance agent and several
Hinckley Township officials and employees. In the email, Wilson explained that
the State had notified Hinckley Township that the tavern’s liquor license was not
in force as of January 11, 2019, and concluded, “Based upon the Hinckley Zoning
Resolution the building and land located at 729 W. 130th no longer qualifies as a
non-conforming use.” Wilson quoted HTZR Section 8.3(D), which states,
“Voluntary discontinuance of the non-conforming us of a building . . . for a
continuous period of two (2) years or longer shall constitute voluntary
abandonment.” He then listed the permitted uses in R-2 residential districts.
Wilson electronically signed the email and included his title, his contact
information, and the zoning office’s hours.
{¶ 5} That same day, Wilson, spoke to Rumes by phone about the email.
After speaking with Rumes, Wilson emailed the Medina County prosecuting
attorney’s office, which acts as legal counsel for the zoning inspector, and informed
it that Rumes intended to seek legal counsel.
{¶ 6} The property owners’ attorney emailed Wilson on April 6 to inquire
about the zoning status of the property. The property owners’ attorney

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acknowledged Wilson’s email to Rumes that informed him that their “property may
no longer be used in the manner in which it [had] historically been used because it
[did] not currently have an active liquor license and/or was temporarily closed
during the pandemic,” but the property owners’ attorney claimed that the property
owners had not received “written notice of the Township’s findings or an
explanation regarding the Township’s position.” Nor, he wrote, had they received
“notice of any issued violations.” The attorney requested “any written notices or
communications to the Owners regarding the Township’s position, findings and/or
determinations.”
{¶ 7} Brian Richter, a Medina County assistant prosecuting attorney,
responded to the property owners’ attorney’s April 6 email on April 12, asserting
that Wilson had “made a specific finding that [his] client’s property may no longer
be used in a manner which does not conform to the Hinckley Township Zoning
Resolution, as it had been historically used up to and until January 11, 2019.”
Richter explained that Rumes had been “provided with the enclosed/attached
written ruling in the form of an e-mail on March 15, 2022.”
B. The property owners appeal the March 15, 2022 email “ruling” to the BZA
{¶ 8} The property owners appealed Wilson’s March 15, 2022 email
“ruling” to the BZA on April 14. The BZA held a hearing on the appeal but
declined to address the merits of whether the discontinued use of the tavern was
voluntary, instead focusing solely on whether Wilson’s March 15 email was a
“decision” under R.C. 519.15 that required any appeal to be filed within 20 days.
{¶ 9} At the hearing, Wilson testified that he had concluded that the
property had lost its status as a nonconforming-use property under the zoning
resolution because the tavern’s liquor license was inactive and the tavern had not
operated for over two years. He also testified that he had reached his “ruling” after
doing “some simple math.” Wilson testified that he had sent the March 15 email
with this ruling to Rumes only and had called him the same day to inform him of

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January Term, 2026

the same. At the hearing’s conclusion, the BZA determined it lacked jurisdiction
to hear the appeal and dismissed it as untimely because it had not been filed within
20 days of Wilson’s email.
C. The property owners appeal to the Court of Common Pleas
{¶ 10} The property owners appealed the BZA’s dismissal to the Medina
County Court of Common Pleas. There, they argued that Wilson’s March 15 email
did not constitute a “decision” under R.C. 519.15, because it did not state that they
were operating in violation of the zoning resolution, did not order them to cease
operations at the property, and failed to specifically state that they could not use the
property as a tavern. The property owners also maintained that a “decision” could
not be conveyed by email and should have been conveyed by first-class mail. And
they argued that Wilson’s email is constitutionally deficient because it does not
mention a property owners’ right to appeal Wilson’s finding that the property no
longer qualifies as a nonconforming use. The property owners argued in the
alternative that even if the email did constitute a “decision” under R.C. 519.15, the
email did not comply with the specific notification requirements set forth in the
zoning resolution and deprived the property owners of the use of their property
without due process since 729 West 130th Street L.L.C. was not notified of the
decision through its statutory agent.
{¶ 11} The BZA argued that the email was a “decision” under R.C. 519.15.
The BZA maintained that Wilson made his decision based on the property owners’
own inquiry, noting that neither R.C. 519.15 nor the zoning resolution delineates
how a zoning inspector’s decision is to be conveyed to the owners. The BZA
asserted that a zoning inspector’s decision could be made even verbally as well as
by mail or email. The BZA therefore asked the court to affirm its dismissal of the
appeal.
{¶ 12} The Medina County Court of Common Pleas affirmed the BZA’s
dismissal of the property owner’s appeal. The court concluded that the email

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constituted a “decision” under R.C. 519.15, because neither the statute nor the
zoning resolution sets forth any requirements as to the contents or delivery of a
“decision.” And the court rejected the property owner’s due-process claim because
Rumes had received notice. Therefore, the court concluded, the appeal was
untimely and deprived the BZA of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
D. The property owners appeal to the Ninth District
{¶ 13} The property owners appealed to the Ninth District, arguing that the
trial court should not have affirmed the BZA’s dismissal of their appeal as untimely,
and they requested that the appellate court vacate the trial court’s decision. They
argued that Wilson’s email was an “ad hoc observation” about the status of the
property and did not constitute an adjudication that would be appealable under R.C.
519.15. They also claimed that Wilson’s failure to provide the email to all owners
of the tavern deprived them of the use of their property without due process.
{¶ 14} The Ninth District agreed with the property owners, holding that the
email did not constitute a decision for purposes of R.C. 519.15. 2024-Ohio-3349,
¶ 13 (9th Dist.). The appellate court interpreted “decision” in R.C. 519.15 as an
“official, formal action” by an administrative official, id. at ¶ 14, and held that
Wilson had not issued “any order, requirement, decision, or determination”
enforcing R.C. 519.02 through 519.25 or any resolution adopted under those
statutes, id. at ¶ 16. And even if Wilson had attempted to issue such a decision, the
appellate court found no evidence in the record that a zoning inspector had the
unilateral authority to determine the status of a property. The appellate court held
that because Wilson never issued a “decision” under R.C. 519.15, the 20-day filing
deadline was never triggered. Id. at ¶ 17. Accordingly, the court concluded that
without a proper decision from the BZA, the trial court had nothing to affirm or
reverse. Id. The appellate court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to enter a ruling, vacated the trial court’s decision, and dismissed the appeal. Id. at
¶ 17-18.

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January Term, 2026

E. The BZA appeals to this court
{¶ 15} The BZA appealed to this court, raising a single proposition of law:

Whenever a Zoning Inspector makes a determination regarding the
allowable use of a landowner’s property, and communicates that
determination to the property owner, such an action constitutes a
decision under R.C. 519.15 and is subject to appeal pursuant to R.C.
519.15.

We accepted jurisdiction over the appeal. 2024-Ohio-5529.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶ 16} This case comes down to whether the zoning inspector issued an
appealable decision regarding the zoning classification of the property owners’
property. Because the BZA’s authority to hear the appeal under R.C. 519.14 and
the property owners’ right to appeal under R.C. 519.15 involve questions of law,
we review these issues of statutory interpretation de novo. See State v. Straley,
2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 9; Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp., 2023-Ohio-4670,
¶ 10.
{¶ 17} When presented with issues of statutory interpretation, “[t]he
question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the
meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902),
paragraph two of the syllabus. “When the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the
General Assembly has said.” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 2003-Ohio-
1099, ¶ 12. Thus, we look at the language of the statute to determine its meaning.
Everhart at ¶ 10; State v. Ashcraft, 2022-Ohio-4611, ¶ 7.
{¶ 18} Chapter 13 of the Hinckley Township Zoning Resolution established
the BZA and created the BZA’s authority, duties, and procedures in accordance

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with R.C. Ch. 519. HTZR Sections 13.1 and 13.2. The BZA’s powers are outlined
in R.C. 519.14, and the rules and procedures concerning appeals to the BZA are
outlined in R.C. 519.15. Under R.C. 519.14(A), the BZA has the authority to
decide appeals “where it is alleged there is error in any order, requirement, decision,
or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of sections
519.02 to 519.25 of the Revised Code, or of any resolution adopted pursuant
thereto.” (Emphasis added.) And R.C. 519.15 creates a limited right to appeal to
the BZA: “Appeals to the board of zoning appeals may be taken by any person
aggrieved or by any officer of the township affected by any decision of the
administrative officer.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} Because the General Assembly left “decision” undefined in R.C.
519.15, we construe the word in accordance with its common, everyday meaning
at the time of enactment. See Eastman v. State, 131 Ohio St. 1, 7 (1936); State v.
Dorso, 4 Ohio St.3d 60, 62 (1983); Vossman v. AirNet Sys., Inc., 2020-Ohio-872,
¶ 17. And we read undefined terms in context, construing them in accordance with
the rules of grammar and common usage to give effect to all words in the statute.
See D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 2002-Ohio-4172, ¶ 19;
Vossman at ¶ 14 (the whole-text canon requires terms of a statute to be read in the
context of the statute as a whole).
{¶ 20} “Decision” generally means “a conclusion or resolution reached
after consideration,” The New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998), or “a
determination arrived at after consideration,” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (3d Ed. 2002). In the legal context, “decision” means a determination
arrived at “after consideration of the facts and the law,” Black’s Law Dictionary
(7th Ed. 1999). Because “decision” is such a broad term, we look to the context
and the subject to which it relates, reviewing its combination with other words and
phrases that might vary its ordinary meaning. Vossman at ¶ 15.

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January Term, 2026

{¶ 21} In R.C. 519.14, “order,” “requirement,” and “determination”
accompany “decision.” Because “words listed together should be understood in the
same general sense,” Vossman at ¶ 19, “decision” must refer to a formal conclusion
made by the “administrative officer” in some official capacity, see R.C. 519.14 and
519.15, and made in the enforcement of the zoning regulations, see R.C. 519.14.
Thus, a party may appeal a zoning inspector’s decision—that is, a formal
conclusion reached after consideration of the facts and law in the enforcement of
R.C. 519.02 through 519.25 or the zoning resolution—to the BZA if the party has
been aggrieved or affected by the decision. See R.C. 519.14 and 519.15.
{¶ 22} Here, the property owners sought information from Wilson about
their property’s nonconforming-use status under HTZR Section 8.3(D), as the
zoning resolution’s preface encourages them to do. Consistent with R.C. 519.19,
HTZR Section 8.3(D) provides that if a party voluntarily discontinues the
nonconforming use for a continuous period of two years or more, the
nonconforming use has been voluntarily abandoned, and any future use of the
property must conform to the use set forth for the property in the zoning resolution.
See also HTZR Section 8.8 (the nonconforming use of a property cannot resume
once the property’s use comes into compliance with its zoning status). But HTZR
Section 8.3(D) does not authorize any particular administrative official or body to
determine that the party has voluntarily discontinued the nonconforming use.
Rather, Section 8.3(D) reads as though any change to the nonconforming-use status
simply occurs by operation of law, despite requiring two factual findings: that the
discontinuance of the nonconforming use was uninterrupted for two years and that
the discontinuance was voluntary.
{¶ 23} Whether it is the zoning inspector or another entity that is to make
that status determination is unclear under HTZR Section 8.3(D). HTZR Section
8.10 provides that the zoning inspector makes the “determination of non-
conforming status” when a property owner submits evidence that the property’s use

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had been lawfully created. After accepting such evidence, the zoning inspector
“shall issue a Certificate of Non-Conforming Use.” Id. Because the property
owners did not engage in any formal process by which the zoning inspector issued
a formal decision based on evidence, the zoning inspector was unable to issue a
“decision” on whether the use of the property remained in compliance with the
property’s nonconforming-use status.
{¶ 24} But even assuming arguendo that a zoning inspector may make a
decision on the tavern’s nonconforming-use status outside the process outlined in
HTZR Section 8.10, the zoning inspector’s “ruling” is nevertheless not a “decision”
as contemplated by R.C. 519.14 necessary to invoke the BZA’s appellate
jurisdiction.
{¶ 25} Clearly, the zoning inspector reached a conclusion here. Using
“simple math,” Wilson concluded that the nonconforming use had lapsed,
apparently by operation of HTZR Section 8.3(D), based on the tavern’s loss of its
liquor license and closure more than two years earlier. He reached this conclusion
in his capacity as an administrative officer, as evidenced by the inclusion of his
signature block and decision to copy other officials on his email. But the zoning
inspector’s responsibility to enforce the zoning resolution does not make every one
of his determinations an enforceable and appealable “decision.” See R.C. 519.14.
The BZA may review appeals alleging error only of a zoning inspector’s “order,
requirement, decision, or determination” in the enforcement of zoning regulations.
Indeed, the BZA encourages the public to contact the BZA, the zoning inspector,
or the zoning commission to answer any zoning-related questions. Those inquiries
may require those administrative officials to offer insights that are not necessarily
enforceable or appealable decisions. See HTZR, Preface. Whether the decision is
enforceable and thus appealable is based on the zoning inspector’s authority to
enforce that decision.

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January Term, 2026

{¶ 26} The zoning inspector has the authority to enforce the zoning
resolution, but that authority is limited. HTZR Section 12.1(A); see also R.C.
519.16. The zoning inspector’s duties to enforce the zoning resolution include
issuing and refusing zoning certificates and investigating zoning violations. HTZR
Section 12.1. The zoning inspector “may take any reasonable action necessary to
substantiate the existence of a zoning violation.” HTZR Section 12.1(B). After
investigating and identifying a zoning violation, the zoning inspector shall notify
the party responsible for the zoning violation by written order so that the party may
remedy the violation. HTZR Section 12.3(A). And in any case in which a building
or land is “proposed to be . . . used in violation of any provisions of this Zoning
Resolution,” the zoning inspector, among others, is permitted to seek an injunction,
mandamus, abatement or any other appropriate action or proceeding, “in addition
to other remedies provided by law,” to “to prevent, enjoin, abate or remove such
unlawful . . . use.” HTZR Section 12.3(C).
{¶ 27} In this case, because the tavern had yet to resume operations, there
was no zoning violation that Wilson could use to enforce his conclusion that the
property had lost its nonconforming-use status. And if Wilson had sought to
prevent the tavern from operating on the basis that the property had lost its
nonconforming-use status, an email to notify Rumes of that conclusion is not an
authorized remedy. See HTZR Section 12.3(C). Thus, Wilson’s email to Rumes
was not an action taken in the enforcement of HTZR Section 8.3(D) or R.C. 519.19
and is not enforceable or appealable to the BZA under R.C. 519.14 and 519.15.
Rather, Wilson’s email is simply advice that the BZA encourages members of the
public to seek “before taking any action that may be affected by zoning.” HTZR,
Preface.
{¶ 28} We conclude that the BZA did not have authority to hear an appeal
from Wilson’s email to Rumes because it does not constitute a decision that was
made either in the enforcement of the zoning resolution or under the relevant

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provisions of R.C. Ch. 519. If the property owners had wanted to challenge
Wilson’s conclusion that the tavern’s nonconforming-use status had lapsed, then
they should have sought a certificate of nonconforming use or a variance under
HTZR Section 8.10, opened the tavern, and anticipated a violation to appeal to the
BZA, or sought an injunction or declaratory judgment in the court of common pleas.
Simply asking Wilson about the status of the property is not sufficient under the
zoning resolution to receive an official answer that can be appealed to the BZA. If
Wilson wanted to prevent the tavern from operating as a nonconforming use
allegedly in violation of HZTR Section 8.3(D) and R.C. 519.19, then he would have
needed to take appropriate legal action consistent with HTZR Section 12.3(C) to
prevent such use. And an email sent to Rumes only is plainly not sufficient notice
to trigger the deadlines for terminating a property’s zoning status as
nonconforming. See HZTR Section 12.3(C). Thus, the BZA did not have
jurisdiction over the appeal because the email was not a “decision” under R.C.
519.14 and 519.15.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 29} We affirm the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ holding that the
zoning inspector did not make a “decision” under either Hinckley Township’s
zoning resolution or R.C. 519.14 and 519.15 that triggered deadlines against the
property owners in pursuing their right to continue the property’s zoning as a
nonconforming use. The BZA was therefore without jurisdiction to entertain the
property owners’ appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
__________________
S. Forrest Thompson, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Stefanie
H. Zaranec and Brian M. Richter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.
Brown, Amodio & Chandler, L.P.A., William J. Muniak, and Maryann C.
Chandler, for appellees.

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January Term, 2026

__________________

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266791. Public record. Not legal advice.