# Selkin v. City of Los Angeles CA2/5

> California Court of Appeal · February 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266579

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** February 24, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 2/24/26 Selkin v. City of Los Angeles CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE

PINK SELKIN et al., B342433

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
v. BC718464, 19STCV12627
19STCV15125, 20STCV12594,
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 20STCV27209, 22STCV21711)

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Frank M. Tavelman, Judge. Affirmed.
Aitken✦Aitken✦Cohn, Wylie A. Aitken and Megan G.
Demshki; Frantz Law Group, James P. Frantz, William P. Harris
and Jason R. Dawson; Niddrie│Addams│Fuller│Singh and
Victoria E. Fuller for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Supervising Assistant City
Attorney and Brian Cheng, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent.
A fire in a commercial building killed two individuals and
severely burned a third. Plaintiffs sued defendant and
respondent the City of Los Angeles (City) under the Government
Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq., “the Act”),1 alleging that the
City was liable under section 815.6, based on its failure to carry
out a mandatory duty to abate obvious building and safety code
violations. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary
judgment, finding that the inspection immunity provided by
Government Code section 818.6 barred any potential liability.
Plaintiffs contend that the scope of section 818.6 inspection
immunity is not broad enough to cover liability based on
information obtained independent from any inspection.
According to plaintiffs, the City had a mandatory duty under
various municipal codes and state statutes to ensure building
safety based on City employees’ actual observation of safety
violations outside the context of any inspection.
The City contends that the inspection immunity statute,
which has been broadly applied to protect public entities from
liability in varied circumstances, bars liability here. The City
also contends that plaintiffs have not raised a triable issue of fact
about whether it was under a mandatory duty to act.
We affirm, because regardless of whether plaintiffs have
identified a specific mandatory statutory duty that the City failed
to carry out with reasonable care, section 818.6 inspection
immunity applies.

1 All further statutory references are to the Government
Code unless otherwise stated.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Overview

This case arises from an arson fire at a commercial building
in Los Angeles which killed two individuals. The survivors of the
deceased filed several suits against the City. Pink Selkin, who
was also trapped in the fire and survived, filed a separate suit,
seeking damages for her permanent injuries, including severe
burns over more than three-quarters of her body.2 Plaintiffs’
theory of liability is that because City employees had actual
knowledge of obvious fire safety hazards, the City had a
mandatory duty to ensure that the substandard conditions were
addressed, and because the City’s knowledge was not in any way
related to a building inspection, the inspection immunity statute
does not protect the City from liability for its failure to fulfill its
mandatory duties.

2 Although the survivors’ suits appear to have been
consolidated before the trial court, Selkin’s suit proceeded
separately but before the same trial court judge until summary
judgment, when the two proceedings were related and the subject
of a single minute order granting summary judgment. In April
2025, we ordered the two appeals consolidated for all purposes.
We give a common summary of the underlying facts and
procedural history, noting distinctions only when relevant to our
analysis.

3
B. Demurrer

As relevant here, the trial court denied the City’s
demurrers to plaintiffs’ complaints asserting inspection
immunity; the court reasoned there was a possibility of liability if
facts demonstrated that without any inspection, City officials
who witnessed unlawful conditions had the authority or duty to
act based on their personal observations. The City filed answers,
and the parties engaged in discovery.

C. Summary Judgment Motion

The City moved for summary judgment against plaintiffs,
making a number of arguments, including that the statutes and
municipal code sections relied upon by plaintiffs did not impose a
mandatory duty on the City, and that even if a mandatory duty
applied, the inspection immunity statute precluded liability.
Plaintiffs’ opposition argued the legal questions of whether a
mandatory duty or inspection immunity applied. On the question
of whether the City had a mandatory duty to take action,
plaintiffs presented evidence of the safety hazards observed by
City personnel.
The evidence presented to the trial court at summary
judgment established that between 2014 and 2021, police officers
responding to the property observed various fire safety issues and
were aware that individuals were living in the commercial
building. In addition, the fire department received two customer
service requests regarding an alleged marijuana grow operation
at the property, and the fire department made two online

4
requests to the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety
(DBS). A DBS staff member testified that DBS is not trained in
matters concerning unlawful growing of marijuana, however, and
therefore DBS forwarded the requests to the police department.3
The trial court granted the City’s motion. In its minute
order, the court reviewed the various statutes and municipal code
sections plaintiffs relied upon to establish mandatory duty
liability under section 815.6, but ultimately found it unnecessary
to determine which, if any, of the provisions imposed a
mandatory duty. As the court explained, “Whether each of these
statutes/ordinances create a mandatory duty applicable to
Plaintiffs’ cause of action would require the statutory
interpretation of each. The Court finds such an analysis
unnecessary in light of the City’s argument that it is immune
from any mandatory duty under [Government Code section]
818.6.” The trial court found the City was immune from liability
based on cases that broadly construe inspection immunity under
section 818.6.
Plaintiffs filed a premature notice of appeal, but in the
interests of justice, we deem the appeal to be taken from the
judgment entered on November 20, 2024.

3 Based upon the appellate briefing and the trial court’s
minute order, we understand that no party presented evidence
that any DBS personnel inspected the property or personally
observed any substandard conditions of the property.

5
DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The purpose of summary judgment “is to provide courts
with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order
to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact
necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) “A trial court properly
grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) We generally apply a de novo
standard of review to a trial court’s decision to grant summary
judgment, “considering all of the evidence the parties offered in
connection with the motion (except that which the court properly
excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence
reasonably supports. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Keeping the standard of review in mind, we will
independently determine whether the City was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law under the immunity provided by
section 818.6.

B. Government Tort Liability

The Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing
liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees
for torts. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14
Cal.5th 1034, 1046–1047 (Santa Clara County).) Part of the
overarching purpose of the Act is to “shield[] public entities from

6
tort claims seeking money damages.” (Santa Clara County, at
p. 1049.) Section 815 outlines the overall structure of the Act.
Section 815, subdivision (a), establishes that “there is no such
thing as common law tort liability for public entities; a public
entity is not liable for an injury ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute.’ ” (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 798, 803.) “But even when there are statutory grounds
for imposing liability, subdivision (b) of section 815 provides that
a public entity’s liability is ‘subject to any immunity of the public
entity provided by statute.’ ” (Id. at p. 804.)
Relevant to this case, where plaintiffs allege that the City
was under a mandatory duty to abate obvious fire and safety
hazards about which City personnel had direct knowledge,
section 815.6 provides that “[w]here a public entity is under a
mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to
protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public
entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by
its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity
establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the
duty.” However, section 818.6 provides a specific statutory
immunity for inspections: “A public entity is not liable for injury
caused by its failure to make an inspection, or by reason of
making an inadequate or negligent inspection . . . for the purpose
of determining whether the property complies with or violates
any enactment or contains or constitutes a hazard to health or
safety.”

7
C. Mandatory Duty

1. Applicable Law

“Government Code section 815.6 has three elements that
must be satisfied to impose public entity liability: (1) a
mandatory duty was imposed on the public entity by an
enactment; (2) the enactment was designed to protect against the
particular kind of injury allegedly suffered; and (3) the breach of
the mandatory statutory duty proximately caused the injury.”
(B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 179
(B.H.); see also Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th
887, 898 (Guzman); Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22
Cal.4th 490, 498–499 (Haggis).)
“First and foremost, application of section 815.6 requires
that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely
discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity;
it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a
particular action be taken or not taken. [Citation.] It is not
enough, moreover, that the public entity or officer have been
under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself
involves the exercise of discretion.” (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at
p. 498; see also B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 180–181.)
“Whether an enactment creates a mandatory duty is a question of
law. (Haggis, at p. 499.)” (Danielson v. County of Humboldt
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) “ ‘Whether a particular statute is
intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere
obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of
statutory interpretation for the courts.’ [Citation.]” (Haggis,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 499.) While statutory language is an

8
important guide, the use of the term “shall” in a legislative
provision “does not necessarily create a mandatory duty; there
may be ‘other factors [that] indicate that apparent obligatory
language was not intended to foreclose a governmental entity’s or
officer’s exercise of discretion.’ (Morris v. County of Marin (1977)
18 Cal.3d 901, 910, fn. 6 (Morris); see Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th
at p. 499, quoting Morris.)” (Guzman, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 899.)
“Second, but equally important, [Government Code] section
815.6 requires that the mandatory duty be ‘designed’ to protect
against the particular kind of injury the plaintiff suffered. The
plaintiff must show the injury is ‘ “one of the consequences which
the [enacting body] sought to prevent through imposing the
alleged mandatory duty.” ’ [Citation.] Our inquiry in this regard
goes to the legislative purpose of imposing the duty. That the
enactment ‘confers some benefit’ on the class to which plaintiff
belongs is not enough; if the benefit is ‘incidental’ to the
enactment’s protective purpose, the enactment cannot serve as a
predicate for liability under [Government Code] section 815.6.
[Citation.]” (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 499.)
“If these two prongs are met, the next question is whether
the breach of the duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injury.” (Guzman, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 898.)
A general assertion that a public entity has a mandatory
duty is insufficient to support a claim for liability under section
815.6. In Washington v. County of Contra Costa (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 890 (Washington), following the accidental release of
toxic gases from rail tank cars stored on private property,
plaintiffs sued the county, alleging that various sections of the
Health and Safety Code included mandatory language, and that

9
based on those sections “it must be concluded that the County
therefore has a general mandatory duty to ensure that there will
be no uncontrolled release of hazardous material.” (Id. at p. 896.)
The appellate court rejected plaintiffs’ argument, holding instead
that “[i]t is not enough that some statute contains mandatory
language. In order to recover plaintiffs have to show that there is
some specific statutory mandate that was violated by the County,
which violation was a proximate cause of the accident.
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 896–897.)

2. Analysis

The City contends that summary judgment in its favor was
warranted because the statutes and municipal codes upon which
plaintiffs rely do not require the City to take specific action based
upon the evidence that police officers observed safety hazards
and a fire chief received and forwarded to DBS a customer service
request to investigate an illegal marijuana grow operation. We
too are not entirely convinced that the statutes and municipal
code sections plaintiffs rely upon require the City to take specific
action, based solely on a police officer’s observation of an open
and obvious fire or safety violation. However, rather than
reviewing each of the enactments individually to determine
whether it requires ministerial or discretionary action, we—like
the trial court—find it unnecessary to determine whether City
has successfully shown as a matter of law that it was not under a
mandatory duty for purposes of liability under section 815.6.
Because inspection immunity under section 818.6 is
available to a public entity, regardless of whether the entity’s
duty to detect, address, or abate a health or safety hazard is

10
construed as mandatory or discretionary (Cochran v. Herzog
Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405, 411 (Cochran)), we
turn to the legal question of whether section 818.6 inspection
immunity applies.

D. Inspection Immunity

1. Applicable Law

Section 818.6, the inspection immunity statute, “was
intended to grant absolute immunity from liability for the
negligent inspection of private property to determine whether
such property constitutes a hazard to health or safety.” (Clayton
v. City of Sunnyvale (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 666, 671 [rejecting
liability arising from negligent review of or failure to inspect
patently dangerous stairwell].) The courts have interpreted
section 818.6 very broadly, immunizing public entities from
liability not just from negligent inspections (Cochran, supra, 155
Cal.App.3d at pp. 408–410 [negligent inspection or negligent
failure to advise property owner of additional fire safety
precautions]; Washington, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 897–898
[negligent inspection of manufacturing facility led to release of
hazardous materials]), but also from the failure to inspect
(Stevenson v. San Francisco Housing Authority (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 269, 273 [negligent failure to inspect a building];
Powell v. State of California (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 910, 915
[negligent failure to inspect daycare premises]), and from the
failure to take certain actions after conducting an inspection
(Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 504 [failure to record the results
of an inspection with the county recorder]).

11
“As the legislative comment to section 818.6 explains:
‘Because of the extensive nature of the inspection activities of
public entities, a public entity would be exposed to the risk of
liability for virtually all property defects within its jurisdiction if
this immunity were not granted.’ In light of such purpose, we
believe that section 818.6 must reasonably be construed to
insulate a public entity from any liability which might arise as a
result of an entity’s failure to detect noncompliance with one of
the myriad safety regulations contained in local or statewide
building codes.” (Morris, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 916.)
The California Supreme Court and the courts of appeal
have explained that the rationale for interpreting section 818.6
liberally and applying inspection immunity broadly arises not
just from the ubiquity and purpose of the inspection process, but
also from the breadth of what an inspection encompasses. (See
Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 504–505, quoting Cochran,
supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at pp. 411–412.)
In Cochran, the employee of an engraving company died in
a fire at a company plant, and the employee’s relatives sought to
hold the city liable for failing to advise the company of
recommended safeguards against fire, despite evidence that the
city learned in a prior inspection that the company used
magnesium, a very combustible material. (Cochran, supra, 155
Cal.App.3d at pp. 408–410.) The reviewing court rejected
plaintiffs’ argument that the inspection immunity should be
construed such that once a public entity had knowledge of
hazardous conditions, the entity would not be immune for
negligently breaching a duty to advise and recommend ways to
address the risks. (Id. at p. 411.) The court explained that such
a restrictive reading would be arbitrary and contrary to the

12
statute’s purpose of protecting public entities from liability in all
aspects of safety inspections and hazard reduction. (Id. at
pp. 411–412.) “Public safety inspection necessarily encompasses
making an informed determination that given conditions are in
fact hazardous or not in compliance with regulations, officially
reporting these hazardous conditions, and fully disclosing them to
all interested parties. Appellants’ narrow interpretation of the
immunity statute would . . . encourage municipalities not to
make any efforts to learn about possible . . . hazards.” (Cochran,
supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at pp. 411–412, italics added.)
In Harshbarger v. City of Colton (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d
1335, 1345–1348 (Harshbarger), the reviewing court relied on
Cochran to conclude that inspection immunity also barred a
claim of negligent hiring. The plaintiffs in Harshbarger were
homeowners who incurred significant costs after two city
inspectors incorrectly certified that construction work was
proceeding in compliance with applicable building codes. (Id. at
p. 1338.) The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the city was
liable for failure to use due care in hiring employees and
discharging its duty under Health and Safety Code section 17960,
because the city had voluntarily assumed a duty to hire qualified
inspectors. After agreeing that Health and Safety Code section
17960 imposed a mandatory duty on the city to enforce provisions
relating to construction of dwellings, the court pointed out that
“inspection of property for compliance with codes and regulations
is the means by which the public entity carries out its mandatory
duty of enforcing compliance with codes and other building
standards,” and that the inspection immunity statute “grants
absolute immunity whether the duty to inspect is construed as
mandatory or discretionary, whether the act of inspection is

13
called ministerial, discretionary or even voluntary.” (Id. at
pp. 1346–1347.)
The California Supreme Court in Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th
at pp. 504–506, agreed with the Cochran court’s approach of
broadly construing the inspection immunity statute to encourage
public entities to learn of possible health and safety hazards. It
held that even when the city knew of a landslide hazard and had
a mandatory statutory duty to record that information with the
county recorder, the inspection immunity protected the city from
liability. The court explained that “allowing liability for failure to
fully report, by recordation, the results of an inspection, while
immunizing the failure to make an inspection at all, would have
the effect, contrary to the evident legislative intent, of
discouraging municipal safety and health inspections. Even if
plaintiff’s first cause of action stated a valid claim for breach of a
mandatory duty, therefore, section 818.6 would immunize the
City from liability for that breach. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 505.)

2. Analysis

Plaintiffs acknowledge that to the extent the inspection
immunity statute is applicable, it overcomes any liability under
the mandatory duty statute. They contend, however, that
because the City’s knowledge of the obvious health and safety
violations arose independent of any inspection, the inspection
immunity statute does not apply.
Plaintiffs draw the distinction that each of the cases finding
the inspection immunity applicable still involved some
relationship to an inspection activity, regardless of whether the
inspection took place or not. They argue that because their

14
claims do not implicate a duty to conduct an inspection or to take
action based on information obtained during an inspection, the
inspection immunity does not apply. Instead, they argue that the
City’s liability arises from its knowledge of the obvious safety and
fire hazards that police officers witnessed on at least eight
occasions over the course of over seven years.
We are not convinced by plaintiffs’ argument. Plaintiffs do
not specify what statutory language requires the City (as a public
entity) to take specific ministerial action based on the officers’
observations. (Washington, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 897–898
[plaintiffs must identify a specific statutory mandate, the
violation of which proximately caused injury].) As the court
explained in Harshbarger, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at page 1346,
inspections are the “means by which the public entity carries out
its mandatory duty of enforcing compliance” with the relevant
fire, safety, and building codes. Plaintiffs have not relied upon or
cited to any statute requiring a police officer who observes an
open and obvious fire and safety hazard to report it to DBS or
any other public entity. (Compare B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at
pp. 180–181.) To the contrary, while plaintiffs point to language
in Harshbarger to argue that Health and Safety Code section
17960 imposes upon city building departments a mandatory duty
to enforce rules and regulations pertaining to building safety,
they ignore the language that follows immediately after,
explaining how the mandatory duty is satisfied: “inspection of
property for compliance with codes and regulations is the means
by which the public entity carries out its mandatory duty of
enforcing compliance with codes and other building standards;
and section 818.6 specifically provides immunity to public entities

15
for failure to make any, or adequate, inspection of property.”
(Harshbarger, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1346.)
To saddle the City, as a public entity, with the knowledge
attributable to individual city personnel, based upon an
unspecified mandatory duty untethered to the inspection process,
runs contrary to the law on mandatory duties and inspection
immunity. When a legislative body seeks to impose a mandatory
duty on a public entity or some department within a public
entity, it does so expressly, even identifying the particular
department that must carry out the duty. While some provisions
of the Los Angeles Municipal Code might be fairly read as
imposing a mandatory duty to abate when DBS knows about a
safety hazard (see, e.g., L.A. Mun. Code § 91.8901.1, et seq.; &
§ 91.8903.1.1), there is no evidence here that any DBS employee
knew of the hazards. Plaintiffs have also not identified any
statute imposing a mandatory duty for law enforcement or fire
officials to cross-refer building safety issues to DBS. (See, e.g.,
B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 180–183 [law enforcement agencies
have a statutory duty to cross-report to the child welfare agency
every known or suspected instance of child abuse or neglect
reported to it].)
We disagree with plaintiffs’ argument that the evidence
gave rise to a reasonable inference that building and safety
personnel had knowledge of a code violation. Instead, it is
reasonable to infer that the only way for DBS to be charged with
knowledge that a particular property is “substandard,” would be
for an inspection to occur, in which case, even if DBS or the City
was under a mandatory duty to abate the hazardous condition,
regardless of whether DBS failed to inspect, or the inspection
negligently failed to identify the open and obvious hazards, or

16
DBS failed to take action to abate, the inspection immunity
would bar liability. We see no reason to apply a different
standard simply because the City is charged with “knowledge”
obtained through an employee unaffiliated with DBS.

3. Plaintiffs’ Reliance on Non-Binding Cases

Plaintiffs point to two instances where a trial court or an
out-of-state court found inspection immunity inapplicable when
the public entity’s mandatory duty was based on knowledge
obtained independent of an inspection. Neither one is applicable
or persuasive. (Robertson v. Saadat (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 630,
649 [appellate court decisions “are not bound by rulings of trial
courts or courts of other jurisdictions”].)

a. Trial Court Decision in the Ghost Ship Case

Gregory et al. v. Ng et al., Alameda County Superior Court
case number RC16843631 is a 2018 trial court decision
overruling a demurrer to plaintiffs’ claim that the City of
Oakland was under a mandatory duty to act based upon
knowledge of dangerous conditions at a commercial property
known as the Ghost Ship, and rejected the city’s argument that
various immunities, including inspection immunity and
discretionary act immunity, barred plaintiffs’ claim. We decline
to give the decision any persuasive weight because it is neither
binding nor comparable to the current case. First, “[t]rial court
decisions are not precedents binding on other courts . . . .
[Citation.]” (Harrott v. County of Kings (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1138,
1148.) In addition, the decision was made at the demurrer stage,

17
and the trial court noted that “City personnel responsible for
enforcing the building codes at issue—other than police officers
and firefighters—were aware of the dangerous conditions at the
Ghost Ship.” Here, in contrast, the trial court was deciding a
motion for summary judgment, and the only evidence of the city’s
knowledge of the property’s safety issues came from police
officers and one fire chief who was aware of a marijuana grow
operation in the building. We also agree with the City that it
would be speculative to assume that those City personnel who
witnessed safety issues such as inadequate lighting or an
electronically locking door would recognize these as code
violations, much less violations requiring immediate abatement
efforts.

b. Out-of-State Opinion

In Drake by Drake v. Mitchell Community Sch. (1994) 628
N.E.2d 1231 (Drake) the family of an Indiana student who
contracted histoplasmosis from pigeon droppings in a grain
elevator repurposed for a Halloween fundraiser sued the school
district. Plaintiffs point to Drake as an example of a court
rejecting inspection immunity based on a teacher’s “specific
knowledge that the grain elevator posed a risk of [the illness]
independent of any investigation.” (Id. at p. 1234.) However, as
the Drake court expressly recognized, school personnel have a
duty to care for the safety of children in their care, and Indiana
law strictly construes immunity protection. (Ibid.) In contrast,
the California Supreme Court has affirmed a broad construction
of inspection immunity to include not just the process of
inspection, but also the additional process of reporting or

18
recording the results of that process. (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th
at pp. 503–504.) Particularly because California decisional law
construes immunity protection under the Act more broadly, we do
not find plaintiffs’ reliance on an out-of-state decision to be
persuasive. (In re S.G. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1298, 1316, fn. 6
[out-of-state authority is not binding precedent, nor persuasive in
light of supreme court authority]; but see Kanter v. Reed (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 191, 208 [out of state authority can provide useful
guidance in the absence of on point California case law].)
For the above reasons, we hold that when the information
about a building’s safety hazards is obtained independent of any
inspection under the circumstances involved here—where the
alleged safety hazards were observed by city employees who had
no duty to cross-report information about the hazards to DBS or
to take any specific steps to mitigate the observed hazards—the
inspection immunity applies.

19
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
defendant and respondent City of Los Angeles.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KUMAR, J.*

* Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266579. Public record. Not legal advice.