# Jells

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · February 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266174

## Case

- **Full name:** Eric Jells v. Warden of FPC Schuylkill
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266174

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that a federal inmate’s Section 2241 petition is actionable where the inmate attacks the term of their custody by challenging the way the BOP is computing their federal sentence
- stating that Section 2241 “allows a federal prisoner to challenge the ‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIC JELLS, :
Petitioner : No. 1:25-cv-02260
:
v. : (Judge Kane)
:
WARDEN OF FPC SCHUYLKILL, :
Respondent :

MEMORANDUM
Currently before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 and a motion to stay filed by pro se Petitioner Eric Jells (“Jells”), a convicted and sentenced
federal inmate. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the motion to stay and dismiss
the Section 2241 petition.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 13, 2024, Jells was sentenced to an aggregate period of sixty months’
incarceration to be followed by three years of supervised release after pleading guilty to
conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of an enterprise through racketeering activity
(18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)) and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute forty
grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detective amount of fentanyl and a
quantity of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine (21
U.S.C. § 846) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. See
United States v. Jells, No. 23-cr-00012 (W.D. Pa. filed May 30, 2023), ECF No. 2424.1 He is
currently incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution Schuylkill and has, according to the

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the docket in Jells’s underlying criminal case. See Orabi v.
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2014) (stating that the court “may take
judicial notice of the contents of another [c]ourt’s docket”); Wilson v. McVey, 579 F. Supp. 2d
685, 688 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (taking judicial notice of court docket).
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) inmate locator (https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/), an
anticipated release date of September 10, 2026.
Jells commenced the instant action by filing his Section 2241 habeas petition, which the
Clerk of Court docketed on November 25, 2025. (Doc. No. 1.) Jells neither remitted the filing

fee nor sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis when he filed his petition; as such, an
Administrative Order issued providing him with a period of thirty days to pay the filing fee or
apply for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 3.) In response, Jells timely paid the
fee. See (Unnumbered Docket Entry Between Doc. Nos. 3 and 4).
On December 16, 2025, the Court issued an order which, inter alia, directed Respondent
to file a response to Jells’s Section 2241 petition. (Doc. No. 5.) Respondent timely filed a
response in opposition to the petition on December 31, 2025. (Doc. No. 6.) Jells did not file a
reply brief in further support of his petition, and the time for him to do so has passed. As such,
Jells’s petition is ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Section 2241 Habeas Petitions
Section 2241 confers federal jurisdiction over a habeas petition that has been filed by a
federal inmate challenging “not the validity but the execution of [their] sentence.” See Cardona
v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations and footnote omitted); Woodall v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that Section 2241 “allows a federal
prisoner to challenge the ‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas”). While “the precise meaning of
‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy[,]” the phrase has been interpreted as to “put into effect” or
“carry out.” See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 242, 243 (citation omitted). As a result, a federal inmate
may challenge conduct undertaken by the BOP that affects the duration of the inmate’s custody.
See, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that a federal
inmate’s Section 2241 petition is actionable where the inmate attacks the term of their custody by
challenging the way the BOP is computing their federal sentence).
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under Section 2241

Although Section 2241 does not contain an explicit statutory exhaustion requirement, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently required a federal inmate to exhaust their
administrative remedies before filing a Section 2241 petition. See Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Federal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust
their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.”
(citations omitted)). Exhaustion is required “for three reasons: (1) allowing the appropriate
agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2)
permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing
agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.” See id. at
761–62 (citations omitted)). Exhaustion is not required when it would not promote these goals.

See Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The exhaustion doctrine will not
be applied . . . when none of the basic goals (of the doctrine) would be served.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). “For example, exhaustion may be excused where it ‘would
be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or
constitutional rights, or if the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to
prevent irreparable harm.’” Brown v. Warden Canaan USP, 763 F. App’x 296, 297 (3d Cir. 2019)
(unpublished) (quoting Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988)). Exhaustion is
also unnecessary if the issue presented is one that consists purely of statutory construction. See
Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433–34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d
1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981).
C. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program2
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has a multi-step administrative remedy program

allowing an inmate “to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of [their]
confinement.” See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a). First, an inmate should attempt informal resolution of
the issue with the appropriate staff member. See id. § 542.13(b). If informal resolution is
unsuccessful, the inmate may submit a formal written grievance, using the BP-9 form, to the
warden within twenty calendar days “following the date on which the basis for the Request
occurred.” See id. § 542.14(a). The warden is to respond to the request within twenty calendar
days. See id. § 542.18. An inmate dissatisfied with the warden’s response may appeal, using the
BP-10 form, “to the appropriate Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the date the
warden signed the response.” See id. § 542.15(a). Finally, an inmate may appeal from the
Regional Director’s response, using the BP-11 form, to the BOP’s General Counsel “within 30

calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed the response.” See id. The General
Counsel’s response to this appeal is due within twenty calendar days; however, the time for a
response may be extended by twenty days. See id. § 542.18.

2 The Court takes judicial notice of the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program, which is
available on the BOP’s website at https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/1330_018.pdf. See, e.g.,
Baptiste v. Morris, No. 18-cv-01484, 2020 WL 2745739, at *2 n.5 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2020)
(taking judicial notice of BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Jells asserts that he has earned one hundred and twenty First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”)
time credits (“FTCs”), which the BOP has failed to apply to his supervised release. (Doc. No. 1

at 1–2.) Jells acknowledges that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies with the BOP
as to this claim, but he argues that he did not have to exhaust the claim because he is raising an
issue of statutory construction or, alternatively, exhaustion would be futile because he will be
released to a halfway house as soon as March 4, 2026. (Id. at 2–4.)
In response, Respondent requests that the Court dismiss Jells’s petition for his failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 6 at 5–11.) Respondent also argues that even if
the Court considers the merits of Jells’s petition, the Court should deny it because he cannot have
FTCs applied to his sentence because he is classified at a medium recidivism risk score. (Id. at
11–14.)
B. The FSA

In 2018, Congress passed the FSA to expand federal prisoners’ access to noncustodial
placements. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621,
3624, 3631–35). The FSA’s provisions work together to motivate inmates to participate in
specific programs and activities by allowing them to receive “earned time credits” for
participating in “recidivism reduction programs.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(h), 3624(g), 3632. It
also requires the BOP to conduct initial assessments for all inmates, assign them to appropriate
evidence-based recidivism reduction (EBRR) programs or productive activities (PAs), and
expand the availability of such programs.
Under the FSA, the Attorney General was charged with development and release of a
Risk and Needs Assessment System (the “System”) within two-hundred-and-ten (210) days of
December 21, 2018, the date on which the FSA was enacted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a). The
System is to be used for: (1) determining an inmate’s recidivism risk; (2) assessing an inmate’s

risk of violent or serious misconduct; (3) determining the type and amount of evidence-based
recidivism reduction programming (“EBRRs”) appropriate for each inmate; (4) periodically
assessing an inmate’s recidivism risk; (5) reassigning an inmate to appropriate EBRRs and
productive activities (“PAs”); (6) determining when to provide incentives and rewards for
successful participation in EBRRs and PAs; and (7) determining when the inmate is ready to
transfer to pre-release custody or supervised release. See (id.). Moreover, the System provides
guidance on the “type, amount, and intensity of EBRR programs and PAs to be assigned to each
inmate based on the inmate’s specific criminogenic needs.” See Kurti v. White, No. 19-cv-
02109, 2020 WL 2063871, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3632(b)). In
response to this directive, the BOP developed the “Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated

Risk and Needs” (“PATTERN”) system. See Brennerman v. Warden, FCI-Allenwood Low, No.
24-cv-02029, 2025 WL 52469, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2025) (citing DeFoggi v. United States,
No. 20-cv-03889, 2020 WL 2899495, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. June 3, 2020)). The PATTERN system
“determines the recidivism risk of each prisoner . . . and classif[ies] each prisoner as having
minimum, low, medium, or high risk for recidivism.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)(1).
The FSA allows eligible inmates who successfully complete EBRRs or PAs to receive
FSA time credits to be applied toward time in pre-release custody or supervised release. See id.
§ 3632(d)(4)(A). An inmate may initially earn ten days of credit for every thirty days of
successful participation. See id. Moreover, eligible inmates assessed at a minimum or low risk
of recidivism who do not increase their risk of recidivism over two consecutive assessments may
earn an additional five days of credit for every thirty days of successful participation. See id.
The BOP applies earned time credits to expedite an inmate’s transfer either to prerelease
custody, which includes residential reentry centers (RRCs) and home confinement, or to

supervised release if such a term has been imposed as part of the inmate’s sentence:
If the sentencing court included as a part of the prisoner’s sentence a requirement
that the prisoner be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment
pursuant to section 3583, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons may transfer the
prisoner to begin any such term of supervised release at an earlier date, not to
exceed 12 months, based on the application of time credits under section 3632.

See id. § 3624(g)(3).
To be eligible for early placement, the prisoner must satisfy the following eligibility
criteria. First, the prisoner must have earned time credits equal to the remainder of their imposed
term of imprisonment. See id. § 3624(g)(1)(A). Second, the prisoner must have demonstrated a
reduced recidivism risk or maintained a low risk during imprisonment. See id. § 3624(g)(1)(B).
Third, the prisoner’s remaining sentence must have been computed “under applicable law.” See
id. § 3624(g)(1)(C). Fourth, for placement in prerelease custody or early placement in
supervised release, the prisoner must have a minimum or low recidivism risk score in the last
two (2) reassessments. See id. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)–(ii).
If an inmate cannot meet this recidivism-risk requirement, they can alternatively petition
the Warden to be considered on an individualized basis for placement in prerelease custody or
supervised release. See id. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II); Delgado v. Barraza, No. 23-cv-00881, 2023
WL 4553380, at *1 (M.D. Pa., July 14, 2023) (“Inmates with a high or medium PATTERN score
can petition the warden to be considered on an individual basis for placement in prerelease
custody or supervised release.” (citations omitted)). The Warden can approve that petition upon
determining that the prisoner (1) “would not be a danger to society if transferred to prerelease
custody or supervised release,” (2) “has made a good faith effort to lower their recidivism risk
through participation in recidivism reduction programs or productive activities,” and (3) “is
unlikely to recidivate.” See id. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II)(aa)–(cc); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c)(2). “This

exception to the minimum- or low-recidivism-risk precondition requires an inmate to directly
petition the [w]arden, and therefore by statute (and regulation) demands administrative
exhaustion.” Fowler v. Wertzman, No. 23-cv-00290, 2023 WL 4853720, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July
28, 2023).
Although this exception requires exhaustion, the precise parameters of the actions needed
to fully exhaust are unclear. The statute requires only that an otherwise ineligible prisoner
petition and obtain approval from the warden to be placed in prerelease custody or early
supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i) (allowing for placement in prerelease
custody if the prisoner “has had a petition to be transferred to prerelease custody or supervised
release approved by the warden of the prison . . . .”). It does not, inter alia, (1) establish a

procedure for a prisoner to submit the petition, i.e., through an Inmate Request to Staff form
(Form BP-S148.055 or BP-A0148), a formal Administrative Remedy (Form BP-9), or a
handwritten piece of paper; (2) designate a time period within which the warden must decide the
petition; or (3) set forth any procedures for a prisoner to follow if the warden denies the petition.
See id.; see also Jones v. LeMaster, No. 23-cv-00083, 2023 WL 6926201, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct.
19, 2023) (explaining that Ҥ 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II) grants the warden the authority to approve a
prisoner’s petition for an exception, and further establishes substantive criteria for evaluating it,
but conspicuously does not establish any particular procedure to follow in doing so”).
C. Analysis
The Court will dismiss Jells’s Section 2241 petition for his failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Jells concedes that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and
requests that he be excused from doing so because he is raising an issue of statutory construction

and exhaustion would be futile. As for his first argument, Jells’s petition does not present a
matter purely of statutory construction requiring this Court to determine the precise meaning of a
provision of the FSA; instead, he seeks an order directing the BOP to apply 120 FTCs towards
his supervised release. Because this claim does not present a claim of statutory construction, he
was required to exhaust this claim with the BOP before filing his petition unless he can show that
exhaustion would be futile. See, e.g., Malley v. Spaulding, No. 22-cv-01673, 2023 WL 3480887,
at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2023) (“Because his petition does not present a matter purely of
statutory construction; rather [sic] he is seeking to have a specific number of FSA time credits
applied towards his sentence, exhaustion is not excused in that situation.” (citations omitted)).
Regarding futility, Jells does not argue that the BOP cannot grant him the relief he seeks

in this case; instead, he asserts that exhaustion would be futile because he is supposed to be
released to a halfway house on March 4, 2026. This type of argument—that exhaustion should
be excused because of an impending release date—has been consistently rejected by district
courts in the Third Circuit. See Meadows v. Warden, FCI-Allenwood Low, No. 24-cv-00952,
2024 WL 3871810, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2024) (explaining that “[t]he Court is unaware of
any decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals holding that a federal prisoner may be
excused from the exhaustion requirement” on the ground that they have an impending release
date, and pointing out that “district courts within the Third Circuit have repeatedly rejected the
argument that an inmate can be excused from the exhaustion requirement simply because [their]
projected release date is approaching, and [they] may not complete [their] administrative appeal
before the release date.” (citations omitted)). This Court agrees with the reasoning of these cases
and will reject Jells’s contention that he should be excused from exhaustion on the ground of
futility.

In conclusion, Jells fails to show that he should be excused from exhausting his FSA
claim in this case and, as such, the Court will dismiss his Section 2241 petition for his failure to
exhaust. The Court also notes that even if exhaustion was excused in this case, Jells’s petition
would be denied because, as Respondent points out, he is ineligible for the application of any
earned FTCs towards prerelease custody because he has a medium recidivism risk level. See
(Doc. Nos. 6-1 ¶ 10 and Attachment C, Jells’s Recidivism Risk Assessment); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)–(ii) (stating that to be placed in prerelease custody or for early placement in
supervised release, the prisoner must have a minimum or low recidivism risk score in the last
two (2) reassessments); id. § 3624(g)(1)(B) (providing that FTCs cannot be applied until the
prisoner has “shown through the periodic risk reassessments a demonstrated recidivism risk

reduction or has maintained a minimum or low recidivism risk, during [their] term of
imprisonment”). Jells also concedes that he will not have “a minimum or low recidivism [risk
level] until April 2026.” See (Doc. No. 7 at 1).3
D. Jells’s Motion to Stay
Jells requests that this Court stay his petition due to his inability to be assessed at a
minimum or low recidivism risk until April 2026. See (id.). He points out that he will be in a

3 To the extent that Jells would seek application of his FTCs despite his medium recidivism risk
score, he could petition the warden for relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II); Delgado,
2023 WL 4553380, at *1 (“Inmates with a high or medium PATTERN score can petition the
warden to be considered on an individual basis for placement in prerelease custody or supervised
release.” (citations omitted)). Jells does not state that he chose this avenue for possible relief.
halfway house and must still serve his period of supervised release, to which his FTCs may be
applied. See (id.). The Court will deny Jells’s motion to stay because, despite his representation
to the contrary, the BOP has yet to designate him at a minimum or low recidivism risk level or
fail to apply his FTCs to his term of supervised release after he achieved this level. Granting his

motion would require the Court to speculate that these events will occur. Accordingly, the Court
will deny the motion to stay. Jells may file another Section 2241 petition if he believes that he is
eligible for the application of his FTCs and the BOP has not applied them to his term of
supervised release.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny Jells’s motion to stay and dismiss his
Section 2241 petition due to his failure to exhaust. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, District Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266174. Public record. Not legal advice.