# MANNO

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · February 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266106

## Case

- **Full name:** David Manno v. Randy Scott
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266106

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1746
- noting that a non-moving patty may not rest upon mere allegations or denials

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DAVID MANNO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:23CV37
)
RANDY SCOTT;! )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a pro se civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff David Manno,
an inmate in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant prevented Plaintiff from attending his physical therapy appointments
on July 28, 2022, and six dates in August 2022. (d. Am. Compl. (‘Compl.”) [Doc. #19] at
5.)? Curtently pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
#31]. For the reasons set out below, the Court recommends that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment be granted.

1 The operative Complaint identifies Defendant as “Keith Scott,” a correctional officer at Scotland Correctional
Institution. (Compl. [Doc. #19] at 2.) Defendant’s Answer indicates that no one by the name of Keith Scott
has worked at Scotland Correctional Institution but an officer named Randy Scott does. (Answer [Doc. #27]
at 3-4.) Records produced by Defendant reflect that Scotland Correctional Officer Randy Scott interacted with
Plaintiff on July 28, 2022. (Scott Decl. Ex. B, Grievance Files [Doc. #32-3] at 3-4.) Plaintiff later clarified that
he relied on another inmate for Defendant’s full name and that he “would request that the name Keith Scott
be amended to Randy Scott” for this litigation. (Notice [Doc. #29] at 1.) Randy Scott answered, participated
in discovery, and has moved for summary judgement. Therefore, the Court will amend the Defendant’s first
name to Randy Scott rather than Keith Scott, as requested by Plaintiff.
> All citations to documents filed in the present litigation refer to the page numbers added by the Coutt’s
electtonic case filing (“ECF”) system.

I. Facts, Claims, and Procedural History
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges Defendant denied him access to his physical therapy
appointments on July 28, 2022 and “6 other dates . . . all in August.” (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff
alleges that he has a physical condition involving torn cartilage and fluid in his knee and that
a doctor ordered that he have physical therapy sessions. (Compl. at 5, 7.) He alleges that on
July 28, 2022, he and three other inmates were transported from Lumberton Correctional
Institution (“Lumberton”) to Scotland Cortectional Institution (“Scotland”) for physical
therapy.? (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant sent him through security screening,
that the screening alerted, and that Defendant did not let him attend his appointment. (Compl.
at 5.) Plaintiff further alleges that, after Plaintiff told Defendant that the security screening
equipment was probably dysfunctional, Defendant used profanity at Plaintiff and placed
Plaintiff in a holding cell. (Compl. at 5.) According to the Complaint, the six other alleged
denials of treatment were “for the same treason.” (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that his knee
“continue[d] to swell and cause severe pain to walk.” (Compl. at 5.)
Plaintiff first filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant caused him to miss a single
session of physical therapy. Due to significant pleading defects, the Court stayed the case and
allowed Plaintiff to amend the Complaint twice. (Orders to File and Stay [Doc. #11, #13].)
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint again alleged only that Plaintiff missed a single therapy session,
as did his Second Amended Complaint. After the first three Complaints all failed to allege
more than one missed physical therapy session and failed to set out facts supporting that

3 Although Plaintiff is now housed at Scotland Cortectional Institution, at the time of the underlying events,
Plaintiff was housed at Lumberton Correctional Institution and had to be transported to and from Scotland for
his physical therapy appointments. (Compl. at 7; Notice of Change of Address [Doc. #44] at 1.)

Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs medical needs or caused any injury
to Plaintiff, the Court recommended dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint.
(Recommendation [Doc. #15].) Plaintiff filed an Objection [Doc. #17] in which he asserted
for the first time that he was denied physical therapy on additional days but had not included
them because he had not yet completed the grievance process for those additional days.
Plaintiff further alleged that he needed copies of his medical records. ‘The Court therefore
withdrew its Recommendation and allowed Plaintiff another opportunity to amend the
Complaint. (Order [Doc. #18].)
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, the operative pleading in this action, alleges that
Defendant denied Plaintiff access to his physical therapy appointments on seven occasions.
(Compl. [Doc. #19] at 4.) The Court ordered service on Defendant. (Order [Doc. #20].)
Defendant filed an Answer, and the Court scheduled the case for discovery, which has since
concluded. (Answer [Doc. #27]; Scheduling Order [Doc. #28].) Defendant then moved for
summaty judgment. (Mot. [Doc. #31].) In support of his Motion, Defendant filed
declarations from Defendant and from Plaintiffs physical therapist, along with exhibits
including medical records and files related to Plaintiffs grievance submission. (Def.’s Br.
[Doc. #32].) The Court directed counsel for Defendant to provide Plaintiff with a complete
copy of his medical records from Lumberton from June 1, 2022 to November 30, 2022.
(Order [Doc. #42].) Plaintiffs responsive filing includes excerpted medical records and two
unsworn affidavits, one from Plaintiff and one from inmate Dennis Rankins. (Pl.’s Br. [Doc.
#43].)

A. Defendant’s Evidence
Defendant produced medical records reflecting that Plaintiff injured his knee in 2020
after jumping from the top bunk of a bunk bed. (Manning Decl. Ex. A, Clinic Records [Doc.
#33] at 1.) In June 2022, after complaining of knee pain, Plaintiff received a diagnosis of
“Ttlendinosis and partial tearing of the distal semimembranosus” and was recommended for
physical therapy two or three times a week for eight weeks, for a total of 16 to 24 sessions.
(Clinic Records at 1, 4, 6.) Plaintiff was scheduled for twenty-four physical therapy
appointments, beginning on July 14, 2022. (Manning Decl. Ex. B, Appointment Schedule
[Doc. #34] at 1-2.) The medical records teflect that Plaintiff had physical therapy as scheduled
on July 14, 18, 21, and 27, 2022, with physical therapist Melissa Manning. (Manning Decl. Ex.
C, Physical ‘Therapy Records [Doc. #35] at 1-4.)
On July 28, 2022, Plaintiff and three other inmates attived at Scotland for medical
appointments. (Scott Decl. [Doc. #32-1] at 2.) When they arrived, Defendant was working
“tn medical” where inmates are brought for physical therapy. (Scott Decl. Ex. B, Grievance
Files [Doc. #32-3] at 3.) Defendant’s duties as a correctional officer at Scotland include
“searchling] offenders, visitors, cells, and other areas for weapons and contraband.” (Scott
Decl. at 1.) Defendant notes that as with all prisoners entering the facility, all four inmates
would have been required to “successfully pass through a cell sensor (metal detector) in a
receiving atea before being allowed to access other parts of the facility.” (Scott Decl. at 2.)
Defendant’s Declaration states that the security screening was a “security measure designed to
keep the facility and its staff safe” and that all inmates are required to pass through the
screening. (Scott Decl. at 2.) The sensor did not alert for the three other inmates but alerted

when Plaintiff passed through the sensor. (Scott Decl. at 2.) Defendant informed Plaintiff
that he could not enter the facility without passing through the cell sensor and not setting it
off. (Scott Decl. at 2; Grievance Files at 3 (stating Defendant “explain[ed] that if you don’t
pass cell sensor, you don’t go to medical for P.T.”).) According to Defendant, Plaintiff became
verbally aggressive and cursed at Defendant, and Defendant placed Plaintiff “in a holding cell
to cool off or until he could be transported back” to Lumberton. (Scott Decl. at 2.) Defendant
states that he was concerned about his own safety and the safety of others, due to Plaintiffs
behavior and the risk that Plaintiff “harbored unauthorized metal on his body.” (Scott Decl.
at 2.) Defendant also states that he was not aware of Plaintiffs specific medical issues,
diagnoses, ot treatments. (Scott Decl. at 2.) PT’ Manning’s records reflect that on July 28,
2022, Plaintiff was not at his appointment because he “was unable to pass through the metal
detector.” (Physical Therapy Records at 5.) Upon his return to Lumberton, Plaintiff had a
clinical encounter with a nutse who noted Plaintiff as having “No Complaint(s).” (Clinic
Records at 17.)
PT Manning’s records reflect that Plaintiff received treatment as scheduled on August
1, 3, and 4, 2022. (Physical Therapy Records at 6-8.)+ PT Manning recorded that Plaintiff
again received treatment as scheduled on August 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, and 24, 2022. (Physical
Therapy Records at 9-14.) Plaintiffs appointments that were originally scheduled for

4 Due to a gap in the records, it is unclear whether a session took place on August 8, 2022, or was rescheduled
or cancelled. (Compare Appointment Schedule with Physical Therapy Records.) Defendant contends that
“Plaintiffs physical therapist neglected to record” the August 8, 2022 appointment. (Def’s Br. at 17.) PT
Manning recorded the August 4, 2022 appointment as the eighth out of twenty-four and the August 10, 2022
appointment the tenth out of twenty-four, suggesting a ninth appointment between the two. (Physical Therapy
Records at 8-9.) Nevertheless, given the uncertainty and the absence of a record, the Court will not infer that
an appointment took place on August 8, 2022.

September 8 and 12, 2022, appeat to have been rescheduled or cancelled, but the September
14, 2022 treatment notes explain that Plaintiff “says he got a cortisone shot on 9/8/22 and it
hurt his knee worse so he couldn’t come.” (Compare Appointment Schedule with Physical
Therapy Records at 15.) The records also reflect that Plaintiff received treatment as scheduled
on September 14, 15, 19, and 21, 2022. (Physical Therapy Records at 15-18.)
PT Manning’s treatment notes state that on September 22, 2022, Plaintiff was “not
seen due to being stuck outside at count.” (Physical Therapy Records at 19.)5 A nutse at
Lumberton recorded an encounter with Plaintiff that same day and noted, “Offender refuses
to go to Scotland CI for physical therapy,” due to a rash related to his handcuffs. (Clinic
Records at 50.) Plaintiff received treatment for the rash and was instructed to apply
medication “before going on any outside trips that require handcuffs.” (Clinic Records at 51.)
PT Manning recorded that Plaintiff received physical therapy again on September 26 and 28,
2022. (Physical Therapy Records at 20-21.)
PT Manning’s notes reflect that on October 3, 2022, Plaintiff “was not seen because,
according to a transport officer, [he] refused to attend the appointment.” (Manning Decl.
[Doc. #32-4] at 3; Physical Therapy Records at 22.) Notes from a clinical encounter at
Lumberton on October 7, 2022, reflect that Plaintiff again complained of a rash and that his
recotds were “updated for flex-cuffs due to allergic reaction from handcuffs.” (Clinic Records
at 58-59.)

5 Plaintiff contests PT’ Manning’s September 22, 2022 notes on the basis that he did not travel to Scotland on
that day, but his account is consistent with PT Manning’s notes, which also reflect that Plaintiff was not seen
and that his appointment was rescheduled. (Compare Pl.’s Br. at 1-2 with Physical Therapy Records at 19.)

PT Manning’s records reflect that on November 10, 2022, Plaintiff had his last physical
therapy session, and stated “that his pain never changes” and “that he has gained some
strength from PT but his knee still hurts the same.” (Physical Therapy Records at 23.) In
total, Plaintiff's medical records reflect that he received physical therapy on at least twenty
occasions: July 14, 18, 21, and 27; August 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, and 24; September 14, 15,
19, 21, 26, and 28; and November 10, 2022. (Physical Therapy Records.)
B. Plaintiffs Evidence
Plaintiff filed a sworn “Answer to Summary Judgment” stating that his filing “including
the document enclosed with it” was submitted under penalty of perjury. (PL’s Br. at 2.)
Attached were two signed but unsworn documents styled as affidavits—one from Dennis
Rankins and one from Plaintiff—and two excerpts from Plaintiffs physical therapy records.
“Tt is well established that unsworn, unauthenticated documents cannot be considered on a
motion for summary judgment.” Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1993) (collecting
cases). “[A]n unsworn statement is admissible to support a summary judgment motion only
if it is made under penalty of perjury.” LeMay v. United States, No. 1:02CR105-6, 2010 WL
3522333, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 2010); see also United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC,
923 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1746). In this case, while Plaintiff
submitted his responsive filing “including” his own enclosed affidavit under penalty of perjury,
Mr. Rankins’s statement is not under penalty of perjury, and Plaintiffs attestation cannot

extend beyond Plaintiffs own statements. Accordingly, Mr. Rankins’s statement is not
properly before the Court.®
In his statement, Plaintiff does not rebut or contest the evidence that he could not pass
through the cell sensor on July 28, 2022. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that the cell sensor alerted
three different times when Plaintiff walked through the sensor. (Manno Aff. [Doc. #43] at 5.)
Plaintiff states that Defendant also screened Plaintiff using a wand-style metal detector and
that Plaintiff “passed” the wand screening. (Manno Aff. at 5.) Plaintiff states that after he
cleared the wand screening, he and the other prisoners began proceeding to the medical facility
when Plaintiff told Defendant that either Defendant was too close to the cell sensor or the
cell sensor was “sctewed up.” (Manno Aff. at 5; see Grievance Files at 1-2.) Plaintiff states
that Defendant began using profanity and instructed Transportation Officer Lowery to place
Plaintiff in the holding cell. (Manno Aff. at 5.) Plaintiff was then unable to have his
appointment that day. (Manno Aff. at 5.)
Although not included in the Complaint, Plaintiffs affidavit includes additional
contentions regarding a second incident on August 10, 2022, when he was receiving a physical
therapy treatment involving electric stimulation. (Manno Aff. at 5.) Plaintiff contends that
the intensity level became painful and that he “said ow” and asked PT Manning “if I could
turn down the box to get up and lets go.” (Manno Aff. at 5.) According to Plaintiffs affidavit,

6 Even if considered, Mr. Rankins’s affidavit would not add anything. Mr. Rankins states only that he was one
of the four inmates transported to Scotland on July 28, 2022, and that Plaintiff was denied physical therapy on
July 28 because an “officer was standing to[o] close to the sensor so it kept going off’ even though Plaintiff
“cleared the wand.” (Rankins Aff. [Doc. #43] at 3.) Mr. Rankins also confitms Plaintiff's accounts of a separate
PT appointment on August 10, 2022, and an interaction that occurred later. (Rankins Aff. at 3-4.) Plaintiff's
statements regarding those interactions are set out above, and Mr. Rankins’s statement would not add anything
ot change the analysis.

Defendant then removed Plaintiff from the room and placed Plaintiff in the medical holding
cell until it was time for his transportation back to Lumberton. (Manno Aff. at 5.)
Finally, Plaintiff also describes a third incident, the exact date unknown, that Plaintiff
contends occurted during the process when cortectional officers remove handcuffs and other
restraints from prisoners headed to medical appointments. (Manno Aff. at 5-6.) Plaintiff
states that Defendant pushed Plaintiff against the wall and started to search him while holding
his atm behind his back. (Manno Aff. at 6.) Plaintiff states that Defendant said, “I know what
you did,” using profanity, and left Plaintiff in the medical holding cell until it was time for his
transportation back to Lumberton. (Manno Aff. at 6.) Plaintiff does not include any other
statements or assertions tegarding any other incidents, and does not address the “6 other dates
...allin August” alleged in the Complaint.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue
of fact exists if the evidence presented could lead a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict
in favor of the non-moving patty. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all facts and draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence before it in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Id. The proponent of summary judgment “bears the initial burden of pointing
to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” ‘Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm’rs, 945
F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). If the
movant carries this burden, then the burden “shifts to the non-moving party to come forward

with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.” Id. at 718-19 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 247-48). A “mere scintilla of evidence” supporting the non-moving party’s case is
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791,
798 (Ath Cir. 1994); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (noting that a non-moving patty may
not rest upon mere allegations or denials).
Ill. Discussion
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must provide “humane conditions of
confinement.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “A prison official’s deliberate
indifference to an inmate’s setious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). A
plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim based on
inadequate medical care. Farmer, 511 U.S. 825; Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir.
1995) (citation omitted) (“[A] prisoner must prove . . . that ‘the deprivation . . . was objectively
sufficiently serious,’ and that ‘subjectively the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind.””).
The fitst prong is objective and requires a showing of a “sufficiently serious”
deprivation of care for a serious medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). A serious
medical need is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctot’s
attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).

10

Second, Plaintiff must also show that, subjectively, Defendant acted with “deliberate
indifference” to his serious medical needs. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference
is more than mete negligence and requires that a prison official “knows of and disregards an
excessive tisk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 835-837. Deliberate indifference may manifest
when non-medical prison personnel, such as prison guards, “intentionally deny] or delayl]
access to medical care or intentionally interfer[e] with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle,
429 U.S. at 104-05. “[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care” is not enough.
Id. at 105. Once prison officials are aware of a serious medical need, they only need to
“respond|| reasonably to the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 825 at 844.
In this case, as to the objective prong of the test, the evidence reflects that Plaintiff had
a knee injury and that he had been referred to physical therapy. However, Plaintiff has not
ptesented evidence that could support a finding of a serious deprivation of medical care.
Plaintiff's evidence reflects that, at most, Defendant prevented Plaintiff from attending two
sessions, once on July 28, 2022, and once on an unknown date, and that Defendant also
removed Plaintiff from his appointment on August 10, 2022, after Plaintiff attempted to stop
a treatment that Plaintiff found painful. (Manno Aff. at 5-6.) Plaintiff ultimately attended at
least twenty physical therapy sessions, including nine sessions in August. The treatment
Plaintiff recetved therefore is largely consistent with the recommended treatment of sixteen to
twenty-four sessions of physical therapy. Plaintiff's medical records also reflect that Plaintiff
received physical therapy on nine of the ten dates in August 2022 shown on his original
physical therapy schedule, even if the August 10, 2022 appointment was interrupted, and

11

Plaintiff has not presented any support for his contention in the Third Amended Complaint
that Defendant denied him access to physical therapy six different times in August.
While Plaintiffs medical records reflect some changes between the original physical
therapy schedule and the treatment he received, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that any
other missed appointments are attributable to Defendant. (See, e.g., Physical Therapy Records
at 15 (explaining that Plaintiff missed appointments after his September 8, 2022 cortisone
injection).) In addition, the medical records note that Plaintiff “refuse[d] to go to Scotland”
and “refused to attend” appointments on September 22 and October 3, 2022, and Defendant,
an officer at Scotland, was not responsible for Plaintiff missing treatment on days where
Plaintiff refused to travel to Scotland. (Clinic Records at 50; Physical Therapy Records at 22.)
Plaintiffs medical records also reflect that he stated his pain level “never changes” and
that physical therapy did not impact his pain level. (Physical Therapy Records at 23.) Plaintiff
received other treatments for pain management, including a lidocaine injection in his knee.
(Clinic Records at 73.) Ultimately, in light of the treatment Plaintiff received, there is no
indication that Plaintiff suffered a substantial risk of serious harm as a result of missing two
physical therapy sessions and leaving one early after he himself indicated the treatment was
causing him pain.
As to the subjective prong of the test, Defendant knew that Plaintiff was brought to
Scotland for physical therapy appointments, although there is no evidence that Defendant
knew of Plaintiffs specific medical needs. While Defendant knew Plaintiff had physical
therapy appointments, there is no indication that Defendant believed missing the
appointments would create an excessive risk to Plaintiffs health. For July 28, 2022, the

12

evidence reflects that Plaintiff was the only inmate in his group that set off the cell censor,
which Defendant understood “could mean that [Plaintiff] harbored unauthorized metal on his
body.” (Scott Decl. at 2.) Defendant presented evidence that he had concern for his own
safety and the safety of others due to Plaintiffs positive alert on the cell sensor and Plaintiffs
conduct afterwards. (Scott Decl. at 2.) Although both Parties dispute whether they behaved
ageressively and used profanity, the undisputed material facts reflect that Plaintiff set off the
cell sensor and was unable to walk through it without setting it off. In addition, while Plaintiff
assetts that he did not set off the wand metal detector, Plaintiff conceded that he set off the
cell sensor at least three times and told Defendant that either the cell sensor was defective or
the positive alerts were because of Defendant. Plaintiff has not created a factual dispute as to
Defendant’s evidence that, as an officer tasked with maintaining safety at Scotland, Defendant
acted reasonably in light of his belief that Plaintiff presented a safety risk due to the potential
presence of unauthorized metal on Plaintiffs person. See Shakka, 71 F.3d 162, 167 (finding
no Eighth Amendment violation when an inmate was temporarily deprived of a wheelchait
for the safety of himself and others).
As to the other incidents alleged by Plaintiff,’ Plaintiff has not established that
Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety in removing Plaintiff
during Plaintiffs August 10, 2022 appointment. Rather, Plaintiff describes an incident in

7 Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs claims regarding missed appointments other than the July 28, 2022
appointment ate barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) because Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust
his administrative remedies except for as to the July 28, 2022 incident. (Def.’s Br. at 9, 11.) Plaintiff raises
contentions regarding the availability of the grievance process. (Objection to Recommended Ruling [Doc. #17]
at 2.) However, the Court need not address those issues, as Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional
violation in any event.
13

which he was experiencing significant pain during treatment, “said ow,” and asked to “turn
down the box to get up and lets go,” after which Defendant took Plaintiff to the holding cell.
(Manno Aff. at 5.) Plaintiff has not presented evidence that Defendant acted with deliberate
indifference as to Plaintiffs medical needs by removing Plaintiff, as PlaintifPs own evidence
reflects that Plaintiff requested to stop the treatment. In addition, as to the third incident
described by Plaintiff, when Defendant searched Plaintiff and left Plaintiff in the holding cell,
it is unclear when this incident took place, whether Defendant would have been awate of a
serious medical need of Plaintiffs at the time, and whether Plaintiff cleared the search. Absent
more evidence, these incidents do not amount to a showing that Defendant acted with
deliberate indifference as to a serious medical need of Plaintiff.
In sum, the Court concludes that no reasonable juror could find that Defendant acted
with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs serious medical need. In addition, Plaintiff has not
established that Defendant interfered with Plaintiffs treatment in a way that caused Plaintiff
substantial harm, in light of the twenty treatment sessions Plaintiff did recetve and the evidence
that Plaintiff missed at least four appointments for reasons unrelated to Defendant. See Webb
v. Hamidullah, 281 F. App’x 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2008) (“An Eighth Amendment violation only
occurs ... if the delay [in medical care] results in some substantial harm to the patient.”’).

8 To the extent Plaintiff may be attempting to raise a new claim of excessive force, “[a] plaintiff may not amend
[his] complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.” Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v.
Battelle Mem’1 Inst., 262 F. App’x 556, 563 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382
F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004).
14

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant’s Motion for Summaty Judgment be
eranted.?
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. #31] be GRANTED and that the Court enter summary judgment in favor of
Defendant.
This, the 234 day of February, 2026.

h et Peake
nited States Magistrate Judge

Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff did not establish a constitutional violation, the Court need not
reach the issue of qualified immunity. However, the Court also notes that Defendant in his individual capacity
would be entitled to qualified immunity in this circumstance. Qualified immunity shields government officials
from liability unless “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right” and “the tight was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A right is clearly established when “the contours of a tight
ate sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.”” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (quotations omitted). Thus, “[q]ualified immunity gives government officials
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Id. at 743. In this
case, Plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment, nor has he
established that every reasonable official would have understood that the actions violated a constitutional right.
Thus, Defendant would also be entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff would not be able to recover
damages from Defendant in Defendant’s individual capacity.
The Court also notes that the official-capacity claims for damages would be barred by sovereign immunity.
[The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor is officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under
§ 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (emphasis added). Indeed, an official
capacity claim raised under § 1983 seeking damages against a state official is generally a claim against the state
itself. Hafer v. Melo, 502 US. 21, 25 (1991). “The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has
waived its immunity, or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to override that immunity,” and § 1983 does not change or override that immunity. Will, 491 U.S.
at 66 (internal citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff also would not be able to recover damages for claims against
Defendant in his official capacity.

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11266106. Public record. Not legal advice.
