# Mohamed

> District Court, N.D. Texas · December 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11264167

## Case

- **Full name:** Hani Salah Mohamed v. Marc D. Dillard, in official capacity as Chargé d’ Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Kenya, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** December 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11264167

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding “there can be no effectual relief by mandamus” as to “a hearing upon an investigation which we may not command and which may never be made”
- holding that mandamus “does not lie to compel a reversal of a decision, either interlocutory or final, made in the exercise of a lawful jurisdiction, especially where in regular course the decision may be reviewed upon a writ of error or an appeal”
- finding that agency decisions are final even if they can be revisited

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

HANI SALAH MOHAMED, §
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-CV-917-B-BW
§
MARC D. DILLARD, in official capacity §
as Chargé d’ Affaires, U.S. Embassy in §
Kenya, et al., §
Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff Hani Salah
Mohamed’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (Dkt. No. 11 (“Mot.”)). Plaintiff seeks
to compel Defendants to adjudicate a pending I-130 visa application for her
daughter. (See Dkt. No. 1 (“Pet.”).) Senior United States District Judge Jane J.
Boyle referred this case to the undersigned magistrate judge for pretrial management
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). (Dkt. No. 7.)
For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’
motion to dismiss be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus be DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, but her daughter, Amal Mohamed
Yusuf (“Amal”), is a non-citizen. (See Pet. ¶¶ 2, 10.) In July 2018, Plaintiff filed a
Form I-130, “Petition for Alien Relative,” with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) that sought to have Amal classified as Plaintiff’s child.1 (See id.
¶¶ 2, 16.) The following year, USCIS approved the Form I-130, and subsequently
forwarded the approved petition to the U.S. Department of State. (See id. ¶¶ 3–4,

17.)
On November 9, 2023, a consular officer at the U.S. Embassy in Kenya
conducted an interview of Amal, at which time Amal swore to, thereby executing,
her visa application.2 (See id. ¶ 19; see also Dkt. 1-2, at 2.) Pursuant to § 221(g) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g), the consular officer refused Amal’s application.3 (See Pet.

1 A non-citizen who is the beneficiary of an approved Form I-130 petition may apply
for a visa in accordance with a process set out in the INA. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1153(a).
In this process, the citizen-relative first files a Form I-130 petition on behalf of the non-
citizen, seeking to have the non-citizen classified as an immediate relative. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1153(f), 1154(a)(1); see also Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 89 (2015). If USCIS approves the
Form I-130, the petition is sent to the Department of State’s National Visa Center (“NVC”).
The NVC then assigns a case number and sends the petition to the U.S. embassy or
consulate where the foreign-national relative lives. The non-citizen may begin to apply for a
visa by submitting required documents and appearing at a United States embassy or
consulate for an interview with a consular officer (i.e., a representative of the U.S.
Department of State). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1), 1202.
2 At a visa interview, a visa applicant executes a visa application in the presence of a
consular officer. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1), 1202; see also 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(l)(2) (defining
“make or file an application for a visa”). The burden of proof is on the applicant to
“establish that [s]he is eligible to receive such visa.” 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
3 Before issuing a visa, a consular officer must ensure that an applicant is not
inadmissible under any provision of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361; see also Din, 576 U.S. at,
89. At the conclusion of the applicant’s interview, the consular officer must either issue or
refuse the visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), or other applicable law. See 22
C.F.R. § 42.81(a) (“When a visa application has been properly completed and executed
before a consular officer . . . the consular officer must issue the visa, refuse the visa . . . or . .
. discontinue granting the visa.”). With certain exceptions not relevant here, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1201(g) provides that no visa may issue if an applicant is ineligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182,
the visa application does not comply with applicable statutes or regulations, or the consular
officer “knows or has reason to believe” that the applicant is ineligible for a visa “under . . .
any other provision of law.”
¶ 20.) Although the consular officer determined that the applicant was not eligible
for the visa sought, the officer initiated post-refusal, discretionary administrative
processing to ascertain whether the refusal might be overcome. (See id.; see also Dkt.

No. 1-2, at 2.) Amal’s visa application remains refused under INA § 221(g), 8
U.S.C. §1201(g).4
On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this mandamus action, asserting three
causes of action. (See generally Pet.) Plaintiff first alleges that the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) requires Defendants to adjudicate Amal’s application and

that “Defendants have failed to adjudicate Plaintiffs daughter’s visa application
within a reasonable time.” (Pet. ¶¶ 24–28 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (“The reviewing
court shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”).)
Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants have violated the Mandamus Act by “fail[ing]

to adjudicate Plaintiffs daughter’s visa application within a reasonable time.” (Id.
¶¶ 29–35.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated Plaintiff’s due-
process rights under the Fifth Amendment because “Defendants’ delay in
adjudicating Amal’s visa application constitutes a deprivation of Plaintiff’s protected
interest without due process.” (Id. ¶¶ 36–40.) Plaintiff requests the Court to compel

4 See U.S. Department of State Consular Electronic Application Center Visa Status
Check, Case number NRB2019820001, https://ceac.state.gov/CEACStatTracker/Status.
aspx?TSPD_101_R0=0883343043ab200004ea852c384d8c40452b54aeca9996c16a58946385c
27e83e1e4d5a7ebb64a1508ad1f18241430006deeab036d4fa8b6117f55cacc688fe5e492a54223
5a024aa9bcbc3bf1678c207576f6a145c5a3062862c5dbfc77919e, indicating case status as “A
U.S. consular officer has adjudicated and refused your visa application.” (last visited Dec.
30, 2025).
Defendants to re-adjudicate Amal’s visa application within fifteen (15) calendar days,
award attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, and
grant any other appropriate relief. (Id. ¶ 41.)

On June 13, 2025, Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), or alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6). (See
generally Mot.) Plaintiff filed a response on July 3, 2025 (Dkt. No. 13 (“Resp.”)), and
Defendants filed a reply on July 17, 2025 (Dkt. No. 14 (“Reply”)). Accordingly, the

motion (Dkt. No. 11) is ripe for consideration.
Defendants argue that this action is moot because Amal’s visa application has
already been adjudicated, and accordingly, Plaintiff’s petition should be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Mot. at 4-9.) Defendants further argue
that even if the case were not moot, the doctrine of consular non-reviewability bars

this Court’s review of the decision to refuse Amal’s application. (See id. at 10-11.)
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because Defendants have
no duty to re-adjudicate the refused visa application. (See id. at 12-17.) And even
assuming a duty to re-adjudicate, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state
sufficient facts to support a claim of unreasonable delay. (See id. at 17-22.) Finally,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable due process claim. (See id.
at 23-24.)
In response, Plaintiff maintains that the case is not moot; that the consular
non-reviewability doctrine does not apply because no final decision has been made
regarding Amal’s application; and that Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to support a
claim of unreasonable delay under the APA, as well as a viable due process claim.
(See Resp.at 11–30.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction
conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” La. Real Est. Appraisers Bd.
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 917 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Texas v. Travis Cnty.,

910 F.3d 809, 811 (5th Cir. 2018)). Courts “must presume that a suit lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the
party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th
Cir. 2001).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is the vehicle through which a party

can challenge a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). “Courts may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of
three bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed
facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the
court's resolution of disputed facts.” Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th

Cir.1986) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981)). When
examining a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1),
which does not implicate the merits of a plaintiff's cause of action, the district court
has substantial authority “to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence
of its power to hear the case.” Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256,
1261 (11th Cir.1997); see also Clark, 798 F.2d at 741. If the court determines that it

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
When a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “is filed in
conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)

jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United
States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001); Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608
(5th Cir. 1977) (explaining that “the court should dismiss only on the jurisdictional
ground . . . without reaching the question of failure to state a claim”). This
requirement prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case

with prejudice. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. The court’s dismissal of a plaintiff's case
because the plaintiff lacks subject matter jurisdiction is not a determination of the
merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does
have proper jurisdiction. Id.
B. Rule 12(b)(6)

To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Reliable
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008). To meet this “facial
plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must accept well-

pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the
court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences,
or legal conclusions.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007)

(citation omitted). A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). The ultimate

question is whether the complaint states a valid claim when viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313
F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court does not
evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success. It only determines whether the plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556

F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court lacks jurisdiction because the case is moot.
The Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) grants “consular officers

exclusive authority to review applications for visas.” Saavedra Bruno v Albright, 197
F3d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 8 USC §§ 1104(a), 1201(a)). Pertinent
regulation provides, “When a visa application has been properly completed and
executed before a consular officer in accordance with the provisions of the INA and
the implementing regulations, the consular officer must issue the visa [or] refuse the

visa under [8 USC § 1182(a) or 8 USC § 1201(g)] or other applicable law.” 22 CFR
§ 42.81(a).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants have unreasonably delayed adjudicating
Amal’s visa application. (See Pet. ¶¶ 29-40.) Defendants argue that this action is
moot because the consular office adjudicated Amal’s visa application by refusing it

under INA § 221(g), which is a final adjudication unless and until it is superseded by
another decision, which may or may not occur. (See Resp. at 7-8.) There is no
dispute that Amal was interviewed at the U.S. Embassy in Kenya on November 9,
2023, and her application was adjudicated that same day. (See id.; see also Pet. ¶¶ 18-
20.) Defendants maintain that because they have provided Plaintiff the relief she

requested, Plaintiff’s claims are now moot. (See Resp. at 12-13 (citing Deakins v.
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 199 (1988) (Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution,
federal courts may adjudicate only “actual, ongoing controversies between
litigants.”)).)
Citing a wide range of cases, Defendants contend that the denial in this case is

final until it has been overturned and there is no mandatory requirement to re-
adjudicate a refused visa application or conduct any further administrative
processing. (See id. (citing Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft, 734 F. Supp. 3d 87, 103 (D.D.C.
2024); Conley v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 731 F. Supp. 3d 104, 111 (D. Mass. 2024); Ahromi
v. Blinken, No. CV-23-2054-PHX-DMF, 2024 WL 3396071, at *7 (D. Ariz. July 12,

2024); Chang v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. C23-01918-RSM, 2024 WL 3161895, at *2
(W.D. Wash. June 25, 2024). And so, while Plaintiff nominally seeks in her
complaint an order to compel adjudication, given that a decision was actually made
and has not been overturned, what Plaintiff really seeks is an expedited re-

adjudication. (See generally Pet.)
In light of the multitude of cases cited by Defendants that express this same
understanding towards the same conclusion regarding the final effect of a refused
visa application and the lack of any credible case law, statutory, or regulatory
authority to the contrary, Plaintiff’s argument that refusal of Amal’s application does

not operate as a denial, but rather, her application was “preliminarily refused” and
“placed into administrative processing status, a temporary measure” (see id. at 11) is
unpersuasive. Because Defendants have already provided Plaintiff the relief she
requests—Amal was interviewed at the Embassy in Kenya and a consular officer
adjudicated her application—and because there is no other relief the Court can grant,
the complaint is moot. See Hussein v. Beecroft, 782 F. App’x 437, 440, 442–43 (6th
Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of a mandamus action as moot where a consular

officer, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g), refused a visa application); Tariq v. Blinken, No.
3:21-CV-02841-M, 2023 WL 2661543, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2023) (dismissing a
mandamus case as moot where a consular officer refused the plaintiff’s daughter’s
visa application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)); Guilarducci v. Blinken, No. 3:21-CV-

1719-K, 2021 WL 5140874, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2021) (dismissing a
mandamus case as moot where a consular officer refused the plaintiff’s fiancée’s visa
application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)); Toor v. Clinton, No. 1:09-cv-F-279-
OWW-GSA, 2009 WL 1582900, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2009) (refusing a visa
application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g), holding that “no writ of mandamus

should issue” because “[t]his refusal satisfied the duty owed to [the applicant] under
22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a)—namely, to ‘issue or refuse the visa under INA 212(a) or INA
221(g) or other applicable law’”).
Here, the record establishes that a decision was made with respect to the
action that was required. Mandamus simply is not available to compel action that

hsd already been taken. See, e.g., US ex rel Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co v US Tariff
Commission, 274 US 106, 112 (1927) (finding “there can be no effectual relief by
mandamus” as to “a hearing upon an investigation which we may not command and
which may never be made”); cf. Ex parte Roe, 234 US 70, 73 (1914) (holding that
mandamus “does not lie to compel a reversal of a decision, either interlocutory or
final, made in the exercise of a lawful jurisdiction, especially where in regular course
the decision may be reviewed upon a writ of error or an appeal”); Huckeby v Frozen

Food Express, 555 F2d 542, 549 (5th Cir 1977) (holding that “extraordinary writs
cannot be used as substitutes for appeals”) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 322 US 258, 260
(1947)).
In addition, the mere possibility that Defendants might reconsider their refusal

under § 1201(g) (as Plaintiff appears to suggest) does not somehow render nonfinal
the action that was taken. Sackett v Environmental Protection Agency, 566 US 120, 127
(2012) (holding the possibility that the agency might reconsider its decision does not
“make an otherwise final agency action nonfinal”); see also Data Marketing Partnership,
LP v US Department of Labor, 45 F4th 846, 854 (5th Cir 2022) (finding that agency

decisions are final even if they can be revisited) (citing Sackett and US Army Corps of
Engineers v Hawkes Co., 578 US 590, 598 (2016). Such being the case here, Plaintiff’s
claims for mandamus and unreasonable delay under the APA cannot proceed. See
Bamdad v United States Department of State, No. 1:23-CV-757-DAE, 2024 WL
1462948, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2024) (collecting cases and dismissing mandamus

action as moot where consular officer had already taken action refusing plaintiff’s
visa application under 8 USC § 1201(g)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is moot,
and the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s due process claim fails for similar reasons. Plaintiff claims that
“Defendants’ delay in adjudicating [Amal’s] visa application constitutes a
deprivation of Plaintiff’s protected interest without due process.” (Pet. ¶¶ 36–40.)

As previously explained, however, because Defendants have adjudicated Amal’s visa
application, Plaintiff’s due process claim is moot. Nor does Defendants’ denial of
Amal’s application establish a due process violation. See, e.g., Adebayo v. Dep’t of
State, No. 24-CV-2523 (LDH), 2025 WL 964096, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025)
(dismissing Fifth Amendment due process claim where plaintiff alleged a delay in

adjudication of children’s visa petitions because “individuals do not have a due
process right in the adjudication of a relative’s visa application”) (citing Dep’t of State
v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 909 (2024)); Hassan v. Bitter, 748 F. Supp. 3d 722, 757 (D.
Neb. 2024) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that a purportedly unreasonable delay in

processing his children’s visa applications violates his due process) (citing Muñoz, 602
U.S. at 909-10); see also Din, 576 U.S. at 101 (finding no due-process violation where
a United States citizen’s non-citizen relative was denied admission to the United
States).
B. Consular non-reviewability also makes this action non-justiciable.

Even if this case were not moot, the doctrine of consular non-reviewability
renders this action equally non-justiciable. Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the doctrine of consular non-reviewability:
Congress may delegate to executive officials the discretionary authority
to admit noncitizens immune from judicial inquiry or interference. . . .
When it does so, the action of an executive officer to admit or to
exclude an alien is final and conclusive. . . . The Judicial Branch has no
role to play unless expressly authorized by law. . . . The Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) does not authorize judicial review of a
consular officer’s denial of a visa; thus, as a rule, the federal courts
cannot review those decisions. This principle is known as the doctrine
of consular nonreviewability.
Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 907–08 (citations and quotations omitted). And there is no law
that provides such express authorization that would allow the Court to review the
visa refusal in this case. See id. Here, Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing
visa eligibility as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (INA § 291) and a consular officer has
refused Amal’s visa application under INA § 221(g). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
are barred from judicial review.
In addition, Fifth Circuit decisions firmly align with this doctrine. The denial
of visas is not subject to review by federal courts. Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d 1212,
1213 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[D]ecisions of United States consuls on visa matters are
nonreviewable by the courts.”). While some courts have found that the APA does
permit review of claims related to the application process other than the officer’s
adjudication, a consular decision to deny a visa—as opposed to the government’s
failure to act on the visa application at all—is the sort of decision for which review is
“clearly barred” by the doctrine of consular non-reviewability. Jaime v. Blinken, No.

EP-22-CV-248-KC, 2023 WL 2657651, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2023), appeal
dismissed, No. 23-50270, 2023 WL 7141121 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2023) (internal citations
and quotations omitted); see also Te Kuei Liu v. INS, 645 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir. Unit
A May 1981) (“Nor is it within the ambit of our review to consider the actions of the
American Consul in Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.”); Gonzalez-Cuevas v. INS, 515
F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1975) (“We are asked to consider the actions of the United

States Consul in Monterrey, Mexico in assigning a priority date for the issuance of
visas to petitioners based upon the date of petitioners’ application rather than the
date of the citizen children’s birth. This action is not within the ambit of our
review.”); Dargahifadaei v. Kerry, No. 3-12-CV-01942-K, 2013 WL 1627887, at *3–4
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2013) (“The APA cannot circumvent the non-reviewability of

consular decisions on visa applications.”). Accordingly, the doctrine of consular
non-reviewability bars review of the visa refusal decision here.
Plaintiff insists that the consular non-reviewability doctrine does not apply
because no final decision has been made, and judicial review is permitted. (See Reply

at 17-19.) For the reasons already discussed, this argument fails. A consular officer
refused Amal’s application. Furthermore, the cases Plaintiff cites to support her
argument are either not binding on this court or not applicable. (See id.) For
example, in Maramjaya v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, No. 06-2158 RCL,
2008 WL 9398947 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2008), the plaintiff challenged USCIS’s decision

on an immigration petition, not a denial of a visa application. See id. at *4. In Jaraba
v. Blinken, 568 F. Supp. 3d 720 (W.D. Tex. 2021), the plaintiff challenged the delay
in scheduling a visa interview. See id. at 726. In Ali v. Rice, No. CV H-07-1868, 2008
WL 11502058 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2008), the plaintiff challenged the State
Department’s inaction on a Form I-824 application. See id. at *1. Thus, these cases
have no bearing on the doctrine of consular non-reviewability which bars judicial
review of Amal’s visa denial decision.
Because the undersigned concludes that the Court lacks jurisdiction, it is not
necessary to determine Defendants’ alternative arguments that Plaintiff fails to state a
claim for her remaining causes of action.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss filed on June
13, 2025 (Dkt. No. 11), should be GRANTED, and this mandamus action should be
DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
SO RECOMMENDED on December 31, 2025.

wn

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-15-

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11264167. Public record. Not legal advice.