# Lake

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · February 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11264143

## Case

- **Full name:** Gemini Lake v. Edward Brennan, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GEMINI LAKE, CIVIL NO. 3:25-CV-00548

Plaintiff,
(SAPORITO, J.)
v. (LATELLA, M.J.)

EDWARD BRENNAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
Pro se Plaintiff Gemini Lake filed the instant action asserting four
counts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to Defendants’ conduct in
filing a petition for a conservatorship in Pennsylvania state court for a
property that Plaintiff owns. Defendants include the City of Pottsville
Redevelopment Authority (“RDA”), the Board of Directors of the RDA
and various individual Board Members, the Solicitor for the RDA, and
three City of Pottsville employees (collectively referred to as the “City
Defendants”) as well as a private developer. Plaintiff filed several
motions to disqualify counsel for the City Defendants. Two were
deemed withdrawn (see Docs. 29, 43) and one remains pending (Doc.
32). For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 26, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this matter by filing a
Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). On April 16, 2025,
the City Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff filed

a Motion to Disqualify Counsel on April 21, 2025. (Doc. 14). While that
Motion was pending, Plaintiff filed a second Motion to Disqualify on
May 30, 2025. (Doc. 27). The Court issued an Order deeming Plaintiff’s

April 21, 2025 Motion to Disqualify withdrawn. (Doc. 29). Plaintiff
filed a response in opposition to the City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
on June 6, 2025. (Doc. 31). Plaintiff then filed another Motion to

Disqualify Counsel and supporting brief on June 13, 2025. (Doc. 32).
The City Defendants filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Disqualify Counsel on June 27, 2025. (Doc. 39). The Court issued an

Order on September 24, 2025 deeming Plaintiff’s second Motion to
Disqualify Counsel withdrawn. (Doc. 24).
Defendant Nat Hyman filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 13, 2025

(Doc. 35) and a supporting brief on June 26, 2025 (Doc. 38). Plaintiff
filed a brief in opposition to Defendant Nat Hyman’s Motion to Dismiss
on July 9, 2025 (Doc. 40) and Defendant Hyman filed a Reply Brief on

July 11, 2025. (Doc. 41).
Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify (Doc. 32) is ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court has inherent power to supervise the professional
conduct of attorneys appearing before it.1 See United States v. Miller,
624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980). This power includes the authority

to disqualify an attorney. Id. As many decisions have stressed, “courts
have vital interests in protecting the integrity of their judgments,
maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the bar, eliminating

conflicts of interest, and protecting confidential communications
between attorneys and their clients.” Commonwealth Ins. Co. v.

1 We have addressed this motion by memorandum and order
because we deem a disqualification motion to be a non-dispositive
matter under § 636(b)(1)(A) that may be ruled on by a magistrate judge,
subject to review by a district judge under the clearly erroneous or
contrary to law standard. Matylewicz v. Cnty. of Lackawanna Transit
Sys. Auth., No. 3:19-CV-1169, 2020 WL 5095933, at *4 n.1 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2020); see also Blueprint Capital Advisors, LLC v. New Jersey,
No. 20-7663, 2025 WL 3551798, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2025) (order
denying motion to disqualify counsel is non-dispositive order).
Graphix Hot Line, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1200, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1992); see also

United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 1991) (same).
Attorney conduct is governed by the ethical standards of the court
before which the attorney appears. See In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust

Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1984). However, motions to disqualify
are generally disfavored. See Cohen v. Oasin, 844 F. Supp. 1065, 1067
(E.D. Pa. 1994). Accordingly, courts approach such motions with

“cautions scrutiny,” mindful of a litigant’s right to the counsel of its
choice. Regalo International, LLC v. Munchkin, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 3d
682, 687 (D. Del. 2016) (internal citation omitted). Thus, “even if a

court finds that counsel violated the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct, disqualification is not mandatory.” AgSaver LLC v. FMC
Corp., No. CIV. A. 11–997, 2011 WL 2274178, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 9,

2011) (citing Jordan v. Phila. Housing Auth., 337 F. Supp. 2d 666, 672
(E.D. Pa. 2004)). In this regard, the Third Circuit has cautioned that a
court:

[S]hould disqualify an attorney only when it
determines, on the facts of the particular case,
that disqualification is an appropriate means of
enforcing the applicable disciplinary rule. It
should consider the ends that the disciplinary
rule is designed to serve and any countervailing
policies, such as permitting a litigant to retain
the counsel of her choice and enabling attorneys
to practice without excessive restrictions.

United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980) (emphasis
added). The party seeking disqualification must “clearly show[ ] that
continued representation would be impermissible.” Regalo
International, LLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 687. “Vague and unsupported
allegations are not sufficient to meet this standard.” Id. Additionally,

“the court must prevent litigants from using motions to disqualify
opposing counsel for tactical purposes.” Cohen, 884 F. Supp. at 1067.
III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises five arguments in support of disqualification of
counsel for the City Defendants. (See Doc. 33 at 4-8). We will address
each in turn. As an initial matter, however, we will address the City

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this motion.
A. We Will Assume Plaintiff Has Standing to Raise His
Disqualification Motion

The City Defendants argue that Plaintiff, who is not a client of
counsel for the City Defendants, does not have standing to move for
counsel’s disqualification. (Doc. 39 at 3-4). However, the City
Defendants acknowledge that the Third Circuit has not yet decided the
issue of whether a non-client litigant may move for attorney

disqualification. (Id. at 3). And more, the City Defendants recognize
that “[a] majority of Courts in [the Third] Circuit to address the issue
have found that a non-client has standing to seek opposing counsel’s

disqualification.” (Id. at 3-4) (quoting Santander Securities, LLC v.
Gamache, No. 17-317, 2017 WL 1208066, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
Notwithstanding that line of authority, they argue that Plaintiff does

not have a personal stake in the motion sufficient to satisfy Article III.
(Id.).
In his Reply brief, Plaintiff likewise recognizes that the Third

Circuit “has not definitively settled the issue,” but argues that a
majority of courts within this Circuit have recognized that a non-client
litigant may have standing to seek disqualification. (Doc. 41 at 4-5).

In Santander, the Court summarized the Third Circuit’s rulings
on non-clients’ standing to move for disqualification. 2017 WL 1208066,
at *3. The Court noted that in In re Corn Deriv. Antitrust Litig., 748

F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit “[a]ssum[ed] without
deciding that a motion to disqualify must be brought by a former
client.” Id. But, in In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 401 n.20
(3d Cir. 2006), the Third Circuit “assumed without deciding that [non-

client] defendants have standing to raise the disqualification issue.” Id.
Finally, In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 685-87 (3d Cir. 2005), the
Third Circuit “conferred standing on non-client insurers to seek

disqualification of their insured's ‘special counsel’ in bankruptcy
proceedings.” Id.
The court in Santander went on to cite the majority of cases

within this Circuit that have found that a non-client has standing to
seek opposing counsel’s disqualification. 2017 WL 1208066, at *3
(citing Bosh v. Renco Grp., Inc., No. 16-190, 2016 WL 3633079, at *4

(W.D. Pa. July 7, 2016); Cafaro v. HMC Intern., LLC, No. 07-2793, 2012
WL 4857763, at *6 n.8 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2012); In re Kirchner, No. 09-
19636, 2010 WL 1855861, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 5, 2010); In re

Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 308 B.R. 716, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004);
Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F. Supp. 2d 418, 431
(D.N.J. 1998); Schiffli Embroidery Workers Pension Fund v. Ryan, Beck

& Co., No. 91-5433, 1994 WL 62124, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 1994); Pa.
Water Works Supply Co. v. Bucks County Bank & Trust. Co., No. 91-
2814, 1991 WL 161473, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 1991); Duca v. Raymark

Indus., 663 F. Supp. 184, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1986)).
Ultimately, the court in Santander indicated that it would be
inclined to deny non-client standing in that matter, but "[b]ecause the

law in this area is less than clear,” the court “assume[d], arguendo, that
[the] non-client . . . has such standing.” 2017 WL 1208066, at *6.
Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff does not have a personal

stake in the Motion is well-taken. Plaintiff’s concerns do not directly
suggest that he will suffer any injury based upon City Defendants’
counsel’s continued representation, but rather that the City Defendants

will not receive adequate and effective representation. However, as the
court in Santander found, because the law in this area is not clear, we
will also assume arguendo, that Plaintiff has standing to assert his

Motion. See Santander, 2017 WL 1208066, at *6.
B. Disqualification is Not Warranted Based Upon Alleged
“Material Limitation”

Plaintiff alleges that disqualification of the City Defendants’
counsel is required based upon the “material limitation” provision of
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2). (Doc. 33 at 4). He
argues that the rule prohibits an attorney from representing a client if
“there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients

will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another
client.” (Id.). Plaintiff argues that the allegations in the Complaint
against Defendants Brennan and Palamar – that they “orchestrated a

conspiracy” and “schemed and planned” to deprive Plaintiff of his rights
– “suggest a significantly greater and distinct level of liability” than the
other City Defendants. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that counsel’s

representation of those two defendants may require him to shift blame
to other City Defendants, implicating Model Rule 1.7. Id. He further
claims some of the other City Defendants may have valid cross-claims

or claims for indemnification/contribution against Defendants Brennan
and Palamar. (Id. at 5.)
The City Defendants respond by arguing that Lake’s vague and

unsubstantiated allegations lacking factual evidence do not justify
disqualification pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct
1.7. (Doc. 39). They further argue that there is no judgment against

the City that would require contribution, nor are there any legal
obligations among and between the city Defendants that would require
one or more of the City Defendants to accept responsibility for potential

damages caused by another City Defendant. (Id. at 9).
As noted supra, attorney conduct is governed by the ethical
standards of the court before which the attorney appears. See In re

Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d at 160. This court has
adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. L.R. 83.23.2; see Moeck v. Pleasant Valley Sch.

Dist., No. 3:13CV1305, 2014 WL 3385124, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 9, 2014).
Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b) provides that a
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a

concurrent conflict of interest, including a situation where there is “a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a

former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”
PA ST RPC Rule 1.7.
We are not persuaded that Plaintiff has satisfied his burden to

demonstrate that there is a significant risk that the City Defendant’s
counsel would be materially limited by his responsibilities to another
client.
In Cohen v. Oasin, 844 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Pa. 1994), the court

addressed a motion to disqualify opposing counsel from representing
multiple parties in a civil action based upon an alleged conflict of
interest. The Court denied the motion, explaining that there was no

proof of an actual conflict. Id. at 1068. Rather, the court noted that the
moving party’s allegations that opposing counsel “would be faced with a
conflict when it receives confidential information . . . amounts to mere

conjecture.” Id. The court went on to say, “[s]imply because plaintiff
[the moving party] alleges [a conflict] . . . does not mean that this is
necessarily true . . .” Id. Further, the court stated,

given that this case has not progressed beyond the filing of a complaint,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that a conflict exists.” Id.
Additionally, the court observed, that it did not appear that

counsel would be unable to adequately represent multiple clients.
“Representation of diverse interests is not uncommon to prominent
members of the bar and it cannot serve as a predicate for the

disqualification of counsel in this or any other court.” Id. (quoting
Ciaffoni v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 550 F. Supp. 1246, 1249
(E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 896 (3rd Cir. 1983); see also Kerry Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 470 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (W.D.

Pa. 1979), (denying motion to disqualify opposing counsel from
representing multiple clients, stating, “[w]e believe that on the basis of
the showing of possible conflict made here and defense counsel’s

assurances that no conflict exists, it is adequate protection of the rights
of all Defendants represented by [counsel] that they be so informed and
allowed to determine the question of joint representation for

themselves.”)
Likewise here, Plaintiff’s asserted bases for his claim that counsel
will be materially limited in his representation are merely conjecture.

His unsupported allegations that counsel may have to shift blame to
certain defendants and his arguments regarding potential crossclaims
or claims for indemnification and contribution are the type of “[v]ague

and unsupported allegations” that are insufficient to meet the standard
for disqualification. Regalo International, LLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 687.
Further, as in Kerry Coal Co., we are reassured by counsel’s

representation that “Professional Conduct Rule 1.7’s obligations
concerning the representation of concurrent clients have been satisfied.”
(Doc. 39 at 12); see also Kerry Coal Co., 470 F. Supp. at 1036.

Accordingly, disqualification on this basis is not warranted.
C. Defendant Spotts’ Criminal Proceedings to Not Warrant
Disqualification

Plaintiff next posits that Defendant Spotts “is facing ongoing
criminal corruption charges related to the very Board at the heart of
this civil action.” (Doc. 33 at 5). Plaintiff argues that Mr. Spotts’
potential testimony in this matter – or decision to testify – may have
repercussions on his criminal proceedings. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that

counsel for the City Defendants cannot simultaneously represent the
best interests of both Defendant Spotts and the other City Defendants.
(Id. at 6).

The City Defendants respond by refuting Plaintiff’s representation
that Defendant Spotts’ criminal charges are related to the RDA, but
rather, indicated that the charges are related alleged theft from the

Humane Fire Company Funds. (Doc. 39 at 10). In any event, they
argue that Mr. Spotts maintains separate criminal defense counsel. (Id.
at 10). Further, to the extent that if a conflict were to arise between

Mr. Spotts’ Fifth Amendment rights and a discovery request in this
matter, Defendants rgue that the Court could assess the validity of the

privilege and Mr. Spotts could consult with his criminal counsel. (Id.).
To the extent Plaintiff’s characterization of Mr. Spotts’ criminal
charges is, as Defendants have suggested, incorrect, we hope that such

misrepresentation was inadvertent. We need not reach that issue,
however, because Mr. Spotts’ criminal case is closed and so, this issue is
moot.2

D. Plaintiff has Not Shown that Counsel for the City
Defendants will be Unable to Satisfy His Duties of
Confidentiality and Loyalty.

Plaintiff next argues that disqualification is necessary because
maintaining confidentiality and undivided loyalty for multiple

2 A district court may take judicial notice of state court dockets. In
re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We take judicial
notice of the state court proceedings insofar as they are relevant.”). We
take judicial notice of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Criminal Docket captioned CP-54-CR-0000395-2005, which indicates
that Mr. Spotts entered a plea of guilty on December 19, 2025, and was
sentenced on that same date. See The Unified Judicial System of
Pennsylvania Web Portal, https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/casesearch
(select “participant name” under search type, select “Schuylkill” under
county, enter “Spotts” in the field for participant last name, and enter
“Joseph” in the field for participant first name). The docket sheet
confirms that the criminal matter is closed. Accordingly, there is no risk
of Defendant Spotts’ Fifth Amendment rights in that matter being
implicated here.
defendants is ethically impossible. (Doc. 33 at 6). He argues that in

light of his accusations of active concealment, intentional false or
misleading representations, and improper conduct amounting to fraud,
“it is highly probable that individual Defendants represented by

[counsel] may possess information that could be detrimental to other
jointly represented Defendants, or that they would prefer to keep
confidential from them.” (Id. at 7). Further, he argues that if counsel

receives confidential information, he will be placed in an “intractable
ethical dilemma.” (Id.).
The City Defendants counter by asserting that they have and will

continue to receive confidential and loyal representation. (Doc. 39 at
10). They argue that Plaintiff’s assertions regarding the impossibility of
maintaining confidentiality and loyalty are vague and unsubstantiated

and lack supporting factual evidence.
We agree. Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6
provides direction for attorneys for maintaining confidentiality. See PA

ST RPC Rule 1.6. Plaintiff has not clearly shown that there are any
facts that demonstrate that the City Defendants’ counsel’s continued
representation would be impermissible based upon a violation of Rule
1.6. His generalized, vague and speculative assertions are insufficient.

Regalo International, LLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 687. Additionally,
Plaintiff references comment 31 to Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.7, which is identical to comment 31 to Pennsylvania Rule of

Professional Conduct 1.7. Both comments address a situation in a
common representation where one client asks a lawyer not to disclose
confidential information to the other client. Plaintiff’s suggestion that

this situation may occur here is, again, entirely speculative. There are
no facts suggesting that any specific City Defendant possesses
confidential information that he or she wishes to keep secret from the

other City Defendants. And again, the City Defendants’ counsel has
represented that “Professional Conduct Rule 1.7’s obligations
concerning the representation of concurrent clients have been satisfied.”

(Doc. 39 at 12); see also Kerry Coal Co., 470 F. Supp. at 1036.
Accordingly, disqualification on this basis is not warranted.
E. Considerations Regarding Settlement Negotiations and
Defense Strategies Do Not Warrant Disqualification

Plaintiff next argues that disqualification is necessary because the
City Defendants “fac[e] potentially disparate levels of liability,” and so,
his ability to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations and
formulate coherent defense strategies is “severely compromised.” (Doc.

33 at 7). Plaintiff also argues that “[t]he value of claims against each
Defendant could vary dramatically, and their individual financial
capacities and willingness to settle may differ.” (Id.). Plaintiff argues

that this is another situation where the representation of one client
would materially limit the representation of another. (Id.).
The City Defendants respond by asserting that:

the gravamen of Lake’s claims is the
commencement of the Conservatorship Petition
by the City of Pottsville Redevelopment Authority
as an entity. This action was taken by the Board
members in their official capacity and by Edward
Brennan in his official capacity as Solicitor.
Contrary to Lake’s assertions, any consideration
of settlement negotiations and a unified defense
strategy will be furthered by the joint
representation of the City Defendants.

(Doc. 39 at 11).
Again, here, Plaintiff’s arguments for disqualification are entirely
speculative. Based upon these unsupported allegations, we cannot say
that the City Defendants’ counsel’s disqualification is required.
F. Client Management Does Not Warrant Disqualification
Finally, Plaintiff cites to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4,
noting counsel’s requirement to keep a client reasonably informed about
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests

for information. (Doc. 33 at 8). Plaintiff suggests that it would be
overwhelming and impractical to keep each individual client informed
and to obtain informed consent on every material decision, given the

alleged conspiracy and varying roles. (Id.). He cites to Comment 2 to
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4, arguing that counsel cannot be
fully candid with one client without breaching duties to another,

hindering the “reasonable communication” necessary for effective client
participation.
The City Defendants cite to Pennsylvania Rule of Professional

Conduct, noting the requirements that a lawyer to promptly inform the
client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s
informed consent is required by the Rules; reasonably consult with the

client; keep the client reasonably informed; promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information; and consult with the client about
any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct. (Doc. 39 at 11-12). The

City Defendants maintain that “diligent communication has been and
will continue to be accomplished by the joint representation of the City
Defendants.” (Doc. 39 at 11-12).
Plaintiff has again failed to make a clear showing that counsel for

the City Defendants will be unable to satisfy his obligations pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4. Disqualification on this
basis is not warranted.

For all of the reasons stated herein, we find that Plaintiff has
failed to make the clear showing required for disqualification of counsel
for the City Defendants. Accordingly, his Motion to Disqualify (Doc. 32)

will be denied. An order follows.

Dated: February 12, 2026 s/ Leo A. Latella
LEO A. LATELLA
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11264143. Public record. Not legal advice.