# Kittle

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · February 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11263934

## Case

- **Full name:** Dustin Kittle v. Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11263934

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that courts “are ‘bound to consider [a] 12(b)(1) motion first, since [a] Rule 12(b)(6
- explaining that courts “are ‘bound to consider [a] 12(b)(1) motion first, since [a] Rule 12(b)(6
- holding that plaintiff must identify a waiver of sovereign immunity to proceed with a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
DUSTIN KITTLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) NO. 1:24-cv-00025
v. )
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
capacity as President of the United )
States, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint
(Doc. No. 55), which is fully briefed (see Doc. Nos. 65, 66). For the reasons stated herein, the
Motion will be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND1
A. Plaintiff’s Interaction with the Farm Credit Administration
The Farm Credit System includes a network of cooperative banks and associations that
provide credit to farmers, ranchers, and agricultural producers. (¶ 22). The Farm Credit
Administration (“FCA”), is an independent agency of the executive branch that regulates Farm
Credit System Institutions. (¶ 23); and 12 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2243. The FCA has enforcement
authority with regard to violations of laws, rules, regulations by System institutions and those
participating in the conduct of the affairs of such institutions. See 12 U.S.C. § 2261(a), et seq.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all facts are as alleged in the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC” or
“Complaint”) (Doc. No. 53), which is cited as “TAC” or simply by paragraph number.
Plaintiff Dustin Kittle is former borrower of Alabama Farm Credit, ACA (“AFC”), a Farm
Credit System institution. (¶¶ 8, 90). In July 2021, as part of an attempt to refinance a loan with
AFC, Kittle “discovered concerns over AFC’s handling of his initial loans” and requested a copy
of his loan file, appraisals of collateral, and AFC’s Charter and Bylaws. Kittle claims AFC’s
president, Chris Glenos, refused to provide the requested documents unless Kittle signed a release

of legal claims and said AFC would not accept new credit applications from Kittle while he was
threatening or pursuing legal claims against AFC. (¶¶ 91-95).
Kittle submitted a borrower complaint to FCA on August 24, 2021. (¶ 96). FCA informed
Kittle that “the complexity of the issues raised affects how long our review takes, but we strive to
provide a response within 60 days.” (Id.; TAC, Ex. C). FCA also stated;
Please understand that we cannot offer you any specific advice on the matters
raised in your complaint. The law does not allow us to function as a consumer
advocacy bureau. We do not adjudicate disputes between System institutions
and borrowers, and we cannot provide legal advice. We also have no
authority to provide monetary relief.
However, as an arm’s length regulator, we can interact directly with System
Institutions when there is a concern that they have violated a law or
regulation. If we find that a violation has occurred, we will use our
examination and enforcement authorities to require corrective action. Our
findings are confidential and protected from general release under 12 C.F.R.
602.2 and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8).
(TAC, Ex. C).
AFC continued to refuse to accept new loan applications from Kittle citing “unresolved
legal claims,” and, on November 8, 2021, AFC placed Kittle’s loans in distress despite Kittle never
missing a payment. (¶¶ 97, 100, 103, 105). Kittle communicated these developments to the FCA
on an ongoing basis. (¶¶ 99, 101, 102-04, 108-09). The FCA responded that it was “making every
effort to thoroughly investigate the matters” and that they would provide “periodic updates on the
status of [their] review.” (¶ 110). On December 1, 2021, Kittle paid off his loans with AFC “to
avoid the wrongful foreclosure of his farm and home.” (¶ 112). To do so, Kittle had to liquidate
assets and obtain financing on less favorable terms through a non-Farm Credit lender. (¶ 113). He
claims this was “[d]ue to the FCA’s complete and utter failure to use its examination and
enforcement authorities to require corrective action [from AFC].” (¶ 112).
FCA continued to provide Kittle periodic communications stating that it was “still

reviewing [his] concerns.” (¶ 115-120). On January 26, 2023, Kittle submitted a request to the
FCA Office of Inspector General requesting review of the FCA’s handling of his complaint.
(¶¶ 121-122). On April 13, 2023, the FCA OIG responded that it had reviewed the complaint
regarding the FCA’s review of his complaint and “[b]ased on our review the agency is still in the
process of reviewing [the] borrower complaint. FCA policy establishes a general expectation
that borrower complaints receive a final response within 60 days, though notes that this
timeframe is a goal, with response times depending on, among other things, the complexity of the
complaint and the need to obtain additional information from the complainant or institution.”
(¶ 129 (emphasis in original)).

Kittle received the FCA findings from his August 2021 complaint in a response letter dated
June 12, 2023. In the letter, FCA notes that it is “aware that since you first wrote to us you have
paid off your loans with the association, thereby ending the lending relationship.” (See ¶ 134 (citing
Compl., Ex. D)). As a result of its examination of Kittles’ complaints, the FCA found AFC failed
to comply with statutes or regulations on multiple occasions.2 (See ¶ 137 (citing Compl., Ex. D)).
The response letter indicates that some of these violations were addressed with AFC, but, for the
most part, does not reference any enforcement action toward AFC. (Id.). With regard to
enforcement, AFC states that, in its role as a “regulator for the System,” if it finds “that System

2 The FCA also found that some of Kittle’s complaints were unfounded, resulted from
misunderstandings, or were business decisions. (Compl., Ex. D).
institutions have violated applicable laws or regulations, [it] has several enforcement options to
bring about corrective actions, including requiring management to address weakness in internal
processes that led to those violations. However, FCA’s authority does not include providing
monetary or personal relief to an applicant or borrower.” (See Compl., Ex. D).
Kittle contends that, despite finding that AFC’s actions violated his rights under the Farm

Credit Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the FCA “is maintaining its refusal to afford
[Plaintiff] his rights and protections under the Farm Credit Act through its enforcement
authorities.” (¶ 138).
Kittle faults the FCA taking too long (more than 60 days) to investigate his complaint and
for failing to take enforcement action against AFC. He brings claims against the FCA for
negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (Count Three), violation of his Fifth Amendment
Due Process Rights (Count Four), mandamus to order FCA to enforce the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) against AFC (Count Five), breach of fiduciary duty (Count Six), under
the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) (Counts Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten). Kittle asks the

Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing FCA and FCA Board Chairman Jeffrey Hall to
exercise their enforcement authority to require AFC to correct the ECOA violations identified in
FCA’s June 12, 2023 findings. (TAC at PageID # 1018-19). He also seeks money damages of at
least $4,800,000 for economic losses caused by FCA’s alleged negligence, a declaration that FCA
unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed agency action in violation of the APA, a declaration
that FCA’s failure to take enforcement action is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law, a
declaration that FCA and Hall violated his due process rights, and an order directing FCA to
establish a formalized process for timely resolution of borrower complaints and to take
enforcement action. (Id. at PageID # 1019).
B. Presidential Appointments to the FCA Board
The FCA is governed by a three-member Board, the members of which are appointed for
six-year terms. 12 U.S.C. § 2242(a). Members are term limited to one term. Id. at § 2242(b)
However, a Board member may stay in holdover status until the succeeding Board member is
appointed. Id. (“Any member of the Board shall continue to serve as such after the expiration of

the member's term until a successor has been appointed and qualified.”).
In January 2021, the board consisted of two members, Glen Smith, who was confirmed in
2017, and Jeffrey Hall, who was confirmed in 2015 and serving in holdover status. (¶ 28). Former
Board chairman Dallas P. Tonsager passed away in May 2019, leaving a vacancy that had not been
filled. (Id.). In 2019 and 2020, President Trump nominated Rodney K. Brown to fill Hall’s
position, but Brown was not confirmed by the Senate and Hall remained in holdover status. (¶ 166).
The Board remained with only two members, Hall and Smith, until President Biden appointed
Vincent G. Logan in October 2022. (¶ 31). In May 2024, President Biden appointed Marcus D.
Graham to replace Smith, whose term expired in 2022, but Graham was not confirmed by the
Senate. (¶¶ 35-36). Logan retired effective March 31, 2025.3 Hall was named board chairman and

CEO by President Trump on January 20, 2025. The FCA Board currently has two board members
– Hall and Smith.
Plaintiff claims that his “loss of statutory borrower rights, economic injury from forced
loan repayment, and the inability to seek redress due to the FCA’s impaired enforcement capacity”

3 The Court takes judicial notice of the historic and current composition of the FCA Board as reported
on the official website of the FCA – fcsic.gov. See FCA News Release: Board Member Vincent Logan
Leaves Enduring Legacy at FCA, (March 13, 2025), available at https://ww3.fca.gov/news/Lists/
News%20Releases/Attachments/723/NR-25-05-03-13-25.pdf (reporting Logan’s retirement); See
https://www.fcsic.gov/about/jeffery-s-hall (about Hall); https://www.fcsic.gov/about/leadership (current
FCA Board Leadership as of February 16, 2026).
were caused by President Biden’s dereliction of duty in failing to appoint a “full FCA Board” and
Hall’s continued service on the Board. (¶¶ 153, 174).
Plaintiff asserts claims for declaratory relief against the President and Hall (Counts One
and Two).4 He seeks a declaratory judgment that President Biden violated 12 U.S.C. § 2442(a)
and Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution by failing to appoint all positions on the

FCA Board and that Hall’s “service on the FCA Board beyond October 13, 2021, violates the one-
term limit of 12 U.S.C. § 2242(a). (TAC at PageID # 1017-18). He contends a declaratory
judgment is necessary to establish President Biden’s inaction was unlawful, confirm Hall’s tenure
as unlawful, to guide future Executive action to prevent a recurrence of harm, to ensure compliance
with the Farm Credit Act, and to protect the Plaintiff’s rights. (¶¶ 157, 177).
C. Claims Against the Inspector General of the FCA
The TAC also asserts claims against the Inspector General of the Farm Credit
Administration.5 (¶¶ 18-20; 188-195; 235-250 (Counts Four, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen)).
Plaintiff concedes dismissal of the claims against the Inspector General. (Doc. No. 65 at 2, n.1).

Accordingly, these claims will be dismissed.
Defendants move to dismiss the remaining claims.

4 The Complaint originally named Joseph Biden. Because the claims are brought against the
President of the United States in his official capacity, Donald J. Trump has been substituted as Defendant.
(See Order, Doc. No. 58).

5 The Complaint originally named Wendy Laguarda, then Inspector General of the Farm Credit
Administration. Because the claims are brought against Wendy Laguarda in her official capacity, the current
inspector general is the proper defendant. Accordingly, in June 2025, Nicholas Novak was substituted as
Defendant. (See Order, Doc. No. 58). As of September 2025, Stephen H. Ravas is the Acting Inspector
General. See https://www/fca.gov/about/offices (last visited Feb. 20, 2026).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Rule 12(b)(1) “provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). “If the court determines at
any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(h)(3). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a “threshold determination” in any
action. Am. Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007). This reflects
the fundamental principle that “[j]urisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to
exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)); see also Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cty., 847 F.3d 812,
816 (6th Cir. 2017) (explaining that courts “are ‘bound to consider [a] 12(b)(1) motion first, since
[a] Rule 12(b)(6) challenge becomes moot if th[e] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction” (quoting
Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990))).

“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and
the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citations omitted). “Without a waiver
of sovereign immunity, a court is without subject matter jurisdiction over claims
against federal agencies or officials in their official capacities.” Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border
Patrol, 741 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2013). “It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting
Munaco v. United States, 522 F.3d 651, 652-53 (6th Cir. 2008)). “Sovereign immunity ‘extends to
agencies of the United States’ or ‘federal officers [acting] in their official capacities.’” Id. (citing
Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1993); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales
Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir.1994)). “A waiver of sovereign immunity may not be implied and
exists only when Congress has expressly waived immunity by statute.” Id. (citing United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33–34 (1992)).
“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can challenge the

sufficiency of the pleading itself (facial attack) or the factual existence of subject matter
jurisdiction (factual attack).” Cartwright, 751 F.3d at 759. A facial attack challenges the
sufficiency of the pleading and, like a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), requires the Court to take all
factual allegations in the pleading as true. Wayside Church, 847 F.3d at 816–17 (quoting Gentek
Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007)). A factual attack
challenges the allegations supporting jurisdiction, raising “a factual controversy requiring the
district court to ‘weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter
does or does not exist.” Id. at 817 (quoting Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc., 491 F.3d at 330). Defendants
assert factual attacks on the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

E. Failure to State a Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must
take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the
Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts its allegations as
true, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d
471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, dismissal is appropriate only if “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 679 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2012).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider the complaint and any

exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits
attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss provided they are referred to in the Complaint and are
central to the claims. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.
2008).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Count One
In Count One, Plaintiff claims the President has violated 12 U.S.C. § 2242(a) and Article
II, section 3 of the United States Constitution by failing to appoint a three-member FCA Board
between January 20, 2021 to January 20, 2025. (TAC, ¶¶ 145-159). Plaintiff contends that by

failing to appoint a three-member FCA Board, the President caused him to lose statutory borrower
rights, forced loan repayment, and made it so that he was unable to seek redress of these harms
due. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that “President Biden, during his term from January
20, 2021 to January 20, 2025, violated 12 U.S.C. § 2242(a) and Article II, Section 3 of the United
States Constitution by failing to appoint all positions on the FCA Board, as he was obligated and
required to do pursuant to federal law.” (TAC at 55-56 (Prayer for Relief)). According to Plaintiff,
a declaratory judgment is necessary “to establish [the President’s] inaction was unlawful and to
guide future Executive action to prevent a recurrence of harm.” (TAC ¶ 157).
Defendants argue Count One should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 56-1 at 8). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction
is a “threshold determination” in any action. Am. Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d
534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, the Court begins there. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for
declaratory judgment does not present a justiciable case or controversy. Defendants argue Count

One is nonjusticiable both because a declaratory judgment will not redress any harm alleged to be
caused by the President and because it presents a nonjusticiable political question. (Id. at 9-11).
Defendants are correct on both points.
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to adjudication of
“cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2. “To ensure that a case or controversy is
before a court and to avoid rendering an advisory opinion, three basic requirements must be met.”
Carman v. Yellen, 112 F.4th 386, 499 (6th Cir. 2024). “First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of … Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id.
(citations omitted). Each claim must satisfy Article III’s requirements. Id. (citing Davis v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008); see also, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 352 (2006).
Plaintiff’s claim for relief in Count One seeks a declaratory judgment that the President’s
failure to appoint a three-member FCA Board between January 20, 2021 and January 20, 2025
violated the law. Any such declaratory judgment would be an advisory opinion because it “could
not affect the present relationship between the parties.” See Parrish v. Bennett, 989 F.3d 452, 457
(6th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he complaint failed to present a justiciable case or controversy because
plaintiff requested a ruling only on whether the past actions of defendants were right or wrong,
which could not affect the present relationship between the parties. In other words, plaintiff sought
only an advisory opinion from the district court as to whether its constitutional rights had been
violated. The court therefore lacked an Article III controversy to adjudicate.”).

Because Count One lacks an Article III controversy, the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this claim and it will be dismissed.
Count One should also be dismissed because it presents a nonjusticiable political question.
The political question doctrine is “essentially a function of the separation of powers.” Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Baker Court formulated the test of whether a case presents a
non-justiciable political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id., 369 U.S. at 217. “Only one factor need be implicated to find a political question.” Grell v.
Trump, 330 F. Supp. 3d 311, 317 (D. D.C. 2018).
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Bush, 715 F. Supp. 405 (D. D.C. 1989), the
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the plaintiffs’ claims that then-President Bush
violated his statutory duty to appoint a member to the three-member panel of the Federal Labor
Relations Authority presented a nonjusticiable political question. Analyzing the Baker factors, the
court considered that Article II of the Constitution “commits the power to appoint officers to the
President, acting with advice and consent of the Senate” and “makes no reference to any role of
the judiciary in the appointment process.” Id. at 407. The court also noted that the statute did not
impose any time frame under which the President is required to make such appointments and the
question of how much time should reasonably be permitted to evaluate and select nominees is
“beyond the scope of judicial expertise” and the implications of requiring the President to make

an appointment within specified time would have far-reaching implications. Id.
Defendants argue the same considerations apply here. The Court agrees. The statute does
not impose a timeframe for the President to make appointments. See 12 U.S.C. § 2242. Indeed, the
statute contemplates that successor members may not be appointed and qualified before current
members’ terms expire by providing that “member[s] of the Board shall continue to serve as such
after the expiration of the member’s term until a successor has been appointed and qualified.” 12
U.S.C. § 2242(b). The matter of Presidential appointments to the FCA Board raises a
nonjusticiable political question.
In sum, Count One will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it does

not present a justiciable case or controversy and presents a nonjusticiable political question.
B. Count Two
In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts a claim against Jeffrey Hall, FCA Board Chairman, for
violation of the Farm Credit Act. (FAC ¶¶ 160-177). Hall was appointed to the FCA Board by the
President and confirmed by the Senate in 2015. (Id. ¶ 165). Although his original term expired in
2018, he has continued to serve in a holdover capacity. (Id. ¶¶ 167-68). Plaintiff claims Hall’s
prolonged service on the Board violates the Farm Credit Act and has caused him harm, including
the loss of statutory borrower rights, economic injury from forced loan repayment, and the inability
to seek redress due to the FCA’s impaired enforcement capacity.” (Id. ¶ 174). He seeks a
declaratory judgment “that Mr. Hall’s service on the FCA Board beyond October 13, 2021 and up
to present, constitutes an unlawful extension beyond the one-term limit of 12 U.S.C. § 2242(a),
whether as a second, and now third, consecutive term or as an impermissible holdover in direct
contravention of Congressional intent.” (FAC at 56 (Prayer for Relief) and ¶ 177).
Defendants argue Count Two should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because the

Farm Credit Act expressly permits Board members to holdover after their term expires, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because it presents a nonjusticiable political question, because there is
no private right of action to enforce the Farm Credit Act, and because Plaintiff lacks standing to
sue to enforce the statute. The requirement of standing is essential to this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and, as discussed below, is dispositive of this claim. Accordingly, the Court begins
and ends there.
“Although the term ‘standing’ does not appear in Article III, [the] standing doctrine is
‘rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy’ and limits ‘the category of
litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court[.]’” Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA,

946 F.3d 855, 861 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547). If a plaintiff does not have
standing, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See Lyshe v. Levy, 854 F.3d
855, 857 (6th Cir. 2017). The requirements of standing are discussed above with regard to Count
One. See supra, III., A. (citing Carman, 112 F.4th at 499) (standing requires an injury in fact,
traceable to the conduct of the defendant, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision). If “the Plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant
caused and the court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to resolve.”
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 422-23 (2021).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim that he was harmed by Hall remaining on the FCA
Board in a holdover status amounts to a disagreement with the President’s management of the FCA
Board to allow Hall to remain in holdover status, which is not an injury. Plaintiff does not address
Defendants’ standing arguments as to Count Two. However, because there is some overlap
between Counts One and Two (if the President had appointed new board members and they had

been confirmed, Hall would not continue to serve in holdover status), the Court also considers
Plaintiff’s arguments in support of standing for Count One. (See Doc. No. 65 at 9). Plaintiff argues
that the FCA Board is “unable to function properly in perpetual holdover status” which has caused
him financial injury. (Id.). As for causation and redressability, Plaintiff contends that the failure to
comply with Section 2242 “has directly impacted FCA oversight and enforcement” and a
declaratory judgment would redress the injury “by prompting lawful appointments and restoring
lawful agency structure.” (Id. at 10).
Plaintiff’s assertion of causation and redressability are too speculative to establish standing.
Essentially Plaintiff claims that if Hall discontinued his Board membership and the President

appointed new FCA Board members and the Senate confirmed those appointments, the new FCA
Board would “function properly” and engage in more effective oversight and enforcement than the
current Board. It is also possible to read Plaintiff’s assertion of injury as based on the presence of
holdover members on the Board and alleged lack of “lawful agency structure,” but this does not
assert any injury to Plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff’s requested relief, a declaration that Hall’s
membership on the Board is unlawful, does nothing to redress any harm to Plaintiff. Even if the
Court were to declare Hall’s service on the Board unlawful, that would not redress Plaintiff’s
asserted injuries – “loss of statutory borrower rights, economic injury from forced loan repayment,
and the inability to seek redress.” Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff does not have standing to
assert the claim in Count Two and the claim will be dismissed.
C. Count Three
Count Three is a claim against the Farm Credit Administration for negligence under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. (TAC, ¶¶ 178-187).

Plaintiff asserts the FCA Policies and Procedures Manual imposes a duty on the FCA to investigate
borrower complaints within 60 days and that it failed to do so, instead taking 657 days. (Id. ¶ 180).
Plaintiff further alleges that the FCA has a duty to “enforce borrower rights” under the Farm Credit
Act and that it failed to enforce its findings against Alabama Farm Credit ACA (“AFC”), despite
confirming violations. (Id.). Plaintiff claims the FCA’s failure to timely investigate and failure to
enforce violations allowed AFC to “escalate violations, forcing Plaintiff to pay off loans early and
liquidate assets” and that these harms could have been prevented if the AFC had timely intervened
and/or redressed after confirming violations. (Id. ¶ 181).
Plaintiff brings the negligence claim under the FTCA, which provides a limited waiver of

sovereign immunity for tort claims against the United States in which “a private individual [would
be liable] under like circumstances.” Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890, 894 (6th Cir. 1994)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674). “The FTCA does not create a cause of action against the United States”
or “provide a means of enforcing federal statutory duties.” Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890,
894 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Howell v. United States, 932 F.2d 915, 917 (11th Cir. 1991); and
Sellfors v. United States, 697 F.2d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984)).
To be actionable under the FTCA, a claim must allege that the United States “‘would be liable to
the claimant’ as ‘a private person’ ‘in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.’” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
Section 1346(b)’s “reference to the ‘law of the place’ means law of the State—the source of
substantive liability under the FTCA.’” Id. at 478. The FTCA confers jurisdiction only to the
extent that an alleged breach of duty is tortious under state law. See Meyers, 17 F.3d at 899-91.
Defendants argue the negligence claim must be dismissed because the FTCA does not
apply and there is, therefore, no waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s claim

of negligence per se based on alleged failure to investigate borrower complaints within 60 days
and failure to enforce borrower rights as required by the FCA and FCA policies and procedures
does not fall under the FTCA because no comparable state-law duty exists. Plaintiff argues that “it
is well settled that the FCA’s failure to follow applicable statutes and regulations regarding
borrower rights amounts to negligence per se.” Plaintiff is correct on this point, but he points to no
authority suggesting that the breach of duty alleged here is tortious under state law. As the Sixth
Circuit explained in Meyers, negligence per se defines a standard of conduct but does not decide
when a duty of care arises. Meyers, 17 F.3d at 899 (holding that “the existence of some relationship
… to which state law would attach a duty of care in purely private circumstances is required under

28 U.S.C. § 2674”); see also 15A Moore’s Federal Practice, § 105.26[7][a] (Matthew Bender 3d
Ed.) (“A claim under the FTCA cannot be brought for violations of federal states that create federal
causes of action when there is no analogous state law. The FTCA was not intended as a mechanism
for enforcing federal statutory duties … An allegation of breach of federal law duty alone does not
state a valid tort claim against the federal government under the FTCA.”).
Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that by undertaking to investigate Plaintiff’s complaint it
was obligated to exercise due care. (Doc. No. 65 at 16-17) (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-69 (1955); and Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.
1967)). Plaintiff asserts that “FCA’s failure to act with reasonable care in pursuing [the]
investigation and responding to known violations gives rise to liability under the assumption of
duty doctrine.” (Id. at 17). Although an assumption of duty may arise under some circumstances,
the cases relied upon by Plaintiff do not suggest that such circumstances are present here. Indian
Towing and Ingham concern an assumption of a duty of care with regard to the physical safety of
others, which is not remotely similar to the duty of care Plaintiff seeks to impose here. Indian

Towing addressed liability of the Coast Guard related to lighthouse services – “once it exercised
its discretion to operate a light … and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light,
it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order.”
350 U.S. at 69 (rejecting an exception from liability for all official conduct furthering a unique
government activity). In Ingham, the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) violated an assumed duty
of care when it failed to inform an incoming aircraft that visibility had dropped. 373 F.2d at 236.
Defendants argue that the allegations in the TAC do not suggest that FCA assumed a duty
to investigate complaints within 60 days. (Doc. No. 56-1). The Court agrees. Indeed, the TAC
states that FCA repeatedly told Plaintiff that it had a “goal” to respond to borrower complaints

within that timeframe, but that the time to investigate depends on the complexity of the complaint
and the need to obtain additional information. (See TAC ¶¶ 98, 115-120, 123, 125, 129, 212).
Nothing in the statute, regulations, or FCA’s communications to Kittle suggests that FCA assumed
a duty to finalize the investigation of complaints within 60 days regardless of the complexity of
the investigation. Further, any consequences of the duration of the investigation were effectively
moot after Plaintiff paid off his loans to AFC on December 1, 2021, just over three months after
submitting his complaint to the FCA. (See TAC ¶ 112). As for the response to known violations,
as discussed below, FCA’s decision on how to use its enforcement authority is discretionary. See
12 U.S.C. § 2261(a) (“the Farm Credit Administration may issue and serve upon the institution or
such director, officer, employee, agent, or other person a notice of charges in respect thereof”)
(emphasis added); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (The Supreme Court “has
recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's
absolute discretion.”); see also infra Section D.

Because the alleged breach of duty to comply with FTC policies regarding the length of
time in which an investigation should be complete is not tortious under state law, Plaintiff’s claim
does not fall under the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity and the negligence claim will be
dismissed.
D. Count Four
In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that FCA and Hall deprived him of property interests
without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (TAC ¶¶ 188-195). Plaintiff asserts a
protected property interest in “statutory rights under the Farm Credit Act of 1971, including the
right to fair credit consideration, protection from retaliation, and equitable treatment by System

institutions, as well as in his farm assets and equity, access to credit, and Class A Voting Stock,
which he was forced to liquidate to avoid wrongful foreclosure.”6 (TAC ¶ 190). Plaintiff contends
FCA and Hall deprived him of these property interests without due process by “failing to enforce
the Farm Credit Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. § 1691) against Alabama Farm
Credit, despite finding numerous violations of Plaintiff’s rights, and by delaying a response to
Plaintiff’s borrower compliant for 657 days, forcing Plaintiff to pay off his loans to avoid
foreclosure.” (Id. ¶ 191). Plaintiff claims the FCA’s lack of a formal administrative process for

6 The TAC also asserts Count Four against Wendy Laguarda, former Inspector General of the FCA.
However, Plaintiff concedes dismissal of the claims against the Inspector General, including Count Four.
(See Doc. No. 65 at 2, n.1).
reviewing borrower complaints and “refusal to provide meaningful relief or enforcement” denied
him any “adequate procedural mechanism to protect his property interests” and violated his right
to due process.
Defendants argue the Court is without jurisdiction to hear the claims in Count Four because
neither the Constitution nor the FCA confer jurisdiction or waive the sovereign immunity of the

United States. (Doc. No. 56-1 at 20). Plaintiff responds that the United States may be sued for
constitutional violation where there is a waiver of sovereign immunity or where ultra vires conduct
is alleged and that here the claim is “rooted in FCA’s failure to follow legally required procedures
and provide fair process to borrower complaints.” (Doc. No. 65 at 23 (citing Leedom v. Kyne, 358
U.S. 184 (1958)). Plaintiff contends these claims are within the Court’s jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. (Id.).
Defendants are correct that there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity for the claims
in Count Four. Constitutional claims do not themselves waive sovereign immunity. See Com. of
Ky. ex rel. Hancock, 362 F. Supp. 360, 368 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (“Although the plaintiff also invokes

the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, it is settled
beyond doubt that constitutional provisions have no effect upon the sovereign immunity from
suit.”); Toledo v. Jackson, 485 F.3d 836, 838 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff must identify
a waiver of sovereign immunity to proceed with a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331). Plaintiff is
correct that sovereign immunity does not apply to ultra vires conduct, but notwithstanding his
assertions to the contrary, Plaintiff has not alleged such conduct here. His claims that Defendants
failed to take enforcement action and delayed resolution of his complaint do not allege conduct
that exceeds the FCAs statutory power. Indeed, although Plaintiff separately seeks mandamus
relief to compel the FCA to enforce the ECOA against AFC, Plaintiff acknowledges that the FCA
lacks authority to provide personal relief for the AFC’s violation of the ECOA and that no private
cause of action is available under the ECOA against the FCA for its inaction. (TAC ¶ 203).
Plaintiff contends that 15 U.S.C. § 1607(5) imposes on the FCA a non-discretionary duty
to Plaintiff as an affected borrower to exercise its enforcement authority whenever it finds a
violation of the ECOA.7 The cited statutory provision imposes no such obligation; it is merely a

delegation of enforcement authority to various agencies. See Vallies v. Sky Bank, 591 F.3d 152,
156 (3d Cir. 2009) (15 U.S.C. § 1607 “provides other federal agencies with enforcement power”);
McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 426 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The statute
grants substantial enforcement authority to the federal agencies with jurisdiction over lending
institutions.” The statue provides:
(a) Enforcing agencies
Subject to subtitle B of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, compliance with
the requirements of this subchapter shall be enforced under –
…
(5) the Farm Credit Act of 1971, by the Farm Credit Administration with respect to any
Federal land bank, Federal land bank association, Federal intermediate credit bank, or
production credit association; …

15 U.S.C. § 1607.
Moreover, the FCA provides that any enforcement action by the FCA is discretionary. See
12 U.S.C. §§ 2261(a) (stating that if the FCA has reasonable cause to believe that an institution
has violated an FCA law, rule, regulation or written condition, the FCA “may issue and serve upon
the institution … a notice of charges in respect thereof”). See also, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 831 (1985) (The Supreme Court “has recognized on several occasions over many years that

7 The ECOA makes it unlawful for a creditor to discriminate against an applicant with respect to any
aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or
age, or because the applicant’s income derives from a public assistance program, or because the applicant
has exercised any rights under the ECOA. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a
decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.”); Pendleton v. Trans Union Sys.
Corp., 430 F Supp. 95, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (“Because enforcement is essentially discretionary,
courts repeatedly have refused to require prosecutors or agencies to investigate particular alleged
violations or institute proceedings against certain persons… Even statutory language stating that

compliance with the Act shall be enforced by the FTC is not sufficient to withdraw the usual
prosecutorial discretion.”) (citing cases).
Because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity and Plaintiff has not
plausibly alleged ultra vires conduct on the part of the FCA or Hall, the due process claim will be
dismissed.
E. Count Five
In Count Five, Plaintiff seeks mandamus to compel FCA to enforce ECOA compliance
against AFC. (TAC ¶¶ 196-204). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the district courts have jurisdiction to
compel an officer or employee of the United States to perform a duty owed to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff

contends “enforcement” to correct ECOA violations is a duty owed to Plaintiff as an affected
borrower.
“Mandamus is available only if: (1) the [petitioner] has a clear right to relief; (2) the
defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to the
[petitioner].” Rimmer v. Holder, 700 F.3d 246, 264 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Carson, 633 F.3d at
491). Mandamus relief is a “drastic” remedy, “to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.”
Carson, 633 F.3d at 491 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)). It
“is not an appropriate remedy if the action that the petitioner seeks to compel is discretionary.” Id.
(citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)). Mandamus is not appropriate here because
the relief sought – enforcement action by FCA against AFC – is discretionary. See supra, sections
C and D. Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed.
F. Count Six
In Count Six, Plaintiff brings a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against FCA, asserting
that FCA owes a “fiduciary-like duty” to system borrowers, including Plaintiff, to “ensure the

Act’s borrower rights are enforced.” (TAC ¶¶ 205-06). Plaintiff contends FCA breached this
“fiduciary-like duty” by “failing to act on known violations and to establish a complaint process.”
(Id. ¶ 207).
Defendants argue this claim is “simply a reformatted version of Plaintiff’s other attacks on
the FCA,” and should be dismissed because there is no private right of action under the Farm
Credit Act and the FCA does not owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. Defendants argue that even if
there were a fiduciary duty, Plaintiff’s allegations do not allege a breach of fiduciary duty because
the FCA has established a complaint process (as stated in the TAC ¶¶ 61-63, 66-67),8 and
enforcement decisions are committed to agency discretion.

Plaintiff relies upon United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) for the proposition that
agencies may owe a fiduciary duty. Mitchell concerned the fiduciary responsibilities of the United
States in managing forests and property belonging to Native Americans. 463 U.S. at 225 (“Where
the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties,
the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless
Congress has provided otherwise)…”)(quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d
981, 987 (Ct Cl. 1980)). In finding a fiduciary relationship, the Mitchell court also noted “the

8 See TAC, Doc. No. 53, ¶ 57 (discussing FCA’s enforcement options); ¶ 59 (borrower complaint
process is not “detailed”); ¶ 60 (borrower complaint process is “informal”); ¶ 61 (borrowers “may submit
a complaint”); ¶ 61 (details the complaint process); ¶¶ 66-67 (describing FCA’s policy of keeping
complainant informed).
undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian
people.” Id. at 225. The same cannot be said for the relationship between the FCA and system
borrowers.
Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Count Six will be
dismissed. In the alternative, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this

claim. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“It has consistently
been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.”).
G. Counts Seven through Ten
Counts Seven through Ten allege various violations of the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). “The APA sets forth the procedures by which federal agencies are
accountable to the public and their actions subject to review by the courts.” Haines v. Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 814 F.3d 417, 423-24 (6th Cir. 2016); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). The

reviewing court may: “(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions [under certain
conditions].” 5 U.S.C. § 706.
The APA explicitly excludes judicial review of agency action “to the extent that—(1)
statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Chaney, 470 U.S. at 828).
“[E]ven where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review,” section 701(a)(2) forecloses
review “if the statute [governing the agency’s actions] is drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. In such a case, the
statute (‘law’) can be taken to have ‘committed’ the decisionmaking to the agency's judgment
absolutely.” Id. “[A]mong those agency actions presumptively exempted from judicial review by
section 701(a)(2) agency decisions not to institute a particular enforcement action.” Id. (citing
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 828).
Plaintiff’s claims in Counts Eight and Ten are based on FCA’s failure to take enforcement

action against ACA for its violations of the Farm Credit Act or ECOA. (TAC ¶¶ 218, 231). Plaintiff
claims the failure to enforce borrower protections demonstrates arbitrary and capricious decision-
making and abdication of statutory responsibilities in violation of § 706(1) and (2)(A). (Id. ¶¶ 220,
233). Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the FCA to take enforcement action
against ACA. (Id. ¶ 222). Because these claims seek review of discretionary action, they are not
reviewable under the APA. Therefore, Counts Eight and Ten will be dismissed.
Counts Seven and Nine concern the FCA’s process for reviewing Plaintiff’s borrower
complaints. Specifically, in Count Seven Plaintiff complains that the FCA did not resolve his
borrower complaint within 60 days and that the “prolonged and unjustifiable delay in investigating

and enforcing borrower protections constitutes an unreasonable withholding and unreasonable
delay of agency action in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).” (TAC ¶ 212-214). In Count
Nine, Plaintiff claims that the FCA’s failure to establish a transparent administrative process for
handling borrower complaints and enforcement of borrower rights deprived him of due process in
violation of § 706(2)(D). (TAC ¶ 225-26). Plaintiff seeks an order “compelling FCA to establish
and enforce a process for timely and effective resolution of borrower complaints” and “requiring
the FCA to establish and adhere to clear administrative procedures for handling borrower
complaints and enforcing borrower protections.” (Id. ¶¶ 215, 228).
Defendants argue these claims should be dismissed for several reasons including, inter alia,
that Plaintiff lacks standing. Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot show that his injury is
traceable to FCA’s alleged delay in resolving his complaints or lack of enforcement action against
AFC. They argue that the allegations in the TAC instead show that Plaintiff caused harm to himself
when “Plaintiff (himself an agricultural attorney), of his own free will, decided that it was in his

best interest to pay off his loans with AFC (thus causing his exclusion from the Farm Credit System
since he was no longer a borrower), and to liquidate his assets and sell his home, just over 3 months
after submitting his complaint to the FCA and just 3 weeks after AFC placed his loans in distress.”
(Doc. No. 56-1 at 38 (citing TAC ¶¶ 96, 105, 112, 134, and PageID# 964) (emphasis in original)).
Plaintiff responds that causation and redressability are satisfied because his injuries are
traceable to FCA’s “failure to timely investigate and act upon admitted borrower rights violations.”
(Doc. No. 65 at 34). Plaintiff argues the fact that he “took independent financial actions (e.g.,
paying off loans, selling assets) does not break the causal chain where those actions were a
foreseeable and direct result of the agency’s inaction in the face of known violations.” (Id. at 35).

The requirements of standing are discussed above with regard to Counts One and Two. See
supra, III., A and B. (citing Carman, 112 F.4th at 499) (standing requires an injury in fact, traceable
to the conduct of the defendant, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision). If “the Plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant caused and
the court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to resolve.” TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 422-23 (2021).
The Court agrees that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claims in Counts Seven and Nine
which concern the FCA’s review of his borrower complaints. First, the allegations in the TAC do
not raise a plausible inference that Plaintiff’s decision to sell assets and pay off his loan were a
foreseeable and direct result of the agency’s delay in reviewing his complaint. Nor can it be said
that FCA’s review of the complaint, which at that time had been only been pending for about 90
days, was unreasonably delayed. Equally importantly, the FCA has now completed the review of
Plaintiff's complaints, therefore any order requiring the FCA to complete the review or improve
its internal processes to make the review faster would not redress any harm to Plaintiff.
In this regard, the Court notes that in the FAC, Plaintiff identifies himself has a “former
borrower, pending applicant, and prospective future borrower” of the Farm Credit System. (TAC
4 9). Plaintiff does not argue that he may have additional complaints against a Farm Credit System
institution at some future date and that those future complaints would not be reviewed within a
reasonable time.’ In any event, such claims speculative claims would not confer standing.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 56) is GRANTED as to
all claims. An appropriate Order will enter.

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Although Plaintiff alleges that as of the filing of the TAC, “a decision by AFC still has not been
made on Mr. Kittle’s pending refinance from August 2021” (TAC J 137(a), n. 2), the FCA acknowledged
as much in its review of Plaintiffs complaints. (TAC {ff 130, 137).
26

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11263934. Public record. Not legal advice.