# Jones

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11263789

## Case

- **Full name:** Kiara S. Jones v. Chad Chronister, ET AL.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 22, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

KIARA S. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-02096-WFJ-NHA

CHAD CHRONISTER, ET AL.,

Defendants.
________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I recommend Plaintiff’s renewed motion to proceed without paying the
filing fee (Doc. 9) be denied and her amended complaint (Doc. 12) dismissed.
I. Background
Plaintiff Kiara Jones brings this lawsuit to challenge the substance and
process of her eviction. She began this action by filing a complaint, moving for
a temporary restraining order, and seeking permission to proceed without
paying the filing fee. Docs. 1, 2, 6. The request for a temporary restraining
order was denied. Doc. 5. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without paying the filing
fee was denied, without prejudice, because the original complaint contained
“no factual allegations at all,” and so, as written, had no chance of succeeding.
Doc 7. The Court allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to file a new complaint and
to renew her motion to proceed without paying the fee.
Plaintiff subsequently renewed her motion to proceed without paying
(Doc. 9) and amended her complaint (Doc. 13).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s landlord, Earl B.
Mason, Sr., obtained a judgment in an eviction action against Plaintiff, in
Florida state court. Id., p. 1. After Plaintiff appealed, the trial court issued a
writ of possession. Id., p. 1. HCSO Deputies, including Deputy G. Harrison

then executed the writ by removing Plaintiff from her residence and denying
her access to the belongings therein. Id. Then, Mason stated that Plaintiff was
trespassed from all of Mason’s properties, which interfered with Plaintiff’s
ability to see her son. Id.

Her amended complaint names as defendants Sheriff Chad Chronister,
Deputy Harrison, Earl B. Mason Sr., and Jason Kao (Mason’s attorney who
assisted him in the eviction proceedings), for their participation in her eviction.
Id. The foundation of her claims is her assertion that “Once the appeal was

filed, jurisdiction transferred to the appellate court and the trial court no
longer had authority to issue or enforce a writ of possession.”1 Id. ¶ 7. Thus,
she argues, Defendant Mason’s continued insistence that she be evicted

1 Since Plaintiff filed her amended complaint, the Second District Court of
Appeals of Florida has dismissed her appeal. See November 26 Order, Jones v.
Mason, 2D2025-1865 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2025). Plaintiff’s eviction case in
Hillsborough County Court in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida
remains open. See Docket, 25-CC-023515.
pending appeal, Defendant Kao’s participation in the eviction proceedings, and
the Sheriff Defendants’ actions to carry out the writ of possession, all violated

her federal rights.
Although Plaintiff does not specify which claims apply to which
Defendants, she alleges violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, the Fair Housing Act, and the Violence Against Women Act. Id., p. 2.

Notably, before amending her complaint, Plaintiff renewed her motion
for a temporary restraining order, which requested that the Court enjoin
Defendants from continuing to enforce the writ of possession. Doc. 8. The
District Court denied that motion, explaining that “although this episode has

been very disturbing to [Plaintiff] and disruptive to her family, federal courts
do not sit in supervision over state courts, and do not (except in very rare
circumstances not present here) exercise any ongoing supervision over state
courts.” Doc. 14. Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails for similar reasons.

II. Standard of Review and Legal Authority
The federal statute that governs the right to bring a lawsuit without pre-
paying a filing fee, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “is designed to ensure that indigent
litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Accordingly, the statute permits a litigant to
commence an action in federal court “by filing in good faith an affidavit stating
. . . that he is unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.” Id. “Congress recognized,
however, that a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the
public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Id. To that end, section 1915
provides that a court shall dismiss a case if the court determines the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous when a complaint lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.
Federal courts must hold pro se filings (meaning those papers filed by a
party who represents himself) to “less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). More
specifically, a court must “provide[] pro se parties wide latitude when
construing their pleadings and papers” and to “use common sense to determine
what relief the party desires.” S.E.C. v. Elliot, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir.

1992). Nonetheless, courts need not exempt pro se litigants from complying
with the requirements imposed by the law and rules of procedure. See Brown
v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d
835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

Finally, independent of the Court’s duty under section 1915(e) to
evaluate the claim of a party proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court also has
an obligation to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its
entirety.”).
“Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, or in other

words, they have the power to decide only certain types of cases.” Morrison v.
Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing University
of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409–10 (11th Cir.
1999)). Critically, unless the party asserting jurisdiction proves otherwise, “[i]t

is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [a federal court’s] limited
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994).
III. Analysis

All of the claims in this lawsuit flow from Plaintiff’s assertion that the
state court improperly issued a writ of possession while the eviction order was
on appeal. To find for Plaintiff on any of her claims, this Court must find that
the state court’s order was improper. This Court cannot do so, for at least two

reasons. First, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from sitting
in review of the state trial court’s order. Second, even if the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine did not apply here, it does not appear that the state court’s action was
improper. Each of these is an independently sufficient basis to deny Plaintiff’s
motion to proceed without paying the filing fee and to dismiss her amended

complaint.
a. Rooker-Feldman Bars Plaintiff’s Claims.
The Rooker–Feldman Doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims. The doctrine
provides that federal courts, with the exception of the United States Supreme

Court, have no authority to review the final judgments of state courts. Siegel
v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Rooker–Feldman
doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005).
Here, Plaintiff challenges the state court’s order issuing a writ of

possession while the underlying order of possession was on appeal. A writ of
possession is considered a judgment to which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies. See Carr v. U.S. Bank as trustee for TBW Mortg. Backed Tr. Series
2006-6, 793 F. App'x 971 (11th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (holding that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes district courts from hearing challenges to
state court writs of possession); Davis v. Thomas, 2025 WL 2743663 (N.D. Ga.
July 1, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2743669 (“Thus,
since plaintiffs are challenging the writ of possession and judgment at
issue . . . the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is properly applied.”) (collecting

cases).2 Because all of Plaintiff’s claims require the Court to rule that the state
court improperly issued the writ of possession, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
divests the Court of jurisdiction over her claims.
b. The Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim on Which Relief
Can be Granted.

Separately, even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, Florida
law is clear that the trial court acted within its power by issuing a writ of
possession while Plaintiff appealed the order of possession.
Under Florida law, “a trial court is without jurisdiction to modify a
judgment, while that judgment is pending on appeal, in the absence of the

appellate court relinquishing jurisdiction to the trial court for that purpose.”
Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc., 193 So. 3d 92, 94 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2016). “In
the absence of a stay pending appeal, however, the trial court retains the power

2 To the extent Plaintiff also challenges the order of possession, that order is a
“final judgment” of a state court and lower federal courts such as this one thus
cannot consider Plaintiff’s objections to it. See May v. Morgan Cnty. Georgia,
878 F.3d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 2017) (“A claim that at its heart challenges the
state court decision itself—and not the statute or law which underlies that
decision—falls within the doctrine because it complains of injuries caused by
state-court judgments and invites review and rejection of those judgments.”)
(cleaned up).
to enforce a judgment that has been appealed.” Mann-Stack v. Homeside
Lending, Inc., 982 So. 2d 72, 74 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2008) (emphasis added).

Here, the trial court issued an order of default and a judgment of
possession on July 17, 2025. 25-CC-023515, Docs. 55, 58. The judgment of
possession ordered that “writ of possession shall issue upon signing of this
complaint.” 25-CC-023515, Doc. 58. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of

appeal to the Florida Court of Appeals of the trial court’s “final judgment”
against her. 25-CC-023515, Doc. 59. A review of the trial court and appellate
court dockets show that neither court issued a stay of the trial court’s order of
possession while Plaintiff appealed it. The writ of possession was issued on

July 23, 2025. 25-CC-023515, Doc. 69. Thus, while the trial court may have
lacked jurisdiction to “modify” its order while it was under appeal, it still had
jurisdiction to enforce the judgment by issuing the writ of possession which the
judgment itself directed the court clerk to issue. Plaintiff’s claims, then, which

all attack the legitimacy of the writ of possession issued while her appeal was
pending, lack merit. Thus, even if the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine did not
preclude the Court from considering Plaintiff’s claims, the amended complaint
would still fail to state a claim sufficient to carry the case forward.

IV. Conclusion
Federal courts generally must give plaintiffs proceeding without a
lawyer one chance to amend their complaint before dismissing it. See Wooden
v. Armenteros, 756 F. App'x 951, 952-53 (11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (“A pro
se plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before
the district court dismisses the action with prejudice, at least where a more
carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.”) (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff
has been given the opportunity to amend her complaint. Additionally, because
Plaintiffs claims are jurisdictionally barred, any further amendment would be
futile.
Accordingly, 1 RECOMMEND:
1. Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 9) be
denied; and
2. Plaintiff's amended complaint (Doc. 12) be dismissed with
prejudice, meaning Plaintiff would not be permitted to re-file.
Reported on December 22, 2025.

NATALIE HIRT ADAMS
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party has fourteen days from this date to file written objections to the Report
and Recommendation’s factual findings and legal conclusions. A party’s failure
to file written objections waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal any
unobjected-to factual finding or legal conclusion the district judge adopts from

the Report and Recommendation. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1. To expedite resolution,
parties may file a joint notice waiving the 14-day objection period.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11263789. Public record. Not legal advice.