# Lamonte Cole v. State of Tennessee

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · February 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11263695

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 12, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Judge Camille R. McMullen
- **Judges:** Judge Camille R. McMullen
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

02/12/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs January 7, 2026

LAMONTE COLE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County
No. C-25-125 Joseph T. Howell, Judge
___________________________________

No. W2025-01491-CCA-R3-PC
___________________________________

Petitioner, Lamonte Cole, appeals from the order of the Madison County Circuit Court
denying post-conviction relief. Upon review, we affirm.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER,
and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

William J. Milam, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lamonte Cole.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Elizabeth Evan, Assistant Attorney
General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Shaun A. Brown, Deputy District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

At the beginning of the Petitioner’s December 9, 2024 guilty plea hearing, the
prosecutor announced to the court that the Petitioner was entering a “blind” plea to the
indictment because he had other criminal matters in other counties that the Petitioner
believed would be “worked out” in the following week. As part of their agreement, the
prosecutor stated the Petitioner’s bond would be reinstated for him to deal with the other
matters. The Petitioner was required to report back on the instant case for sentencing on
December 17, 2024, following resolution of the other pending criminal matters. The
prosecutor advised the court that the parties had agreed upon an “eight-year-to-serve offer”
if the Petitioner reported for sentencing, passed a drug screen, and had no new arrests.
However, there was no agreement to the sentence if the Petitioner failed to comply with
these conditions. Defense counsel was present and agreed to the terms as announced by
the prosecutor.

During the guilty plea colloquy, the trial court advised the Petitioner that he had a
right to stop the proceedings and ask any questions at any time, and the Petitioner affirmed
that he understood. The court asked the Petitioner if he had signed the plea paperwork,
whether he had the opportunity to review the same with trial counsel, and the Petitioner
replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” The Petitioner also affirmed that he understood the
proceedings he was going through by entering the guilty plea. The court began to advise
the Petitioner of his constitutional rights, and the Petitioner interrupted the court to ask
counsel a question, and the court paused the proceedings to allow them to confer. The
court then proceeded to advise the Petitioner of his constitutional rights as relevant to entry
of a guilty plea, the Petitioner indicated that he understood, and he waived his rights.

The State noted that the Petitioner was entering a guilty plea in count one of the
indictment to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm having a prior violent
felony conviction, which carried a sentence range of eight to twelve years to be served at
85%. For count two, the Petitioner was pleading to being a convicted felon in possession
of a handgun, which carried a sentencing range of two to four years to be served at 85%.
The State noted that each count would merge at sentencing because they involved
possession of the same firearm on the same day. The Petitioner indicated that he
understood the nature of the charges, the applicable penalties, and had no questions.

The Petitioner stipulated that the facts as alleged in the indictment were substantially
true and correct. The court repeated the terms and conditions of the plea agreement. In
addition to remaining drug and alcohol free, the plea agreement required the Petitioner not
to be arrested for any new charges. If the Petitioner failed to comply with the conditions
of the plea agreement, the trial court would determine the length of his sentence. The
Petitioner affirmed that he understood the plea agreement. Defense counsel noted that this
was “an incentive [for the Petitioner] to return and act properly while he’s out these eight
days that he would be out until that sentencing. The 17th [of December], Your Honor, was
his trial date, so that’s why we have that date in mind.” The court again began to advise
the Petitioner that if he did not comply, and the Petitioner interrupted, “That the sentence
would be void.” The court reviewed the terms, conditions, and consequences for failing to
comply with the plea agreement a third time, and the Petitioner indicated that he
understood. The Petitioner advised the court that he did not have any questions and that
he was satisfied with the representation of trial counsel.

At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the trial court found that the Petitioner was
entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea and that there was a factual basis in support
of the guilty plea. The court accepted the guilty plea, reinstated the Petitioner’s bond in
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accord with the plea agreement, and reset the matter for December 17th at 8:15 a.m. for
sentencing.

On April 21, 2025, a sentencing hearing was held at which the parties offered
argument only. The State recalled the history of the Petitioner’s case, noted that the
December 17th sentencing date “came and went,” and that the Petitioner came back into
their custody only because he was rearrested in another county on new charges of public
intoxication and other offenses. The State, no longer bound by the plea agreement, moved
the court for a sentence at the high end of the range. Second trial counsel1 argued for a
sentence in the middle of the range and for split confinement. The Petitioner provided a
“promissory note” to the court and his family, committing to being a better person and a
more productive citizen if given another opportunity on release. The trial court imposed
an effective eleven-year sentence to be served at 85%.

On April 23, 2025, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief,
alleging, in pertinent part, that trial counsel “did not properly advise [the Petitioner] about
a plea.” The pro se petition was signed by the Petitioner; however, it did not include a page
verifying under oath that the issues as alleged were true and correct. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-30-104(e) (“The petition and any amended petition shall be verified under oath.”).
The post-conviction court issued a preliminary order appointing counsel and requiring a
response from the State. On May 5, 2025, the State filed its response and motion to dismiss
the Petitioner’s Pro Se filing, alleging that the pro se petition was not in proper form and
that it failed to meet the mandates of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-104(c),
(d), (e), (f), and (g). On July 9, 2025, appointed post-conviction counsel filed a notice that
no amendment to the Petitioner’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief would be filed.

At the August 25, 2025 post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he was
retained to represent the Petitioner, that he filed the routine motions in this case, and that
the Petitioner initially wanted him to file a motion to suppress. Trial counsel advised the
Petitioner that a suppression motion would not succeed because the Petitioner was on video
during the traffic stop telling the officers that a gun was in the car. Based on the evidence,
trial counsel believed going to trial would have been a “mistake” and he discussed settling
the case with the Petitioner.

Trial counsel recalled the terms and conditions of the Petitioner’s guilty plea;
specifically, that he would be released from jail pending sentencing and that he would
receive an eight-year sentence if he returned on time for sentencing. Trial counsel noted
that the Petitioner did not appear at sentencing. Trial counsel did not communicate with
the Petitioner between entry of his guilty plea and when he was rearrested. Trial counsel

1
The Petitioner was represented by different trial counsel at sentencing.
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explained that the Petitioner filed a board complaint against him, which prompted trial
counsel to withdraw from representation. Before entering the guilty plea, trial counsel
reviewed the evidence against the Petitioner, explained the plea paperwork with him, and
reviewed the possible defenses in his case.

On cross-examination, trial counsel agreed that the Petitioner was released for about
eight to ten days or a week as part of the plea agreement. Trial counsel said the Petitioner
wanted to resolve his other outstanding criminal matters in other counties and Kentucky.
Trial counsel appeared at the December 17th sentencing hearing, but the Petitioner did not,
and the parties were just in “limbo” until they heard from the Petitioner.

Second counsel testified that he was appointed to represent the Petitioner for the
purpose of sentencing. As relevant to the issues herein, second counsel stated that he had
reviewed the original plea paperwork with the Petitioner. He explained the circumstances
of a “blind” plea to the Petitioner. However, second counsel acknowledged that the
Petitioner had other charges in other counties, failed to appear in court for the instant
sentencing hearing, and had previously failed to appear in court. Second counsel said,
“That did not look good and obviously cost him in the sense that he could have had the
eight-year sentence, whether it was to serve or on probation.” Second counsel told the
Petitioner that when he failed to appear for the original sentencing hearing, that was the
end of the eight-year-sentence possibility.

The Petitioner testified that he did not understand how long he had to withdraw his
guilty plea. He said he asked for thirty days at the guilty plea hearing because he knew he
had other charges to resolve. He did not understand why “they kep[t] saying it was a week
involved.” In effect, the Petitioner stated that he did not understand the date for or when
his sentencing hearing was set. Asked specifically what, if anything, trial counsel did not
do in preparation for the guilty plea that the Petitioner wished trial counsel would have
done, the Petitioner stated that he was not told that his case could proceed to trial. The
Petitioner also stated that he was unaware of “the process of how things go” and did not
have an understanding of the charges against him.

On cross-examination, the Petitioner said that when he stepped back to confer with
trial counsel during the guilty plea colloquy, he told trial counsel that he wanted to
withdraw his guilty plea. He said trial counsel told him it was too late. He agreed that he
did not tell the judge that he wanted to withdraw his plea. The Petitioner clarified that he
told trial counsel that he wanted to withdraw his plea after they left the courtroom. He
insisted that he asked trial counsel for thirty days, not a week or ten days. After asking
trial counsel about the thirty days, the Petitioner alleged that trial counsel said, “everything
was good.” The Petitioner acknowledged, however, even if that was true, the Petitioner

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was not in court for sentencing thirty days later because he was in custody in another
county.

On August 29, 2025, the post-conviction court entered an order denying relief. The
court had reviewed the transcript of the guilty plea hearing and determined that the
Petitioner had been advised of all his rights, that the trial court had reviewed the guilty plea
with the Petitioner, that the Petitioner understood what he was doing by pleading guilty,
and that the Petitioner stated that he was satisfied with trial counsel’s representation. The
post-conviction court also credited the testimony of trial counsel. Given these
considerations, the post-conviction court determined that the Petitioner had failed to prove
his case by clear and convincing evidence. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction. The State contends the post-conviction court was without
jurisdiction to rule on the petition because the Petitioner failed to verify the issues in the
petition under oath before the hearing. The Petitioner did not respond to the State’s motion
to dismiss on this ground in the lower court or in his brief on appeal. Here, the State
correctly observes that the issues within the petition for post-conviction relief were not
verified under oath by the Petitioner as required by Code sections 40-30-104(d) or (e).
However, even though the State included these grounds in their motion to dismiss, they did
not object to or raise this issue prior to the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. In addition,
the post-conviction court allowed the case to proceed without pointing out the error, and
the petitioner testified under oath at the evidentiary hearing, thereby adopting and attesting
to the veracity of the claims in the petition. Under these circumstances, we will consider
the merits of the Petitioner’s claims. See Sexton v. State, 151 S.W.3d 525, 530 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2004) (concluding that plenary review of petitioner’s claims was appropriate
despite absence of verification when “[t]he trial court did not notify the petitioner of its
concerns until the evidentiary hearing” and “took sworn testimony from the petitioner and
her trial attorneys relative to the petitioner’s claims”); Watt v. State, No. M2015-02411-
CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 6638856, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2016) (same); Lipton
v. State, No. E2019-01037-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 3182628, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
15, 2020).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The Petitioner asserts that trial counsel’s
representation of him was deficient, that both prongs of Strickland have been met, and that
he has proven by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was ineffective. The law
governing this issue provides that post-conviction relief is only warranted when a petitioner
establishes that his or her conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of an
abridgement of a constitutional right. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. A post-conviction
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petitioner has the burden of proving the factual allegations by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f); see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 8(D)(1); Nesbit v. State, 452
S.W.3d 779, 786 (Tenn. 2014). Evidence is considered clear and convincing when there
is no serious or substantial doubt about the accuracy of the conclusions drawn from it. Lane
v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2010); Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 216
(Tenn. 2009); Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

A claim for post-conviction relief based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
presents a mixed question of law and fact. Mobley v. State, 397 S.W.3d 70, 80 (Tenn.
2013) (citing Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tenn. 2011)). This court reviews “a
post-conviction court’s conclusions of law, decisions involving mixed questions of law and
fact, and its application of law to its factual findings de novo without a presumption of
correctness.” Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Felts v. State,
354 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tenn. 2011); Calvert, 342 S.W.3d at 485). However, a post-
conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence in the
record preponderates against them. Calvert, 342 S.W.3d at 485 (citing Grindstaff, 297
S.W.3d at 216; State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999)). “Accordingly, appellate
courts are not free to re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence, nor are they free to substitute
their own inferences for those drawn by the post-conviction court.” Whitehead, 402
S.W.3d at 621 (citing State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2001)). “As a general
matter, appellate courts must defer to a post-conviction court’s findings with regard to
witness credibility, the weight and value of witness testimony, and the resolution of factual
issues presented by the evidence.” Id. (citing Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tenn.
1999)).

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must
establish that (1) his lawyer’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);
Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). “[A] failure to prove either deficiency
or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim.
Indeed, a court need not address the components in any particular order or even address
both if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing of one component.” Goad v. State,
938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

A petitioner successfully demonstrates deficient performance when the petitioner
establishes that his attorney’s conduct fell below “an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688;
Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936). Prejudice arising therefrom is demonstrated once the
petitioner establishes “‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. at 370 (quoting
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement in the context
of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
entered his guilty plea and would have proceeded to trial. Serrano v. State, 133 S.W.3d
599, 605 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

The Petitioner is aggrieved over trial counsel’s “poor communication” in failing to
advise him of his sentencing date as part of his plea agreement and trial counsel’s alleged
failure to advise the court of his desire to withdraw his plea during the guilty plea hearing.
The record shows that during the guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor announced that the
Petitioner’s bond was being reinstated to allow him to resolve other pending criminal
matters. If the Petitioner reported to the December 17th sentencing hearing drug and
alcohol free without any new arrests, then he would receive an agreed upon eight-year
sentence. Trial counsel specifically stated that this agreement was “an incentive [for the
Petitioner] to return and act properly while he’s out these eight days that he would be out
until that sentencing. The 17th, Your Honor, was his trial date, so that’s why we have that
date in mind.” The court reviewed the terms, conditions, and consequences for failing to
comply with the plea agreement three times, and the Petitioner indicated that he
understood. The Petitioner advised the court that he did not have any questions and that
he was satisfied with the representation of trial counsel. The Petitioner failed to appear at
the December 17th sentencing hearing. He was sentenced on April 21, 2025, and the trial
court imposed an effective eleven-year sentence to be served at 85%.

At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel recalled the terms and conditions of the
Petitioner’s guilty plea; specifically, that he would be released from jail pending sentencing
and that he would receive an eight-year sentence if he returned on time for sentencing.
Trial counsel said that the Petitioner was released for about eight to ten days or a week as
part of the plea agreement because the Petitioner wanted to resolve his other outstanding
criminal matters. Trial counsel appeared at the December 17th sentencing hearing, but the
Petitioner did not, and the parties were just in “limbo” until they heard from the Petitioner.
Trial counsel was not asked if the Petitioner asked him to withdraw his guilty plea during
the guilty plea hearing. Second counsel reviewed the original plea paperwork with the
Petitioner and acknowledged that the Petitioner had other charges in other counties, failed
to appear in court for the instant sentencing hearing, and had previously failed to appear in
court. Second counsel said, “That did not look good and obviously cost him in the sense
that he could have had the eight-year sentence, whether it was to serve or on probation.”
Second counsel told the Petitioner that when he failed to appear for the original sentencing
hearing, that was the end of the eight-year-sentence possibility. The Petitioner testified
and insisted that he asked trial counsel about the thirty days, and trial counsel said,
“everything was good.” The Petitioner acknowledged, however, even if that was true, the
Petitioner was not in court for sentencing thirty days later because he was in custody in
another county. Although the Petitioner stated that he asked trial counsel to withdraw his
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guilty plea, the Petitioner agreed that he did so after they left the courtroom. The Petitioner
said trial counsel told him it was too late.

Based on the above evidence, the post-conviction court credited the testimony of
trial counsel and determined that the Petitioner had failed to establish ineffective assistance
of counsel by clear and convincing evidence. The record fully supports the determination
of the post-conviction court. Accordingly, the Petitioner has failed to establish deficient
performance or prejudice arising therefrom. He is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

S/ Camille R. McMullen____________
CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11263695. Public record. Not legal advice.