# TAYLOR

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · February 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11263272

## Case

- **Full name:** Joel E. Taylor v. Tony Skinner, Dawn Johnson
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** February 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

JOEL E. TAYLOR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:24-cv-01731-SEB-MG
)
TONY SKINNER, )
DAWN JOHNSON, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Joel E. Taylor, a pre-trial detainee at the Delaware County Jail, brings claims
against Defendant Sheriff Tony Skinner and Defendant Dawn Johnson for violating rights under
the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). Defendants Sheriff Tony Skinner and Dawn Johnson have moved for
summary judgment. Dkt. [15]. Mr. Taylor has not responded. For the reasons below, that motion
is GRANTED.
I.
Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment,
the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir.
2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because
those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A
court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need
not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d
562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the basis for its motion
and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must
support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions,
documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in
opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered
undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Mr. Taylor failed to respond to the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, facts alleged
in the motion are "admitted without controversy" so long as support for them exists in the record.
S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f); see S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (party opposing judgment must file response

brief and identify disputed facts). "Even where a non-movant fails to respond to a motion for
summary judgment, the movant still has to show that summary judgment is proper given the
undisputed facts." Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
II.
Factual Background
Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the Court views
and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 572–73.
Mr. Taylor was a pretrial detainee at the Delaware County Jail from November 18, 2022,
through at least June 18, 2025. Dkt. 17-1 at 1, 9 (Taylor Deposition). Mr. Taylor received multiple
write-ups while incarcerated for violations such as fighting with other inmates, disobeying orders,
refusing to lock down, throwing food trays and cups of hot water at jail staff, and making and
drinking hooch. See generally dkt. 17-3 (Incident Reports).
When Mr. Taylor entered the jail, he received the regular meal trays served at the jail. Dkt.
17-1 at 20. During the first year that Mr. Taylor was in the jail, he thought that the portion sizes

on the trays were too small. Id. Also while Mr. Taylor was in the jail, he developed a persistent
rash in his groin and on his back. Id. at 3. He thought that the rash might be an allergic reaction to
the food he was eating, so he went on an elimination diet where he stopped drinking coffee and
eating the beans, eggs, and onions that were served to him on his regular meal tray. Id. at 4–5. On
some occasions, Mr. Taylor refused a meal tray altogether. Id. at 5. He was concerned that he was
not getting enough calories, but he stopped eating certain foods and periodically refused the meal
tray offered to him because he was scared that he did not know what was causing his rash. Id.
At some point, Mr. Taylor heard that inmates who worked in the kitchen got to eat whatever
they wanted, so he began writing to Defendant Dawn Johnson and asking her to hire him to work

in the kitchen. Id. at 5–6. Ms. Johnson did not hire Mr. Taylor to work in the kitchen. Id. at 19–20.
She states in her declaration that she did not do so because she was aware of his extensive
disciplinary history, knew that he had spent a lot of time on disciplinary lockdown, and did not
think he was a suitable candidate to work in the kitchen. Dkt. 17-8 ¶¶ 8–9 (Johnson Declaration).
Ms. Johnson did not directly tell Mr. Taylor that she would never hire him to work in the kitchen.
Dkt. 17-1 at 19. She told him that it was easier for her to hire inmates who had already worked in
the kitchen because they knew what to do and she did not have to train them. Id. at 20. She also
told him to keep writing to her and maybe someday she would hire him to work in the kitchen. Id.
at 19.
Approximately one year after Mr. Taylor first entered the jail, he met an inmate named
"Stormy." Id. at 20. Mr. Taylor saw that Stormy's food tray that was different from his and looked
like it was healthier and contained more food. Id. at 15, 20. Stormy told Mr. Taylor that it was a
kosher food tray and that if Mr. Taylor wanted to get the same tray, all he had to do was request
it. Id. at 20. Mr. Taylor requested a kosher diet (because he thought it was healthier and had more

food) and began receiving kosher meal trays. Id. at 15, 19.
According to Mr. Taylor, at some point the kitchen started shorting the amount of food on
the kosher meal trays. Id. at 21. Even so, the kosher meal trays almost always had more food on
them than the regular meal trays. Id. As of June 18, 2025, Mr. Taylor was still receiving kosher
meals and was content with the meals. Id. at 15–16.
When Mr. Taylor was booked into the jail on November 18, 2022, he was weighed by jail
staff as being 200 pounds, and he self-reported that he was 6 feet 2 inches tall. Dkt. 17-2 ¶ 12 (Dye
Declaration). Mr. Taylor's regular weight fluctuates between 197 and 207 pounds. Dkt. 17-1 at 6.
Mr. Taylor stated that, when a nurse weighed him in August 2024, he weighed 173 pounds. Id.;

dkt. 17-3 at 21. Mr. Taylor's medical records report that Mr. Taylor was weighed by the jail's
medical staff twice before he filed this lawsuit, and he weighed 200 pounds on November 18,
2022, and 184 pounds on August 9, 2024. Dkt. 17-4 at 4, 8 (Medical Records). At no time did the
jail's medical staff record Mr. Taylor's weight as 173 pounds. See generally dkt. 17-4. By June 18,
2025, Mr. Taylor thought that his weight was back up to "probably 195 pounds." Dkt. 17-1 at 6.
Every two years, if not more often, the Sheriff's Office has its menus reviewed by a
registered dietitian to confirm that the jail's kitchen is meeting the inmate's caloric and nutritional
needs. Dkt. 17-2 ¶ 7. The most recent menu review before Mr. Taylor filed this lawsuit was
conducted in June 2024 and confirmed that the menus provided sufficient nutritional content and
calories to meet the needs of the majority of the inmates in the jail. Id. ¶¶ 8–9; dkt. 17-6 at 1.
The Sheriff's Office "Inmate Workers" policy provides that inmates may be given jobs
within the jail "consistent with their security and supervision requirements and the needs of the
Jail." Dkt. 17-7. It also provides that "[n]o inmate will be assigned or not assigned to a job on the

basis of gender, race, religion, or national origin." Id.
To apply for a job in the jail's kitchen, inmates must submit a written request to Ms. Johnson
through the jail's kiosk. Dkt. 17-2 ¶ 17. If Ms. Johnson thinks that she might like to have a
particular inmate work in the kitchen, she makes inquiry with the Jail Commander or his designee
to confirm that the inmate is sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to work in the kitchen around
things like knives, hot water, stove burners, and the like. Id. ¶ 18. Inmates who have significant
disciplinary histories are rarely, if ever, allowed to work in the kitchen. Id. at ¶ 19. Although Mr.
Taylor submitted several requests to work in the jail's kitchen, he had an extensive disciplinary
history, including fighting, disobeying orders, refusing to lock down, throwing food trays and cups

of hot water at jail staff, and making and drinking hooch. Id. ¶ 20. Ms. Johnson states that she did
not select Mr. Taylor to work in the kitchen because of his substantial disciplinary history and the
significant amount of time he spent in lockdown. Dkt. 17-8 ¶ 8. She also explicitly states her
decision was not due to Mr. Taylor's religion (as she was not aware of what Mr. Taylor's religion
was), nor was it due to Mr. Taylor's receipt of kosher meal trays. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.
Mr. Taylor has been a Christian his entire life. Dkt. 17-1 at 17. He agrees that he has been
able to practice his religion while incarcerated. Id. at 23.
III.
Discussion
When the Court screened Mr. Taylor's complaint, it determined that he had stated claims
under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA.1 Dkt. 11 at 2. Sheriff
Skinner and Ms. Johnson assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of these claims
on the merits and because they are shielded by qualified immunity. The Court addresses these
matters in turn.
A. First Amendment and RLUIPA
Both the First Amendment and RLUIPA require an inmate to show that the challenged
prison practice substantially burdens his religious exercise and that his request for a religious

exemption is sincere. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015); West v. Radtke, 48 F.4th 836,
844 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). "Religious exercise" includes "any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." Holt, 574 U.S. at 360
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A)). "[A] prisoner's request for an accommodation must be
sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation." Id. at 360–61. A substantial
burden on religious exercise occurs when a prison attaches some meaningful negative consequence
to an inmate's religious exercise, forcing them to choose between violating their religion and
incurring that negative consequence. West, 48 F.4th at 845 (citing Jones v. Carter, 915 F.3d 1147,
1150 (7th Cir. 2019)).
The evidence is that Mr. Taylor requested a kosher diet not out of religious observance but

because he believed the kosher trays to be healthier and contain more food than the regular trays.

1 Because it was unclear whether Mr. Taylor was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner during the
relevant time period, the Court indicated that he might have stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment
instead of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it has since been established that Mr. Taylor was a pretrial
detainee. See dkt. 11 at 2; dkt. 17-1 at 9.
He also stated that he was able to exercise his religion while incarcerated. With no evidence that
Mr. Taylor's religious exercise was substantially burdened in any regard, Sheriff Skinner and Ms.
Johnson are entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims.
B. Fourteenth Amendment: Conditions of Confinement
Conditions-of-confinement claims for pretrial detainees, which flow from the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are analyzed under an objective standard. Hardeman v.
Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821−22 (7th Cir. 2019). Under this standard, the plaintiff must show "that
the conditions in [the jail] posed an objectively serious threat to his health; that the [defendants']
response was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances; and that they acted purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly with respect to the consequences of their actions." Mays v. Emanuele,
853 F. App'x 25, 26–27 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 823, 827 and Miranda v.
County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353−54 (7th Cir. 2018)). "A jail official's response to serious
conditions of confinement is objectively unreasonable when it is 'not rationally related to a
legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose' or is 'excessive in relation to that purpose.'" Id.

(quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)).
Mr. Taylor has failed to create a dispute of material fact as to any of the elements of a
conditions-of-confinement claim. First, he has not shown that the meals at the jail posed an
objectively serious threat to his health. The undisputed designated evidence shows that the
Delaware County Jail's menus are reviewed at least every two years by a registered dietitian. A
review in June 2024 confirmed that the jail's menus were calorically and nutritionally sufficient
for the majority of jail inmates. Mr. Taylor asserts that the meals were inadequate, but he
designates no evidence that would allow a jury to conclude—not speculate—that they were. And,
as a layperson, he is not qualified to offer an opinion on the nutritional adequacy of the meals. Fed.
R. Evid. 701 (setting forth requirements for lay opinion testimony). Though the evidence most
favorable to Mr. Taylor shows that his weight decreased from 200 to 173 pounds during his
incarceration, Mr. Taylor admits to going on an elimination diet at his own initiative. He has not
designated any evidence that would suggest that he lost that weight because of the adequacy of the
meals, as opposed to his own choice to pursue an elimination diet. Further, there is no indication

that 173 pounds is an unhealthy weight for Mr. Taylor, only evidence that he usually weighs more.
Second, even assuming for present purposes that the meal trays provided were
constitutionally inadequate, Mr. Taylor has not shown that Sheriff Skinner or Ms. Johnson acted
objectively unreasonably under the circumstances. He has not designated any evidence that they
were aware of—or should have been aware of—the inadequacy of the meals. Biennial menu
reviews were conducted to ensure the meals being provided were adequate. Mr. Taylor has
identified no evidence that he alerted Sheriff Skinner or Ms. Johnson to any inadequacy in his meal
trays or told them that he blamed the meal trays and not his own elimination diet for his weight
loss. Without evidence that Sheriff Skinner or Ms. Johnson, in providing the meal trays that they

did, acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly with respect to providing inadequate nutrition, Mr.
Taylor's claim cannot withstand summary judgment. Sheriff Skinner and Ms. Johnson are entitled
to summary judgment on the conditions of confinement claim.
C. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall
'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1). "The Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state and local governments from discriminating on the basis
of certain protected classifications and also bars governments from treating a person irrationally
as a so-called 'class of one." Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 611 F. Supp. 3d 516, 532 (N.D.
Ill. 2020) (citing Reget v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010)).
In his complaint, Mr. Taylor stated that Ms. Johnson "has a no hire policy for kosher
people.” Dkt. 1-2 at 4. He makes no allegations about Sheriff Skinner in this regard. Mr. Taylor
has presented no evidence of such a policy to not hire inmates receiving kosher trays, and at
summary judgment a party cannot rest on their pleadings. See Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 771
(7th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). A jail policy explicitly prohibits religious
discrimination in work assignments. Dkt. 17-7 at 1. Ms. Johnson affirmed under penalties of
perjury that she did not select Mr. Taylor to work in the kitchen because of his substantial
institutional disciplinary history and because he had spent a significant amount of time on lock
down. Dkt. 17-8 8. She specifically denied that her decision was based on Mr. Taylor's religion
or receipt of kosher meal trays. Jd. 10, 12. Mr. Taylor counters none of this evidence, and there
is no dispute of fact here for a fact-finder to resolve. Sheriff Skinner and Ms. Johnson are entitled
to summary judgment on this claim.
Because the Court has determined that summary judgment is appropriate on all claims on
the merits, it will not address Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. [15].
Final judgment will issue in a separate entry.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: __ 2/19/2026 Fuh, Genus Barker
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
9 Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

JOEL E. TAYLOR
25357
DELAWARE COUNTY JAIL
3100 S. Tilloston Ave
Muncie, IN 47302

Pamela G. Schneeman
Clark Johnson & Knight, Ltd.
pschneeman@cjklaw.com

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11263272. Public record. Not legal advice.