# Hough

> District Court, E.D. New York · January 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262646

## Case

- **Full name:** Dwayne Hough v. Patrick J. Ryder, Nassau County Police Commissioner, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** January 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FILED
CLERK
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------------------X 1/29/202   6 3:45 pm
DWAYNE HOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Plaintiff, LONG ISLAND OFFICE
ORDER
-against- 25-CV-6642 (GRB)(ST)

PATRICK J. RYDER, Nassau County Police
Commissioner, et al.,

Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------------X
GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:
On November 24, 2025, Dwayne Hough (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint while
incarcerated at the Franklin Correctional Facility naming Nassau County Police Commissioner
Patrick J. Ryder (“Ryder”), Nassau County Police Officer Ryan Hayden (“Hayden”), and
thirteen unidentified Nassau County police officers named as “John Doe #1-13” (“Does” and,
with Ryder and Hayden, “Defendants”). (Docket Entry (“DE”) 1.) Plaintiff also filed an
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and the required Prisoner Litigation
Authorization form (“PLA”). (See DE 2-3.) Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff is
qualified by his reported financial position to proceed IFP. Accordingly, the application to
proceed IFP (DE 2) is granted. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s claims against Ryder and
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims relating to his medical care are dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff’s remaining claims
shall proceed as set forth below.
BACKGROUND
I. Summary of the Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that, during his arrest on November 21, 2022, Hayden “punched and
kicked” Plaintiff while Plaintiff’s hands were handcuffed behind his back. (See DE 1 at 5.)1
Plaintiff describes that Hayden “forcibly squeeze[d] the handcuff on my right hand, tearing my
ligaments.” (Id.) According to the Complaint, “[a]t least 13 other Nassau County Police Officers,
namely John Doe #1-13 merely watched.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that, as a result of the alleged
assault, he has “limited use of my right hand and I am permanently disfigured and disabled.”
(Id.) Plaintiff claims that he has
submitted numerous medical slips whilst incarcerated at Nassau County
Correctional Center, which went ignored, along with a multitude of grievances
addressing the injuries suffered from the arrest. Throughout my incarceration . . . I
received physical therapy which did nothing to remedy my torn ligaments.

(Id.)
With regard to Ryder, Plaintiff alleges: “Commissioner Patrick J. Ryder’s supervising
role and authority makes him responsible party, as his negligent behavior allowed for my pain
and suffering” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff brings federal claims of excessive force and for
deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment as well as state law tort claims. (Id. at 4.)
For relief, Plaintiff seeks to recover a damages award in the total sum of $4 million. (Id. at 6.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
The Second Circuit has established a two-step procedure wherein the district court first
considers whether a plaintiff qualifies for IFP status and then considers the merits of the
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir.
1983).

1 Excerpts from the complaint have been reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original.
Errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.

2
I. In Forma Pauperis
Upon review of the renewed IFP application, the Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by
his financial status to commence this action without the prepayment of the filing fee. Therefore,
the application to proceed IFP (DE 2) is granted.
II. Sufficiency of the Pleadings
As Judge Bianco summarized,
A district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The Court is required to dismiss the action
as soon as it makes such a determination. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read pro se complaints liberally,
see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010), and
to construe them “‘to raise the strongest arguments that [they] suggest [ ].’”
Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d
Cir. 2010)). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must
assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the
complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir.
2010), aff’d, --- U.S. ----, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Notwithstanding a plaintiff’s pro se status, a complaint must plead sufficient facts
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671
F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011). While “detailed factual allegations” are not
required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff’s factual allegations must also be
sufficient to give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).

3
Patrick v. Bronx Care, No. 14-CV-7392 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL 7476972, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 31, 2014).
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1983 Claims
Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for
redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d
Cir. 1993). To maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) acted
under color of state law (2) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the Constitution or
federal law. See id.
Here, the Complaint does not allege a plausible Section 1983 claim as against Ryder
because, as the Second Circuit has made clear, “there is no special rule for supervisory liability.”
Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d. 609, 618 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2020). Rather, “[t]o hold a state
official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying
constitutional violation directly against the official without relying on a special test for
supervisory liability.” Id. at 620. In the absence of any such allegations, Plaintiff’s Section 1983
claim against Ryder2 is not plausible and is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

2 Nor is Ryder, as the Nassau County Police Commissioner, responsible for the medical care at the Nassau County
4
Similarly, the Complaint does not allege plausible deliberate indifference claims (whether
brought under the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment) because both amendments
involve a two-pronged test that requires showing an “objective deprivation” with the requisite
“mens rea,” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 32, 35 (2d Cir. 2017). To satisfy the first prong,

often framed as the “objective prong,” both amendments “require[] a showing that the
challenged conditions were sufficiently serious such ‘that the conditions, either alone or in
combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.’” Volant v. Nassau
Cnty., No. 2:24-cv-7882, 2025 WL 580367, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2025) (quoting the
discussion of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claims in Darnell,
849 F.3d at 30). “There is no static test to determine whether a deprivation is sufficiently serious;
instead, the conditions themselves must be evaluated in light of contemporary standards of
decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As for the mens rea prong, the Eighth Amendment requires a showing “that a prison
official had the requisite ‘culpable intent,’ which is present if the official ‘has knowledge that [a

prisoner] faces a substantial risk of serious harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate the harm.’” Smith v. New York State, No. 23-cv-6601, 2024 WL
4746554, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2024) (summary order) (quoting Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original). As such, “mere negligence will
not suffice.” Id. By contrast, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the mens rea prong requires
showing that the defendant-official “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or
recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition . . . even

Correctional Center.
5
though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive
risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. “In other words, the . . . ‘mens rea prong’ . . . is
defined objectively” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s sparse allegations relating to the sufficiency of the medical care for his

ligament injury do not demonstrate that either prong is met whether Plaintiff’s conditions of
confinement claim is brought under either the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is not plausible and is dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
However, given that the alleged excessive force occurred during Plaintiff’s arrest, such
claims would arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s objective “knew or should have known”
standard. Given the allegation that the Does “merely watched” as Hayden assaulted Plaintiff, the
Court declines to dismiss these claims as against the Does at this early stage. Accordingly, the
Court orders service of the summonses and Complaint upon Hayden and the Does by the United
States Marshal Service in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

However, given that the identities of the Does are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, the
Court requests, pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam),
that the Nassau County Attorney ascertain the full names and service addresses of the individuals
involved in the events alleged in the Complaint. (See DE 1.) To be clear and for the avoidance of
any doubt, the Nassau County Attorney shall provide the identity and contact information for any
individual(s) involved in Plaintiff’s arrest, regardless of the date. Accordingly, the Clerk of the
Court shall serve a copy of the Complaint together with this Order on the Nassau County Attorney,
and the Nassau County Attorney’s Office is requested to attempt to ascertain the full names of the
unidentified defendants and to provide their names and the address(es) where such defendants can
6
be served to the Court and to Plaintiff within thirty (30) days of the date that this Order is served
upon it.
The Nassau County Attorney need not undertake to defend or indemnify these individuals
at this juncture. This Order merely provides a means by which the Plaintiff may name and properly
serve these defendants as instructed by the Second Circuit in Valentin. Once the information is
provided to the Court by the Nassau County Attorney’s Office, Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be
deemed amended to reflect the full names of these defendants, a summons shall be issued to each

defendant, and the USMS shall effect service.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken
in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to also serve a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at his address of record and to note service
on the docket. In addition, the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of the Complaint together with
this Order on the Nassau County Attorney, and the Nassau County Attorney’s Office is requested
to attempt to ascertain the full names of the unidentified defendants and to provide their names
and the address(es) where such defendants can be served to the Court and to Plaintiff within
thirty (30) days of the date that this Order is served upon it.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Gary R. Brown

_______________________
Dated: January 29, 2026 GARY R. BROWN
Central Islip, New York United States District Judge

7

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262646. Public record. Not legal advice.