# Bolivar

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · February 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262637

## Case

- **Full name:** Radha Bolivar, et al. v. HMD Trucking, Inc., et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262637

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that punitive damages could not be sustained against a truck driver who made a wide- turn onto a highway in heavy fog

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

RADHA BOLIVAR, et al., )
) Case No. 1:24-cv-155
Plaintiffs, )
) Judge Travis R. McDonough
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Michael J. Dumitru
HMD Trucking, Inc., et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants HMD Trucking, Inc. and Antonio Wortham’s motion for
partial summary judgment (Doc. 74). For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT
Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (id.).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
This action arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on March 1, 2023. On that
day, both Defendant Antonio Wortham (“Wortham”) and Plaintiff Radha Bolivar (“Bolivar”)
were driving westbound on Interstate 24. (Doc. 75, at 2; Doc. 87, at 6.) Plaintiff Bolivar had
one passenger in his vehicle, Plaintiff Angelica Goatache. (Doc. 75, at 2.) Wortham moved to
the left lane to pass Bolivar. (Id.) Later, Wortham attempted to move back to the right lane, but
collided with Bolivar. (Doc. 75, at 2; Doc. 87, at 6.) Bolivar sought medical care after the
accident. (Doc. 75, at 3; Doc. 87, at 6.)
Wortham began working for HMD Trucking Inc. (“HMD”) in October 2021. (Doc. 74-5,
at 2.) Before hiring Wortham, HMD conducted background checks on him and communicated
with his previous employers. (Doc. 102-1, at 45–48, 60–68.) Wortham had one accident in
2020, prior to working at HMD, where “a motor vehicle hit [Wortham’s] trailer tire, and [the
other driver] took 100 percent fault in the accident.” (Doc. 74-1, at 8.) The company Wortham
worked for during the 2020 accident continued to employ him after this accident and noted to
HMD that he passed all DOT-regulated testing for drugs and alcohol. (Doc. 102-1, at 67.)

While employed at HMD, Wortham had four incidents that caused damage to his vehicle.
Three of these incidents did not involve any other vehicle but caused damage to Wortham’s
vehicle. (Doc. 74-5, at 5–8; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) The first incident occurred when Wortham was
backing in to a dock at a low speed and dented his air deflector. (Doc. 74-5, at 5; Doc. 102-7, at
1.) His second incident happened when he was parking his vehicle and scratched his rim. (Doc.
74-5, at 6; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) The third incident occurred when another vehicle struck
Wortham’s hood, and there was no fault attributed to Wortham. (Doc. 74-5, at 7; Doc. 102-7, at
1.) The fourth incident caused damage to the plastic cover on the driver’s side step—air
fairing—and resulted from road debris. (Doc. 74-5, at 8; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) Wortham did not

report these incidents immediately to HMD. (Doc. 74-1, at 28–29; Doc. 74-4, at 22.) After these
four incidents, in August 2022, Wortham completed an in-person safety training at HMD’s
orientation room. (Doc. 102-7, at 1; Doc. 74-6, at 7–10; Doc. 90-4, at 74–81.) In August 2023,
Wortham completed an online “space management” training through Tenstreet. (Doc. 102-5, at
6; Doc. 74-6, at 7–10; Doc. 90-4, at 74–81).
Vehicles operated under HMD contain a recording device that have four lenses; one lens
faces the driver’s sleeping area, and another lens faces the driver when in the driving position.
(Doc. 90-4, at 20–21.) To further monitor its drivers, HMD vehicles have a real-time monitoring
system that analyzes drivers’ safety, and HMD is provided with a monthly report with drivers’
safety metrics. (See Doc. 74-5, at 3–4.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed suit on February 26, 2024, in the Circuit Court for Marion County,
Tennessee. (Doc. 1-2, at 3.) Defendants timely removed the case to this Court. (See Doc. 1.) In

their complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims against HMD for direct negligence—entrustment, hiring,
supervision, retention, and training. (Doc. 1-2, at 5–8.) Plaintiffs also assert negligence claims
against Wortham. (Id. at 8–10.) Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against both HMD and
Wortham. (Id. at 10.) On December 9, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims against both Defendants and Plaintiffs’ direct
negligence claims against HMD. (Doc. 74.) Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment
is ripe for the Court’s review.
II. STANDARD OF LAW
Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc.,
253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349
F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may meet this burden either by affirmatively
producing evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact or by pointing out
the absence of support in the record for the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
Once the movant has discharged this burden, the nonmoving party can no longer rest upon the
allegations in the pleadings; rather, it must point to specific facts supported by evidence in the
record demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285
F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
At summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence; its role is limited to

determining whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably
find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). A mere
scintilla of evidence is not enough; the Court must determine whether a fair-minded jury could
return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record. Id. at 251–52; Lansing Dairy,
Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). If not, the Court must grant summary
judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Direct Negligence Claims Against HMD
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ “direct negligence claims against HMD, claiming that

HMD negligently hired, trained, retained, entrusted, and supervised Mr. Wortham” fail as a
matter of law because “Plaintiffs cannot establish any of the necessary requirements for the
direct claims of negligence.” (Doc. 75, at 15–16.) Plaintiffs contend that there are questions of
material fact as to whether HMD negligently hired, trained, retained, supervised, and entrusted
Wortham. (See Doc. 87, at 19–29.)
As an initial matter, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party
asserting a fact to “support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the
record . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Brown v. FCA US LLC, No. 25-1405, 2025 WL 3657226,
at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025) (“the non-moving party, must ‘cite specific portions of the record’
to show that a material dispute of fact exists.” (citing U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc.,
130 F.3d 1185, 1191 (6th Cir. 1997)). In opposing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiffs fail to cite evidence that establishes the facts they are asserting or generally cite to
exhibits that do not correspond to the facts they are asserting. For example, Plaintiffs state, “Yet
HMD’s corporate representative testified: ‘I cannot identify any investigation into the Publix

crash.’” (Doc. 87, at 20.) Yet, Plaintiffs provide no citation to admissible evidence to support
this fact or even provide the name of the person who allegedly made such a statement. (See id.)
Plaintiffs also claim that Wortham had a violation for improper backing in July 2019 and cites
“Alabama MVR (Exhibit E).” (Id. at 21.) However, the document listed as “Exhibit E” does not
show any such violation, and even states, in what appears to be the section where such violations
would be noted, that there is “No Incident History to Report”. (Doc. 102-2, at 1.) Conclusory
representations unsupported by evidence fail to demonstrate that disputes of material fact remain.
1. Negligent Entrustment
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ negligent-entrustment claim fails because there is no
evidence suggesting that Wortham was an incompetent driver or that HMD had knowledge of

any incompetence. (Doc. 75, at 19–21.) Plaintiffs respond that Wortham’s crash prior to his
hiring at HMD and his failures to report four incidents while employed at HMD made him unfit
to operate HMD’s vehicles.1 (Doc. 87, at 27.)
In Tennessee, negligent-entrustment claims consist of four elements: “(1) an entrustment
of a chattel, (2) to a person incompetent to use it, (3) with knowledge that the person is

1 Plaintiffs also argue that HMD’s federal safety scores should have made it aware of that there
were elevated risks for its drivers generally, which put HMD on notice not to entrust its drivers
with vehicles. (See Doc. 87, at 27.) However, negligent-entrustment claims are based on the
entrustor’s knowledge about the entrustee. Harper v. Churn, 83 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2001). An entrustor’s federal safety scores are not the type of information that can be
attributed to an individual entrustee’s competency for a negligent-entrustment claim.
incompetent, and (4) that is the proximate cause of injury or damage to another.” Harper v.
Churn, 83 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Negligent-entrustment is based on the
entrustor’s “direct negligence in entrusting the chattel to an incompetent user[,]” and “is
committed at the moment when control of a chattel is relinquished by an entrustor to an
incompetent user.” West v. E. Tenn. Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3d 545, 555 (Tenn. 2005) (citing

Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557, 564 (Tenn. 2004)); Rimer v. City of Collegedale, Tenn., 835
S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (“it must be affirmatively shown that the entruster had at
that time knowledge of such facts and circumstances relating to the incompetency of the
entrustee to operate the motor vehicle as would charge the entruster with knowledge of such
incompetency”). Tennessee courts will find negligent-entrustment when an entrustor had
knowledge that an entrustee was “addicted to habits of intoxication” and still entrusted the
chattel to the entrustee. V.L. Nicholson Const. Co. v. Lane, 150 S.W.2d 1069, 1070 (Tenn.
1941). However, if there is no evidence that shows the entrustor had knowledge that the driver
was incompetent, the entrustor cannot be held liable for negligent-entrustment. See Hamrick v.

Spring City Motor Co., 708 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tenn. 1986); Rimer, 835 S.W. 2d at 25.
In this case, there is no evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that HMD knew Worthman was incompetent. Wortham’s 2020 accident was an
accident in which “a motor vehicle hit [Wortham’s] trailer tire, and [the other driver] took 100
percent fault in the accident.” (Doc. 74-1, at 8.) Furthermore, Wortham’s employer at the time
of the 2020 accident noted that Wortham passed all DOT-regulated testing for drugs and alcohol.
(Doc. 102-1, at 67.) One accident for which another driver was at fault is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether an entrustee is incompetent.
Plaintiffs also argue that Wortham’s failure to report four incidents proves he was
“unfit[]”. (Doc. 87, at 27.) Three of these incidents were minor incidents: (1) denting an air
reflector while backing up; (2) scratching a rim while parking; and (3) damaging a plastic cover
to a step by hitting road debris. (Doc. 74-5, at 5–8; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) The fourth incident
occurred when another vehicle struck Wortham’s hood, and there was no fault attributed to

Wortham. (Doc. 74-5, at 7; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) These incidents are not the type on which a
reasonable jury could base a finding of incompetency.
Plaintiffs’ next argument, that Wortham’s failure to immediately report these incidents
makes him dishonest and, thus, incompetent, is also unavailing. Even viewing in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiffs, dishonesty about minor incidents does not make someone incompetent
as a driver. Plaintiffs fail to cite—and the Court cannot find—any precedent suggesting
dishonesty about minor vehicle incidents makes a driver incompetent. Accordingly, there is
insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Wortham was an
incompetent driver, and thus, insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude

that HMD knew he was an incompetent driver. As a result, the Court will grant HMD’s motion
for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent-entrustment.
2. Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention, or Training
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not established “any of the necessary requirements
for the direct claims of negligence.” (Doc. 75, at 16.) Plaintiffs contend that HMD was
negligent because: (1) it did not conduct an adequate background check on Wortham; (2) it
retained Wortham after he had five incidents; (3) it allegedly falsified training records; and (4) it
did not adequately supervise Wortham. (See Doc. 87, at 20–26.)
In Tennessee, a negligence claim requires proof of the following elements: “(1) a duty of
care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant falling below the
standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact;
and (5) proximate or legal cause.” Hale v. Ostrow, 166 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tenn. 2005). Claims
for negligent training, hiring, supervision, or retention of an employee requires a plaintiff to
establish, “in addition to the elements of a negligence claim, that the employer had knowledge of
the employee’s unfitness for the job.” See Binns v. Trader Joe’s East, Inc., 690 S.W.3d 241, 254

(Tenn. 2024) (citation modified).
As discussed above in Part II.A.I, there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that Wortham was an incompetent driver, and thus, Wortham was fit for the
job. As a result, there is also insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that HMD knew Wortham was unfit for the job. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring,
supervision, retention, and training claims also fail.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ argument that HMD negligently hired Wortham because it did
not conduct an adequate background check is contradicted by the evidence, which shows that
HMD ran several background checks on Wortham and communicated with Wortham’s previous

employers to get information about Wortham’s work history. (Doc. 102-1, at 45–48, 60–68.)
There was nothing in the background checks that would give an employer pause to hire
Wortham. (See id.) Also, the evidence does not support Plaintiffs’ argument that HMD should
have terminated or enhanced its monitoring of Wortham after his four incidents and discovery
that he did not promptly report those incidents, and thus, Plaintiffs negligent retention and
supervision claims fail. Plaintiffs’ assertions that “HMD negligently trained Wortham by
falsifying training records”2 because there are two different dates cited for trainings (Doc. 87, at

2 Plaintiffs cite “Exhibit G” for the HMD training records from August 2022 training, but
“Exhibit G” appears to be an internal system for HMD to keep track of communications with
Wortham and does not note any trainings completed by Wortham. (See Doc. 102-4). Although
23) is also unsupported by the evidence. Documents produced by HMD show that Wortham
attended two separate trainings—not one—an in-person training and an online training through
Tenstreet. (Doc. 74-4, at 11; Doc. 74-5, at 9; Doc. 74-6, at 7–10; Doc. 90-4, at 74–81). There is
no evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that HMD was negligent
in its hiring, supervision, retention, or training of Wortham. Accordingly, the Court will grant

HMD’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ direct negligence claims, and those claims
against HMD will be dismissed.
B. Punitive Damages
In Tennessee, punitive damages are appropriate only if the claimant can show, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the opposing party engaged in “intentional, fraudulent, malicious,
or reckless conduct.” Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992). Punitive
damages are only to be awarded “in the most egregious of cases.” Id. “A person acts recklessly
when the person is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
such a nature that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an

ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances.” Id.
1. Punitive Damages Against Wortham
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages from Wortham because
his action of “not see[ing] Plaintiffs’ vehicle prior to the lane change” was a “mistake or ordinary
negligence,” which they argue does not satisfy the requirements for a punitive damages award.
(Doc. 75, at 25.) Plaintiffs argue that Wortham “ha[s] a pattern of dishonesty and concealment . .
. ,” and “a driver who repeatedly hides collisions and misrepresents fault is a driver who knows
his conduct creates risks . . . .” (Doc. 87, at 11–12.)

not entirely clear, Plaintiff may have meant to cite Exhibit J, which notes the four incidents and
the damage incurred to Wortham’s truck. (See Doc. 102-7.)
The Sixth Circuit has observed that, in cases “arising out of an automobile-truck accident
in Tennessee[,] . . . poor judgment and lack of ordinary care are not the stuff of which punitive
damages awards are made[.]” Leap v. Malone, 106 F.3d 401, 1996 WL 742306, at *2 (6th Cir.
1996) (table) (citation modified); Womack v. Gettelfinger, 808 F.2d 446, 453–54 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that punitive damages could not be sustained against a truck driver who made a wide-

turn onto a highway in heavy fog); see also Anderson v. U.S.A. Truck, Inc., No.
W200601967COAR3CV, 2008 WL 4426810, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2008) (listing
automobile crash cases where Tennessee state courts have found that punitive damages did or did
not apply and noting that a case where the driver “was negligent in his failure to see the
plaintiff’s vehicle just before impact” did not justify punitive damages).
Here, it is undisputed that Wortham caused the accident because he changed lanes
without seeing Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Doc. 75, at 25; Doc. 87, at 12; Doc. 74-1, at 16.) Even if
viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Wortham’s failure to report prior accidents to
his employer is insufficient to show that he engaged in “intentional, fraudulent, malicious, or

reckless conduct” in connection with the accident in this matter. See Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at
901. Also, the four incidents relied on by Plaintiffs involved three incidents where Wortham’s
vehicle was the only vehicle involved and one incident where “another driver back[ed] into
[Wortham’s] vehicle.” (Doc. 87, at 12.) These incidents are not ones that create a substantial or
unjustifiable risk—the requirement for punitive damages. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ prayer for
punitive damages against Wortham is denied.
2. Punitive Damages Against HMD
Plaintiffs argue that HMD’s conscious disregard of Wortham’s unfitness for the job and
its policy that allowed drivers to cover the inward cameras in the vehicles makes HMD liable for
punitive damages. (Doc. 87, at 13–18.) As discussed earlier, HMD was not reckless in hiring,
retaining, supervising, or training Wortham (see supra Part II.A.2), and Wortham was competent
for the job (see supra Part II.A.1).
Plaintiffs also argue that HMD’s policy of allowing drivers to cover their inward facing
camera shows that HMD “conscious[ly] disregarded” public safety. (Doc. 87, at 13.) For a
claim that a party was reckless, punitive damages are only awarded “in the most egregious of

cases” and when a conscious disregard “constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise.” Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 901. Here, the evidence does
not establish that HMD’s policy of allowing drivers to cover their inward cameras, the lens that
would face a driver’s sleeping area, is a “gross deviation,” especially considering that the
recording device had four lenses including a side lens that could capture a driver. (Doc. 90-4, at
20–21.) HMD also utilized a system with real-time monitoring that analyzed drivers’ safety and
provided HMD metrics monthly for HMD to evaluate drivers’ safety performance. (Doc. 74-5,
at 3–4.) There is insufficient evidence that HMD’s policy of placing recording devices in its
vehicles that record drivers’ activities but allows drivers to cover the one lens that captures their

sleeping area is reckless conduct to warrant punitive damages. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ prayer for
punitive damages against HMD is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (Doc.
74) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ direct negligence claims against HMD—negligent entrustment,
hiring, supervision, retention, and training—are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs’
prayer for punitive damages against both Wortham and HMD is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262637. Public record. Not legal advice.