# Kropf

> District Court, D. Oregon · February 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262631

## Case

- **Full name:** Angella M. K. v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** February 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262631

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting claimant’s argument that RFC was incomplete because it did not account for her limitations where ALJ appropriately discounted her testimony

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

ANGELLA M. K., Ca se No. 6:24-cv-02142-AR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.
_____________________________________

ARMISTEAD, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Angella M. K. seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision
denying Social Security disability benefits. Plaintiff (1) argues that the Administrative Law Judge
failed to incorporate in the residual functional capacity (RFC) determination limitations assessed
by a consultive psychologist, Dr. Scott Alvord; (2) challenges the ALJ’s finding as unpersuasive
opinions about her limitations from Kimberly Richards, her therapist; and (3) contends that the
ALJ’s discounting of her subjective symptom testimony lacked clear and convincing reasons.
(Pl.’s Br. at 4-17, ECF 9.) The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the
Commissioner applied proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020).
With that standard of review applied, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
(1) Dr. Alvord’s Limitations. The ALJ characterized as “moderate” the following limitations
from consultative psychological examiner, Dr. Alvord: plaintiff’s difficulty in understanding,
carrying out, and remembering instructions; her difficulty in concentrating and persistently
working at a reasonable pace; her difficulty maintaining effective social interactions—
consistently and independently—with coworkers, supervisors, and the public; and her ability to
cope with normal pressures at work. (Tr. 29.) Plaintiff takes issue with how the ALJ translated
those findings when posing hypotheticals to the vocational examiner and including limitations in
the RFC determination. (Pl.’s Br. at 7.)
For example, the RFC included limiting plaintiff to “occasionally hav[ing] direct

interaction with the general public, co-workers, and supervisors” (Tr. 24), yet plaintiff contends
that that time limitation fails to consider Dr. Alvord’s limitation about her ability to maintain
effective social interaction on a consistent and independent basis. (Pl.’s Br. at 7; Pl.’s Reply Br. at
2-3.) That is, according to plaintiff, “an RFC limiting the amount of time Plaintiff spends with
supervisors, coworkers, or the public does not accurately account for whether that interaction is
appropriate or effective when it does happen.” (Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3.) In plaintiff’s view, the RFC
limiting her to occasional direct interaction with the supervisors, coworkers, and the public and
no fast-paced or production work fails to account for “[p]laintiff’s individual response to stress”
as provided in SSR 85-15, available at 1983-1991 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 343 (Jan. 1, 1985).

The ALJ did not err here. Much of plaintiff’s argument hinges on how much significance
the ALJ should have given to the term “moderate.” But the ALJ is “responsible for translating
and incorporating clinical findings” by Dr. Alvord “into a succinct RFC” and when posing
questions to the vocational expert. Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th

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Angella M. K. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 6:24-cv-02142-AR
Cir. 2015); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ALJ is the final
arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence.”).
Plaintiff asserts also that Dr. Alvord’s treatment notes were consistent with her own
subjective testimony regarding areas of socialization, such as leaving the house or dealing with
demands from supervisors. (Pl.’s Br. at 8.) And she argues that the ALJ failed to account for her
anxiety flares, auditory hallucinations, and her response to time pressures when incorporating Dr.
Alvord’s opinion into the RFC. But the ALJ did not err in not incorporating plaintiff’s own
testimony into the RFC. As discussed below, the ALJ appropriately discounted plaintiff’s
testimony, and therefore was not required to include her discredited limitations in the RFC. See

Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting claimant’s argument
that RFC was incomplete because it did not account for her limitations where ALJ appropriately
discounted her testimony).
(2) Kimberly Richards. Kimberly Richards, a licensed professional counselor, was plaintiff’s
therapist and provided two opinions about plaintiff’s mental health impairments. In her 2022
opinion, Richards opined that plaintiff has limitations—including limitations as to plaintiff’s
social functioning—that would preclude performance for 30 percent of the workday. (Tr. 9.)
Richards also opined that plaintiff would be absent five or more days per month and off-task for
30 percent of the workday due to her nervous system dysregulation. (Tr. 25.) That opinion was

followed by another in 2024, in which Richards stated that plaintiff’s symptoms of distress have
remained unchanged, and that despite weekly therapy, plaintiff “becomes dysregulated and
isolates when feelings arise causing her to be overwhelmed. When this occurs, she exhibits
increasing levels of agoraphobia and cannot take care of her basic needs.” (Id.) The ALJ was not

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Angella M. K. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 6:24-cv-02142-AR
persuaded, finding that, despite Richards’ long-term treating relationship with plaintiff, Richards’
opinions were neither well-supported by her treatment notes nor consistent with the overall
record. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s finding that the social-functioning limitation opined
by Richards was unpersuasive is not supported by or consistent with the record. (Pl.’s Br. at 10-
12; Pl.’s Reply Br. at 4); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (the regulations require ALJs to evaluate the
supportability and consistency of a medical opinion when assessing its persuasiveness); Woods v.
Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (ALJs must “articulate . . . how persuasive [they] find
all of the medical opinions” and “explain how [they] considered the supportability and
consistency factors”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)). The court disagrees.

To start, the ALJ observed that Richards’ treatment notes “heavily focused” on plaintiff’s
relationships with family members and romantic partners rather than her vocational ability or
functioning. (Tr. 25.) That observation is supported by the record. (Tr. 25; see also Tr. 1413,
1415, 1493, 1479 (treatment notes examine plaintiff’s relationships, exercises to help heal those
relationships, with the main goal of helping plaintiff understand and accept her past experiences,
particularly regarding her abusive relationship). Further, the ALJ considered Richards’ treatment
notes that showed that when plaintiff engaged in activities or responsibilities related to
vocational activities, plaintiff reported experiencing a positive effect on her symptoms, which
undermined the severe limitations assessed by Richards. (Tr. 25, citing Tr. 1383, 1437-38

(discussing how babysitting gave plaintiff a sense of purpose), 1466 (“She reported feeling
‘stable’ this week, noting that she had been busy helping her grandmother and mom.”), 1474
(“The client seemed to find some solace in her current coping mechanisms, specifically working
in her parents’ yard, which seems to help her manage her feelings of anger.”).)

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The ALJ was also unconvinced by Richards’ opinion about the extent of plaintiff’s
dysregulation: “regarding [plaintiff’s] risk of ‘dysregulation,’ as referenced in [Richards’]
opinion for why plaintiff is so severely limited, the treatment notes mention only a couple
specific examples of dysregulation.” The plaintiff contests that finding, asserting that because
she sometimes experienced “psychological dysregulation even in the safe, familiar setting of her
therapist’s office,” this supports Richards’ opinion about how her dysregulation would negatively
affect her ability to work. (Pl.’s Br. at 11.) But the ALJ’s finding is supported by the record—
dysregulation is mentioned twice in Richards’ treatment notes: a mention that living with
plaintiff’s family causes her to feel dysregulated and another mention that plaintiff became

dysregulated during therapy after discussing her family origins. (Tr. 1411, 1433.) Neither
mention of dysregulation was related to work, and the ALJ was entitled to conclude that the
sparse mention of dysregulation in the treatment notes did not support Richards’ opinion as to
plaintiff’s dysregulation relating to her ability to work. The ALJ did not err.
(3) Subjective Symptom Testimony. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give specific, clear
and convincing reasons for discounting two parts of her subjective symptom testimony. (Pl.’s Br.
at 12-16); Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015) (if a claimant provides
objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment and there is no affirmative evidence of
malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting the

claimant’s testimony); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The first part concerns her ability to sit or stand for
more than 20 minutes and the second part concerns her difficulties with social interactions.
(a) Sitting and Standing. Plaintiff testified that her fibromyalgia and arthritis limited
her to sitting or standing for about 10-15 minutes at a time (Tr. 47-54), which the ALJ found not

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Angella M. K. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 6:24-cv-02142-AR
credible, as that claimed limitation was not included in the RFC. Plaintiff argues that the parts of
the record the ALJ relied on for that finding are not, when properly considered, inconsistent with
her testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at 12-14). In particular, plaintiff contests the ALJ’s finding that her
physical examinations were “mostly unremarkable” (Tr. 27), asserting that the examinations on
which the ALJ relies were focused on health issues other than her fibromyalgia and arthritis. (Pl.s
Br. at 13-14.) The court has reviewed the treatment notes for the examinations and has no reason
to second guess the ALJ’s consideration of those notes—even if the treatment providers were
“focused” on issues other than her arthritis and fibromyalgia, they were nevertheless
examinations where plaintiff’s “normal appearance” and “normal gait” were observed, and no

functional abnormalities were noted. (Tr. 1508, 1515, 1525, 1529.) See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53
F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (“When objective medical evidence in the record
is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as
undercutting such testimony.”). And the ALJ was permitted to rely on treatment notes showing
that her fibromyalgia was effectively controlled when she was on her medication (Tr. 26, citing
Tr. 1094, 1098, 1108, 1120, 1506-08), and, in the most recent examination, an observation that
plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was stable and controlled with Lyrica (Tr. 27, citing Tr. 1508, 1515,
1524, 1529, 1532, 1536-37).

The court is also not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly relied on
physical activities described in treatment notes to discount her symptom testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at
14.) Those treatment notes relied on by the ALJ reflect that plaintiff engaged in daily walks,
remodeling, babysitting of grandchildren, yard work, and exercise which had therapeutic

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Angella M. K. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 6:24-cv-02142-AR
purposes and effects. (Tr. 25) Those examples of vocational activities that were beneficial stood
in contrast, as the ALJ pointed out, to “the few broad and vague references to the claimant’s
struggles with work, stress at work, . . . and ability to maintain employment.” (Id.) It is enough
that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and suggest a greater
physical and mental capacity than alleged by plaintiff. (Tr. 52, 53, 1531, 1534, 292, 599); see
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other ground by statute, 20
C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (“Even where [a claimant’s] activities suggest some difficulty functioning,
they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant to the extent that they contradict claims of a
totally debilitating impairment.”); see also Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir.

1997) (inconsistencies between testimony and conduct may be considered in weighing a
claimant’s credibility.).
(b) Social Interaction. Plaintiff testified that, because of her anxiety and auditory
hallucinations, she has difficulty interacting with others and maintaining focus and argues that
the RFC limiting her “to a low stress environment with limited expectations regarding pace and
with limited interactions with others” insufficiently captured her difficulty with concentration.
(Pl.’s Br. at 14-15.) That is because, according to plaintiff, the ALJ erred in focusing on
plaintiff’s better moments and failing to account for when plaintiff is doing worse. (Pl.’s Br. at
15) (citing Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is error to reject a

claimant’s testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment.”)).
The court disagrees. The instances in the record that the ALJ relied on to discount
plaintiff’s symptom testimony about her social interactions were not merely a “few isolated
instances of improvement.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017 (“Cycles of improvement and

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debilitating symptoms are a common occurrence, and in such circumstances it is error for an ALJ
to pick out a few isolated instances of improvement over a period of months or years and to treat
them as a basis for concluding a claimant 1s capable of working.”). Here, the ALJ acknowledged
that plaintiff's symptoms “ebbed and flowed over time” (Tr. 25) but identified many instances of
stability and improvement. (Tr. 24-27, see also Tr. 598, 604-05, 611-12, 631, 984, 1095, 1118,
1349, 1435, 1437, 1459; Tr. 26, citing Tr. 1093 (the ALJ explaining that plaintiff “received
treatment for her mental impairments with medication management, which was noted to be
working well”)). The ALJ’s findings here are supported by substantial evidence. (See also Tr.
634-35, 981, 1073, 1508-09.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s analysis provides specific, clear and
convincing reasons to discount plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony.
Because the ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical opinion evidence and subjective
symptom testimony, the RFC accounted for the limitations credited by the ALJ and supported by
substantial evidence in the record; the ALJ did not err at step five.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision. DATED:
February 17, 2026.

United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262631. Public record. Not legal advice.