# Rodgers

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · February 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262578

## Case

- **Full name:** Edward D. Rodgers, II v. Kellis Thompson and Dr. Christopher Montgomery
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** February 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262578

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that police officers did not use unreasonable force when they ordered suspected felon with injured shoulder and a reputation for possessing firearms to lie on the floor, handcuffed the suspect’s hands behind his back, and then lifted him off the floor by the wrist
- stating that the plaintiff “must show grossly incompetent or inadequate care so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care”
- finding that the Court will not consider medical treatises for purposes of proving the probative facts of opinions in the articles since they are hearsay

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

EDWARD D. RODGERS, II, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Case no. 1:23-cv-00077-SNLJ
KELLIS THOMPSON and DR. )
CHRISTOPHER MONTGOMERY, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Dr. Christopher Montgomery’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 88] and defendant Kellis Thompson’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 95]. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
For the reasons stated below, the motions will be GRANTED.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Edward D. Rodgers, II, filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging defendants violated his constitutional rights when they used unreasonable
force to arrest him and failed to treat his serious medical condition while incarcerated at
the Butler County Jail. Defendants Butler County Sheriff’s Department, Damien Smith,
and Randal Huddleson were dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023. [Doc. 6].
The official capacity claims against Dr. Christopher Montgomery and Kellis Thompson
were also dismissed. [Id.]. The remaining claims are against Kellis Thompson in his
individual capacity for unreasonable force in arresting plaintiff and against Dr.
Christopher Montgomery for his failure to treat plaintiff’s alleged serious medical
condition while incarcerated at the Butler County Jail. [Doc. 1].

Kellis Thompson and Dr. Christopher Montgomery have each filed a motion for
summary judgment alleging that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all
claims brought against them. [Docs. 88, 95]. Plaintiff opposes both motions. [Docs.
101, 102, 107, 114].
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise indicated:

A. Kellis Thompson
Investigator Kellis Thompson has been a law enforcement officer with the Butler
County Sheriff’s Department since 1999. [Doc. 97 at ¶¶1, 2; Doc. 97-1 at ¶¶1, 2]1. On
November 13, 2020, Investigator Thompson responded to a residence to assist in the
investigation of a report of a gunshot victim at the residence. [Id. at ¶6; Doc. 97-1 at ¶6].

During that investigation, Investigator Thompson determined that a gunshot victim had
been shot by another individual; and, the suspect in that shooting was identified as Eddie
Rodgers, the plaintiff. [Id. at ¶¶7, 8; Doc. 97-1 at ¶¶6-8]. During the investigation, it was

1 Plaintiff references in one of his memorandums that he does not understand how defendant
can submit a statement of facts using an affidavit when defendant Thompson has not been
through or answered questions at a deposition. [Doc 102]. He does not specifically seek
to have the affidavit stricken, but the Court feels obligated to elaborate on this point.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows for the use of affidavits or declarations. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Any such affidavit or declaration must be made on personal
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. (c)(4). This Court
finds that Investigator Thompson’s affidavit [Doc. 97-1] satisfies this standard and is
admissible in support of his motion for summary judgment.
determined that plaintiff was last seen leaving the residence driving a white Ford F150
pickup truck with Missouri license plate number 4DCG98. [Id. at ¶10, Doc. 97-2 at p.

52, Lines 12-13]. Investigator Thompson then proceeded in his marked patrol vehicle to
search for plaintiff and his white Ford F150. [Id. at ¶11, Doc. 97-1 at ¶10].
While searching for plaintiff and his white Ford F150, Investigator Thompson
located a white Ford F150 pickup truck stopped behind a building on the north side of
Highway 53 at or near its intersection with Thomas Street. [Doc. 97 at ¶12, Doc. 97-1 at
¶11]. Investigator Thompson ultimately ended up following the pickup truck as it

traveled north on Thomas Street and confirmed the license plate number that belonged to
the suspect. [Id. at ¶¶12, 13; Doc. 97-1 at ¶¶11, 12].
Investigator Thompson then initiated a traffic stop by activating the emergency
lights on his marked patrol vehicle. [Id. at ¶15; Doc. 97-1 at ¶14]. The driver of the
pickup truck, later to be confirmed as plaintiff, pulled into a nearby parking lot. [Id. at

¶16; Doc. 97-1 at ¶15]. Investigator Thompson had personal knowledge that plaintiff
was the suspect in the shooting earlier that day, so he believed there to be a high
probability that he had a firearm or weapons with him. [Id. at ¶18; Doc. 97-1 at ¶18].
Since Investigator Thompson was the only officer at the scene and was armed with the
information about the possible firearm or weapons, he exited his patrol vehicle with his

AR-15 rifle pointed towards plaintiff in the driver’s seat and ordered him to exit the
vehicle. [Id. at ¶¶19, 20; Doc. 97-1 at ¶¶17, 19].
When plaintiff exited the vehicle, Investigator Thompson instructed him to put his
hands up. [Id. at ¶¶21, 22; Doc. 97-1 at ¶¶20, 21; Doc. 97-2 at p. 54, Lines 2-6]. He then
told him to walk to the rear of the pickup truck and put his hands behind his back. [Id. at
¶¶23, 24; Doc. 97-1 at ¶21; Doc. 97-2 at p. 57, Lines 16-18]. Plaintiff complied with

Investigator Thompson; and, Investigator Thompson handcuffed plaintiff’s hands behind
his back consistent with the procedures of the Butler County Sheriff’s Department and
his training at Southeast Missouri Law Enforcement Academy. [Id. at ¶¶27, 32; Doc. 97-
1 at ¶¶24, 25; Doc. 97-2 at p. 57, Lines 16-20].
Plaintiff testified that he told Investigator Thompson that he had injured his
shoulder “real bad” a few hours ago and asked to be handcuffed in front. [Doc. 97-2 at p.

55, Lines 17-20]. Investigator Thompson told plaintiff he would not handcuff him in
front since Investigator Thompson was concerned about safety since plaintiff was
suspected of shooting another individual earlier that day. [Doc. 97 at ¶¶31, 32; Doc. 97-1
at ¶¶22, 25]. Plaintiff complied when Investigator Thompson told him to place his hands
behind his back near his waistline. [Doc. 97-2 at p. 57, Lines 16-20]. Investigator

Thompson handcuffed plaintiff’s left hand in a normal manner. [Id. at p. 58, Line 5].
Plaintiff then testified that Investigator Thompson took plaintiff’s right hand and twisted
his palm outward and up as he handcuffed his right hand. [Id. at p. 59, Lines 12-20].
Plaintiff testified that he knew Investigator Thompson had handcuffed his right hand like
that in an effort to preserve gunshot residue on plaintiff’s right hand. [Id. at p. 59, Lines

16-17]. However, plaintiff testified that he believed that his alleged shoulder injury was
exacerbated while he was handcuffed and made to lean over the hood of Officer
Thompson’s patrol vehicle. [Doc. 89-1 at p. 52, Line 25-p. 62, Line 11].
Investigator Thompson was the only law enforcement officer at the scene at the
time he handcuffed plaintiff. [Doc. 97 at ¶33; Doc. 97-1 at ¶26]. During his interaction
with plaintiff at the traffic stop and arrest, Investigator Thompson never punched, hit, or

kicked plaintiff. [Id. at ¶34; Doc. 97-1 at ¶27]. Investigator Thompson also never used
any object to strike or hit plaintiff during his arrest or at any other time. [Id. at ¶35; Doc.
97-1 at ¶28]. Investigator Thompson never used a taser on plaintiff at any time. [Id. at
¶36; Doc. 97-1 at ¶29]. Another officer ultimately transported plaintiff to Butler County
Jail. [Doc. 97 at ¶37; Doc. 97-1 at ¶30].

B. Dr. Christopher Montgomery
Plaintiff testified that he first injured his shoulder in 2002 when he tore his rotator
cuff playing handball and lifting weights while at Algoa Correctional Center. [Doc. 89-1
at p. 111, Lines 8-21]. Plaintiff was incarcerated on numerous occasions after his initial
injury in 2002. [Id. at p. 105-110]. During his imprisonment in 2011, plaintiff was seen
multiple times for pain in his shoulder and feeling like “something is broke on my

shoulder.” [Docs. 89-1 at p. 105, Line 15-p. 106, Line 3; 89-6; 89-7; 89-8; 89-9; 89-10].
A right shoulder x-ray showed “changes of the distal clavicle [that] suggest prior fracture
with ununited fracture seen along the inferior aspect of the distal clavicle. Soft tissue
calcification or other etiology cannot be excluded.” [Doc. 89-11]. Later in 2011,
plaintiff saw a nurse and told her that he reinjured his shoulder a month earlier lifting

weights. [Doc. 89-18]. He was given various medications to assist with the pain, and he
was told not to lift weights. [Doc. 89-20].
In March 2012, plaintiff was given steroid injections and was, again, told to reduce
his activity to moderate lifting. [Doc. 89-23]. In June 2012, plaintiff submitted
numerous medical service requests for additional steroid injections. [Docs. 89-24, 89-
25]. After examination, plaintiff was not given additional steroid injections; but, instead,

was ordered lay-in restrictions on activities with his right arm and right hand, lower bunk,
shoulder rehab exercise, and acetaminophen. [Doc. 89-28]. In July 2012, plaintiff
submitted a medical service request asking that the lay-in restrictions be lifted so that he
could exercise his shoulder. [Doc. 89-32]. In August 2012, plaintiff submitted another
medical service request asking for steroid injections for his shoulder, back and hip. [Doc.
89-33]. He was instructed that he did not need both injections and oral steroids; and, he

was ordered to take oral steroids for 30 days. [Doc. 89-34]. By September 2012,
plaintiff reported that his shoulder felt much better and his complaints shifted more to
back pain. [Doc. 89-37].
By October 2012, plaintiff was again complaining of shoulder pain and wrote a
medical service request seeking another shot for his shoulder and back. [Doc. 89-39].

When plaintiff was seen on October 19, 2012, the doctor noted that the medical records
showed an ununited past right clavicle fracture. [Doc. 89-40]. As such, the treating
physician at that time ordered injections and an oral medication for muscle spasms. [Id.].
Plaintiff was then released from custody. [Doc. 89-1 at p. 107, Line 13-24].
Plaintiff was reincarcerated in 2014 after a probation violation. [Doc. 89-1 at p.

107, Line 19-p. 108, Line 3]. As soon as he was in custody again, plaintiff started
submitting medical service requests looking to be back on prednisone. [Docs. 89-41, 89-
42]. In response, in May 2014, plaintiff received a lay-in restriction for poor use of his
right arm; but, he was not given steroids. [Doc. 89-43]. He did have another x-ray of his
right shoulder that showed a healed fracture of the distal clavicle with mild degenerative
changes of the acromioclavicular articulation with no indication of an acute osseous

injury. [Doc. 89-44]. After reviewing the x-ray, plaintiff’s providers diagnosed that the
fracture had healed with some residual arthritis. [Id.].
In August 2014, plaintiff again complained of right shoulder pain and some
deformity of his clavicle visible in his previous x-rays. [Docs. 89-45, 89-46]. He was
ordered a prescription for 10 mg oral prednisone for 6 days, but he was not treated with
steroid injections. [Id.]. Plaintiff submitted several other medical service requests in

August and September 2014 complaining of right shoulder pain along with various other
medical infirmities. [Docs. 89-47, 89-50, 89-51]. Plaintiff was seen again in October
2014 and was ordered a dose-pack of prednisone followed by prednisone tablets. [Doc.
89-52]. On October 21, 2014, plaintiff self-declared a medical emergency indicating that
he needed medicine for his shoulder pain. [Doc. 89-55]. The pharmacy ordered his

prednisone, and plaintiff was otherwise ordered to fill out a medical service request.
[Id.]. On October 24, 2014, plaintiff again self-declared a medial emergency for chest
pain and his right shoulder. [Doc. 89-56]. He was prescribed heartburn medication, but
no additional steroids were ordered. [Id.]. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was again released
from custody. [Doc. 89-1 at p. 108, Line 25-p. 109, Line 4].

The Court has been provided with no medical history for plaintiff from 2014 to
2020. [Doc. 89 at ¶65]. Plaintiff testified that he did not seek any medical treatment for
his shoulder from 2014 to 2016. [Doc. 89-1 at p. 113, Lines 19-21]. Plaintiff was then in
federal custody from 2016 until June 8, 2020. [Id. at p. 110, Lines 13-15]. He testified
that once he was in federal custody, he received hydrocortisone shots and pills to treat his
shoulder. [Id. at p. 113, Lines 22-25]. He also testified that x-rays were taken. [Id. at p.

114, Lines 4-8]. Plaintiff then went to a halfway house before he was paroled. [Id. at p.
110, Line 18-p. 111, Line 3].
On November 13, 2020, plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned at Butler County
Jail and completed a medical screening form indicating, among other things, he had a
“shoulder broke”. [Doc. 89-58]. Dr. Christopher Montgomery was a physician at the
Butler County Jail at the time plaintiff was incarcerated. [Doc. 89-57].

On December 14, 2020, plaintiff submitted a medical service regarding bumps on
his genital area. [Doc. 89-59]. Dr. Montgomery saw plaintiff on December 16, 2020,
and documented his prior medical history of hypothyroidism and that he had been off his
medication since September. [Doc. 89-57 at ¶9; Doc. 89-61]. Plaintiff’s reported
symptoms included dizziness, weakness, lack of sleep, nausea, and headache. [Id.]. Dr.

Montgomery also noted lesions on plaintiff’s genital area. [Id.]. Dr. Montgomery treated
the rash or lesions and ordered lab tests to check plaintiff’s thyroid and test for syphilis
and herpes. [Id.]. There is no indication that plaintiff mentioned his shoulder to Dr.
Montgomery during this visit. [Id.].
On December 26, 2020; January 5, 2021; February 18, 2021; and February 19,

2021, plaintiff submitted medical service requests relating to the ointment and antibiotics
for his genital area. [Docs. 89-63, 89-64, 89-65, 89-66, 89-67, 89-68, 89-69, 89-70, 89-
71, 89-72, 89-73, 89-74, 89-57 at ¶¶10-13]. Plaintiff did not mention his shoulder in any
of these requests. [Id.]. On February 24, 2021, Dr. Montgomery saw plaintiff again and
ordered lab tests for Hepatitis A, B, and C, HSV 1 and 2, RPR, and HIV to assess
plaintiff’s genital symptoms and T3, T4, and TSH to evaluate his thyroid. [Docs. 89-75,

89-76, 89-77, Doc. 89-57 at ¶14, 89-78]. Again, plaintiff did not mention his shoulder in
any of these requests. [Id.]. For the remainder of February 2021, plaintiff’s only
interactions with Dr. Montgomery were related to treatment of his genital area and
thyroid testing. [Doc. 89-57 at ¶¶15-17].
On October 8, 2021, plaintiff saw Dr. Montgomery relating to the history of his
nerve damage to his shoulder and neck, chronic arthritis, and PTSD. [Docs. 89-79, 89-

80, 89-81, 89-57 at ¶18]. Dr. Montgomery’s notes indicate that plaintiff was previously
treated with naproxen and Gabapentin. [Id.]. Dr. Montgomery further noted that plaintiff
was “having quite a bit of pain”, “has had some racing thoughts and difficulty sleeping”
and “has asymmetry of his reach as he has had some sort of nerve damage to the right
shoulder questionable brachial plexus.” [Id.]. Dr. Montgomery prescribed gabapentin

600 mg twice daily. [Id.]. He further instructed plaintiff to follow-up with prison staff to
assess the effectiveness of the treatment plan. [Id.; Doc. 89-1 at p. 167, Lines 5-12].
On November 12, 2021, plaintiff submitted a medical services request requesting
an increase in his gabapentin. [Docs. 89-82, 89-83, 89-84, 89-57 at ¶19]. Dr.
Montgomery agreed to increase the gabapentin dose to 800 mg three times daily. [Id.].

On December 11, 2021, plaintiff submitted another medical services request for
antibiotics from an alleged staph infection from another inmate. [Docs. 89-85, 89-86, 89-
87, 89-57 at ¶20]. There was no mention in this medical services request about his
shoulder. [Id.]. On December 17, 2021, plaintiff wrote another medical service request
asking that his bipolar disorder and depression medication be increased. [Docs. 89-90,
89-91, 89-92, 89-57 at ¶22]. Again, plaintiff did not mention his right shoulder in this

request. [Id.]. On January 17, 2022, plaintiff wrote another medical service request
relating to a hemorrhoid and a request for triple antibiotic cream. [Docs. 89-93, 89-94,
89-95, 89-57 at ¶24]. There was no mention in this request regarding his right shoulder.
[Id.]. On January 23, 2022, plaintiff reported a wound on his buttock. [Doc. 89-57 at
¶25, Docs. 89-88, 89-89]. There was no indication of pain in his right shoulder. [Id.].
Then, on January 27, 2022, plaintiff submitted another medical service request about his

staph infection and “excruciating pain.” [Docs. 89-96, 89-97, 89-98, 89-57 at ¶26, 89-1
at p. 172, Line 19-p. 174, Line 1]. Again, there was no indication about pain in his right
shoulder. [Id.].
The records do not show any additional medical service requests in plaintiff’s file
again until June 19, 2022, when plaintiff submitted a medical service request for “hep c

treatment.” [Docs. 89-102, 89-103, 89-57 at ¶27]. There was no mention in this medical
services request about his shoulder. [Id.]. Then, on August 17, 2022, plaintiff told Shane
Slone that he was interested in monthly steroid injections for his shoulder pain. [Doc. 89-
104, 89-105, 89-106, 89-57 at ¶28, 89-1 at p. 174, Line 2-p. 175, Line 23]. Plaintiff was
informed that “they normally do not give those here at the jail just oral medications.”

[Id.]. When plaintiff became upset, he was told that Dr. Montgomery would be
consulted. [Id.]. Dr. Montgomery responded to plaintiff’s request for steroid injections
that “they do not prescribe monthly steroid injections and is not considered a medical
emergency that when he gets out he can see ortho.” [Id.]. Dr. Montgomery no longer
provided services to plaintiff at Butler County Jail after November 10, 2022. [Doc. 89-57
at ¶6].

Following Dr. Montgomery’s departure, plaintiff wrote medical services requests
complaining of chronic pain and arthritis from broken bones and nerve pain, requesting
gabapentin, requesting a doctor visit, and indicating that he believed he needed an x-ray
because he was in pain all the time and believed his shoulder was broken. [Docs. 89-107,
89-108]. Plaintiff had a shoulder x-ray in December 2022, that revealed that there were
no fractures, that the coracoclavicular joint was normal, and the glenohumeral joint was

unremarkable. [Doc. 89-110]. The x-ray did show degenerative spurring off the distal
clavicle with narrowing of the AC joint. [Id.]. Then, in February 2023, plaintiff had an
x-ray of his scapula, which did not show any fractures either. [Doc. 89-111].
On March 13, 2023, plaintiff saw Dr. Christine A. Herrington and reported chronic
shoulder pain and told her that he had fallen off a fence in 2020 before he was in prison.

[Doc. 89-112]. Plaintiff denied having received treatment while in Butler County Jail
and requested steroid injections in both shoulders. [Id.]. Dr. Herrington ordered oral
prednisone and scheduled plaintiff for bilateral intra-articular injections. [Id.]. She
educated plaintiff on the fact that he could do no more than 4 injections in his lifetime for
each joint and that they could be done no sooner than 4 months apart. [Id.]. Plaintiff

acknowledged the risks and benefits of the injections before Dr. Herrington administered
them on March 29, 2023. [Doc. 89-113]. He was instructed to avoid heavy lifting that
would continue his chronic pain. [Id.].
In May 2023, plaintiff reported again that he had constant pain in his right
shoulder and requested to be seen by a doctor. [Doc. 89-114]. On June 12, 2023,
plaintiff saw nurse practitioner Dana Jost. [Doc. 89-115]. Nurse practitioner Jost found

scapular winging on the plaintiff’s right shoulder that was “not very severe.” [Id.]. She
prescribed Pyridoxine HCl and Ibuprofen for his pain, and requested a referral for
physical therapy to assist with his scapular winging symptoms. [Id.; Doc. 89-116]. The
reviewing doctor denied the request. [Id.].
In July 2023, plaintiff complained again of right shoulder pain and stated that
Gabapentin helped the pain go from 10/10 to a 5/10. [Doc. 89-117]. He again requested

physical therapy and pain medication. [Id.]. On July 25, 2023, nurse practitioner Jost
prescribed a scheduled series of oral Prednisone. [Id.].
On October 23, 2023, plaintiff again complained to nurse practitioner Jost about
his right shoulder and requested an x-ray. [Docs. 89-118, 89-119]. Nurse practitioner
reminded plaintiff that he had just had x-rays [Id.]. When plaintiff insisted he needed

surgery, nurse practitioner Jost told him there was no surgery to fix his scapular winging.
[Id.]. Then, on January 11, 2024, plaintiff requested that nurse practitioner Jost put him
on Naproxen for his shoulder pain. [Doc. 89-120].
1. Plaintiff’s Admissions
Plaintiff has made several admissions related to his claim that Dr. Montgomery

failed to treat his serious medical condition. First, plaintiff admits that he sustained a
shoulder injury before he saw Dr. Montgomery the first time. [Docs. 89-125 at ¶8(d), 89-
126 at ¶8]. Plaintiff has, himself, admitted that his shoulder injury is chronic. [Id. at
¶8(h) and ¶¶8(j) and 9(c), Doc. 89-127 at ¶2(c)].
2. Plaintiff’s Experts
Plaintiff disclosed nurse practitioner Dana Jost and Dr. Christine Herrington as

experts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). [Docs. 89-121, 89-122].
However, no expert reports or opinions have been solicited from either.
In reviewing the records, Dana Jost does not endorse the use of monthly steroid
injections; and, in fact, had denied plaintiff’s requests for specific medical treatments
numerous times. [Docs. 89-34, 89-37, 89-49, 89-118]. Further, Dr. Herrington does not
endorse the use of monthly steroid injections as she specifically told plaintiff he could

only have 4 in his lifetime, and they had to be at least 4 months apart. [Doc. 89-112].
Dr. Herrington’s records or notes do not indicate that plaintiff will need surgery
specifically because his shoulder was allegedly untreated for a long time. [Doc. 89-126
at ¶8(m); Docs. 89-112, 89-113]. Both Dana Jost and Dr. Herrington have stated that
plaintiff’s shoulder injury is a chronic injury. [Doc. 89-126 at ¶8(j)].2

3. Dr. Montgomery’s Declarations
Dr. Montgomery declared that steroid injections are not done monthly because
they carry many serious risks and side effects like infection, nerve damage, reflex
sympathetic dystrophy, bleeding, pain, and vascular compromise. [Doc. 89-57 at ¶¶29,

2 Plaintiff has disclosed two medical literature articles relating to scapular winging. [Docs.
89-123, 89-124]. However, plaintiff has not disclosed any medical expert that has relied
on or cited this medical literature. Accordingly, both medical literature articles are
inadmissible as hearsay and will not be considered by the Court in ruling on the pending
motions for summary judgment. See Brown v. U.S., 419 F.2d 337, 341 (8th Cir. 1969)
(finding that the Court will not consider medical treatises for purposes of proving the
probative facts of opinions in the articles since they are hearsay).
35]. Dr. Montgomery also declared that oral steroids have risks including development
of diabetes, congestive heart failure, adrenal suppression, and weight gain. [Id. at ¶30].

He also declared that Gabapentin treatment has risks like dizziness, ataxia, abnormal gait,
tremor, seizures, dysarthria, absent reflexes, movement disorders, and loss of
consciousness. [Id. at ¶31].
Dr. Montgomery chose to treat plaintiff with Gabapentin and NSAID’s for his
shoulder pain because of plaintiff’s history of nerve damage and trauma to his shoulder.
[Id. at ¶33]. With plaintiff’s history of nerve damage and trauma to his shoulder, Dr.

Montgomery was concerned about treating him with steroids. [Id.]. Dr. Montgomery
opined that treatment with Gabapentin and NSAID’s was appropriate since plaintiff had
no known serious side effects to that treatment before. [Id.]. Dr. Montgomery prescribed
Gabapentin. [Id.]. Dr. Montgomery then increased plaintiff’s Gabapentin prescription
when plaintiff continued to complain about pain because plaintiff had reported no

concerning side effects. [Id. at ¶34].
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court may grant a
motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464,
467 (1962); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court will view “all facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and mak[e] all reasonable inference in [that party’s] favor.”
Schmidt v. Des Moines Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 811, 819 (8th Cir. 2011). “[W]here the
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue…Rule 56(e)
permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of

evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The moving party need not negate the
nonmoving party’s claims by showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Id. at 325. Instead, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’…that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.
In response to the movant’s showing, the nonmoving party’s burden is to produce

specific facts demonstrating “’a genuine issue of material fact’ such that [its] claim should
proceed to trial.” Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 565 F.3d 417, 422 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
The nonmoving party “’must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts,’ and must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042
(8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87)). “’[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties’” will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment. Quinn v. St. Louis Cnty., 653 F.3d 745, 751 (8th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).

In other words, in deciding “a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a “genuine” dispute as
to those facts.’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Otherwise, where the Court finds that “the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party” – where this
is no “’genuine issue for trial’” – summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. V. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
IV. DISCUSSION
As previously stated, the complaint is based upon plaintiff’s claims against
defendants alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights when they used
unreasonable force to arrest him and failed to treat his serious medical condition while he
was incarcerated at Butler County Jail. Defendant Kellis Thompson’s motion for

summary judgment alleges (1) that he did not use unreasonable force; and, (2) that he is
entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant Dr. Christopher Montgomery’s motion for
summary judgment alleges (1) that plaintiff cannot show a serious medical need; and, (2)
that plaintiff cannot show that Dr. Montgomery had the required state of mind to prevail
on his claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Court will

address each argument in more detail infra.
A. Plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim for unreasonable force against Kellis
Thompson.

1. Kellis Thompson did not use unreasonable force.
Where an “excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory
stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of
the Fourth Amendment…” Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)). Thus, an objective
“reasonableness” standard must be applied in evaluating claims that law enforcement
officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Graham,
490 U.S. at 396). However, it is well-established that law enforcement officers may use

some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect an arrest or investigatory
stop. Id.
A law enforcement officer’s use of force violates the Fourth Amendment only
when it is objectively unreasonable based upon the facts and circumstances of a particular
case. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. The facts and circumstances of a particular case are
“judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the

20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396-97. Even if there were other alternatives or actions
the officer could have chosen to engage in, an officer need not “pursue the most prudent
course of conduct as judged by 20/20 hindsight vision.” Church v. Anderson, 898 F.3d
830, 833 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Retz v. Seaton, 741 F.3d 913, 918 (8th Cir. 2014)).
“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. “Not every push or shove, even if it
may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 396. Thus, the reasonableness of a particular use of force can

depend on circumstances like the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, the duration of the officer’s actions, whether
the actions take place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect
may be armed, the number of persons with whom the officer must contend at one time,
and whether the officers actions were performed pursuant to standard police procedure.
Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 583 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396);

Clark v. Ware, 873 F. Supp.2d 1117, 1119-20 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (quoting Sharrar v.
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997)); Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 472 (8th
Cir. 1995) (finding that police department guidelines are relevant in analyzing whether
the force was unreasonable). “[W]hat would ordinarily be considered reasonable force
does not become excessive force when the force aggravates (however severely) a pre-

existing condition the extent of which was unknown to the officer at the time.”
Rodriguez v. Farell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2002). Generally, courts in Missouri
have found no excessive force where a pre-existing condition was not objectively
manifested or known to the officer. See Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875, 882 (8th Cir.
2010) (“when an officer exerts objectively reasonable force which results in the

aggravation of a pre-existing injury unknown to the officer, such an injury is not
sufficient to indicate excessive force”) (citing Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d
1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2009)).
When making an arrest or investigatory stop, an officer must be permitted to not
only grab the arrestee but also put him/her in handcuffs when effectuating that arrest.

Kasiah v. Crowd Sys., 915 F.3d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at
396). The handcuffing of an arrestee’s hands behind his back is a routine police
procedure. Royster v. Nichols, 698 F.3d 681, 691 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Dunn v. Denk, 79
F.3d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1996)). An officer’s decision not to deviate from this standard
practice is a judgment call, pure and simple. Id. (citing Calvi v. Knox Cnty., 470 F.3d
422,428 (1st Cir. 2006).

Here, based upon a review of the entire record, plaintiff has not presented any
evidence that at the time of the investigatory stop and his arrest that his shoulder injury
was visible to Investigator Thompson. Instead, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, he only informed Investigator Thompson that he had a pre-existing
injury. As a result, Investigator Thompson followed routine police procedure when he
handcuffed plaintiff. Those actions alone do not amount to excessive force.

Further, his actions in handcuffing plaintiff were objectively reasonable
considering that Investigator Thompson was the only officer on scene and knew that
plaintiff was the lead suspect in shooting another individual. Investigator Thompson did
not know whether plaintiff was still armed or posed an immediate threat to Investigator
Thompson or other citizens in proximity to the traffic stop. Investigator Thompson

followed procedures and policies to secure plaintiff in an objectively reasonable fashion.
The fact that plaintiff did not like how Investigator Thompson may have twisted his arms
when putting him in handcuffs is not enough to amount to excessive force. See Blazek v.
City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280
F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the officer did not use unreasonable force

as a matter of law when the officer grabbed the plaintiff’s arm, twisted it around the
plaintiff’s back, jerked it up high to the plaintiff’s shoulder, and then handcuffed the
plaintiff as he fell to his knees screaming that the officer was hurting him, which resulted
in a severe aggravation of a prior injury)); see also Thompson v. City of Lawrence, 58
F.3d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that police officers did not use unreasonable
force when they ordered suspected felon with injured shoulder and a reputation for

possessing firearms to lie on the floor, handcuffed the suspect’s hands behind his back,
and then lifted him off the floor by the wrist).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact
exists regarding whether Investigator Thompson used unreasonable force in his
investigatory stop and arrest of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary
judgment in favor of defendant Kellis Thompson.

2. Kellis Thompson is entitled to qualified immunity.
Aside from granting summary judgment on the traditional standards discussed
supra, Investigator Thompson also asserts in his summary judgment motion that he is
entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity shields public officials from liability
for civil damages if their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Watkins v. City of
St. Louis, Missouri, 102 F.4th 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2024). Since Investigator Thompson
asserted his right to qualified immunity, plaintiff then bore the “burden to prove (1) the
defendant violated his constitutional rights; and (2) the law was clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) overruled on

other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). This Court has discretion
to decide the order in which these two prongs should be addressed, and, when appropriate,
does not need to address both. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-37.
Here, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in demonstrating that Investigator
Thompson violated his constitutional rights. The Court has found that no constitutional

violations have occurred at the hands of Investigator Thompson. See supra. Without a
constitutional violation having occurred, plaintiff cannot overcome the defendant’s claim
to qualified immunity. Therefore, the Court finds that Investigator Thompson is also
entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff’s unreasonable force claim is barred by
qualified immunity.

B. Plaintiff cannot establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need against Dr. Christopher Montgomery.

The Eighth Amendment requires that officials provide inmates with needed
medical care. Cullor v. Baldwin, 830 F.3d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 2016). “[D]eliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Redmond v. Kosinski, 999 F.3d
1116, 1120 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
Deliberate indifference has two components: objective and subjective. Cheeks v. Belmar,
80 F.4th 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2003). To prevail, plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) an
objectively serious medical need; and, (2) that defendant actually knew of, and
deliberately disregarded, that serious medical need. Corwin v. City of Independence, 829
F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2016).
From an objective standpoint, a medical need is serious “if the medical need in
question is supported by medical evidence, such as a physician’s diagnosis, or is so

obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 425 (8th Cir. 2017).
From a subjective standpoint, deliberately disregarding a serious medical need is

“more than negligence, more even than gross negligence. It may be found where medical
care is so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment.” Presson v. Reed, 65
F.4th 357, 366 (8th Cir. 2023); see also Redmond, 999 F.3d at 1120 (stating that the
plaintiff “must show grossly incompetent or inadequate care so inappropriate as to
evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care”). “The level of
culpability required to demonstrate deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials

is equal to criminal recklessness.” Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 343 (8th Cir. 2011).
When the allegation is one of lack of treatment, “the failure to treat a medical condition
does not constitute punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment unless
prison officials knew that the condition created an excessive risk to the inmate’s health
and then failed to act on that knowledge.” Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.

2009). If the allegation relates more to a delay in treatment, it only arises to the level of
an Eighth Amendment violation when the objective seriousness of the deprivation is
measured by reference to the effect of delay in treatment. Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d
927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005). “To establish this effect, the inmate must place verifying
medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical

treatment.” Id. An inmate’s self-reporting assertions of pain are insufficient to constitute
verifying medical evidence in the absence of corroborating evidence of symptoms.
Hancock v. Arnott, 39 F.4th 482, 487 (8th Cir. 2022). An inmate may satisfy the verifying
medical evidence requirement by supplying medical records in support of self-reporting
assertions of pain. Dantzler v. Baldwin, 133 F.4th 833, 844 (8th Cir. 2025) citing Williams
v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 2007).

In the present case, plaintiff had a long history of shoulder pain before he ever
came under Dr. Montgomery’s care at Butler County Jail. Plaintiff indicated on his
medical screening form in November 2020 that he had a “shoulder broke”, but he never
complained again about his shoulder until his October 8, 2021, visit with Dr.
Montgomery. [Docs. 89-58, 89-79, 89-80, 89-81, 89-57 at ¶18]. It is clear from the
record that when confronted by plaintiff about his shoulder pain, Dr. Montgomery did not

ignore or give short shrift to plaintiff’s complaints. [Id.]. Rather, he conducted a detailed
physical examination and reviewed plaintiff’s prior treatment history. [Id.]. As a result,
Dr. Montgomery prescribed Gabapentin. [Id.]. About a month later, in November 2021,
plaintiff requested that his Gabapentin be increased. [Docs. 89-82, 89-83, 89-84, 89-57 at
¶19]. Dr. Montgomery agreed to plaintiff’s request and increased the dosage. [Id.].

Plaintiff then went until August 17, 2022, before he next complained about his
right shoulder pain when he requested steroid injections. [Docs. 89-104, 89-105, 89-106,
89-57 at ¶28, 89-1 at p. 174, Line 2-p. 175, Line 23]. Dr. Montgomery responded that
“they do not prescribe monthly steroid injections and is not considered a medical
emergency that when he gets out he can see ortho.” [Id.]. Plaintiff made no further

complaints about right shoulder pain to Dr. Montgomery before Dr. Montgomery ceased
providing services at Butler County Jail in November 2022. [Doc. 89-57 at ¶6].
Plaintiff’s allegations that Dr. Montgomery was deliberately indifferent to his
serious shoulder pain and that Dr. Montgomery’s lack of treatment or delayed treatment
has now caused him scapular winging or other shoulder issues are all unsupported by the
facts. Most of plaintiff’s medical complaints to Dr. Montgomery focused on medical

infirmities unrelated to his shoulder. When plaintiff did make his sporadic and
inconsistent complaints about shoulder pain, his complaints were never ignored by Dr.
Montgomery. Rather, plaintiff was always assessed or provided with a response. Any
treatment recommendations by Dr. Montgomery were provided based upon physical
assessments and plaintiff’s prior treatment history.
In reviewing the totality of the evidence presented, it is clear to this Court that Dr.

Montgomery concluded that the appropriate approach to plaintiff’s shoulder pain was
prescription pain relievers in different dosages to address what he considered to be
chronic nerve pain. There is no evidence or indication that plaintiff had any other serious
medical need, like a break or fracture, that would have necessitated additional treatment.
Dr. Montgomery’s denial of plaintiff’s specific request for steroid injections was not

unreasonable – and certainly does not arise to a level of criminal recklessness, or for that
matter, even negligence. Instead, it was merely plaintiff’s personal disagreement with
Dr. Montgomery for failing to provide the specific treatment that plaintiff requested. See
Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting plaintiff’s “mere
disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of constitutional

violation.”). There also is no evidence or indication, presented by any expert or in the
record itself, that Dr. Montgomery’s selected course of treatment caused plaintiff’s
development of scapular winging, the incorrect healing of a prior injury, or more pain.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. In reviewing the
record as a whole, this Court finds that no rational trier of fact could find in favor of
plaintiff. Therefore, Dr. Montgomery is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's
Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference.
Vv. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding
whether Investigator Thompson used unreasonable force in his investigatory stop and arrest
of the plaintiff. Further, this Court finds that Investigator Thompson is entitled to summary
judgment because plaintiff's unreasonable force claim is barred by qualified immunity.
Finally, this Court finds that Dr. Montgomery is also entitled to summary judgment because
no genuine issue of material fact exists to show that Dr. Montgomery was deliberately
indifferent to a serious medical need that plaintiff alleges existed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED defendant Dr. Christopher Montgomery’s Motion
for Summary Judgment [Doc. 88] is GRANTED. A separate judgment will be entered.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Kellis Thompson’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 95] is GRANTED. A separate judgment will be entered.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE
the case.
SO ORDERED this 12“ day of February, 2026.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, □□□
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11262578. Public record. Not legal advice.