# Dor

> District Court, D. Connecticut · February 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261939

## Case

- **Full name:** Francesse Senat Dor v. Google LLC (d/b/a Gmail)
- **Court:** District Court, D. Connecticut
- **Decided:** February 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261939

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that, because pro se litigants “cannot be expected to know all of the legal theories on which they might ultimately recover,” a reviewing court’s “imagination should be limited only by [the] factual allegations” when determining what legal claims the complaint suggests
- concluding that plausibility requirement applies to allegations of amount in controversy

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

Francesse Senat Dor,

Plaintiff, Civil No. 3:25-cv-01915 (SVN)

v.

Google LLC (d/b/a Gmail), February 13, 2026

Defendant.

RECOMMENDED RULING ON INITIAL REVIEW OF
THE COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915

I. INTRODUCTION
This is a lawsuit filed by the plaintiff, Francesse Senat Dor, proceeding pro se, against
Google LLC (d/b/a Gmail). (Am. Compl., ECF No. 13, at 1.) Ms. Dor asserts that Google’s spam
filter failed to block abusive, spoofed, and spam emails from reaching her Gmail account. She
says that reading these emails caused her emotional distress, and although she does not allege that
the emails ever reached anyone else but her, she contends that they somehow damaged her
reputation and disrupted her “professional communications and ongoing federal litigation.” (Id.
at 1-2.) She sought permission from the court to begin her lawsuit in forma pauperis, or “IFP.”
(ECF No. 22.)
When a plaintiff wishes to proceed IFP—that is, without paying the filing fee—the court
ordinarily conducts two inquiries. First, it reviews the plaintiff’s financial affidavit and determines
whether she is unable to pay the fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Second, to ensure that the plaintiff is
not abusing the privilege of filing a free lawsuit, the court examines her complaint to determine
whether, among other things, it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or “seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). And in all cases—not just those that involve indigent pro se plaintiffs—
the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the complaint “fails
to state a claim,” seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from that relief, or fails

to show jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the case. Id.
United States District Judge Sarala V. Nagala reviewed the plaintiff’s in forma pauperis
motion and determined that she was unable to pay the fee. (ECF No. 28.) Judge Nagala then
referred this case to me—United States Magistrate Judge Thomas O. Farrish—to conduct the
second inquiry. (ECF No. 29.) I have thoroughly reviewed the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 13.) Based on my review, I recommend that Judge Nagala dismiss the complaint
because Ms. Dor has not properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, because
her complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted and seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief pursuant to Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, or “CDA.” I further recommend that the dismissal be without

leave to replead.
II. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff’s lawsuit arises out of unwanted emails. She says that her Gmail account was
“repeatedly targeted by spoofed emails falsely appearing to originate from Plaintiff’s own
address.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 13, at 1.) She also says that she received “sexually explicit spam
and abusive messages,” including an email that said, “Why are you harassing my daughter, you
pig[.]” (Id. at 2.) She claims that Google had a duty to protect her email account from spoofed
and abusive emails, but it failed to do so, causing her “reputational harm, emotional distress,” and
disruption of her “professional communications and federal litigation.” (Id. at 1-2.) She claims
compensatory damages for “reputational harm,” emotional distress damages for “severe emotional
suffering and disruption of professional and legal advocacy,” and punitive damages “to deter
Defendant and others from similar misconduct.” 1 (Id. at 2.)
III. REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT

A. General Principles of Review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
“A motion to proceed IFP comes with a consequence.” Ortiz v. Tinnerello, No. 22-cv-
1318 (AWT) (TOF), 2023 WL 11842871, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2023). “Because IFP plaintiffs
lack ‘an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious or repetitive lawsuits’ . . .
[28 U.S.C. § 1915] instructs the Court to review their complaints and dismiss certain types of
abusive or facially unmeritorious claims.” Emiabata v. Bartolomeo, No. 3:21-cv-776 (OAW)
(TOF), 2022 WL 4080348, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 3, 2022) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 324 (1989)).
In performing this inquiry, the Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over
the plaintiff’s claims. Unlike many state courts, federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,”
meaning that they cannot hear just any case. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994). Leaving aside some others that are not relevant here, a federal court can typically

adjudicate only three types of claims: (1) those that “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States”—so-called “federal question” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; (2)

1 In Ms. Dor’s original complaint, she included screenshots of emails as exhibits. (See
Compl., ECF No. 1, at 4-6.) Although she stated that Gmail’s filters had “failed to block these
messages,” each email was clearly in her Gmail’s spam folder. (See id. at 1, 4-6.) She has since
amended her complaint, and “an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders
it of no legal effect.” In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2000). But
the Court will caution Ms. Dor that “[f]iling a document with the Court is a representation of the
truthfulness of the claims contained therein[,]” Moales v. Land Rover Cherry Hill, No. 3:25-cv-
544 (VDO), 2025 WL 1249616, at *3 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2025), and she should take care to ensure
that all her filings are a true and accurate representation of the facts.
disputes between citizens of different states, where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000—
“diversity jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and, under certain circumstances, (3) other claims
that are “so related” to an “original jurisdiction” claim that they “form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution”—“supplemental jurisdiction”

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). If jurisdiction is lacking, the complaint must be dismissed, even if it
was drafted by a pro se plaintiff. See, e.g., Rene v. Citibank N.A., 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); cf. Makarova v. U.S., 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (placing the burden of
proving subject matter jurisdiction on the pro se plaintiff).
If jurisdiction exists, the Court reviews the complaint to determine whether it should be
dismissed for one of three other reasons specified in the statute. First, the court must “dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is “frivolous” when it is entirely without a factual or legal basis.
As the Court of Appeals has explained, an “action is ‘frivolous’ for § 1915(e) purposes if it has no
arguable basis in law or fact, as is the case if it is based on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory.’”

Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325-27).
“Frivolous” complaints include those that are based on “fanciful factual allegation[s],” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 325, as well as those in which a dispositive defense clearly exists “on the face of the
complaint.” Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995).
Second, the court must dismiss a complaint that “fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint fails to state a claim when it lacks
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Facial plausibility,” in turn, requires the pleading of
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When an IFP complaint lacks this “facial plausibility,” it is
subject to dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Gordon v. Suffolk Cnty., 792 F. App’x 128,
129 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order). Third, “the court shall dismiss the case” if it finds that the
complaint “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
These and other pleading rules are applied liberally in favor of pro se plaintiffs. “Since
most pro se plaintiffs lack familiarity with the formalities of pleading requirements,” courts must
“construe pro se complaints liberally, applying a more flexible standard to evaluate their
sufficiency than we would when reviewing a complaint submitted by counsel.” Lerman v. Bd. of
Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2000). In other words, courts interpret pro se complaints
“to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Still, even a pro se plaintiff must plead a plausible claim. See
Vega v. Univ. of Conn. Med. Ctr., No. 3:11-cv-1864 (AVC), 2012 WL 1825381, at *1 (D. Conn.
May 16, 2012) (“Although courts still have an obligation to liberally construe a pro se complaint,

the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility.”
(internal citation omitted)).
B. Analysis: Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
(Am. Compl., ECF No. 13, at 1.) Diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless two principal
requirements have been met. The first is that the “matter in controversy” must exceed “the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The second is that the
dispute must be “between . . . citizens of different States[.]” Id. The party seeking to invoke
diversity jurisdiction—in this case, Ms. Dor—bears the burden to show that both requirements
have been satisfied. See Advani Enters., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 140 F.3d 157, 160 (2d
Cir. 1998) (“The party seeking to invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 bears the burden of
demonstrating that the grounds for diversity exist and that diversity is complete.”).
To show that a dispute is between citizens of different states, a plaintiff must allege
different facts depending on the type of citizen involved. The citizenship of an LLC “is determined

by the citizenship of each of its members.” Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 60 (2d
Cir. 2016). A natural person “is deemed a citizen of the state wherein he or she is domiciled[.]”
Universal Reins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing
Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1998)). “Domicile has been described as the place
where a person has ‘his true fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he
is absent, he has the intention of returning.’” Linardos, 157 F.3d at 948 (quoting 13B C. Wright,
A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3612, at 526 (2d ed. 1984)).
As to the amount in controversy, the burden is on Ms. Dor to demonstrate that her claims
may be worth more than $75,000. “A party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court has the
burden of proving that it appears to a ‘reasonable probability’ that the claim is in excess of the

statutory jurisdictional amount.” Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784
(2d Cir. 1994) (citing Moore v. Betit, 511 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir.1975)). When a plaintiff pleads
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the Second Circuit recognizes “a rebuttable
presumption that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of the actual amount in
controversy.” Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 347 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wolde–Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty.
Servs., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999)). Where a complaint does not contain facts plausibly
suggesting that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, however, the court is not required to
presume that the conclusory allegations in the complaint are a good faith representation of the
amount in controversy. See Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas. Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 3d 153, 155 (D.
Conn. 2016) (concluding that plausibility requirement applies to allegations of amount in
controversy); Wood v. Maguire Auto. LLC, 508 F. App’x 65, 65-66 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary
order) (affirming that bare and conclusory allegations as to the amount in controversy were “not

entitled to a presumption of truth”). Thus, “[a] plaintiff seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction
cannot meet its burden of proof with mere conclusory allegations of indirect or speculative value.”
Chavez v. Maker, No. 1:18-cv-07965 (RA) (GWG), 2019 WL 4926348, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7,
2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), report & recommendation adopted sub
nom., Chavez v. Wylie, 2019 WL 6873806 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 20-
383, 2020 WL 4332758 (2d Cir. May 28, 2020).
Here, construing the complaint liberally, the first of the two principal diversity-jurisdiction
requirements probably could be satisfied with another pleading amendment. The plaintiff alleges
that she is a citizen of Connecticut. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 13, at 1.) She does not allege the
citizenship of Google LLC’s members (see id.), but the Court will note that in other federal cases,

Google has not been found to be a citizen of Connecticut. E.g., Brown v. Google, No. 1:24-cv-
7018 (LTS), 2025 WL 2855341, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2025); Ballentine v. Google LLC, No. 24-
cv-4699 (LTS), 2024 WL 4855215, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2024).
However, Ms. Dor has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that her claims meet the
$75,000 statutory jurisdictional amount for diversity jurisdiction. She asserts, in a conclusory
fashion, that she is entitled to “$100,000 or more” in compensatory damages for “reputational
harm,” emotional distress damages in the amount of “$250,000 or more,” and punitive damages in
the amount of “$250,000 or more.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 13, at 2.) She offers no plausible
factual allegations explaining how these amounts were calculated or otherwise supporting her
damages amount. At bottom, her complaint alleges that she read some unpleasant emails. She
does not allege that the emails reached anyone else, or otherwise plausibly allege how those emails
damaged her reputation. Because the plaintiff has failed to plead facts demonstrating plausible,
non-speculative damages exceeding $75,000, she has not properly invoked the court’s diversity

jurisdiction. Lapaglia, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (“Federal diversity jurisdiction requires an amount
in controversy of at least $75,000.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). Accordingly, I recommend that
Judge Nagala dismiss her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
C. Analysis: Immunity and Failure to State a Claim
Although I conclude that Ms. Dor has not invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction and
recommend that the complaint be dismissed for that reason, I will nevertheless address whether
her complaint also warrants dismissal on other grounds. When reviewing pro se IFP complaints
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), courts examine the factual allegations and consider what theories of
recovery they suggest, without limiting themselves to the theories expressly identified by the
plaintiff. See Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that, because pro se

litigants “cannot be expected to know all of the legal theories on which they might ultimately
recover,” a reviewing court’s “imagination should be limited only by [the] factual allegations”
when determining what legal claims the complaint suggests). In Emiabata, for example, the
plaintiff asserted six specific claims that were all barred by one sort of immunity or another. 2022
WL 4080348, at *10. But his factual allegations suggested a seventh claim—a civil rights claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—so the Court analyzed that claim as well, even though the plaintiff had
not expressly pled it. Id. at *11.
In this case, Ms. Dor asserts three claims—negligence, emotional distress, and something
she calls “platform harm.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 13, at 2.) Under the latter heading, she alleges
that Google “damaged [her] reputation by allowing impersonation and spoofing of her Gmail
account,” with the result that she “suffered reputational harm” and “disruption” of other “federal
litigation.” (Id.) Applying the Phillips principle, I will interpret this as an attempt to raise a
common law defamation claim. Thus, I will construe her complaint as attempting to raise claims
of negligence, infliction of emotional distress, and defamation, and I will consider whether those

claims should be dismissed for one or more of the reasons listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
1. Immunity
The defendant is immune from liability for the plaintiff’s claims of negligence, emotional
distress, and defamation under the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230. Section 230 provides that “[n]o provider
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Section
230 also provides that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under
any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). Thus, Section
230 shields a defendant from civil liability when: (1) the defendant is a “provider or user of an
interactive computer service[;]” (2) the plaintiff’s claims would treat the provider as the publisher

or speaker of information; and (3) the information was provided by another “information content
provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
All three apply in this case. To begin with, Google is a provider of an interactive computer
service. An “interactive computer service” provider is one that “provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server[.]” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). As many courts have
found, Google fits within this definition. E.g. Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC,
925 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Google); Ynfante v. Google LLC, No. 22-cv-6831 (JGK),
2023 WL 3791652, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2023) (Google); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Google,
Inc., No. 2:22-cv-01904 (DJC) (JBP), 2023 WL 5487311, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023) (Google,
and specifically “Google’s Gmail”).
Second, the plaintiff’s complaint treats the defendant as the publisher or speaker of
information. Section 230 “specifically proscribes liability” for “decisions relating to the

monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from its network—actions quintessentially related
to a publisher’s role.” Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted). “In other words, Section 230 bars any claim that ‘can be boiled down to the failure of
an interactive computer service to edit or block user-generated content that it believes was tendered
for posting online, as that is the very activity Congress sought to immunize by passing the
section.’” Ynfante, 2023 WL 3791652, at *2 (quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley
v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 n.32 (9th Cir. 2008)). All the plaintiff’s claims are
fundamentally based on her assertion that the defendant allowed certain unwanted messages
through Gmail’s spam filters. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 13, at 2.) Because she seeks to hold the
defendant liable for its decisions related to monitoring and screening of emails, her claims “fall

squarely within the exercise of a publisher’s role” and are “therefore subject to Section 230’s broad
immunity.” Ynfante, 2023 WL 3791652, at *2. Finally, the emails in question came from an
information content provider distinct from the defendant. The plaintiff does not allege that the
defendant is the creator or developer of any of these emails. (See generally Am. Compl., ECF No.
13.) Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims of negligence, emotional distress, and defamation are barred
under Section 230 of the CDA, and I recommend that they be dismissed for “seek[ing] monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
2. Failure to State a Claim
a. Negligence
The plaintiff asserts a claim of negligence under Connecticut common law. (Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 13, at 2.) She claims that the defendant owed a “duty of reasonable care to protect her

Gmail account from impersonation, spoofing, and harmful content,” that the defendant breached
that duty by “failing to implement adequate safeguards and allowing spoofed and abusive emails
to reach [her] inbox,” and that she suffered “reputational harm, emotional distress, and disruption
of professional communications” as a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s
breach of duty. (Id.)
“The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach
of that duty; causation; and actual injury.” RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381,
384 (1994). “The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist
does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular
situation at hand.” Petriello v. Kalman, 215 Conn. 377, 382-83 (1990) (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted) (quoting Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 151-52 (1982)). To
determine whether a legal duty of care exists, courts look to: (1) “whether an ordinary person in
the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would
anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result[;]” and (2) whether
public policy suggests that “the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend
to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case[.]” Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn.
245, 250 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Generally, a party does not have an obligation “to aid or to protect another party.” Ryan
Transp., Inc. v. M & G Assocs., 266 Conn. 520, 526 (2003). “[A]bsent a special relationship of
custody or control, there is no duty to protect a third person from the conduct of another.”
Kaminski v. Fairfield, 216 Conn. 29, 33-34 (1990). Here, there is no indication that the defendant
had a “special relationship of custody or control” with the plaintiff. Id. In addition, her claimed
harms—emotional distress, reputational damage, and disruption of her communications—are

attenuated from what the defendant is claimed to have done here, such that a reasonable person
would not anticipate that the claimed harms were likely to result. Therefore, she has failed to
allege facts that would show that the defendant owed her a duty of care. Thus, even if the Court
were to conclude that the defendant is not immune from this suit under Section 230 of the CDA, I
would recommend that the plaintiff’s claim of negligence be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
b. Emotional Distress
The plaintiff claims “emotional distress,” which I interpret as a state-law claim for either
intentional infliction of emotional distress or negligent infliction of emotional distress. To state a
plausible claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead facts that, if

she were to prove them, would show that the defendant “intended to inflict emotional distress or
that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct;”
“that the conduct was extreme and outrageous;” “that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of
[her] distress;” and “that the emotional distress . . . was severe.” Appleton v. Bd. of Educ. of Town
of Stonington, 254 Conn. 205, 210 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state
a plausible claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the complaint must allege facts that
would show that “the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff
emotional distress;” the “distress was foreseeable;” the distress “was severe enough that it might
result in illness or bodily harm;” and “the defendant’s conduct was the cause of [her] distress.”
Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 444 (2003).
In this case, the plaintiff states in a conclusory fashion that the defendant’s conduct “was
extreme and outrageous, and it foreseeably resulted in Plaintiff’s emotional distress.” (Am.

Compl., ECF No. 13, at 2.) But this conclusory allegation must be disregarded for purposes of
determining whether she has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Putting aside her conclusory allegations, the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the defendant
failed to filter out certain emails, and those emails were distressing when she read them. The
foreseeability element of both the intentional and negligent forms of emotional distress is lacking,
because the defendant could not have plausibly foreseen that she would receive these emails from
unknown third parties, and that she would be severely emotionally distressed by receiving them.
Thus, even if the Court were to conclude that the defendant is not immune from this suit under
Section 230 of the CDA, I would recommend that the plaintiff’s claim of emotional distress be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

c. Defamation
Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant caused harm to her reputation. (Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 13, at 1.) She says that her reputation was harmed when she received “sexually explicit
spam and abusive messages,” and when she received “spoofed emails falsely appearing to
originate from Plaintiff’s own address.” (Id. at 1-2.) She calls this claim “platform harm,” but
since there is no recognized tort with that name, I interpret it as an attempt to raise a defamation
claim under Connecticut common law.
“Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander. Defamation is that which tends
to injure reputation in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence
in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions
against [her].” DeVito v. Schwartz, 66 Conn. App. 228, 234 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “To succeed on a defamation claim in Connecticut, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
defendant made a false statement about plaintiff; (2) defendant published the statement to a third

party; and (3) plaintiff’s reputation was thereby injured.” Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chem. Co., 364
F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).
The plaintiff does not allege that the defendant published a defamatory statement to a third
party. Based on her complaint, the only person to receive the emails was herself. Even if she
shared them with others later, “[a]s a general rule . . . no action for defamation exists if the
defendant publishes the defamatory statements to only the plaintiff, and the plaintiff subsequently
disseminates the statements to a third person.” Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chem. Co., 267 Conn. 210,
217 (2004). In addition, since the emails were not published to a third party, the plaintiff cannot
plausibly claim any injury to her reputation. Reputation is “[t]he esteem in which someone is held
or the goodwill extended to or confidence reposed in that person by others . . . .” Reputation,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Therefore, “unless the defamatory matter is
communicated to a third person there has been no loss of reputation.” Maddox v. Bank of New
York Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 19 F.4th 58, 65 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Restatement of Torts § 577 cmt. b). Thus, even if the Court were to conclude that the
defendant is not immune from this suit under Section 230 of the CDA, I would recommend that
the plaintiff’s claim of defamation be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in Part III, I recommend that Judge Nagala dismiss the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim and immunity
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). Furthermore, I recommend that the dismissal be
without leave to replead. Although courts typically permit pro se plaintiffs “leave to amend at
least once,” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000), the plaintiff has already amended
her complaint once. Moreover, when “[t]he problem with [the complaint] is substantive[,] better

pleading will not cure it.” Id. In such cases, “[r]epleading would . . . be futile[,]” and “futile
request[s] to replead should be denied.” Id. (citing Hunt v. Alliance N. Am. Gov’t Income Tr., 159
F.3d 723, 728 (2d Cir. 1998)). This is such a case; better pleading will not cure or negate the
pleading defects identified above.
This is a recommended ruling by a magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1); D. Conn. L.
Civ. R. 72.1(C). If Ms. Dor wishes to object to my recommendation, she must file that
objection with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen days—that is, by February 27, 2026.2
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (stating that objections to magistrate judges’ recommended dispositions
must be filed within fourteen days); D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 72.2(a) (same). If she does not file an
objection within fourteen days, she will not be able to assign as error any defect in this

recommended ruling. D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 72.2(a). Failure to file a timely objection will also
prevent her from obtaining appellate review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Small v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[F]ailure to object timely to a magistrate’s
report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrate’s decision.”); accord
Impala v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 670 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order).
/s/ Thomas O. Farrish
Hon. Thomas O. Farrish
United States Magistrate Judge

2 Ms. Dor signed up for electronic notifications (ECF Nos. 4, 11), and is therefore not entitled
to the five additional days given to litigants who will receive the recommended disposition by
mail.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261939. Public record. Not legal advice.