# People of Michigan v. Kenneth McDonald

> Michigan Court of Appeals · February 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261861

## Case

- **Court:** Michigan Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** February 17, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
February 17, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 1:31 PM

v No. 375243
Macomb Circuit Court
KENNETH MCDONALD, LC No. 2024-002089-FC

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and GARRETT and BAZZI, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On remand by the Michigan Supreme Court,1 the prosecution appeals by leave granted the
opinion and order granting defendant Kenneth McDonald’s motion to suppress related to the
search of his cell phone. We affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arose when McDonald was charged with second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
in relation to the death of his mother-in-law, Stella Maltese (the decedent). On October 12, 2023,
at approximately 11:00 a.m., the decedent and the decedent’s sister were present at the decedent’s
residence when Grace McDonald, who is the decedent’s daughter and McDonald’s wife, stopped
by. At about noon, the decedent’s sister and Grace left the premises, with Grace leaving in the
decedent’s blue van, which the decedent permitted her and McDonald to use.

At approximately 2:45 p.m., McDonald and Grace drove to the decedent’s home to retrieve
tools from the decedent’s garage after not being able to get in contact with her. McDonald went
into the garage and Grace entered the home, where she found the decedent on the floor, with a
cord wrapped tightly around her neck. McDonald removed the cord and began cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) while Grace called the police. The decedent was pronounced dead after the

1
People v McDonald, ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 377 (2025).

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police arrived. After an initial interview at the scene, McDonald and Grace were taken to the
Shelby Township Police Department (STPD) for questioning.

During his subsequent interview with the police, McDonald acknowledged the existence
of an Adult Protective Services (APS) report, in which the decedent alleged McDonald was
embezzling money from her. McDonald denied doing so and denied killing the decedent. In the
course of the interview, the police observed a red mark on the top of McDonald’s hands, between
his thumb and pointer finger, which an officer believed was caused by McDonald strangling the
decedent with a cord. McDonald and Grace claimed to be at their home from noon until the time
they arrived at the decedent’s residence. Throughout the investigation, the police retrieved
surveillance footage of the roads between the decedent’s and McDonalds’ homes. The footage
depicted a blue van returning to the area of the decedent’s residence at about 1:00 p.m. and
returning to the area of the McDonalds’ home at approximately 1:30 p.m., contradicting
McDonald’s and Grace’s contentions.

Detective Phillip Young of the STPD generated a search warrant for McDonald’s and
Grace’s shared residence and their individual cell phones, which were discovered in the blue van
owned by the decedent. On October 13, 2023, STPD Detective Sergeant Charles Johnson authored
the supporting affidavit requesting the specified data be extracted from the phones:

 Call logs, to include incoming, outgoing and missed calls

 Phonebook and contacts to include phone numbers, and e-mail addresses.

 SMS/MMS messages and attached multimedia files, to include incoming
and outgoing.

 Secondary SMS applications and messages to include KIK, TextPlus,
Snapchat and others

 E-mails to include incoming and outgoing

 Pictures and all ExIF information to include geotagging information (GPS
location of the location of the picture.)

 Videos and geotagging information

 Audio files to include any voicemail stored on the device and voice notes

 Secondary phone number accounts such as Skype, Line 2 and other
applications that can assign a second roaming phone number.

 WiFi network information, to include SSID (Network name) and GPS
information of the network

 GPS directions

 Calendar information, including sync’ed [sic] calendars

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 Internet History and usage to including websites visited, search terms and
Cookies

 And any account information, settings, and saved usage information for any
and all installed applications, also known as “apps” on the device.

Detective Johnson wrote the following in support of the search warrant:

On 10/12/2023 at 2:46PM, Shelby Township Police Department received a
911 call from []. Female caller, later identified as Grace Marie McDonald was
reporting that her mother Stella Maltese possibly deceased and had a cord around
her neck. Grace was frantic on the phone. A male, later identified as Kenneth
McDonald got on the phone and stated she was found face down on the floor.
Officers arrived on scene and observed Stella Maltese deceased on the floor. Stella
had a ligature mark across the front and sides of her neck. There was a broken
computer keyboard cord lying on living room floor next to where the victim was
found. The cord was broke off of the keyboard. The chair and the computer tower
were knocked over. Officers observed that the oven was on and there was chicken
cooking inside of it.

Grace and her Aunt Grace Schmidt, Stella’s sister, stated they were at the
home and Stella was cooking dinner at that time. They left at l245pm in 2 different
vehicles. Grace McDonald drove the 2011 Chrysler Town and Country and Grace
Schmidt drove the 2011 Dodge Journey.

Grace McDonald and Kenneth McDonald stated they needed to get some
tools from the home around 1430hrs. They called Stella two times and she did not
answer. When they arrived they found her on the floor with a cord around her neck.
They both stated they were at home . . .in Macomb Twp between approximately
1245 and 1440hrs

On 4/24/2023, the Shelby Township Police Department received a[n] Adult
Protective Services referral for Stella Maltese. At that time Stella believed checks
were being withdrawn from her Comerica Bank Account. The account was only in
Stella’s name. She advised that the only access her daughter or Kenneth had to the
account were deposit tickets she gave them to repay the Home Equity Line of
Credit. . . .

On 8/21/2023, the Shelby Township Police Department received an Adult
Protective Services referral for Stell[a] Maltese. The referral stated that Stella had
checks drawn off her account that were being forged by her daughter, Grace
McDonald and Kenneth McDonald. Since February the total amount taken is
roughly $19,000. Stella wanted to follow through with pressing charges. Detective
Verdura is in charge of the case. Stella advised that she had credit/bank reports
printed out and she was going to tum them over to him on 10/13/2023.

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Additional investigation of stationary LPR cameras in the area, as well as
intersection video indicates that the Town and Country Van may have returned to
the area of 21 Hayes between 1300 and 1330 in contradiction to statements made
by Grace. The listed devices were located inside the Town and Country van, owned
by Stella, but normally driven by Grace and Kenneth.

Further investigation revealed that Kenneth had markings on his hands that
appeared to be of a similar shape and size to the cord found near Stella’s body.
These markings were indentations and appear consistent with application of
pressure.

As listed devices may contain, in writer’s training and experience,
communications data, location data, and other digital evidence with relation to this
incident, Affiant requests this petition for examination be granted.

The search warrant was granted as requested. Detective Young and Detective Johnson analyzed
the geolocation data obtained from McDonald’s cell phone, which indicated McDonald was at the
decedent’s home at 1:28 p.m. An autopsy was conducted on the decedent, identifying the cause
of death as strangulation and the manner of death as homicide. McDonald was then charged with
second-degree murder.

McDonald moved to suppress the data obtained from his cell phone, contending that the
supporting affidavit failed to establish a nexus between the target cell phone, McDonald, and the
alleged conduct; that the affidavit failed to satisfy the particularity requirement; and that the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.2 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing
on January 31, 2025. Detective Johnson was the only witness to testify at the hearing. He was
qualified as an expert in cell phone extraction and analysis. Detective Johnson explained that his
main interest in McDonald’s phone was location data and “communication data from about the
time of the incident.” Detective Johnson was looking for location data because witness statements
indicated that the decedent was alone when she died; however, a license-plate recognition camera
and surveillance footage indicated that the blue van McDonald and Grace had been driving
returned to the area near the decedent’s home between 1:00 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. Detective Johnson
stated that he was looking for communication data between McDonald and Grace that involved
the decedent’s murder.

According to Detective Johnson, he included a long list of areas to search because
communication and location data could be found in different places on the phone. He testified that
the geographical location data was located within the T-Mobile diagnostic folder. The location
data indicated that McDonald’s cell phone was at or near the decedent’s home at 1:35 p.m. The
phone was then in a subdivision in Macomb Township near McDonald’s home at 1:47 p.m. The
cell phone then returned to the area near the decedent’s home at 2:30 p.m. The phone data further
demonstrated that Grace and McDonald sent each other text messages, which contradicted their
statements that they were together. On cross-examination, Detective Johnson acknowledged that

2
McDonald initially moved to suppress the evidence retrieved from both phones; however, he
later withdrew his motion related to Grace’s phone.

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the affidavit did not list a specific date and time with respect to the property to be searched and
seized. He further recognized that he never used the words “murder,” “homicide,” “suspect,” or
“motive” in the affidavit. Detective Johnson additionally admitted he never stated that he was
investigating an offense in the affidavit. The court took the matter under advisement and allowed
the parties to file supplemental briefs.3

The trial court granted McDonald’s motion to suppress, agreeing with McDonald’s
argument that the affidavit did not provide sufficient context connecting the cell phone listed in
the search warrant with any alleged criminal behavior by McDonald. The court observed that
Detective Johnson’s testimony acknowledged that there was no specific offense listed in the
affidavit, and that McDonald was never referred to as a suspect. Further, the trial court resolved
that the warrant, even after incorporating the affidavit, lacked the required particularity to be valid
under the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that the warrant placed no restriction on what
could be searched on the phone that related to the decedent’s death. The trial court noted that
Detective Johnson’s testimony acknowledged that the warrant did not include specific time or date
limitations and included a “broad” statement. The court opined that the warrant permitted the
police to search everything on the phone since its first use.

The trial court further determined the exclusionary rule did not apply, relying on this
Court’s opinion in People v Carson, ___ Mich App ___;___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket
No. 355925) (Carson I), rev’d in part on other grounds ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 166923) (Carson II). The court stated that the warrant was a general warrant that no
reasonable police officer could have relied upon in objective good faith. As a result, the trial court
ruled that severance was inappropriate, and McDonald’s motion to suppress was granted.

The prosecution applied for leave to appeal in this Court, which was denied. People v
McDonald, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 2, 2025 (Docket No. 375243).
The prosecution then applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which, in lieu of
granting leave, remanded the matter to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. People v
McDonald, ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 377 (2025).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a trial court’s ultimate decision on a motion to suppress on the basis
of an alleged constitutional violation.” People v Gingrich, 307 Mich App 656, 661; 862 NW2d
432 (2014). “We review a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing for clear error.”
People v Sammons, 505 Mich 31, 41; 949 NW2d 36 (2020). “Clear error is established when the
appellate court is left with a firm and definite conviction that an error occurred.” People v Horton,
345 Mich App 612, 616; 8 NW3d 622 (2023). “The application of law to those facts is a
constitutional matter that this Court reviews de novo.” Id. “Any ancillary questions of law relevant
to the motion to suppress are also reviewed de novo.” Gingrich, 307 Mich App at 661.

3
Although Detective Johnson’s testimony regarding the drafting of the search warrant and
affidavit is included for context, the four corners of the relevant documents themselves reveal the
numerous deficiencies in both the warrant and the affidavit.

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III. ANALYSIS

The prosecution argues that the trial court erred in granting McDonald’s motion to
suppress, concluding that the search warrant was invalid. We disagree.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.” US Const, Am IV. Comparably, the Michigan Constitution of 1963 states:

The person, houses, papers, possessions, electronic data, and electronic
communications of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things or to
access electronic data or electronic communications shall issue without describing
them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions
of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal
proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous
weapons seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in
this state. [Const 1963, art 1, § 11.]

“Absent a compelling reason, Michigan courts must construe Const 1963, art 1, § 11 to provide
the same protection as that secured by the Fourth Amendment.” People v Brcic, 342 Mich App
271, 277; 994 NW2d 812 (2022). “Cell phones in the modern world hold ‘the privacies of life.’ ”
Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 16, quoting Riley v California, 573 US 373, 403; 134 S Ct
2473; 189 L Ed 2d 430 (2014). “Therefore, like the protections that extend to the home, ‘Fourth
Amendment principles apply with equal force to the digital contents of a cell phone.’ ” Carson II,
___ Mich at ___; slip op at 16, quoting People v Hughes, 506 Mich 512, 527; 958 NW2d 98 (2020).
“Accordingly, in the context of a cell-phone search, we must jealously guard the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment, including the particularity requirement.” Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip
op at 16.

“The last two phrases of the Fourth Amendment, the particularity requirement, only allows
the issuance of search warrants ‘particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.’ ” People v Bogucki, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 372629); slip op at 6, quoting US Const, Am IV. The Michigan Constitution contains
a substantively similar provision at Const 1963, art 1 § 11. “ ‘The purpose of the particularity
requirement in the description of items to be seized is to provide reasonable guidance to the
executing officers and to prevent their exercise of undirected discretion in determining what is
subject to seizure.’ ” Brcic, 342 Mich App at 278, quoting People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210,
245; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). “A search warrant is sufficiently particular ‘if the description is such
that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify’ the people
and property subject to the warrant.” Id. at 278, quoting Steele v United States, 267 US 498, 503;
45 S Ct 414; 69 L Ed 757 (1925). “It is also well settled that a search may not stand on a general
warrant.” People v Hellstrom, 264 Mich App 187, 192; 690 NW2d 293 (2004).

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The Michigan Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion that a warrant automatically
authorizes the police to examine all digital data seized based on “the mere possibility that evidence
may conceivably be found anywhere on the device, or that evidence might be concealed,
mislabeled, or manipulated.” Hughes, 506 Mich at 541; see also Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip
op at 18. Stated alternatively, the Michigan Supreme Court has declined to endorse a blanket rule
permitting unrestricted review of digital information based on speculative possibilities alone.
“Such a per se rule would effectively nullify the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment in the context of cell-phone data and rehabilitate an impermissible general warrant
that would in effect give police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will amount a person’s
private effects.” Hughes, 506 Mich at 541-542 (citations and quotations marks omitted). Further,
“allowing a search of an entire device for evidence of a crime based upon the possibility that
evidence of the crime could be found anywhere on the phone and that the incriminating data could
be hidden or manipulated would ‘render the warrant a general warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement.’ ” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Ultimately, the degree of particularity required to adequately direct a search depends on the crime
being investigated and the items sought.” Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 23.

In this case, the search warrant at issue sought an extensive range of data from McDonald’s
cell phone, including call logs, contacts, text messages, e-mails, pictures, videos, audio files, GPS
coordinates, calendar, Internet history, and all account information for any installed applications.
In the last paragraph of the affidavit, Detective Johnson stated that in his training and experience,
McDonald’s cell phone “may contain . . . communications data, location data, and other digital
evidence with[] relation to this incident. . . .” However, Detective Johnson did not identify the
specific “incident” to which he referred. The affidavit not only mentioned the decedent’s murder
but also referred to two prior incidents of possible financial crimes involving the decedent. The
language used in the affidavit indicates that the financial offenses may have been a motive for
McDonald and Grace to murder the decedent; however, Detective Johnson does not expressly
make this connection. Moreover, the only fact to indicate McDonald was a suspect was the single
sentence describing the markings discovered on McDonald’s hands, which matched the cord found
near the decedent. The affidavit does not mention McDonald’s police interview, when he claimed
he removed the cord and attempted CPR, resulting in the markings.

At the evidentiary hearing, Detective Johnson testified that he was mainly concerned with
obtaining location data and communication data from McDonald’s phone at the approximate time
of the decedent’s death. However, Detective Johnson did not limit the search to these specific
categories or to a specific time or date range. See Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 18 (“The
lack of instruction on the scope, breadth, or focus of the search shifts the particularity requirement
from the warrant, where it belongs, to the executing officer’s discretion.”)

In issuing the contested opinion and order, the trial court relied on Carson I, which the
prosecution contends was improper. In Carson I, the police obtained a search warrant to search
the contents of the defendant’s cell phone and uncovered incriminating text messages and other
circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant to the offenses charged. Carson I, ___ Mich
App at ___; slip op at 3-4. The defendant was convicted and appealed, arguing ineffective
assistance of counsel, contending that the “affidavit in support of the police’s request for a search
warrant was inadequate in that it failed to establish probable cause to believe that the cell phone
would contain relevant evidence.” Id. at 6-7. In the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial

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court determined defense counsel erred by failing to move to suppress the cell phone’s contents
but determined the error was harmless, because the good-faith exception applied. Id. at 7.

Regarding the underlying search of the cell phone, this Court held, “The warrant
authorizing a search of the contents of [the] defendant’s cell phone was too broad in violation of
the particularity requirement, and the good-faith exception is inapplicable to these facts.” Id. at 10-
11. The search warrant in Carson I, among other things, sought:

Any [sic] physical keys, encryption devices and similar physical items that are
necessary to gain access to the cellular device to be searched or are necessary to
gain access to the programs, data, applications and information contained on the
cellular device(s) to be searched; Any [sic] passwords, password files, test keys,
encryption codes or other computer codes necessary to access the cellular devices,
applications and software to be searched or to convert any data, file or information
on the cellular device into a readable form; This [sic] shall include thumb print and
facial recognition and or digital PIN passwords, electronically stored
communications or messages, including any of the items to be found in electronic
mail (“e-mail”). Any and all data including text messages, text/picture messages,
pictures and videos, address book, any data on the SIM card if applicable, and all
records or documents which were created, modified, or stored in electronic or
magnetic form and any data, image, or information that is capable of being read or
interpreted by a cellular phone or a computer. [Id. at 12.]

This Court concluded that the warrant “was a general warrant that gave the police license to search
everything on defendant’s cell phone in the hopes of finding anything, but nothing in particular,
that could help with the investigation.” Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). This Court explained that
making an opening reference to an investigation of larceny in a building and safe breaking “was
negated by the ensuing instruction to search for such items by searching and seizing the entirety
of the phone’s contents.” Id. at ____; slip op at 12. This Court found it particularly troubling that
the warrant specifically authorized a search of the defendant’s photographs and videos, “despite
there being no evidence suggesting that these files would yield anything relevant . . . .” Id. at ___;
slip op at 12. The Carson I Court further opined:

Numerous other examples establish that many states have joined in our conclusion
that that the particularity requirement disallows the issuance of warrants
authorizing police to search the entirety of a person’s cell phone contents for
evidence of a particular crime; the massive scale of the personal information people
store on their mobile devices means that there must be some limits to the scope of
the search. [Id. at 14.]

In Carson II, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding with respect to the
particularity requirement for the search and seizure of cell phones but reversed on the ground that
the defendant was unable to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Carson II, ___ Mich at
___; slip op at 23-24, 29-30.

As in Carson, the search warrant in this case was insufficient to satisfy the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment because it essentially authorized the collection of all data

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from McDonald’s phone since the phone’s first use. See Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at
21 (“Put simply, when information concerning the relevant time frame of the criminal activity
exists, this time limitation should be included in the search warrant to ensure adequate
particularity.”) In addition, neither the affidavit, nor the warrant connected the data to be searched
with any suspected criminal behavior by McDonald, thus failing to establish a nexus between the
records sought and the offense alleged. For example, there was no information in the affidavit or
warrant explaining how all of McDonald’s photos, e-mails, calendar, or contacts would be relevant
to the decedent’s murder or even the previously alleged financial offenses. While Detective
Johnson clarified at the evidentiary hearing that he was primarily interested in the geolocation and
communication data from McDonald’s cell phone, the warrant requested significantly greater
information. See Bogucki, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6 (“A search warrant for access to
everything on a cell phone, for the purpose of finding anything that could assist with an
investigation, is a general warrant that fails the particularity requirement.”) Additionally,
Michigan caselaw provides that review of a search warrant is strictly confined to the four corners
of the warrant and its supporting affidavit, rather than relying on material never presented to the
issuing magistrate. See People v Keller, 479 Mich 467, 475-477; 739 NW2d 505 (2007); see also
People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 603-604; 487 NW2d 698 (1992).

The police had sufficient information to appropriately curtail the search warrant in
accordance with constitutional standards, yet failed to do so, and the magistrate compounded this
failure by authorizing a warrant with obvious deficiencies. As opined by the Michigan Supreme
Court:

The need for specificity about the types of data expected to be encountered and
searched must be weighed against the fact that law enforcement often will not be
certain what evidence exists and where it will be located. This does not, however,
free them from the obligation to provide the most specific description possible and
to support a request to search each category of data mentioned in a warrant affidavit.
Nor does it permit magistrates to approve boundless searches of electronic data
when the information available provides a basis for a more reasonably tailored
search.

* * *

In our modern age, when cell phones carry a virtually unlimited amount of private
information, such wide-ranging exploratory rummaging is constitutionally
intolerable and clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. [Carson II, ___ Mich at
___; slip op at 22, 24.]

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted McDonald’s motion to suppress on this basis.

The prosecutor further argues that even if the search warrant was invalid, the evidence
seized should still be admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
“Generally, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible at trial.”
People v Hughes (On Remand), 339 Mich App 99, 110-111; 981 NW2d 182 (2021). “The
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that originated as a means to protect the Fourth
Amendment right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v

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Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 498; 668 NW2d 602 (2003). “The exclusionary rule, modified by several
exceptions, generally bars the introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations
made during an unconstitutional search.” Id. at 498-499 (footnote omitted).

“However, there are exceptions to the exclusionary rule.” Bogucki, ___ Mich App at ___;
slip op at 7. “Among the exceptions is the good-faith exception, which ‘renders evidence seized
pursuant to an invalid search warrant admissible as substantive evidence in criminal proceedings
where the police acted in reasonable reliance on a presumptively valid search warrant that was
later declared invalid.’ ” Hughes (On Remand), 339 Mich App at 111, quoting Hellstrom, 264
Mich App at 193. “In those cases, it is the magistrate rather than the officer who made an error
and therefore excluding the evidence does not further the deterrence rationale behind the
exclusionary rule. . . .” Hughes (On Remand), 339 Mich App at 111. “At the same time, this Court
has recognized that a warrant may be so facially deficient, in failing to particularize the place to
be searched or the things to be seized, that executing officers could not reasonably have presumed
it to be valid.” Bogucki ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7.

The prosecution contends the suppression of the evidence was improper because there were
no allegations of police misconduct. The prosecution asserts the only misconduct that the trial
court penalized was “grammatical,” because Detective Johnson specifically limited his search to
the items listed in the affidavit. While there were no claims of police misconduct, the prosecution
ignores this Court’s holdings in Carson I and Bogucki. In Carson I, ___ Mich App at ___; slip
op at 15, this Court concluded that “the warrant in this specific case was so facially deficient by
virtue of its failure to particularize the places to be searched and things to be seized that the
executing officers could not have reasonably presumed it to be valid,” rendering the exclusionary
rule inapplicable. In Bogucki, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7, this Court adopted the holding
in Carson I with respect to the exclusionary rule regarding improper searches of cell phones.
Because the warrant in this case was similar to the warrant in Carson, the good-faith exception
does not apply.

The prosecution asserts that the exclusionary rule would not bar total admission of the
evidence, and this Court should sever the noncompliant portions of the search warrant. The
prosecution relies on Judge Redford’s dissent in Carson I. In his dissent, Judge Redford explained
even if the warrant was constitutionally defective, the exclusionary rule would not bar the
admission of the text messages between the defendant and his coconspirator, which had probable
cause. Carson I, ___ Mich App at ___ (REDFORD, J., dissenting); slip op at 11. Dissenting
opinions are not binding nor precedent. People v Woolfolk, 304 Mich App 450, 478; 848 NW2d
169 (2014), aff’d 497 Mich 23 (2014).

Whether severance is applicable is a multiple-step analysis. Keller, 479 Mich at 478-479.
“First the court must divide the warrant into categories. Then, the court must evaluate the
constitutionality of each category.” Id. at 479. “If only some categories are constitutional, the
court must determine if the valid categories are distinguishable from the invalid ones and whether
the valid categories make up the great part of the warrant.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). The prosecution does not provide an analysis and relies on Judge Redford’s dissent to
support its position that the geolocation and communication data from October 12, 2023, may be
severed from the warrant. The prosecution fails to explain how that could occur given the
complexity and scope of the search. See Blackburne & Brown Mtg Co v Ziomek, 264 Mich App

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615, 619; 692 NW2d 388 (2004) (“An appellant may not merely announce its position or assert an
error and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for its claims, unravel or
elaborate its argument, or search for authority for its position. Insufficiently briefed issues are
deemed abandoned on appeal.”) (Quotation marks and citations omitted).

Ultimately, the facts in this case mirror those in Carson. Although the prosecution
correctly notes that the search warrant incorporated an affidavit, the affidavit neither identified a
suspect nor the offense under investigation and failed to establish any limiting factors relevant to
the search. Such deficiencies run directly contrary to the core protections of the Fourth
Amendment, which exist to prevent precisely this type of unfettered governmental intrusion. Law
enforcement had an obligation to tailor the warrant in a manner consistent with constitutional
requirements yet neglected to do so, as did the magistrate in authorizing the improper warrant.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable
and in granting McDonald’s motion to suppress.4

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

4
We decline to address the parties’ arguments regarding whether there was sufficient probable
cause to authorize the warrant, as we have concluded that the contested search warrant failed to
meet the particularity requirement. Further, due to the ambiguities in both the search warrant and
affidavit regarding the underlying offense investigated, it is unclear as to which offense the
probable-cause standard would pertain to.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261861. Public record. Not legal advice.