# Hart

> District Court, S.D. Florida · January 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261440

## Case

- **Full name:** Jonathan D. Hart v. Elaine A. Carbuccia
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261440

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reversing judgment for nominal § 1983 damages against state judge

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
CASE NO. 25-60335-CIV-SMITH/HUNT

JONATHAN D. HART,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ELAINE A. CARBUCCIA,

Defendant.
_______________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS CAUSE is before this Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”).
ECF No. 12. The Honorable Rodney Smith, United States District Judge, referred the
Motion to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for appropriate rulings. ECF
No. 16; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); S.D. Fla. L.R., Mag. R. 1. Upon thorough and careful
review of the Motion, Plaintiff’s Response, ECF No. 13, and being otherwise fully advised
in the premises, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion be
GRANTED for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are based on the allegations set forth in the Second Amended
Complaint. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff Jonathan Hart (“Plaintiff”) was a party to two state court
proceedings1 in the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit before Judge Elaine
Ann Carbuccia (“Defendant”), who is the lone defendant in this case. Id.

1 This Court may take judicial notice of the dockets in the related state court proceedings.
See Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 652 (11th Cir. 2020). The dockets
The first state court case was a dissolution of marriage suit between Plaintiff and
his ex-wife (“the Dissolution Proceeding”).2 Id. at 3. In that case, the parties disputed
timesharing rights over their three children. Id. The second state court case is a civil
action for a domestic violence injunction brought by one of the minor children against
Plaintiff (“the Injunction Proceeding”).3 Id.

In the Dissolution Proceeding, at a hearing in February 2024, Defendant allegedly
“engaged in actions that blatantly contravened the principles of open and fair courtroom
proceedings” by instructing Plaintiff to “sit down” and “stop talking.” Id. at 3–4. She
ultimately refused to allow the Plaintiff to present “material witnesses and exhibits” at this
hearing. Id. at 3.
In the Injunction Proceeding, Plaintiff filed various motions “to discharge the
Guardian ad Litem, object to a Social Investigator, and to dissolve the domestic violence
injunction or in the alternative modify the injunction.” Id. At a hearing on November 13,
2024, Plaintiff called Dr. John Abuso as a witness. Id. at 4. Dr. Abuso is a therapist who

testified Plaintiff is not violent and that he “posed no danger to himself, his children, or his
ex-wife.” Id. According to Plaintiff, that testimony was “uncontroverted.” Id. Despite that
testimony, Defendant denied Plaintiff’s motion to dissolve the injunction. Id. at 5. Plaintiff
moved for reconsideration of that decision, but Defendant denied that motion as well. Id.

are publicly available through the website for the Clerk of Courts for Broward County.
https://www.browardclerk.org/.

2 Plaintiff provided case number FMCE17002803. ECF No. 10 at 3.

3 Plaintiff provided case number DVCE21006587. ECF No. 10 at 3.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant. See
ECF No. 1. Since initial filing, Plaintiff has amended his complaint twice. See ECF Nos.
9; 10. The Second Amended Complaint brings one count for relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See ECF No. 10 at 9. The basis of this § 1983 claim is that Defendant allegedly

deprived Plaintiff of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 1. As relief, Plaintiff requests $275,000 in
compensatory damages, injunctive relief requiring Defendant to complete “judicial
training,” and an order requiring Defendant’s recusal in related state cases. Id. at 9–10.
Now before the undersigned is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 12.
LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“To meet this ‘plausibility standard,’ a plaintiff must ‘plead[] factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’” Arias v. Integon Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 18-22508-CIV-ALTONAGA/GOODMAN,
2018 WL 4407624, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 17, 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In
considering a motion to dismiss, “the complaint must be construed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff and the factual allegations taken as true.” Brooks v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). Unsupported allegations
and conclusions of law, however, will not benefit from this favorable reading. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679.
A. Pro se pleadings
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160
(11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Still, a pro se litigant must abide by “the relevant law

and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome,
863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Peterson v. Atlanta Hous. Auth., 998 F.2d
904, 912 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[A] court’s duty to liberally construe a plaintiff’s complaint in
the face of a motion to dismiss is not the equivalent of a duty to re-write it.”).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that she is protected by judicial immunity. Issues of immunity
may be considered at the motion to dismiss stage. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
227 (1991) (stressing importance “of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible
stage in litigation”).
Judges are entitled to “immunity . . . from liability for damages for acts committed

within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), overruled on
other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 467 U.S. 800 (1982). The two-part test for
determining when a judge is immune from liability depends on (1) whether the judge dealt
with the plaintiff while acting in a “judicial capacity” and, if yes, (2) whether the judge acted
in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357, 362
(1978).
First, the undersigned considers whether Defendant dealt with Plaintiff in a “judicial
capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. This requires examining the challenged conduct
because “it [is] the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who
perform[s] it, that inform[s] our immunity analysis.” Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593,
615–16 (2024) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). Though judicial
immunity may not extend to “administrative decisions” by a judge, see Forrester v. White,
484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988), nothing in the Second Amended Complaint suggests that this

suit is based on an administrative action. According to Plaintiff, Defendant “made the
rulings (or decisions) which are the subject of this lawsuit in her official capacity as a
judge.” ECF No. 10 at 3. She held hearings, denied Plaintiff’s motions, and instructed
Plaintiff to “sit down” and “stop talking” in court. Id. at 3–4. Those actions are
quintessential functions of a trial judge. See McIndoo v. Broward Cty., 750 F. App’x. 816,
819 (11th Cir. 2018) (concluding that state court judges were entitled to absolute judicial
immunity for claims that “stem from judicial rulings made . . . as part of the underlying
child-custody proceedings”). The undersigned finds that Defendant acted squarely in her
judicial capacity.
Second, the undersigned considers whether Defendant nevertheless acted “in the

‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 357. In Plaintiff’s Response to the
Motion, ECF No. 13 at 4, Plaintiff cites to the dissent in Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d
942, 954–55 (11th Cir. 1985) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (“It is difficult to understand how
every person in the United States may be held accountable in damages for conspiring to
violate another person’s federal constitutional rights, except those persons trained in
constitutional guarantees, charged with interpreting the constitution, and oath bound to
deal fairly with parties to litigation.”). In Dykes, a state court judge allegedly conspired
with a litigant and signed a child custody order in a dependency proceeding despite
lacking personal jurisdiction over the mother. See id. at 947. Nevertheless, the en banc
majority concluded that subject matter jurisdiction existed, so judicial immunity was still
available. See id. at 949–50. Since the Dykes decision, courts in the Eleventh Circuit
have readily dismissed § 1983 claims against judges on immunity grounds. See, e.g.,
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1071 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of complaint);

Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1084–85 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing judgment for
nominal § 1983 damages against state judge); Bounds v. 16th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Fla., No.
21-10066-CIV-ALTMAN, 2021 WL 3190876, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2021) (dismissing
pro se plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against state judge for failure to state claim). This is true
“even when the judge’s conduct ‘was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of
his [or her] authority.’” Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57).
Against that background, even if Defendant made an erroneous ruling, that would
not mean that Defendant acted outside of her jurisdiction. See Stevens, 877 F.3d at
1301. There is no need to make that finding, however, because all of Defendant’s alleged

conduct consisted of actions taken well within her jurisdiction. Defendant is immune to
Plaintiff’s claim for damages.
Because Plaintiff also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, that is not the end of
the inquiry. “Judicial immunity’s scope depends on the type of relief sought.”
Middlebrooks v. Kasmar, No. 4:25-CV-00167-WMR, 2025 WL 3209684, at *2 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 11, 2025), appeal dismissed, No. 25-12771, 2025 WL 3172591 (11th Cir. Nov. 13,
2025).
Section 1983 states that “injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Tarver
v. Reynolds, 808 F. App’x. 752, 754 (11th Cir. 2020) (interpreting § 1983 to mean that
“judges also receive protection from declaratory and injunctive relief”). Declaratory relief
is unavailable only if there is no “adequate remedy at law.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234,
1242 (11th Cir. 2000). In this case, the typical state appellate process serves as an

adequate remedy. See Duman v. Wigand, No. 25-61151-CIV-STRAUSS, 2025 WL
2324362, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2025) (“If Plaintiff is seeking a modification or
reversal of a domestic violence injunction, a Florida appellate court can provide the
necessary relief to remedy any deprivation.”).
Given that Plaintiff had the opportunity to appeal each of Defendant’s rulings (and
Defendant represents that Plaintiff took advantage of those opportunities), injunctive and
declaratory relief is not available to Plaintiff in this case. Indeed, Plaintiff “makes no
allegations regarding a violation of a declaratory decree or the availability of declaratory
relief,” so the Second Amended Complaint fails to establish that such relief would be
appropriate.4 Duman, 2025 WL 2324362, at *3; see also Richardson v. Davis, No. 1:25-

CV-03375-JPB-AWH, 2025 WL 2743900, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3305601 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2025) (dismissing
claims against judge where there is ongoing appeal of state court rulings).
Judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim in its entirety. Even when construing
the Second Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and accepting his

4 In his response to the Motion, Plaintiff emphasizes that he is seeking “prospective”
relief. ECF No. 13 at 4. The Supreme Court previously concluded in Pulliam v. Allen that
“judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief” in a § 1983 suit. 446 U.S.
522, 541–42 (1984). Since then, § 1983 was amended, and the Eleventh Circuit has
found that the Pulliam decision was “partially abrogated by statute.” Bolin v. Story, 225
F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000).
factual allegations as true, see Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1369, the undersigned finds that
dismissal is warranted.5
In addition, Defendant requests dismissal with prejudice. ECF No. 12 at 19. When
granting or denying leave to amend a complaint, “trial courts have broad discretion.”

Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Plaintiff has amended his Complaint twice. See ECF
Nos 9; 10. Each Complaint suffers from the same fundamental issue: the bar of judicial
immunity, which is more than a mere pleading defect. On these facts, further amendment
would be “futile.” Hall v. United Ins. Co. of America, 367 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004).
The undersigned recommends dismissal with prejudice. See Austin v. Mullins, No. 24-
14271-CIV-CANNON, 2024 WL 4502258, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 10, 2024) (“[A]ny
amendment by Plaintiff clearly . . . could not overcome the judicial immunity doctrine,
warranting dismissal with prejudice.”).
RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12, be GRANTED, and the Second Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 10, be DISMISSED with prejudice.
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above
findings and recommendations as provided by the Local Rules for this district. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely

5 Because judicial immunity applies, the undersigned need not address other arguments
raised in the Motion.
object waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and
Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
DONE AND SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 15th day of January
2026.

Pe m Ilt
PATRICKM.HUNT =———<“i‘COSCSCSCS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
All Counsel of Record
Jonathan D. Hart
120 Wild Pine Rd.
Wellington, FL 33414

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261440. Public record. Not legal advice.