# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Florida · January 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261415

## Case

- **Full name:** Lorenzo Rashad Johnson v. United States of America
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

LORENZO RASHAD JOHNSON

v. Case No. 8:20-cr-57-VMC-AEP
8:25-cv-2145-VMC-AEP
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

______________________________/
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Lorenzo Rashad
Johnson’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,
or Correct Sentence. (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 119). The
United States of America responded on September 15, 2025.
(Civ. Doc. # 6). Mr. Johnson failed to file a reply. Also
pending before the Court is Mr. Johnson’s pro se Motion for
Reconsideration. (Civ. Doc. # 3). For the reasons that follow,
the Section 2255 Motion is dismissed as untimely, and the
Motion for Reconsideration is denied without prejudice.
I. Background
In March 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Johnson
pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and
ammunition. (Crim. Doc. ## 70, 72, 75). The plea agreement
advised:
It is understood by the parties that the Court is
neither a party to nor bound by this agreement. The
Court may accept or reject the agreement, or defer
a decision until it has had an opportunity to
consider the presentence report prepared by the
United States Probation Office. The defendant
understands and acknowledges that, although the
parties are permitted to make recommendations and
present arguments to the Court, the sentence will
be determined solely by the Court, with the
assistance of the United States Probation Office.
(Doc. # 70 at 16). Mr. Johnson acknowledged in the plea
agreement that he was “entering into this agreement and [was]
pleading guilty freely and voluntarily without reliance upon
any discussions between the attorney for the government and
the defendant and defendant’s attorney and without promise of
benefit of any kind (other than the concessions contained
herein), and without threats, force, intimidation, or
coercion of any kind.” (Id. at 18). The plea agreement
“constitute[d] the entire agreement between the government
and the defendant with respect to the aforementioned guilty
plea and no other promises, agreements, or representations
exist or have been made to the defendant or defendant’s
attorney with regard to such guilty plea.” (Id. at 22).
The Court sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment,
which was a one-level downward variance from the applicable
guidelines range of 77-96 months. (Crim. Doc. ## 99, 100).
His judgment of conviction was entered on October 8, 2021.
(Crim. Doc. # 100). The judgment did not specify whether the
federal sentence should be served concurrently or
consecutively with the sentence that had not yet been imposed
in Mr. Johnson’s then-pending state court case. Perhaps
because of the appellate waiver in the plea agreement, Mr.
Johnson did not appeal.
Subsequently, in January 2022, Mr. Johnson was sentenced

in state court on unrelated state charges, including fleeing
or eluding, sale of cocaine, and possession of cocaine. (Crim.
Doc. # 114 at 5-8; Crim. Doc. # 88 at 19-21). The state court
ordered that his state sentence be served concurrently with
his federal sentence. (Crim. Doc. # 114 at 7). His plea in
state court specified that Mr. Johnson would receive credit
on his state sentence for all “time incarcerated in a county
facility before the imposition of the sentence.” (Id. at 6).
As he was in state custody, Mr. Johnson served his state
sentence first. Once released from state custody, he was
transferred to federal custody to serve his federal sentence

in September 2024. (Civ. Doc. # 5 at 2). Because this Court
did not pronounce whether the federal sentence should be
served concurrently or consecutively with the state sentence,
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) treated the sentences as
consecutive. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“Multiple terms of
imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively
unless the court orders that the terms are to run
concurrently.”); United States v. Allen, 124 F. App’x 719,
720 (3d Cir. 2005) (“While a state court may express its
intent that a defendant’s state sentence run concurrently
with a previously imposed federal sentence, this intent is
not binding on federal courts or the BOP.”).

Mr. Johnson then filed the instant Section 2255 motion
on August 5, 2025. (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 119). The
United States of America responded, arguing the Motion is
untimely and alternatively fails on the merits. (Civ. Doc. #
6). Mr. Johnson failed to reply. He also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of an unspecified
order. (Civ. Doc. # 3). The Motions are ripe for review.
II. Discussion
A. Motion for Reconsideration
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Johnson filed an odd Motion
for Reconsideration in this Section 2255 case on August 25,

2025. (Civ. Doc. # 3). It is unclear to the Court for what
order Mr. Johnson seeks reconsideration because no
substantive order was entered in this Section 2255 case at
the time Mr. Johnson sought reconsideration. The Motion asks
that Mr. Johnson “be credited 854 days of time he served in
predetention . . . to his now federal case number he’s
currently serving.” (Id. at 2).
To the extent the Motion is seeking reconsideration of
an order entered by this Court in the criminal case, the
Motion is incorrectly filed in this Section 2255 case. For
that reason, the Motion is denied without prejudice.
Alternatively, the Court notes that Mr. Johnson states

at the beginning of the Motion that the Motion is brought in
part under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Thus, if the Motion was correctly
filed in the criminal case, the Court would construe this
Motion as a Section 2241 motion. Indeed, a Section 2241
motion, rather than a Section 2255 motion, is the proper
avenue for Mr. Johnson to seek relief on his claim that the
BOP has miscalculated the county jail credits he should
receive. See United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1345
(11th Cir. 2000) (“A claim for credit for time served is
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after the exhaustion of
administrative remedies.”); Allen, 124 F. App’x at 721 (“The

exclusive remedy for challenging the BOP’s calculation of a
federal sentence is a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, directed to the district court in the
United States District where the petitioner is
incarcerated.”).
Section 2241 motions, however, must be filed in the
district court in the district in which the defendant is
confined. See Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1495
(11th Cir. 1991) (“Section 2241 petitions may be brought only
in the district court for the district in which the inmate is
incarcerated. Fernandez is confined at FMC–Rochester in
Minnesota. Consequently, even if we were to construe

Fernandez’s claim as a section 2241 motion, the district court
for the Southern District of Florida would not have
jurisdiction.”).
Here, Mr. Johnson is housed in the El Reno Federal
Correctional Institution, which is in Oklahoma. Therefore,
Mr. Johnson may only file a Section 2241 Motion in the Western
District of Oklahoma. To the extent the Motion would be
construed as a Section 2241 Motion, it would be due to be
dismissed because this Court would lack jurisdiction over the
Motion.
B. Section 2255 Motion

1. Timeliness
First, the United States argues that Mr. Johnson’s
Section 2255 Motion should be dismissed as untimely. (Civ.
Doc. # 6 at 5). The Court agrees.
“The [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (‘AEDPA’)] established a one-year statute of limitations
applicable to § 2255 motions, which begins to run from, inter
alia, ‘the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final.’” Ramirez v. United States, 146 F. App’x 325, 326 (11th
Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). “In most cases, a
judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for filing

a direct appeal expires.” Id.
Judgment was entered in this case on October 8, 2021.
(Crim. Doc. # 100). Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
5(b)(1)(A), Mr. Johnson had fourteen days — until October 22,
2021 — to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 5(b)(1)(A).
But Mr. Johnson did not file a notice of appeal. Thus, Mr.
Johnson’s judgment of conviction became final on October 22,
2021. “The limitation period started the next day, and the
time to file a Section 2255 motion expired a year later” — on
October 23, 2022. Salley v. United States, No. 8:19-cr-317-
MSS-AEP, 2023 WL 3568618, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2023). The

date Mr. Johnson filed his Section 2255 Motion, August 5,
2025, is over two and a half years after the October 23, 2022,
deadline.
Furthermore, the Court determines that the one-year
statute of limitations did not begin to run under Section
2255(f)(4) when Mr. Johnson was transferred to federal
custody after serving his state sentence. See 28 U.S.C. §
2255(f)(4) (stating that the limitation period shall run from
the latest of multiple dates, including “the date on which
the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence”). Mr.
Johnson knew at the time his judgment became final that his

plea agreement and judgment in the federal case did not
discuss the calculation of jail credits such that, with the
exercise of due diligence, he would have discovered his
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness at that time. Thus, the
Motion is untimely.
Finally, Mr. Johnson has not established entitlement to
equitable tolling. “Because equitable tolling is an
extraordinary remedy, it is limited to rare and exceptional
circumstances and typically applied sparingly.” Hunter v.
Ferrell, 587 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “The petitioner has the

burden of proving entitlement to equitable tolling by showing
that ‘extraordinary circumstances that were both beyond his
control and unavoidable even with diligence’ prevented filing
the petition on time.” Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035,
1040 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (emphasis original).
Mr. Johnson cannot meet that burden.
He argues that his delay in filing his Section 2255
Motion was caused by his misunderstanding over whether his
federal sentence was concurrent with his later-imposed state
sentence. (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 12). According to Mr. Johnson, he
did not learn that his federal sentence was not running

concurrently with his later-imposed state sentence until he
was transferred from state custody into federal custody in
September 2024. (Id.). “Since arriving to federal custody, it
was brought to [his] attention by [his] case manager that
[he] did not receive credit for time spent in federal hold
overs” and he complains he was unable “to have access to [his]
legal document while in state or federal custody.” (Id.).
This is not an exceptional circumstance that warrants
equitable tolling. Courts in the Eleventh Circuit “have not
accepted a lack of a legal education and related confusion or
ignorance about the law as excuses for a failure to file in

a timely fashion.” Perez v. Fla., 519 F. App’x 995, 997 (11th
Cir. 2013). “As with any litigant, pro se litigants ‘are
deemed to know of the one-year statute of limitations.’” Id.
(citation omitted). Thus, Mr. Johnson’s confusion over
whether his federal sentence was concurrent with his state
sentence and over how the jail credits would be calculated
for his federal sentence does not justify equitable tolling.
Nor does his vague claim that he did not have access to an
unspecified “legal document” support equitable tolling. See
Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“[L]ockdowns and periods in which a prisoner is separated
from his legal papers are not ‘extraordinary circumstances’

in which equitable tolling is appropriate.”), aff’d, 545 U.S.
353 (2005).
In short, Mr. Johnson’s Motion is untimely, and the
Motion is dismissed.
2. Merits
Alternatively, even if the Motion were timely, the Court
would deny it on the merits. Mr. Johnson bears the burden of
proving that he is entitled to relief under Section 2255.
Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1304, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015).
Mr. Johnson raises two grounds in his Section 2255
Motion. (Civ. Doc. # 1). In his first ground, he raises a

claim of ineffective assistance of his counsel, Mr. Howard
Anderson. His argument in its entirety is this:
Counsel was ineffective in [not] bringing up
matters orally in court pertaining to time credit
negotiations between prosecution and I. Also,
defense counsel failed to insert time credit clause
into plea agreement as he promised he would. I have
731 days of 854 days that should be credited to me
[while sitting] in Pinellas County Jail.
(Id. at 5). Thus, the Court construes this ground as
complaining only about credits for jail time he served before
his federal sentence was imposed, rather than the time he
served in state custody after his state sentence was imposed.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Mr.
Johnson must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
“that particular and identified acts or omissions of counsel

‘were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.’” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314
(11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In other words, Mr.
Johnson must show that “no competent counsel would have taken
the action that his counsel did take.” Id. at 1315. In
deciding whether an attorney’s performance was deficient,
courts are “highly deferential” and “indulge [the] strong
presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and
that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise
of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 1314 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
To satisfy Strickland’s second prong — prejudice — Mr.
Johnson must show that “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “[I]f
a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the Court
need not make a ruling on the performance component.” Ortiz
v. United States, No 8:15-cr-409-VMC-JSS, 2017 WL 6021645, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2017).
Here, Mr. Johnson’s first ground fails because there is
no prejudice. Section 3585(b) provides:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the
service of a term of imprisonment for any time he
has spent in official detention prior to the date
the sentence commences —
(1) as a result of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the
defendant was arrested after the commission of the
offense for which the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another
sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). “Authority to calculate credit for time
served under section 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney
General,” through the BOP, “not the sentencing court.” United
States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259 (11th Cir. 2010);
see United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331 (1992) (“The
Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), has
responsibility for imprisoning federal offenders.”). Indeed,

the Supreme Court has held that Ҥ 3585(b) does not authorize
a district court to compute the credit at sentencing.” Wilson,
503 U.S. at 334.
Thus, section 3585(b) requires that a defendant be given
credit for time served in jail pre-sentencing and vests the
authority to make that calculation with the BOP — not this
Court at sentencing. Given this, there was no reason for Mr.
Johnson’s counsel to put on the record at sentencing that Mr.
Johnson is entitled to credit for his time served in jail.
Nor would a provision in the plea agreement that Mr. Johnson
is entitled to jail credit be needed. The statute applies

regardless such that there is no prejudice from counsel’s not
mentioning this statute during sentencing or in the plea
agreement.
Mr. Johnson also was not prejudiced by his counsel’s
failure to put on the record the specific number of days Mr.
Johnson believed he should be credited or to ask the Court to
calculate the credits that should be given to Mr. Johnson.
Because the BOP is the entity tasked with calculating credits,
this Court would not have agreed to calculate the amount of
jail credit for Mr. Johnson even if Mr. Johnson’s counsel
asked during sentencing. See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334 (holding
that Ҥ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute

the credit at sentencing”); Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1345 (“The
granting of credit for time served ‘is in the first instance
an administrative, not a judicial, function.’” (citation
omitted)).
For these reasons, the Motion would be due to be denied
as to the first ground.
In his second ground, Mr. Johnson conclusorily states:
“My guilty plea was entered because the agreement was
petitioner will be getting all jail credit and nothing was
said on record.” (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 6). Mr. Johnson does not
specify what type of claim this is, but he does assert that

he did not raise this argument on direct appeal because of
“ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id. at 7). This second
ground appears to be a claim that Mr. Johnson’s guilty plea
was not voluntary, but it also could potentially be construed
as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
However the claim is construed, it lacks merit. On its
face, this claim is insufficiently pled. See Tejada v. Dugger,
941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that conclusory
statements, unsupported by specific facts or the record, are
insufficient to demonstrate entitlement to habeas relief);
Brown v. United States, No. CR 19-00019-JB-B, 2022 WL 3643653,
at *5 (S.D. Ala. June 24, 2022) (“Brown’s claim of an illegal

sentence is subject to summary denial because it rests
entirely on unsupported generalizations and is contradicted
by the record.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CR
19-00019-JB-B, 2022 WL 3638175 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2022).
Mr. Johnson does not allege that his guilty plea was
involuntary. He does not allege that, had he known that he
would not receive the entire amount of pre-sentencing jail
time to which he believed he is entitled as credit against
his federal sentence, he would not have pled guilty in the
federal case. Mr. Johnson signed his plea agreement, and the
Court accepted Mr. Johnson’s guilty plea after a plea

colloquy. (Crim. Doc. ## 70, 72, 75). There is no mention in
the plea agreement that the Court would order that Mr.
Johnson’s federal sentence be served concurrently with his
not-yet-imposed state sentence. (Crim. Doc. # 70). Nor is
there mention of the amount of jail credits Mr. Johnson would
receive. (Id.). Rather, the plea agreement stated that Mr.
Johnson was entering the agreement voluntarily and not based
on a “promise of benefit of any kind (other than the
concessions contained herein)” or “threats, force,
intimidation, or coercion of any kind.” (Id. at 18). The plea
agreement also made clear that “the sentence will be
determined solely by the Court.” (Id. at 16).

Thus, Mr. Johnson’s unsworn statement, suggesting he
believed the plea agreement required that he receive the
amount of jail credit he anticipated, is insufficient to prove
his guilty plea was involuntary. Nor does Mr. Johnson’s
alleged confusion over the amount of jail credit he would
receive establish that his counsel’s assistance was
ineffective or prejudicial. See Pio v. United States, No. 13-
23666-CIV, 2014 WL 4384314, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2014)
(“Conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
are insufficient to state a claim.”).
For these reasons, the Motion would also be due to be

denied as to the second ground.
III. Evidentiary Hearing
As the Court readily determined that Mr. Johnson’s
Section 2255 Motion was untimely and alternatively lacks
merit, no evidentiary hearing is required. See 28 U.S.C. §
2255(b) (stating that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary
if “the motion and the files and records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief”); see also Hernandez v. United States, 778 F.3d 1230,
1232-33 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To establish that he is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing, Hernandez had to allege facts that
would prove that his counsel performed deficiently and that

he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance.”).
IV. Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In
Forma Pauperis Denied

The Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability because Mr. Johnson has failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor will the Court
authorize Mr. Johnson to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis
as to either the Section 2255 Motion or the construed Section
2241 Motion because such an appeal would not be taken in good
faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Mr. Johnson shall be
required to pay the full amount of the appellate filing fee
pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1) and (2).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Lorenzo Rashad Johnson’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion
to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence. (Civ. Doc. #
1; Crim. Doc. # 119) is DISMISSED as untimely.
(2) Lorenzo Rashad Johnson’s pro se Motion for
Reconsideration (Civ. Doc. # 3) is DENIED without
prejudice. To the extent Mr. Johnson wishes to pursue
relief under Section 2241, he should file such motion
with the federal court in the district in which he is
housed.
(3) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and
to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
20th day of January, 2026.
Eigen Mocely GFR.
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261415. Public record. Not legal advice.