# Ramsberger

> District Court, M.D. Florida · January 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261402

## Case

- **Full name:** Eliot Zeke Ramsberger v. Jonathan Charles Avey, St. Petersburg Police Department, and City of St. Petersburg
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261402

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming the district court’s comparison of plaintiff’s allegations to bodycam footage at the motion-to-dismiss stage
- applying the pleading standard to an excessive force claim under § 1983
- applying Randall to an excessive force claim under § 1983

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

ELIOT ZEKE RAMSBERGER,

Plaintiff,

v.
Case No. 8:25-cv-581-KKM-AAS

JONATHAN CHARLES AVEY,
ST. PETERSBURG POLICE
DEPARTMENT, and CITY OF
ST. PETERSBURG,

Defendants.
___________________________________
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Eliot Zeke Ramsberger brings this Section 1983 action
against Police Officer Charles Avey, the City of St. Petersburg, and the St.
Petersburg Police Department (SPPD) for Fourth Amendment violations
arising out of a police canine attack. See 2d Am. Compl. (Doc. 38). The
defendants move to dismiss the complaint. See MTD (Doc. 39). I grant their
motions in part. I dismiss without prejudice—and with leave to amend—the
claims against Avey and the City because they are too vague to state a claim
and overcome qualified immunity. But I dismiss with prejudice the claims
against the SPPD because it is not an entity that can be sued.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 10, 2023, Ramsberger “was involved in a single-vehicle

accident in St. Petersburg, Florida.” 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 8. He briefly left the
scene, and upon return “was confronted by Defendant Officer Avey” who,
without provocation, screamed “ ‘[p]olice canine, get on the ground’ ” and
“simultaneously unleash[ed] his canine to attack.” Id. ¶¶ 9–10; Resp. (Doc. 44)

at 4. Ramsberger failed to heed the order immediately because he was afraid
that dropping down would expose his head and upper body to fatal injuries.
See Resp. at 4. Ultimately, Ramsberger dropped to the ground and the canine
bit his leg. See id. Avey shouted “[r]oll over. Don’t f[]ing move.” See id. But

Ramsberger could not heed the order as the canine was still attached to his
leg. Id. The bite lasted for nearly a minute and “result[ed] in great bodily
harm.” 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 11.
Defendant Officer Avey’s bodycam fills in details. Though the footage

raises questions about the context of the encounter, it does not clearly
contradict Avey’s account. Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 187–88 (11th Cir.
2024) (affirming the district court’s comparison of plaintiff’s allegations to
bodycam footage at the motion-to-dismiss stage), cert. denied, 2025 WL

2824210 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2025). The footage shows Officer Avey and a police canine
responding to an incident in a residential neighborhood at night. See generally
2
Ex. A (Doc. 43). Avey rushes into a vehicle, starts driving, and asks
(presumably over the radio), “where did you see him hitting the fence?” Id. at

0:52–1:41. Avey pulls over and the pair exit the car. Id. at 2:06. “About how far
down the block did you see him go north?” he asks. Id. at 2:33–2:39. The canine,
which is leashed, leads Avey as they search through the front and back yards
of a residential neighborhood. Id. at 2:41–3:57. There are few outdoor lights,

and the footage is dark. Id. While passing through the backyards of several
homes, Avey passes what might be a shed and begins to run. Id. at 4:01.
Suddenly, Avey yells “police canine!” Id. at 4:04. He stops, and the camera
turns sideways—whether because Avey fell or crouched to release the canine,

it is unclear—then Avey urges “get him . . . get him!” Id. at 4:05–4:06.
Ramsberger comes into view. Id. at 4:07. He stands in the distance in
front of a tall, white, wooden fence with his hands behind his head. Id. Avey
screams “get on the ground! Get on the f[]ing ground.” Id. at 4:08. The pair

reaches Ramsberger, and the canine attacks his leg as Ramsberger lays down
on his back. Id. at 4:11. Avey yells, “don’t f[]ing move” and calls for re-
enforcements, including “a rescue for a dog bite.” Id. at 4:14–4:23. Avey again
tells Ramsberger not to move and then instructs him to roll onto his stomach.

Id. at 4:23–4:30. Ramsberger objects that he “can’t roll if the dog is on my leg.”
Id. at 4:32. Throughout the encounter, Ramsberger remains flat with his hands
3
up. Avey again orders Ramsberger not to move, grabs his hands, and pulls him
to roll over. Id. at 4:35–4:42. At this point, another person comes into view and

helps Avey shackle Ramsberger. Id. at 4:45–4:51. After finishing the task, Avey
says “you got him,” stands up, and says “good boy, good job buddy” to the
canine. Ramsberger commands “out.” Id. at 4:51–4:58. The canine, which
remained attached to Ramsberger, backs off, revealing what appears to be a

wound on Ramsberger’s right thigh. Id. at 4:58–5.01. Avey and the canine walk
away, and the footage ends.
Two years after the incident, Ramsberger filed this suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See 2d Am. Compl. He brings a Fourth Amendment excessive force

claim against Officer Avey (Count I). Id. ¶ 17. He also brings municipal liability
claims against both the City and the SPPD, alleging failure to train, supervise,
and intervene. (Counts II and III). Id. ¶¶ 21–22, 25–26. The defendants move
to dismiss, MTD, and Avey responds, Resp. For the reasons below, I grant the

motion in part.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This
pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
4
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must
plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).1 A claim is plausible on its face when a “plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Saunders
v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying the pleading standard

to an excessive force claim under § 1983). When considering the motion, the

1 The Court notes that the government’s insistence that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit
imposes upon [] Plaintiffs a heightened pleading standard” that requires specificity
“for § 1983 claims against public officials” is incorrect and more than a decade out-of-
date. See MTD at 10; Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709–710 (11th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that, since Iqbal, there is no heightened pleading standard for § 1983 civil
rights cases governed by Rule 8(a)(2); Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th
Cir. 2014) (applying Randall to an excessive force claim under § 1983).
5
complaint’s factual allegations are accepted “as true” and construed “in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284

(11th Cir. 2008). Consideration is limited “to the well-pleaded factual
allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters
judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th
Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.

B. Qualified Immunity in Individual Officer Suits
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials
sued in their individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.’ ” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002).
To be entitled to qualified immunity, a government official must first
prove that he was acting within his discretionary authority at the time of the
alleged violation. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003).

After a defendant meets this initial burden, the plaintiff must show that (1)
the official violated his constitutional or statutory rights and (2) those rights
were clearly established at the time the official acted. See Jones v. Fransen,
857 F.3d 843, 851 (11th Cir. 2017). “When qualified immunity is asserted in

the context of a motion to dismiss, [courts] look to the pleadings to see if the

6
plaintiff has successfully alleged the violation of a clearly established right.”
O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. ANALYSIS
Ramsberger alleges that Avey violated the Fourth Amendment by
initiating the canine attack and that the City and SPPD are liable for failure
to train or otherwise prevent the incident. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 21–22, 25–26.

The defendants respond that Ramsberger fails to state his claims, qualified
immunity bars suit against Avey, and the SPPD is not a legal entity subject to
suit. See MTD at 10–18. I agree that the allegations warrant dismissal because
they are too vague to evaluate whether Avey violated a clearly established

right. I dismiss all claims with leave to amend the claims against Avey and the
City.
A. Claim Against Officer Avey
Count I alleges that Avey used excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment when the canine attacked Ramsberger. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–19.
Because Ramsberger’s allegations are conclusory, he fails to satisfy Rule 8 and
overcome qualified immunity. I dismiss the claim without prejudice.
i. Incorporation-by-Reference

Before I begin, a clarification. Though “a court generally may not
consider matters outside of the pleadings without treating the motion as a
7
motion for summary judgment,” the “incorporation-by-reference doctrine”
provides an exception. Johnson v. Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1298 (11th Cir.

2024). Under the doctrine, “a district court may consider evidence attached to
a motion to dismiss . . . if the [evidence] is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim;
and (2) undisputed, meaning that its authenticity is not challenged.”
Swinford, 121 F.4th at 187–88 (approving a district court’s consideration of

bodycam footage at the motion-to-dismiss stage).
The defendants ask the Court to consider Avey’s bodycam footage in
adjudicating the motion to dismiss. See Mot. for Leave (Doc. 40); MTD at 2.
According to the defendants, Ramsberger consented to submission of the

footage. Mot. for Leave at 3. Still, Ramsberger counters that “weigh[ing] video
evidence” is inappropriate at this stage of the case and that “attempts to
narrate the video evidence [are] factually incorrect and wrong by all means.”
Resp. at 7.

Consideration of the bodycam footage is appropriate because the footage
meets the requirements for incorporation by reference in the Eleventh Circuit.
See Swinford, 121 F.4th at 187. First, the footage is central to the incident.
Though the bodycam does not “clearly depict” the entire encounter due to the

lack of light and camera angle, it does show part of the action leading up to the
incident and lasts for the entirety of “the relevant conduct.” See id. at 187. This
8
includes Avey’s questions about the suspect’s location, the search through the
neighborhood, and the full duration of the bite. See Ex. at 0:00–5:01.

Second, Ramsberger does not dispute the authenticity of the footage.
Rather, he challenges that the “attempts to narrate it” are “factually incorrect.”
Resp. at 7 (emphasis added). Thus, he contests Avey’s description of the
footage, not the footage itself. In any event, the footage does not contradict

Ramsberger’s account. Above all, the bodycam demonstrates that there are
knowable facts central to the allegations that are missing from the complaint.
But even without the footage, dismissal is warranted because Ramsberger’s
claims—as currently pled—are conclusory and vague.

ii. Qualified Immunity
“Because it is undisputed that [Avey] [was] acting within the scope of
[his] discretionary authority” when he pursued and detained Ramsberger, the
burden shifts to Ramsberger to defeat the defense of qualified immunity. See

Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007); see MTD at
4, 9; Resp (failing to contest that Avey acted within the scope of his authority);
Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009) (evaluating a seizure
effected by a canine bite).

Thus, Ramsberger must show that Avey violated his constitutional right
by using excessive force and that the right was clearly established at the time.
9
Ramsberger’s allegations are too vague to state a claim for excessive force and
defeat qualified immunity. I dismiss the claim with leave to amend.

“To establish a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force, a plaintiff
must allege (1) that a seizure occurred and (2) that the force used to effect the
seizure was unreasonable.” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1315 (citation modified).
Courts assess force under an objective reasonableness standard. Hadley v.

Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008). Under that standard, courts
evaluate the officer’s use of force “on a case-by-case basis from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 738 (11th Cir. 2010)

(citation modified). This analysis turns on “the facts and circumstances of each
particular case,” including a non-exhaustive list of factors, such as (1) “the
severity of the crime at issue”; (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others”; and (3) “whether he is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Ramsberger alleges that “[b]y deploying [the] canine
against [him] without justification, Defendant Avey used force that was
excessive, unreasonable, and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” 2d Am.

Compl. ¶ 17. He argues that the attack was unprovoked because he “was
clearly unarmed,” “non-threatening, and not resisting arrest.” Resp. at 4; 2d
10
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–12. Moreover, he contends that Avey failed to warn him
sufficiently about the canine and then issued commands that were

unfollowable. For example, the order “to roll over and not move at the same
time” was impossible given that the “canine was eating the front of [his] upper
leg.” Resp. at 4. Finally, he insists that Avey should have recalled the canine
sooner given Ramsberger’s attempts to comply with orders. See Resp. at 5.

The amended complaint does not provide adequate detail for to assess
whether Avey states a claim.2 Excessive force is a context-specific analysis, and
the complaint is largely devoid of context. To be sure, the government offers
little to rebut Avey’s argument that the attack was unreasonable. But without

knowing more, the Court cannot make the determination. The mere use of force
by officers and a resulting injury from an arrest fails to state a claim because
there are insufficient facts to conclude that the force used was gratuitous and
unnecessary. See Johnson v. City of Miami Beach, 18 F.4th 1267, 1272–73

(11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that gratuitous force might involve unnecessary

2 “An evaluation of the reasonableness of the force used is appropriate at [the motion-
to-dismiss] stage because ‘the question of whether the force used by the officer . . . is
excessive is a pure question of law, decided by the court.’ ” Robinson v. City of
Huntsville, No. 21-13979, 2022 WL 3867584, at *5 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2022) (per
curiam) (quoting Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1321 (11th Cir. 2017)).

11
force against a secure suspect who is not resisting and poses no safety threat
to the officer).

Thus, to demonstrate a Fourth Amendment violation, Rambserger must
allege facts concerning the lead-up to the attack. For example, things such as
whether he was evading an officer by flight, why he appeared unthreatening,
if he was arrested and whether the charges were dropped, and the extent of his

injuries would provide context for the reasonableness of the use and extent of
force. See Dorey v. Hartmann, 2022 WL 2211246, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 21,
2022) (noting the facts necessary to assess an excessive force claim); see also
Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1270 (rejecting qualified immunity and reasoning that

“lacerations, injuries to [the plaintiff’s] teeth and jaw,” and “damage to his left
eardrum” refuted the officer’s claim that force used was de minimis).
Ramsberger should also provide more context about the car crash, such as the
time and location of the crash, his departure, and his return to the scene.

Related, the lack of facts hinders the Court’s ability to determine
whether Avey violated a clearly established right. Ramsberger provides some
information, including an explanation for why he did not immediately follow
commands. Resp. at 4 (explaining that dropping to the ground would have

exposed his head to a fatal canine bite); see Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1267
(reversing a district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 claim on qualified immunity
12
grounds because the trial court’s conclusion that a reasonable officer could
have believed that the plaintiff was resisting arrest—and that force was

necessary—when the plaintiff lifted his head up off of hot pavement to avoid
being burnt). Still, the information is incomplete.
Without more context, the Court cannot assess whether Avey’s use of
force was reasonable or whether Ramsberger’s rights were clearly established.

Id.; see Edwards v. Shanley, 666 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that
“clearly established law” prohibited “police officers from allowing a police dog
to conduct a five- to seven-minute attack against a person who ran from his car
after a traffic stop, where he is lying face down with his hands exposed, no

longer resisting arrest, and repeatedly pleading with the officers to call off the
dog because he surrenders”); see also Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 524–25
(5th Cir. 2016) (holding that police violated a clearly-established right by
deploying a canine on a drunk-driving suspect who had initially fled but was

not resisting arrest, especially because the officer permitted the canine to bite
until the suspect was handcuffed, even though he was already subdued).
Because Ramsberger fails to plead facts sufficient to establish that Avey
violated a constitutional right, I dismiss the claim against Avey without

prejudice.

13
B. Claims Against the City
Ramsberger also brings municipal liability claims against the City of St.

Petersburg. Count II alleges that the City, “through policies, practices, and
customs, permitted or encouraged . . . excessive force” through “police
canines.” 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Specifically, the City, through deliberate
indifference, “fail[ed] to properly train and supervise officers, including

Defendant Avey,” id. ¶ 22, and this failure caused his injuries, id. ¶ 23. Count
III alleges that the City “failed to intervene, supervise, or implement corrective
measures” even though “[s]upervisory officials and policymakers knew or
should have known of repeated instances of excessive force and canine misuse.”

Id. ¶¶ 25–27. Because Ramsberger fails to show a predicate constitutional
violation and his allegations are otherwise vague and conclusory, I dismiss the
claims without prejudice.
“[M]unicipal entities may be held liable under § 1983 only where ‘action

pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional
tort.’ ” Plowright v. Miami Dade County., 102 F.4th 1358, 1370 (11th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). To state a
claim, a plaintiff must plead that “(1) his constitutional rights were violated;

(2) the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate

14
indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) the policy or custom caused
the violation.” Id. (citation modified).

As to the second element, a plaintiff meets his burden by “(1) identifying
an official policy; (2) identifying an unofficial custom or widespread practice
that is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with
the force of law; or (3) identifying a municipal official with final policymaking

authority whose decision violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Chabad
Chayil, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1229 (11th Cir.
2022).
The “failure to provide adequate training” may qualify as a “policy or

custom . . . if the deficiency ‘evidences a deliberate indifference to the rights of
[the municipality’s] inhabitants.’ ” Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d
1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009). Deliberate indifference means that “the
municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and

the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Id. (citation
omitted). In the absence of other prior incidents, a plaintiff may show
indifference “if the likelihood for constitutional violation is so high that the
need for training would be obvious.” Id.

“In order to establish a municipality’s liability for an officer’s actions, the
plaintiff must show that the act is one which the municipality has officially
15
‘sanctioned or ordered.’ ” Trammell v. Thomason, 335 F. App’x 835, 845 (11th
Cir. 2009) (assessing an allegation that a city approved the practice of warning

a suspect and deploying a canine simultaneously) (quoting McCormick v. City
of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 n. 13 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).
Dismissal is warranted on multiple grounds. First, because Ramsberger
fails to plead a predicate constitutional violation, there can be no municipal

liability. See Plowright, 102 F.4th at 1370. Second, Ramsberger’s claims are
too vague and conclusory. For instance, he argues that Avey’s “lack of training
and de-escalation skills” led him to use force beyond what “any reasonable and
well[-]trained officer would have done” in the same situation. Resp. at 4–5. But

Ramsberger is silent as to the kind or content of the missing training and
provides no evidence of deliberative indifference. See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22–23.
Likewise, his allegation that the City had a policy to encourage “excessive force
and canine misuse” is too vague for the Court to assess. See id. ¶¶ 20–27.

In a similar vein, Ramsberger alleges the existence of “a pattern of civil
rights violations,” but does not name any incidents besides the instant matter.
See id. ¶ 14; Craig v. Floyd County, 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to

impose liability against a municipality. A pattern of similar constitutional
violations is ordinarily necessary.”) (citation modified). A “naked statement
16
that the [City] ‘knew or should have known’ ” about a practice “is insufficient
to satisfy the pleading standard.” Plowright, 102 F.4th at 1370–71.

Accordingly, I dismiss the claims against the City without prejudice.
C. Claims Against the St. Petersburg Police Department
Ramsberger also brings municipal liability claims against the SPPD,
2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–22, 25–26. SPPD objects that, as a city police

department, it “is not a legal entity subject to suit.” MTD at 14. Ramsberger
acknowledges that “some courts have dismissed municipal police
departments,” but insists (without citing cases) that other courts “allow [the
departments] to remain when pled with the municipality.” Resp. at 5.

A defendant must be an entity or individual subject to suit to proceed
under § 1983. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992). Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3), the “capacity to sue or be sued is
determined” “by the law of the state where the court is located.”3 The SPPD

lacks the capacity to sue and be sued under Florida law. See Faulkner v.
Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Florida
law has not established Sheriff’s offices as separate legal entities with the

3 The rules vary for natural persons, corporations, and other organizations. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 17(b).
17
capacity to be sued.”); Dean, 951 F.2d at 1214 (“[P]olice departments are not
usually considered legal entities subject to suit.”); Lederer v. Orlando Utilities

Comm’n, 981 So.2d 521, 525–26 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“Generally, a municipal
department is not a separate legal entity and does not have the capacity to sue
or be sued. Examples of such subordinate entities comprising an integral part
of a municipality would generally include a police or fire department, planning

department or city attorney’s office.”). Accordingly, the claims against the
SPPD are dismissed with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ramsberger brings § 1983 claims against Officer Avey, the City of St.

Peterburg, and the SPPD. The defendants move to dismiss all claims. I dismiss
without prejudice the claim against Avey for failure to state a claim and
overcome qualified immunity. Similarly, I dismiss without prejudice all claims
against the City for failure to state a claim. Finally, I dismiss with prejudice

all claims against the SPPD because it is not an entity that can be sued, thus
any attempt to amend would be futile. See Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit,
927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir. 2019).
Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims (Doc. 39) is GRANTED IN
PART.
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2. The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 38) is DISMISSED. Count I is
DISMISSED without prejudice. Counts II and III] are DISMISSED
without prejudice as to the City of St. Petersburg, and with prejudice as
to the St. Petersburg Police Department.
3. The clerk shall TERMINATE the St. Petersburg Police Department as

a defendant from this case.
4, Plaintiff may amend his complaint no later February 3, 2026. Failure
to do so will result in dismissal of this action with prejudice.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on January 20, 2026.

athryn’ Kimball Mizelle
United States District Judge

19

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261402. Public record. Not legal advice.