# HAMPTON

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · February 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261038

## Case

- **Full name:** Derrick Hampton v. PA Parole Board; and Superintendent Brothers
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DERRICK HAMPTON, )
Petitioner, Civil Action No. 25-261
v. Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
PA PAROLE BOARD; and Re: ECF Nos. 3 and 17
SUPERINTENDENT BROTHERS, )
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
For the reasons that follow, the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus
by a Person in State Custody (the “Petition”), ECF No. 3, will be denied, and a certificate of
appealability will be denied.! Additionally, Petitoiner’s Motion for Discovery, ECF No. 17, will
be denied.
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Derrick Hampton (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner who currently is incarcerated

at the State Correctional Institution at Pine Grove (“SCI-Pine Grove”) in Indiana, Pennsylvania.
Petitioner currently is serving an aggregate sentence of 19 years and six months to 39 years
of imprisonment for his 2006 convictions of Attempted Homicide, Aggravated Assault, and
firearms offenses. ECF No. 4 at 2; ECF No. 9-1 at 2-3; see also Docket, Com. v. Hampton, Docket
No. CP-02-CR-17049-2002, (available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?do
cketNumber=CP-02-CR-0017049-2002&dnh=RnV VySSORzarLMIA0%2BJfUQ%3D%3D (last
visited Feb. 11, 2026)).

' The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. ECF Nos.
21 and 22.

The record indicates that Petitioner became eligible for parole on April 25, 2022. The
maximum date of his incarceration is October 25, 2041. ECF No. 9-1 at 3.
This federal habeas proceeding commenced with the receipt of the Petition on February
21, 2025. ECF No. 1. In the Petition, Petitioner argues that various decisions of Respondent PA
Parole Board (the “Board”) to deny him release on parole violated his constitutional rights, and
was a waste of money. ECF No. 3 at 5, 7, and 8. Petitioner appears to assert that multiple parole
denials provide bases for federal habeas relief, and explicitly cites to decisions of the Board dated
December 15, 2021; December 30, 2022; December 18, 2023; and December 11, 2024. ECF No.
4 at 2-3. See also ECF No. 3-1; 3-2; and 3-3.
Respondents answered the Petition on April 9, 2025. ECF No. 9. In the Answer,
Respondents fail to address any potential procedural defects in the Petition, but instead argue that
the Petition should be denied on the merits. Id. at 4-7.
Petitioner submitted his Traverse on June 24, 2025. ECF No. 15.
On July 25, 2025, Petitioner filed a Motion for Discovery, in which he sought the
documentation upon which the Board relied to deny parole. ECF No. 17. Respondents initially
responded on August 26, 2025, generally arguing that discovery should be denied because
Petitioner had failed to state a claim for habeas relief. ECF No. 23 at 3. Respondents were ordered
to file a supplemental response addressing the discoverability of the specific documents demanded
by Petitioner, ECF No. 24, which they did on September 3, 2025, ECF No. 25.
Petitioner was informed that he could file a reply brief on or before October 6, 2025. ECF
No. 26. As of the date of this writing, he has not seen fit to do so.
Both the Petition, ECF No. 3, and the Motion for Discovery, ECF No. 17, are ripe for
consideration.

I. THIS COURT MAY ADDRESS THE PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE
PETITION SUA SPONTE.
Respondents fail to address any procedural defects in the Petition. However, pursuant to
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases, this Court may dismiss the Petition sua sponte
if it plainly appears on its face that the Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
Rule 4 provides in relevant part that:
If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge
must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.
In interpreting Rule 4, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 observe that:
28 U.S.C. § 2243 requires that the writ shall be awarded, or an order
to show cause issued, “unless it appears from the application that the
applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” Such
consideration may properly encompass any exhibits attached to the
petition, including, but not limited to, transcripts, sentencing
records, and copies of state court opinions. The judge may order
any of these items for his consideration if they are not yet included
with the petition.
In addition to ordering state court records and/or opinions, a federal habeas court may,
under Rule 4, take judicial notice of those state court records and/or state court opinions as well as
its own court records. See, e.g., Barber v. Cockrell, 4:01-CV—0930, 2002 WL 63079, at *1 n4
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2002) (in a Rule 4 case, the court took judicial notice of its own records of a
prior habeas petition filed by the petitioner); United States ex. rel. Martin v. Gramley, No. 98 C
1984, 1998 WL 312014, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1998) (in a Rule 4 summary dismissal, the court
took “judicial notice of the opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court in this case.””)
Thus, to the extent that Respondents did not address any particular procedural defect in the
Petition, this Court may do so on its own.

A. Any claim seeking relief based on the Board’s decisions issued in 2021, 2022, and
2023 is untimely.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides as follows
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the
latest of--
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created
by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such
State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period
of limitation under this subsection.
Courts apply the statute of limitations in Section 2244(d) to petitions challenging the denial
of state parole. Brown v. Pennsylvania Parole Bd., No. 1:24-CV-816, 2024 WL 4339994, at *2
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2024) (citing McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 212-13 & n9 (3d Cir.
2007)).
Here, the Petition was received by this Court on February 21, 2025, and appears on its face
to be entitled to an effective filing date of February 18, 2025. ECF No. 3 at 16. Accordingly, any
decision of the Board predating February 18, 2024, would be untimely. In this case, that would

exclude any decision other than the one issued on December 11, 2024. See ECF No. 9-2 (decision
issued on December 15, 2021); ECF No. 9-3 (decision issued on December 30, 2022): ECF No.
9-4 (decision issued on December 18, 2023); ECF No. 9-5 (decision issued December 11, 2024).”
Thus, only the Board’s 2024 decision is timely. Federal habeas relief based on the Board’s
decisions issued in 2021, 2022, and 2023 is barred by the statute of limitations.
B. The Petition is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.
28 U.S.C.§ 2254 states, in pertinent part:
(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted unless it appears that--
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State; or
(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the applicant.
Petitioner asserts in the Petition that he has no state remedies available to exhaust. ECF
No. 3 at 7. While this once was a correct statement of the law of Pennsylvania, it no longer is so.
Petitioner had remedies in state court, and has failed to exhaust them.
In DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 2005), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit examined the state of Pennsylvania law at the time that it issued its decision
in 2005, in order to determine whether the petitioner in that case, who claimed the Board violated
his Fifth Amendment right against coerced self-incrimination, had an available state court remedy
in which to exhaust his claim. The Third Circuit held that, aside from litigating an ex post facto
claim, Pennsylvania law did not provide a mechanism by which a prisoner could challenge a parole

2 Petitioner does not argue, and the record does not otherwise support, that equitable tolling
would apply to any claim based on any of the decisions that predate February 18, 2024.

denial. Id. at 445. Therefore, given the state of Pennsylvania law at the time, a Pennsylvania
prisoner who challenged the denial of parole was exempt from the exhaustion requirement with
respect to all other types of constitutional claims. Id.
However, the law in Pennsylvania has changed in the two decades since DeFoy was
decided in January 2005. Instead, by 2024, when Petitioner defaulted the due process claim at
issue in this case, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court had made clear that a prisoner could
raise due process challenges in a mandamus action challenging the Board’s decision denying
parole. See, e.g., Toland v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 263 A.3d 1220, 1233 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2021) (“under our precedent, both ex post facto claims and due process challenges
may be raised in a mandamus action.”); see also, e.g., Bowman v. Brittan, No. 23-2092, 2024 WL
§050028, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2024) (“Based upon Toland, which DeFoy could not consider
since it had yet been decided, it is clear that Petitioner had an available state court remedy; hence,
he was required to comply with the exhaustion requirement.”), report and_ recommendation
adopted sub nom. Bowman v. Att’y Gen., 2024 WL 5047464 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2024); Bradley v.
Wingard, No. 15-cv-235J, 2017 WL 11476608, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2017) (“Review [in state
court] is obtained by the disappointed inmate filing a petition for a writ of mandamus and the
Board responding with a demurrer... [A]lthough the burden on the inmate is a high one and the
discretionary aspects of a parole decision cannot be reviewed, Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287,
290 (Pa. 2001), the Commonwealth Court does consider constitutional claims on their merits.”),
report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 10150909 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018).
Thus, Petitioner had a firmly established state court remedy available to him to challenging
the Board’s December 11, 2024, decision on due process grounds. He could have filed a
mandamus petition in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. A review of the

Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System online dockets indicates that he did not do so. See
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch (last visited Feb. 11, 2026). He may not file one now.
See Pa. R.A.P. 1512(a). Accordingly, Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claims. There are no
grounds on the record to excuse his default. Therefore, the Court will deny the Petition because it
is procedurally defaulted.
I. THE PETITION LACKS MERIT .
Alternatively, the Petition should be denied on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 2254 permits a federal court to grant a state prisoner the writ of habeas corpus
“on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). It is Petitioner’s burden to prove that he is entitled to the writ. See, e.g.,
Vickers v. Sup’t Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 858 (3d Cir. 2017); see_also Stanley v. Tice, No.
22-cv-1, 2022 WL 1806079, at *1-2 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2022),
It is well-established that Petitioner has no right to parole under Pennsylvania state law.
See, e.g., Hudson _v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. And Parole, 204 A.3d 392, 396 (Pa. 2019).
Whether or not to grant parole is a decision left to the sole discretion of the Board. 61 Pa. C.S.A.
§§ 6135, 6137 and 6139; see also, e.g., Homa v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 192 A.3d
329, 334 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018).
In exercising its discretion, the Board must consider factors such as the nature and
circumstances of the offenses Petitioner committed, recommendations made by the trial judge and
prosecuting attorney, Petitioner’s general character and background, his conduct while in prison,
his physical, mental, and behavioral condition, and his complete criminal record. 61 Pa. C.S.A. §

3 The public record did not indicate that Petitioner sought review of any of the decisions of the
Board upon which he ostensibly bases the Petition.

6135(a). Decisions of the Board to grant or refuse parole must be accompanied by a brief statement
of reasons underlying the Board’s decision. 61 Pa. C.S.A. § 6139(a)(5).
The reasons listed by the Board in its December 11, 2024, decision reflect that it considered
those factors. ECF No. 9-5 at 2-3.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “contains a substantive component that
bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them.” Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
and citations omitted); see also Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Even if a state
statute does not give rise to a liberty interest in parole release . . ., once a state institutes a parole
system all prisoners have a liberty interest flowing directly from the due process clause in not
being denied parole for arbitrary or constitutionally impermissible reasons.”). “Conduct can
violate substantive due process if it shocks the conscience, which encompasses only the most
egregious official conduct.” Newman, 617 F.3d at 782 (internal quotations and citations omitted);
see also Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2002) (“when an executive action is at
issue, only the most egregious conduct will be considered arbitrary in the constitutional sense.”).
“As a general matter, it is governmental conduct intended to injure that is most likely to rise to the
conscience-shocking level.” Evans v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrs., 645 F.3d 650, 660 (3d
Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that it would be
arbitrary and capricious for the Board to base its decision on a reason that has no “rational
relationship to the purpose of parole[,]” such as the “color of one’s eyes, the school one attended,
or the style of one’s clothing.” Block, 631 F.2d at 236 n.2. It has further held that it “would violate

due process if [a parole board] bases a decision on constitutionally impermissible criteria such as

race, religion, or the exercise of free speech rights.” Id. at 237; see also Newman, 617 F.3d at 784.
Petitioner has not met his burden of proving that the Board's decision denying him parole
was arbitrary and capricious, shocked the conscience, or was based on impermissible reasons. In
the Petition, his arguments seem to involve his completion of various prison programs, the lack of
detail in the Board’s written decisions, and his disagreement with the Board’s ultimate conclusion

as to whether he should be released. ECF No. 4 at 4-7. But these arguments, at their heart, merely
express disagreement with the Board’s discretionary decision based on the factors that it must
consider under state law. This Court may not evaluate whether the Board made the correct
decision, and it is “not authorized by the due process clause to second-guess parole boards and the
requirements of substantive due process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.”
Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001). Therefore, these arguments provide no basis
for relief.
Although Petitioner disagrees with the Board's assessment of him, he has not demonstrated
that the Board relied on anything that can be described as “conscience shocking.” Nor does an
independent review of the reasons for the decision articulated by the Board reveal anything that
might implicate a constitutionally impermissible basis for denial. ECF No. 9-2 — 9-5. Petitioner
simply has not established that the decision to deny him parole rose to the level of “the most
egregious official conduct” necessary to support a substantive due process claim. Newman, 617
F.3d at 782. Accordingly, there can be no finding that Petitioner is in custody in violation of his
substantive due process rights.
Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny the Petition.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A certificate of appealability will be denied because jurists of reason would not find it
debatable whether Petitioner’s claims lacked merit. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85
(2000).
V. MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases authorizes discovery only where
“snecific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts

are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief. Bracey v. Gramley, 520
U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997). In light of Petitioner’s procedural default, no amount of discovery would
entitle him to federal habeas relief for any of the asserted denials of parole. Therefore, Petitioner’s
request for discovery will be denied.
It is worth noting, however, that, in this supplemental opposition brief, Respondents argue
that the records of the Board that Petitioner seeks are privileged under state law. ECF No. 25 at 5
(citing 37 Pa. Code § 61.2 — a regulation promulgated by the Board itself). But, as counsel for
Respondents no doubt is aware, the regulation that she cited does not shield these documents from

an inmate seeking them discovery under state law. Toland v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
311 A.3d 649, 665 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024), aff'd but criticized, 344 A.3d 744 (Pa. 2025). Counsel
is reminded of her duty of candor to the tribunal under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(2) —

an obligation that this Court takes seriously.

10

VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Petition, ECF No. 3, will be denied, and a certificate of
appealability will be denied. Additionally, the Motion for Discovery, ECF No. 17, will be
denied.
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT, .
“fief tf AGF
i} ‘AM hifedld FR My
Dated: February _, 2026 Ce AMMLEL “ f-
MAUREEN P. RELLY ~
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ce: Derrick Hampton
GP-2142
SCI Pine Grove
189 Fyock Road
Indiana, PA 15701

All counsel of record (via CM/ECF)

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11261038. Public record. Not legal advice.