# Dunbar

> District Court, D. Maryland · February 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260951

## Case

- **Full name:** Vincent Lamont Dunbar, Jr. v. Lt. Loretta Lakanse
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** February 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Oe YSBC- GREENBELT
) 996 FER LO □□□□□□
VINCENT LAMONT DUNBAR, JR., )
Plaintiff,
) Civil Action No.: 25-cv-1509-LKG
Dated: February 10, 2026
LT. LORETTA LAKANSE,} )
Defendant.
)
oo)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendant Lt. Loretta Lakanse (ECF No. 9) and self-
represented Plaintiff Vincent Lamont Dunbar., Jr.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
15). Defendant Lakanse responded to Plaintiff’s motion. ECF No. 16. No hearing is required.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D, Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied
without prejudice. Counsel shall be appointed to represent Plaintiff.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiffs Allegations
Plaintiff states that on April 12, 2025, while lie was a pretrial detainee at the Montgomery
County Correctional Facility, his cell was flooded. ECF No. 1 at 4. Defendant Lakanse came to
his cell and when his door slot opened, he tried to get on one knee to explain what was going on
but Defendant Lakanse sprayed him in the mouth with mace. Jd. Defendant Lakanse deployed a
second shot of spray into his “private area and left [him] in the cell for 10-15 minutes,” Jd,
- Plaintiff states that his throat was sore and swollen. Jd. He claims that Defendant Lakanse failed
to follow procedure and that he was not a threat given that he was in his cell. Jd. Additionally, he
states that Defendant Lakanse never told him, “to handcuff up” but instead just came to his cell
and started to spray the chemical agent. Jd. at 4-5. He seeks compensatory damages. Jd. at 5.

1 The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the full and complete name of Defendant.

In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff notes that the water to his cell was shut off
and he was at his cell door to be handcuffed when Defendant sprayed him with the OC spray and
then left him in his cell for a period of time. ECF No. 15 at 3; ECF No, 15-1 at 2; ECF No. 15-2
at 1-2. He denies that he was a threat to himself or others and notes he was “behind a secure
door.” ECF No. 15 at 3.
B. Defendant’s Motion
Defendant Lakanse moves for summary judgment or dismissal, arguing that Plaintiff fails
to state a claim against her and she is otherwise entitled to summary judgment. ECF No. 9.
In a declaration accompany the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, Defendant
Lakanse avers that on April 12, 2025, Plaintiff was housed in cell A-1, the far left cell of the
lower tier on the N1-1 housing unit. ECF No. 9-4, ff 3-4 (Lakanse Aff}. The N1-1 housing unit
houses inmates who have been the subject of administrative action due to violating inmate rules.
Id., 45. Defendant Lakanse states, without any additional details, that Plaintiff's disciplinary
history included assaultive behavior. /d.
On April 12, 2025, Pfc. Adedeji reported that Plaintiff repeatedly flushed his toilet,
despite being directed to stop, which resulted in a flood on the lower tier of the unit. ECF No. 9-
4,16; ECF No. 9-6, ff] 3, 4 (Adedeji Aff). Defendant Lakanse responded to the unit with Sgt.
Yeboah and observed that the bottom tier cells and day area were flooded with water. ECF No. 9-
4,7. Defendant Lakanse states that the “flooding presented a safety and hygiene issue that
[needed to be] immediately addressed.” Jd. 8. Plaintiff was given orders to stop flushing and
flooding his cell, but continued to do so, and the water to his cell was turned off. Id., | 9; ECF
No. 9-6, 76.
Defendant Lakanse avers that in compliance with policies and procedures she ordered
Plaintiff to come to his food slot to be handcuffed, explaining that inmates on the special
management unit must be handcuffed to be escorted from their cell. ECF No. 9-4, 10. She
reports that Plaintiff did not come to the food slot to be handcuffed. Jd. In an effort to gain his
compliance so that he could be escorted from the cell safely she deployed a one second burst of
OC spray into the cell through the flood slot. Jd., 4 11; ECF No. 9-6, 7. Plaintiff used his body
to block the food tray, lessening the effectiveness of the OC spray. ECF No. 9-4, { 12; ECF No.
9-6, 17. Defendant Lakanse states that Plaintiff was standing against the door with a towel or
cloth wrapped around his head and face. Jd., ] 12. Defendant Lakanse denies deploying any

additional OC spray into the cell (d., 4 13) and Pfc. Adedeji denies observing Lakanse deploy
any further OC spray into the cell. ECF No. 9-6, { 9.
Defendant Lakanse explains that she stepped away from Plaintiff’s cell to direct the
secure evacuation of other inmates from the affected area and to address the flooding on the unit.
ECF No. 9-4, 915. While she remained close, Plaintiff “shouted verbal threats to [her] from his
cell.” Jd. 16. Pfc. Adedeji heard Plaintiff’s threats. ECF No. 9-6, 10. Defendant Lakanse
directed a restraint chair be brought to the unit, but it was not needed, ECF No. 9-4, 17. She
also requested an OC spray cannister with a hose be brought to her because in situations where
the food slot is blocked a hose may be used to attempt to deploy OC spray into the cell. Jd., □ 18.
However, she did not deploy the OC spray with the hose because she could not find an opening
into the cell and after she brought the canister with the hose to the cell, Plaintiff complied with
orders to be handcuffed. Jd. J 19; see also ECF No. 9-6, fj 10, 11.
Plaintiff was taken to the recreational yard and showers for decontamination. ECF No. 9-
4, 420; ECF No. 9-6, § 13. Nurse Wendhim evaluated Plaintiff and cleared his return to his cell.
ECF No. 9-4, 9 21; ECF No. 9-6, { 14.
Defendant has provided the stationary camera video of the use of force. ECF No. 9-2
(filed separately). The Court has reviewed the video which begins at 05:18:11:901 p.m. At the
beginning of the video an inmate is on the unit, eating in the common area: he moves quickly
and appears to speak to someone off camera. Id. at 05:18:23.762. Defendant Lakanse and
another officer entered the unit at 05:19:13.103. Jd. When Defendant Lakanse arrived on the unit
she had an OC can in her hand (id. at 05:19:19:754) and walked directly to Plaintifi’s cell door.
The other officer opened what appears to be a utility closet next to Plaintiff’s cell. A third officer
entered the unit and went directly to Plaintiff's cell. Jd. The third officer opened Plaintiffs door
slot at 05:19:24:154 and Defendant Lakanse immediately deployed the OC spray into Plaintiffs
cell. Jd. At this point a fourth officer had also entered the unit. Jd. The door slot was closed at
05:19:27.354. Id. Before the OC spray was deployed, the officers do not appear to give Plaintiff
any commands when they arrived on the unit.
The inmate who had been eating in the common area when the incident began was placed
in handcuffs at 05:20:17:656 and walked off from view of the camera. Jd.
Defendant Lakanse was given the OC can with a hose at 05:21:15:501. It appears another
inmate is removed from his cell at 05:21:56.301, although the angle of that movement is

obscured by the stairs on the unit. Jd. The inmate in the cell next to Plaintiff was removed from
his cell at 05:23:21.804, and he had a cloth wrapped around his face. Id.
A male officer appears to speak briefly to Plaintiff through his cell door. Id. at
05:24:57.905. The officers next appear to ready the restraint chair that had been placed on the
unit by loosening its straps. fd. at 05:25:49.
At 05:27:48.911 Defendant Lakanse approached Plaintiff's cell door and attempted to use
the hose to deploy more OC spray into the cell. Id. Immediately thereafter however, Plaintiff is
handcuffed through the cell door and removed from his cell. Jd. at 05:28.24.562.
Defendant has also provided still images taken from the video. A still image taken at
05:18:12.051 shows Plaintiff standing at his cell door. ECF No. 9-10, He appears to have a cloth
wrapped around his forehead. Jd. The first photograph of the use of force, captures the video at
05:19:24.005 and shows Defendant Lakanse deploying OC spray through the door slot, while
another officer stands next to her. ECF No. 9-7, An arm is visible in the cell door window, but it
is unclear from the video, or the still image, whether the slot is blocked by Plaintiff. Jd. The next
photograph captures the video at 05:19:24:654 and shows essentially the same thing, although in
this photograph Plaintiff appears to be closer to the cell door/window. ECF No. 9-8. The next
still image from the video is taken at 05:19:25:104 and is essentially the same. ECF No. 9-9. The
final still image offered from the video was taken at 05:28:52.864 and shows Plaintiff being
escorted from his cell with a wrap around his forehead and a cloth around his neck. ECF No. 9-
11.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss
In reviewing the complaint in light of a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
12(b)(6) the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the
facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4% Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4% Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4% Cir.
1997).
A “plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

The complaint, however, does not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to
dismiss, Id. at 555. Instead, “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Jd. at 563. To survive
a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78
(2009) (quoting Fvombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief” Jd. at 679 (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), which provides in pertinent part:
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme
Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion. “By
its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
“The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56€), cert.
denied, 541 U.S. 1042 (2004). The court should “view the evidence in the light most favorable
to... the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or

? Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l
Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S, 506,
513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading standard” of Rule
8(a)).

assessing the witnesses’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr, Inc., 290 F.3d 639,
644-45 (4th Cir. 2002); see FDIC v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 173 (4th Cir, 2013).
The district court’s “function” is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249. Moreover, the trial court may not make credibility determinations on summary judgment.
Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4" Cir. 2015); Mercantile
Peninsula Bank v. French, 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007); Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States, 436 F.3d 431, 442 (4th Cir. 2006); Dennis, 290 F.3d at 644-45. Therefore, in the face of
conflicting evidence, such as competing affidavits, summary judgment is generally not
appropriate, because it is the function of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes, including
matters of witness credibility.
Nevertheless, to defeat summary judgment, conflicting evidence, if any, must give rise to
a genuine dispute of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. If “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” then a dispute of material
fact precludes summary judgment. Jd, at 248; see Libertarian Party of Va. V. Judd, 718 F.3d 308,
313 (4% Cir. 2013). On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence “is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Jd. at 252. And, “the mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id.
Because Plaintiff is self-represented, his submissions are liberally construed, See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That notwithstanding, the court must also abide the
“affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses
from proceeding to trial.”” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
Ill. DISCUSSION
A. Fourteenth Amendment Excessive Force
The Supreme Court held in Kingsley v. Hendrickson that “the appropriate standard for a
pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one.” 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). It
is enough that a pretrial detainee shows that the “force purposely or knowingly used against him
was objectively unreasonable,” id., regardless of an officer’s state of mind, id. at 395 (cited in

Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2016)). Pursuant to Kingsley, this Court must
consider whether under the “facts and circumstances” of this particular case, and from the
“perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” the force used against Plaintiff was objectively excessive.
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. This Court must also “account for the ‘legitimate interests that stem
from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,’
appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that in th[e] judgment’ of jail officials ‘are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Jd.,
quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (brackets in original). The Kingsley Court
noted that a considerations such as “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the
amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper
or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably
perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting” may bear on the
“reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397.
The Court finds that there are material disputes of fact. While the parties do not dispute
that the use of force arose because Plaintiff’s cell was flooded, the evidence appears to
demonstrate that the water to the cell was tumed off at the time Defendant Lakanse approached
Plaintiff's cell. Thus, there was no apparent urgency to enter Plaintiff’s cell. Certainly,
correctional staff had a need to clean up the flooding and to remove detainees from the unit but
the video evidence demonstrates they were able to begin doing so prior to removing Plaintiff
from his cell.
More importantly, assuming Plaintiff had been directed to submit to handcuffing over the
loudspeaker, the video evidence of what occurred next is open to interpretation. Defendant
Lakanse asserts that the video shows Plaintiff blocking his feed slot necessitating her deployment
of OC spray. Plaintiff asserts that the video shows him at his cell door prepared to submit to
handcuffing and endeavoring to explain the reason for the flooding. The video is without sound,
and so what the Court is left with is a video that shows Defendant Lakanse deploying a burst of
OC spray into Plaintiff’s cell as soon as his door slot is opened, with no apparent direction or
opportunity for him to submit to handcuffing, and without any apparent effort to temper the
amount of force applied. Given Plaintiff was secured in his cell and the water to the cell was
turned off, it is unclear what threat Defendant Lakanse perceived Plaintiff created.

Additionally, Defendant Lakanse argues that the still images taken from the video show
Plaintiff covered his face in anticipation of the use of force, but in the still image taken from the
video before the use of force Plaintiff appears in his cell window with an apparent wrap around
his forehead, not his face. ECF No. 9-10. When he is removed from his cell, he has a wrap
around his forehead and neck. ECF No. 9-11. It is unclear from the evidence before the Court if
or when Plaintiff used a cloth to cover his face.
“Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant
will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780
F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al.,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed. 1998)). While it may be true that the still images
and video do not actually depict what either party says they do, this is a debate over facts and is
best reserved for the finder of facts. Thus, there remains a triable issue of fact on Plaintiff's
claim alleging excessive force such that neither party is entitled to summary judgment.
B. Qualified Immunity .
Defendant argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Under this doctrine, Ҥ 1983
actions against government officials in their individual capacities” are barred “unless (1) they
violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was
clearly established at the time.’” Barrett v. PAE Gov t Servs., Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 428 (4th Cir.
2020) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)). Defendant Lakanse’s qualified
immunity defense is unavailing at this stage of the litigation, because Plaintiff has alleged facts
suggesting that the constitutional right was well-established at the time of the incident at issue
and that conduct allegedly violative of his constitutional rights actually occurred. See Willingham
v, Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2005). Defendant Lakanse is, of course, free to reassert
the defense at subsequent stages of the proceedings.

IV. CONCLUSION
By separate order which follows, the Court DENIES Defendant Lakanse’s motion to
dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment. Counsel shall be appointed to represent Plaintiff.

Date LEBLAKA ¢ GRE SGSBRO_
United StatesDistrict Judge

3 A federal district court judge’s power to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), is a
discretionary one, and may be considered where an indigent claimant presents exceptional
circumstances. See Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1975); see also, Branch v, Cole, 686
F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1982). There is no absolute right to appointment of counsel; an indigent
claimant must present “exceptional circumstances.” See Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966
(4th Cir. 1987). Exceptional circumstances exist where a “pro se litigant has a colorable claim
but lacks the capacity to present it.” See Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984),
abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v, U.S, Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989) (holding that
28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory appointment of counsel); see also Jenkins v.
Woodard, 109 F.4th 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2024) (“...a district court must conduct a fact specific,
two-part inquiry to assess whether a case presents exceptional circumstances before it decides
whether to appoint counsel” including “whether the plaintiff has a colorable claim” and
“considering the claim’s objective complexity and the plaintiff’s subjective abilities, whether the
plaintiff lacks the capacity to present it.” (internal quotations omitted)). Here, Plaintiff presents a
colorable claim, and the Court must consider whether, given “the claim’s objective complexity
and the plaintiff’s subjective abilities,” he “lacks the capacity to present it.” Jenkins, 109 F.4th at
247. Informing this review, the Court is mindful that summary judgment is generally
inappropriate “where the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery.” EL. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2011); see Shaw v,
Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2023); Putney v. Likin, 656 F. App'x 632, 638-39 (4th Cir,
2016) (per curiam); McCray v. Maryland Dep t of Transportation, 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir.
2015). Discovery will allow Plaintiff to develop further his claims and secure evidence regarding
the events surrounding the use of force.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260951. Public record. Not legal advice.