# Portillo-Osorto

> District Court, D. Maryland · February 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260928

## Case

- **Full name:** Freddy Portillo-Osorto v. Rachel Leslie Daniel
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** February 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260928

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

FREDDY PORTILLO-OSORTO,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 25-cv-1040-ABA
v.

RACHEL LESLIE DANIEL,
Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION
On May 14, 2021, M.L.R. reported to the Anne Arundel County Police
Department that her supervisor Freddy Portillo-Osorto (“Mr. Portillo” or “Plaintiff”)
repeatedly demanded sex over the course of six months in 2020–2021, barricaded her in
a bathroom, and raped her on two occasions (March 14 and April 30, 2021).1 Based on
that police report, as well as a written statement from a co-worker, José Melendez,
Detective Rachel Leslie Daniel (“Det. Daniel” or “Defendant”) filed an application for
charges and arrest warrant against Mr. Portillo. A Statement of Charges was issued,
charging him with rape and other offenses. About six weeks later, a grand jury returned
an indictment. At a bail review hearing, Mr. Portillo conceded there was probable cause
supporting the indictment. Yet he has now sued Detective Daniel, alleging that she
violated his constitutional rights in her application for the criminal charges. For the
following reasons, even accepting all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the complaint does

1 The parties have referred to M.L.R. by her full name. By separate order, the Court is
ordering that all filings with her name be sealed, and that the parties file versions of all
filings with her name redacted.
not allege facts that would establish any constitutional violation, and thus will be
dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept all of Plaintiff’s factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in Plaintiff’s favor. King

v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016). Here, the complaint cites and attaches
a number of documents, which the Court must consider as having been incorporated
into the complaint and may consider without converting the motion to one for summary
judgment. Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th
Cir. 2004). These documents are:
Exhibit A Police report taken by Cpl. V. Hernandez of the
(ECF No. 1-3)2 Anne Arundel County Police Department (May 14,
2021)
Exhibit B Medical records from visit by M.L.R. to the
(ECF No. 1-4) emergency department of the Baltimore
Washington Medical Center (April 29, 2021)
Exhibit C Statement of Charges filed with the District Court
(ECF No. 1-5) of Maryland for Anne Arundel County (September
16, 2021)
Exhibit D Police report taken by Det. Daniel (November 9,
(ECF No. 1-6) 2021)
Exhibit E Investigation Report of the Anne Arundel County
(ECF No. 1-7) Police Department Criminal Investigation Division
(September 15, 2021)
Exhibit F Written statements by M.L.R., Mr. Melendez, and
(ECF No. 1-8) another employee (Raul Zurita), taken by Paige
Martonik of DPR Construction (May 5, 2021)
Exhibit G Translated transcript of police interview of M.L.R.
(ECF No. 1-9) (May 31, 2021)

2 As noted above, the referenced versions of these documents are being ordered sealed.
Mr. Portillo’s allegations and the documents he submits state as follows:
Mr. Portillo and M.L.R. were employees of DPR Construction who were both
working at a warehouse located at 7555 Harmans Rd. Severn, MD 21144. ECF No. 11-2
at 6.3 On or about May 14, 2021, M.L.R. “reported to the Northern District station
located at 939 Hammonds Lane, Brooklyn, MD 21225 to report sexual assaults,
purportedly perpetuated by Plaintiff, over a course of nearly six (6) months at their
(Plaintiff and alleged victim) shared employment workplace.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 11. The initial
report “was taken by V. Hernandez (Officer 2476) of the Anne Arundel County Police
Department as Hernandez is a Spanish speaker,” like M.L.R. Id. ¶ 12.
As quoted in paragraph 13 of Plaintiff’s complaint, M.L.R.’s allegations against

Mr. Portillo that she recounted to the Anne Arundel County Police Department on May
14, 2021, were detailed, graphic, and disturbing. M.L.R. worked as part of the cleaning
staff at the warehouse. Id. ¶ 13(vii). The record does not reveal Mr. Portillo’s position,
but it included “handing out employee checks.” Id. ¶ 13(ii). M.L.R. described that in
December 2020 Plaintiff began calling her and sending her text messages saying “that
he was attracted to her and he would give her money for sex.” Id. ¶ 13(i). In February
2021, M.L.R. alleged that the conduct severely escalated, including that Plaintiff, who as
noted above was in charge of distributing paychecks, told M.L.R. on February 2, 2021,
that “if she did not give him oral sex or anal sex he would not give her check.” Id. ¶
13(ii). Sometime later, Plaintiff “took her to the bathroom,” “put his arm on her neck
and started touching her body, on the outside of her clothing, while pining her to the

3 Citations to briefs are to the ECF page numbers, which may differ from the pagination
used by the parties.
wall,” and left only after someone else came into the bathroom. Id. ¶ 13(iii). On February
18, 2021, after all workers were sent home early due to snow, M.L.R. attempted to enter
her car to leave but Plaintiff “entered into her vehicle and would not get out,” and when
a supervisor came by, Plaintiff “attempt[ed] to conceal himself in the vehicle.” Id. ¶
13(iv). On March 10, Plaintiff “tried to kiss her by force” and then “began insulting her in

front of all her co-workers.” Id. ¶ 13(v). On March 14, while M.L.R. was cleaning
bathrooms, Plaintiff entered the bathroom and sexually attacked her, pinning her to the
wall, and “began to touch her breasts and then [Portillo] put his hand inside her pants
and penetrated her vagina with his fingers.” Id. ¶ 13(vii).4
On April 29, 2020, M.L.R. went to the University of Maryland hospital “because
she had a mental break down from the continued sexual abuse [Plaintiff] was
committing against her” and then “went to her job to file for a sex offense complaint
with her Superintendent.” Id. ¶ 13(ix). The next day, according to M.L.R.’s police report,
Plaintiff again attacked M.L.R. while she was cleaning a bathroom: “After entering the
bathroom, [Portillo] pulled his penis out and pulled [M.L.R.’s] hair and told her to suck
his penis. [Portillo] told her that would teach her a lesson and no matter what she said

they would never fire him because he was the supervisor” and then “put his penis in her
mouth by force.” Id. ¶ 13(x).
On May 5, M.L.R. made a written report to the employer. Id. ¶ 30; ECF No. 1-8 at
1 & 4–15. Plaintiff was fired that day. Nine days later, on May 14, M.L.R. went to the

4 The medical record refers to Mr. Portillo by his second surname, Osorto. Other records
hyphenate his surnames. See, e.g., ECF No. 11-5 at 1. It appears that Mr. Portillo, as is
typical among Latinos with multiple surnames (generally one paternal, one maternal)
goes by his first surname, Portillo. See, e.g., ECF No. 1-8 at 1, 2, 12, 18. Accordingly, the
Court will do the same.
police department to make her report. That is when she met with Cpl. Hernandez.
M.L.R. told Cpl. Hernandez that it was only after Plaintiff was fired that she felt “able to
report the above incidents to the police.” Id. ¶ 13(xi).
On May 31, 2021, a different law enforcement officer, Detective Honesto,
interviewed M.L.R. Id. ¶ 18. M.L.R. reiterated and expanded upon her recollection of the

sexual assaults, including identifying additional physical assaults and other “unwanted
touching.” Id. ¶ 19(ii)–(v). M.L.R. also alleged that Plaintiff had urged her to participate
in a scheme to defraud their employer; M.L.R. declined. Id. ¶ 19(i).
On or about September 16, 2021, Detective Daniel—a fellow member of the Anne
Arundel County Police Department with Cpl. Hernandez and Det. Honesto, who had
conducted the interviews of M.L.R.—filed an application for issuance of criminal charges
against Plaintiff, including charges of rape, sex offense, assault, destruction of property,
false imprisonment, and harassment. Id. ¶ 44; see also ECF No. 1-5 at 7–9 (Application
for Statement of Charges). The application also requested issuance of a summons or
warrant. ECF No. 1-5 at 7. It is through that application that Plaintiff contends Det.
Daniel violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Because Plaintiff in part contends that

there was information missing from the application that Det. Daniel should have
included and that, if included, would have negated a finding of probable cause, the
Court will quote in its entirety Det. Daniel’s factual recitation in the application:
On 05/31/2021 at 1000hrs [M.L.R.] responded to CID located
at 8666 Veterans Hwy Millersville, MD 21108. [M.L.R.] began
explaining she previously worked for “DPR Construction” and
identified the suspect as “Freddy Portillo.” [M.L.R.] identified
the workplace as a warehouse under construction located at
7555 Harmans Rd. Severn, MD.
[M.L.R.] stated in December 2020, she was assigned to work
at the warehouse where Mr. Portillo worked after a “Covid”
outbreak. [M.L.R.] stated initially Mr. Portillo was a “nice
person.” [M.L.R.] stated someone in early February of 2021
Mr. Portillo asked [M.L.R.] about her vehicle. [M.L.R.] stated
he made comments alluding to improving her financial
situation. [M.L.R.] stated Mr. Portillo suggested he could alter
records through their employer and benefit her financially.
[M.L.R.] stated she wanted no part of his scheme.

[M.L.R.] stated Mr. Portillo’s attitude toward her changed
dramatically. [M.L.R.] stated on 02/12/2021 there was
inclement weather which prompted the warehouse to close
early. [M.L.R.] stated while she was sitting in her vehicle, Mr.
Portillo entered and sat in the front seat. [M.L.R.] stated Mr.
Portillo refused to exit the vehicle and instructed her to drive
to a hotel. [M.L.R.] stated Mr. Portillo made comments about
having sexual intercourse at a hotel and added “I can help you,
there’s no need to prostitute.” [M.L.R.] stated she did not
want any kind of relationship with Mr. Portillo. [M.L.R.]
stated a supervisor unknowingly knocked on her window and
stated she needed to leave before the weather worsened. Mr.
Portillo exited the vehicle. [M.L.R.] stated there were
numerous incidents over the next couple weeks of unsolicited
touching by Mr. Portillo. [M.L.R.] described the touching as
him “brushing” up against her unnecessarily. [M.L.R.] stated
on 03/17/2021 she wore a green tee shirt to work for St.
Patrick’s Day. [M.L.R.] stated she was cleaning a room in the
warehouse, when she was cornered by Mr. Portillo. [M.L.R.]
stated Mr. Portillo ripped her shirt and began touching her
breasts under her clothing. [M.L.R.] described the touching as
“skin to skin.” [M.L.R.] stated she was able to break away and
leave the area. [M.L.R.] stated she repeatedly asked Mr.
Portillo to stop.

[M.L.R.] stated after the incident Mr. Portillo was continually
insulting her in front of all the other workers on the job site.
[M.L.R.] stated during this time she began asking other co-
workers for assistance but could not find a resolution adding
“Nobody would help.”
[M.L.R.] stated on 04/14/2021 she was instructed to clean a
bathroom by Mr. Portillo. [M.L.R.] stated while she was in the
bathroom Mr. Portillo entered and immediately began trying
to pull her pants down. [M.L.R.] stated she attempted to fight
him off while trying to keep her pants up. [M.L.R.] stated Mr.
Portillo was pulling on her pants with such force her belt loop
tore. [M.L.R.] stated Mr. Portillo inserted his fingers into her
vagina. [M.L.R.] stated she was eventually able to break away
and exit the bathroom.

[M.L.R.] stated over the next several weeks she was the victim
of constant harassment and insults at the expense of Mr.
Portillo. [M.L.R.] stated the harassment escalated to phone
calls in the middle of the night and included numerous
incidents of unwanted touching. [M.L.R.] described the
touching as “all week he touched my buttocks and breasts.”

[M.L.R.] stated the incidents began to affect her health.
[M.L.R.] stated she sought medical attention on 04/29/2021
due to her stress from the assaults and harassment by Mr.
Portillo. [M.L.R.] stated she spoke with a coworker identified
as “Francisco” about the assault.

[M.L.R] stated on 04/30/2021 she returned to the job site and
was again instructed by Mr. Portillo to clean a bathroom.
[M.L.R.] stated upon entering the bathroom Mr. Portillo
entered the bathroom and began to choke her. [M.L.R.] stated
she began to feel “out of breath.” [M.L.R.] stated Mr. Portillo
threw her onto the ground and “took his penis out.” [M.L.R.]
stated he told her “Open your mouth.” [M.L.R.] stated “I had
no energy to defend myself.” [M.L.R.] stated Mr. Portillo put
his penis in her mouth and on her face. [M.L.R.] stated Mr.
Portillo did not ejaculate during the incident. [M.L.R.] stated
after several minutes Mr. Portillo exited the bathroom.

Id. at 8—9.
The District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County issued a Statement of
Charges and Arrest Warrant that same day, September 16. Id. at 1—6; see also ECF No.
11-5 at 31 (additional version of arrest warrant). Plaintiff was arrested four weeks later,
on October 14. ECF No. 1 ¶ 45. A bond hearing was held that same day, at which a
District Court Commissioner ordered Plaintiff to be held without bond. Id.; see also ECF
No. 11-5 at 35–36 (initial appearance report).
A grand jury returned an indictment against Mr. Portillo on November 5, 2021.
ECF No. 11-5 at 16–21. In doing so, the grand jury found that there was probable cause

to believe that Mr. Portillo had committed the following offenses on the following dates:
Count Charge Offense date
1 Rape, Second Degree April 14, 2021
2 Sexual Offense, Fourth Degree April 14, 2021
3 False Imprisonment April 14, 2021
4 Assault, Second Degree April 14, 2021
5 Sexual Offense, Fourth Degree March 17, 2021
6 Assault, Second Degree March 17, 2021
7 Rape, First Degree April 30, 2021
8 Rape, Second Degree April 30, 2021
9 Sexual Offense, Fourth Degree April 30, 2021
10 Unnatural or Perverted Practice April 30, 2021
11 False Imprisonment April 30, 2021
12 Assault, Second Degree April 30, 2021

Mr. Portillo filed a motion for bond on November 15, 2021. Id. at 53–56. The
Circuit Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County held a hearing on December 9,
2021. ECF No. 11-6 (transcript). At the hearing, counsel for Mr. Portillo conceded that
there was “enough for probable cause” and that “clearly . . . it’s a case that meets the no
bond status.” Id. at 8, 11. But he argued that the evidence was sufficiently weak that the
Circuit Court should grant the motion for release pending trial. Id. at 9.
The Circuit Court denied the motion for bond, affirming that Plaintiff remain
held without bond. The court ruled as follows:
[I]n light of the nature of the charges the Court does have
concern for public safety. I also find that the information that
the victim is fearful for her safety, and the fact that there have
been some veiled threats made towards her are concerning to
the Court.
I do recognize that he remained in the area, even after he
became aware that this allegation was made, but prior to his
arrest. However, I think we’re in a different situation now that
the charges in fact have been lodged and they do carry
significant penalties. So in light of that I think he poses both a
flight risk and -- and a public safety concern. So the Court will
keep bond the same.
Id. at 15–16; see also ECF No. 11-5 at 75 (hearing sheet).
A trial was scheduled for April 2022. Ten days before the trial was scheduled to
begin, the State’s Attorney’s Office entered nolle prosequi on all charges, and Plaintiff
was released from custody. ECF No. 1 ¶ 47; see also ECF No. 11-5 at 77 (order granting
release from commitment); id. at 79 (criminal hearing sheet). The record does not reveal
why the State’s Attorney’s Office decided not to pursue the charges.
Plaintiff now claims that there was insufficient evidence for charges to have been
filed in the first place, and has sued Detective Daniel, alleging that she violated his
constitutional rights by filing the application for criminal charges on September 16,
2021. Count 1 alleges a violation of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and
Count 2 alleges a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The core premise of Plaintiff’s theory is that there were certain “discrepancies of
the timeline and events” that “should have given pause to any reasonable officer
similarly situated that there may be reasons to question the veracity of the accuser.” ECF
No. 1 ¶ 22. For example, he points to some discrepancies in the dates on which M.L.R.
reported that the alleged assaults occurred. See id. ¶¶ 24, 26, 27, 28. He also points to

statements in some of the medical records that arguably conflicted with some of
M.L.R.’s allegations, such as an April 29, 2021, hospital record stating that she “denie[d]
being physically or sexually abused.” Id. ¶ 16 (quoting ECF No. 1-4 at 3). Plaintiff also
contends that the investigating officers should have had doubts about M.L.R.’s
allegations because some of those allegations were not specifically mentioned in her
written complaint to their employer. See id. ¶¶ 31–32.
Detective Daniel has filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary
judgment, arguing that (1) there was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of
criminal charges, (2) the complaint does not adequately allege causation, and (3) in any
event the complaint should be dismissed based on qualified immunity. ECF No. 11. Mr.
Portillo has filed a brief in opposition, ECF No. 14, and Detective Daniel has filed a reply

brief, ECF No. 17.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When a defendant asserts that,
even assuming the truth of the alleged facts, the complaint fails “to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted,” the defendant may move to dismiss the complaint. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and state a facially
plausible claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When considering such a motion,
the Court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint

and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” King, 825 F.3d at 212.5
III. DISCUSSION
Under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), the people are “to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . .
. and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Thus,
when Detective Daniel prepared and submitted her application for criminal charges and
an arrest warrant, the Fourth Amendment required, among other things, that her
application be supported by probable cause.
“The long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects ‘citizens from rash and
unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,’ while

giving ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’” Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949)). The probable-cause standard is a “‘practical, nontechnical conception’” that
deals with “‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable

5 Because the complaint, even with all allegations accepted as true, does not state claims
on which relief can be granted, the Court need not reach Defendant’s alternative
argument that she should be granted summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court does
not address the summary judgment standard, or whether it would be appropriate to
consider a motion for summary judgment at this stage.
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231
(1983) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175–76). “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. At bottom,
probable cause for issuance of criminal charges or an arrest warrant requires “a

reasonable ground for belief of guilt,” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (quoting McCarthy v.
De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)), and that “the belief of guilt [is] particularized with
respect to the person to be . . . seized.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (citing Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)).
In addition to requiring that a warrant application contain sufficient information
to establish probable cause, the Fourth Amendment also prohibits an affiant from
making “material false statements” in such an application “deliberately or with a
‘reckless disregard for the truth.’” Miller v. Prince George’s Cty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)). A similar standard
applies to omissions: a plaintiff who, like Mr. Portillo, claims that a warrant application
should have included additional information, must plead and prove that the affiant

“omitted from that affidavit ‘material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless
disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.’” Id. at 627 (quoting
United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990)). “With respect to omissions,
‘reckless disregard’ can be established by evidence that a police officer ‘failed to inform
the judicial officer of facts [the officer] knew would negate probable cause.’” Id. (quoting
Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Inc., 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003)). “A plaintiff’s
‘allegations of negligence or innocent mistake’ by a police officer will not provide a basis
for a constitutional violation.” Id. at 627–28 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171).
To constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, any alleged false statement or
omission in a warrant application must be “material.” Miller, 475 F.3d at 628. For an
alleged false statement or omission to be “material” it must have been “necessary to the
finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. “To determine materiality, a court
must excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts recklessly omitted, and then

determine whether or not the corrected warrant affidavit would establish probable
cause.” Miller, 475 F.3d at 628 (cleaned up, citations omitted). “If the ‘corrected’
warrant affidavit establishes probable cause”—i.e., if the warrant application even with
an alleged false statement excised, or with an allegedly omitted statement added, still
would establish probable cause—“no civil liability lies against the officer.” Id.
Mr. Portillo does not assert the first type of Fourth Amendment claim described
above: he does not contend that there were insufficient facts in the September 2021
application to establish probable cause. That is unsurprising, for two reasons. The first
is that he conceded exactly that point while litigating the criminal case, acknowledging
during a bail hearing that there was “enough for probable cause.” ECF No. 11-6 at 8. The
second is that there are more than sufficient facts within the September 2021

application, which is quoted in full above, to establish probable cause. In the
application, under the penalties of perjury, Det. Daniel explained that M.L.R. and Mr.
Portillo worked at the same warehouse, that the alleged pattern of harassment began in
December 2020, that on a day in February 2021 Mr. Portillo entered M.L.R.’s car and
instructed her to drive to a hotel and initially refused to leave the car, and that “over the
next several weeks she was the victim of constant harassment and insults at the expense
of Mr. Portillo” and that “the harassment escalated to phone calls in the middle of the
night and included numerous incidents of unwanted touching.” ECF No. 1-5 at 8–9. It
described the March 17, 2021, incident, when M.L.R. was “cleaning a room in the
warehouse,” was “cornered by Mr. Portillo,” and Mr. Portillo “ripped her shirt and began
touching her breasts under her clothing.” Id. It described the incident on April 14, 2021,
when while M.L.R. was cleaning a bathroom Mr. Portillo “entered and immediately
began trying to pull her pants down,” and “used one hand to grab her by the neck while

using his other to touch her vagina under the clothing.” Id. And it described that on
April 30, 2021, Mr. Portillo, again after entering a bathroom that M.L.R. was cleaning,
“began to choke her,” “threw her on the ground” and “put his penis in her mouth and on
her face.” Id. at 9.
Those factual assertions, which Plaintiff acknowledges the officers obtained
during the two interviews of M.L.R. (including one that lasted two hours), ECF No. 1 ¶¶
13, 19, were sufficient to establish probable cause that Mr. Portillo had committed the
charged offenses. After all, “[a] victim’s ‘reliable identification of her attacker’ almost
always suffices to establish probable cause.” English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th 636, 646 (4th
Cir. 2024) (quoting Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1991)). In fact,
“it is difficult to imagine how a police officer could obtain better evidence of probable

cause than an identification by name of assailants provided by a victim, unless,
perchance, the officer were to witness the crime himself.” Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 262.
So Plaintiff’s allegations, even accepted as true, along with the incorporated
documents, establish that the allegations in the September 16, 2021 application were
sufficient to establish probable cause. And Plaintiff does not contend that the
application affirmatively misrepresented anything that Det. Daniel or her fellow officers
in the Anne Arundel Police Department learned from the investigation.6 So where does
that leave Plaintiff’s claim that Det. Daniel violated the Fourth Amendment? He asserts
two theories.
First, Plaintiff argues that Det. Daniel “omitted material facts from the warrant
application she either new [sic] or with reckless disregard for the truth should have

known.” ECF No. 14 at 19–20 (emphasis added) (citing Brown v. Wiita, 7 F. App’x 275,
279 (4th Cir. 2001) and Sanders v. Downing, Case No. 23-cv-6823-MHC, 2025 WL
1852392 (D.S.C. May 9, 2025)). Specifically, he claims that Det. Daniel violated the
Fourth Amendment because her application did not mention (1) that M.L.R.’s written
statement to the company did not “allege[] any physical sexual assaults” or mention
“any incident at all on the date of April 30th, 2021,” and (2) that the April 29, 2021,
medical record stated that she “denie[d] being physically or sexually abused.” See ECF
No. 14 at 20–21; ECF No. 1-4 at 3.

6 Det. Daniel also points out that the District Court Commissioner who reviewed the
application independently determined that the evidence was sufficient to establish
probable cause to believe that Plaintiff committed the alleged offenses, ECF No. 1-5 at 1–
4, and that a grand jury also independently determined that there was probable cause to
believe that Plaintiff committed the alleged offenses, ECF No. 11-5 at 16–20. The fact
that “a neutral magistrate or, in this case, commissioner, issued [an] arrest warrant” is
generally a “clear[] indication” that an officer who filed a warrant application “‘acted in
an objectively reasonable manner.’” Jackson v. Carin, 128 F.4th 525, 534 (4th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012)). A grand jury’s
indictment has a similar effect. Id. (citing Durham v. Horner, 565 F.3d 183, 189 (4th
Cir. 2012)). But as noted, here the Court need not reach the question of whether Det.
Daniel’s conduct was objectively reasonable for qualified immunity purposes, because
the application did in fact contain sufficient evidence constituting probable cause and
Det. Daniel did not otherwise violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in connection
with the application.
This theory fails, at minimum, on materiality grounds. As noted above, for an
alleged false statement or omission to be “material” it must have been “necessary to the
finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. And for an alleged omission,
Plaintiff must show that with the allegedly omitted statement added, the application
would lack probable cause. Miller, 475 F.3d at 628. Here, the complaint comes nowhere

close. The application contained a slew of specific, detailed allegations about Mr.
Portillo’s actions toward M.L.R. Those factual allegations amply established probable
cause. The complaint does not plausibly allege that Det. Daniel acted intentionally or
with “reckless disregard” that mentioning the allegedly exculpatory information related
to the workplace report or the medical record would have “negated[] probable cause.”
See id. But even if the complaint were construed to adequately allege intentionality or
recklessness, the factual allegations in the complaint do not plausibly allege that the
omissions were material. Even with those statements added, the application would have
established probable cause to believe that Mr. Portillo had committed the alleged
offenses. And the Court can readily make this determination even though this case has
not proceeded past the pleadings stage, because although the court must accept as true

all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations, the question of whether Det. Daniel’s application
established probable cause, or whether a hypothetical application that contained the two
facts that Plaintiff contends should have been included would have established probable
cause, are questions of law. Armstrong v. Hutcheson, 80 F.4th 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2023).
This is a similar claim to the one the Fourth Circuit considered, and rejected, in
English v. Clarke—though Mr. Portillo’s claim is much weaker than the one in that case.
In English, the victim was attacked while sleeping in her home, at night, in a room that
was “pitch black.” English, 90 F.4th at 641. Based on some of the perpetrator’s
statements, the victim believed she knew who one of the perpetrators was: a friend of
her son, Kewon English. Id. It later turned out she was wrong, and based on a DNA test
the prosecutor dropped the charges against Mr. English. Mr. English argued that the
circumstances surrounding the victim’s identification of him were murky, and that there
were “some inconsistencies between [the victim’s] four accounts,” and thus “the victim’s

identifications were not reliable enough to establish probable cause.” Id. at 646–47. But
those “inconsistencies [were] minor and understandable given the trauma that the
victim recounted experiencing,” id., and “the victim identified English as her attacker to
law enforcement and others with enough specificity that the officers could reliably find
the right individual.” Id. at 646.
Second, Plaintiff argues that the September 2021 application lacked probable
cause because Det. Daniel “recklessly failed to investigate readily available exculpatory
evidence” before filing the application. ECF No. 14 at 21 (emphasis added). He argues
that in light of the supposed “discrepancies” in the evidence, and given that M.L.R. was
“suing the construction company for whom the Plaintiff and alleged victim both worked”
at the time, Det. Daniel should have, for example, interviewed other co-workers,

requested “work hours or times [sic] sheets,” “investigat[ed] the work site,” or “look[ed]
for any potential cameras available for review.” Id. at 22–23. His theory is that even if
Det. Daniel had sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to obtain criminal
charges, she should have waited to apply for criminal charges until she conducted
additional investigation.
Plaintiff does not identify any legal basis supporting that theory. He cites Savage
v. Cty. of Stafford, Va., 754 F. Supp. 2d 809, 815–16 (E.D. Va. 2010), but in Savage the
arrest was made without a warrant, and there were genuine factual disputes about what
facts the officer knew at the time; here, Plaintiff’s claim turns on the validity of Det.
Daniel’s written warrant application. He cites Wheeler v. Anne Arundel Cty., Case No.
08-cv-2361-JFM, 2009 WL 2922877, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2009), but there Judge Motz
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment by
“fail[ing] to investigate relevant leads or to interview alibi witnesses.” Id. at *5. Finally,

Mr. Portillo cites Humbert v. O’Malley, Case No. 11-cv-440-WDQ, 2014 WL 1266673 (D.
Md. Mar. 25, 2014), but in Humbert the evidence both at the time of the warrant
application and thereafter called into serious doubt whether the person who had been
arrested was the person who had committed the rape: the victim herself disclaimed any
notion that Mr. Humbert committed the rape, and exculpatory DNA evidence was
available within weeks of the arrest but Mr. Humbert remained incarcerated for over a
year. Id. at *4–5. Here, the information that Mr. Portillo claims was unconstitutionally
“omitted” from the warrant application was not remotely like the exculpatory evidence
in Humbert. In short, nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint or the documents incorporated
therein establishes that Det. Daniel either had a duty to further investigate the crime
before applying for charges to issue, or breached any such duty. To the contrary, the

record, even accepting all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in his favor, establishes that Det. Daniel had probable cause that Plaintiff had
committed the offenses, and otherwise complied with her constitutional obligations in
applying for issuance of the charging document and arrest warrant.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims do not state any cognizable claim that Det.
Daniel violated his constitutional rights. Mr. Portillo clearly believes that if the state had
proceeded with the prosecution against him he would have been acquitted at trial. He
has alleged as much in his complaint. He seems to firmly believe that M.L.R. was lying
when she made her report to their employer, and then again when she met with the
investigating officers. He bases that view on what he contends are discrepancies among
M.L.R.’s descriptions of his alleged criminal conduct. Some of those alleged
discrepancies may have formed the basis for some potential lines of cross examination
at trial, or potential arguments for why a jury should conclude that the evidence did not

establish Plaintiff’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, as noted above, Mr.
Portillo’s counsel in the criminal case (the same attorney representing him in this civil
case) relied on those same asserted discrepancies in seeking—unsuccessfully—to
persuade the state court to grant Mr. Portillo bond during the criminal case. See, e.g.,
ECF No. 11-6 at 6–7 & 14–15. But as Mr. Portillo conceded during that bond hearing, the
evidence that the state (including Det. Daniel) relied on to request the issuance of
criminal charges were sufficient to establish probable cause that Plaintiff had committed
those offenses.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s federal claim (Count 2) does not state a claim on
which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s state constitutional claim (Count 1) fails for the
same reasons, because the Maryland courts construe Article 26 in pari materia with the

Fourth Amendment. State v. McDonnell, 484 Md. 56, 78 n.9 (2023). The parties agree
that the same standard applies to both of Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 14 at 16 (Plaintiff);
ECF No. 11-1 at 18 (Defendant).7

7 Because the Court concludes that the allegations do not allege facts that would
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment or Article 26, the Court need not and
does not decide whether qualified immunity alternatively entitles Detective Daniel to
dismissal of the complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For these reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
3. The Clerk of Court is directed to mark this case as CLOSED.

Date: February 10, 2026 /s/
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260928. Public record. Not legal advice.