# MATTHIE

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · February 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260898

## Case

- **Full name:** Jovaughn Matthie v. Sandy Township, Pennsylvania, Travis A. Goodman, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania and Ryan P. Sayers
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANNIA

JOVAUGHN MATTHIE, )
□□
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-00146
) Judge D. Brooks Smith
SANDY TOWNSHIP, PENNSYLVANIA _ )
TRAVIS A. GOODMAN, CLEARFIELD _ )
COUNTY, PENNSYVANIA and RYAN P._)
SAYERS, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM and ORDER OF COURT
Plaintiff Jovaughn Matthie (““Matthie”) has commenced this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania law against Sandy Township and
Officer Travis Goodman (“Goodman”). It arises out of his arrest and prosecution in
connection with a physical altercation that took place in Sandy Township in October
2023. Matthie alleges that he was charged without probable cause, that the nature of
his charges reflects selective enforcement based on race, and that Sandy Township
maintained an unlawful practice of overcharging African-American defendants.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted,
and the charges against Sandy Township and Goodman are dismissed with prejudice.

I. Background!
Matthie is an African American Man of Jamaican descent. (FAC at § 11). On
the evening of October 30, 2023, at approximately 5:00 p.m., he was involved in a
physical altercation with Stephen Hale (“Hale”) in Sandy Township, Pennsylvania.
Ud. at J§ 11-24). Matthie, a long-haul trucker, was picking up a shipment at
Domtar—a paper company where Hale worked—when tensions escalated between
the two men. (/d.). Matthie alleges that, after some posturing and name-calling, Hale
punched him and that he responded in self-defense until Hale fell, at which point
Matthie ran away. (/d. at §§ 20-24). Shortly thereafter, Hale’s supervisor reported
the incident to Sandy Township Police. (/d. at JJ 30-32). Officers photographed
Hale’s injuries and took his statement, which described a very different sequence of

events. (/d.) According to Hale, Matthie became irritated and spat in his face after
Hale both asked Matthie where he was going and referred to him as “hoss.” (ECF
19-1 at 3). Hale said he then pushed Matthie backward to create some space—after
which Matthie attacked him. (/d.).
Hale was transported to the emergency room after speaking with responding
police officers. (FAC at § 33). The incident report reflects that Hale had “several
broken out front teeth, a large cut to the right eye brow/temple area with moderate

' The operative pleading is Matthie’s First Amended Complaint, filed August 4,
2025. ECF 14 (“FAC”).

blood loss . . . contusions on his ribs” and “was having trouble standing on his own
and was very dizzy and disoriented.” (ECF 19-1 at 3).
After Officer Travis Goodman’s (“Goodman’’) shift began at approximately
6:00 p.m., he was briefed on the incident and undertook further investigation. (FAC
at J§ 35-37). As part of that investigation, Goodman and another officer went to the

emergency room where Hale was being treated and spoke with Hale and hospital
staff about Hale’s condition and the circumstances of his encounter with Matthie.
(FAC at 36). Goodman reported that nursing staff suspected that Hale had suffered
“multiple facial fractures,” an “orbital socket fracture, clavic[le] fracture, humerus
fracture and other severe injuries,” and that Hale would be “undergoing several
further tests.” (ECF 19-1 at 4).
Later that night, Goodman prepared a criminal complaint and an affidavit of
probable cause (“affidavit”) and applied for an arrest warrant. (FAC at J 42-44). A
magistrate issued the warrant, and Goodman arrested and charged Matthie with two

counts of simple assault,” one count of harassment,’ and one count of aggravated

* Matthie was charged under both 18 Pa. C.S. § 2701(a)(1), which prohibits
“attempt[ing] to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily
injury to another,” and 18 Pa. C.S. § 2701(a)(3), which prohibits “attempt[ing] by
physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”
3 “A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or
alarm another, the person: (1) strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the other
person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same.” 18 Pa. C.S. §
2709(a)(1).

assault*—a first degree felony. (FAC at 7 38; see also ECF 19-1 at 2-3). The next
day, bail was set at $50,000 secured. (FAC at 71). Matthie alleges that he was
unable to post bail and remained incarcerated for nearly a year while the criminal

case remained pending. (/d. at J] 49, 71). Matthie’s case eventually went to trial on
October 8, 2024. (Id. at § 77). Matthie proceeded pro se and was acquitted on all

counts. (/d. at J] 77, 85).
Matthie then filed this civil action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Pennsylvania law arising out of his arrest and prosecution. As relevant here,
Matthie asserts § 1983 claims against Goodman for malicious prosecution and
selective enforcement/prosecution, a malicious-prosecution claim against Goodman
under Pennsylvania law, and a § 1983 municipal-liability claim against Sandy
Township under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
(FAC at 97 100-108, 118-126, 136-44, 154-61). Goodman and Sandy Township
moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF 19). Matthie opposed the motion (ECF
22), and Defendants replied (ECF 23). The motion is now ripe for disposition.>

person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . attempts to cause serious bodily
injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.”18 Pa.
C.S. § 2702(a)(1).
> The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Matthie’s federal claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the related state law claim.

II. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,
183 (3d Cir. 1993). In resolving such a motion, a district court must accept all well-
pled factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Indeed, a district court must do so “even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts alleged is improbable and that

a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Jd. at 213 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). However, a court need not accept as true
“unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir.
2007) (citations omitted).
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. That
standard requires more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must plead
sufficient factual content “that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd.

In addition to the complaint, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may
consider “matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and
items appearing in the record of the case.” Handal v. Innovative Indus. Props., Inc.,
157 F.4th 279, 292 (3d Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). Otherwise, a district court “may
not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th
335, 342 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Where a defendant attaches documents as
exhibits to a motion to dismiss, a district court may only consider them if they are
“integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint” Doe, 30 F.4th at 342 (quoting
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 Gd Cir. 1997)); see
also Hickey v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 81 F.4th 301, 308 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2023) (“On a
motion to dismiss, a district court may only consider an undisputedly authentic
document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on that document[.]” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).

I. Analysis
A. Qualified Immunity
As an initial matter, Goodman contends that the federal claims® against him

must be dismissed because he is protected by qualified immunity.’ Qualified
immunity “shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir.
2021) (citation modified) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). To
determine whether Goodman is entitled to qualified immunity, two questions are
relevant for each claim asserted against him: (1) whether the facts alleged plausibly
show that Goodman “violated a statutory or constitutional right” and (2) whether
“the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft

y. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982)).

6 “(Q]ualified immunity is a defense only to violations of federal law under § 1983.
Immunity from state law claims is governed by the state’s immunity doctrine.” E/ v.
City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 334 (3d Cir. 2020). Goodman does not invoke
Pennsylvania official immunity under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8546.
7 Goodman bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to qualified immunity.
See Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010).

1. Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution
Matthie alleges that Goodman lacked probable cause to arrest and charge him,
thereby violating his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (FAC at
100-108). At the outset, however, his malicious prosecution theory cannot
proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent Matthie invokes
substantive due process, that route is strictly foreclosed by Albright v. Oliver, in
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim cannot
be grounded in substantive due process. 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (“[I]t is the Fourth
Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which [a malicious prosecution]
claim must be judged.”); see also Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782,
792 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] claim of malicious prosecution under section 1983 cannot
be based on substantive due process considerations|[.|” (citing Albright, 510 US. at
272)).
Nor has Matthie plausibly pleaded a procedural due process claim. Although
a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim may, in some circumstances, “include police
conduct that violates . . . the procedural due process clause,” Torres v. McLaughlin,
163 F.3d 169, 173 (d Cir. 1998), Matthie does not identify what additional process
he was owed or how the procedures available to him were constitutionally

inadequate.* Instead, Matthie merely alleges that his due process rights were violated
because “there was no probable cause for [his] arrest.” Pltf. Br. at 14; see also FAC

at ¢ 101. Such claims must be brought under the Fourth Amendment. Washington v.
Hanshaw, 552 F. App’x 169, 172-173 (Gd Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a right to be free from
prosecution absent probable cause exists, it must [] be grounded on the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.” (citing Albright,
510 U.S. at 273)).
Accordingly, if Matthie’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim may proceed, it
is only under the Fourth Amendment. And Goodman is entitled to qualified
immunity “if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed”

to arrest and charge Matthie in light of clearly established law and the information
available to Goodman at the time. Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405,
411 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1991).
Generally, probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable

person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be

8 See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To state a
claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must
allege that .. . the procedures available to [the plaintiff] did not provide ‘due process
of law.’”); see also Hoffman v. Karpovich, No. CV 22-1005, 2022 WL 1774131, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 2022) (dismissing a Fourteenth Amendment claim where the
plaintiff “fail[ed] to identify any process not afforded” to him).

arrested.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2020).? But where, as
here, a neutral magistrate found probable cause in connection with a warrant
application, a plaintiff may proceed only by plausibly alleging that “(1) the police
officer knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made

statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2)
that such statements or omissions are material or necessary to the finding of probable
cause.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
On a fair reading of the FAC and Matthie’s briefing, Matthie advances two
theories for why Goodman purportedly lacked probable cause to arrest and charge
him. First, he contends that Goodman exaggerated Hale’s injuries in the warrant
application, thereby inflating the basis for a felony assault charge. Second, he
contends that Goodman did not interview him before seeking the warrant and
therefore failed to consider (or disclose) facts supporting self-defense—an
affirmative defense that Matthie says defeated probable cause to charge him at all.'°
I address each theory in turn.

This analysis focuses on what the officer “knew at the time of arrest.” Jd. at 202.
Nor does it matter that “a person is later acquitted of the crime for which she or he
was arrested.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 299 (citation omitted).
10 See Pltf. Br. at 6 (arguing that “there was no probable cause for bringing any of
these charges against Plaintiff because it was apparent from the outset that Plaintiff
lawfully acted in self defense after being attacked”); id. at 7 (arguing that no probable
10

a. Misrepresented Facts
Matthie first contends that Officer Goodman, in the criminal complaint and
affidavit, “created [a] litany of false, serious injuries to Hale attributed to the fight”
in order to “manufacture serious bodily injury” and justify a charge of aggravated
assault under 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(1). Pltf. Br. at 22. Section 2702(a)(1) makes it a
felony to “attempt[] to cause serious bodily injury to another, or cause[] such injury
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(1). “Serious bodily
injury” is defined as injury that causes “permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 2301.
Matthie identifies two categories of alleged falsehoods. First, the criminal
complaint states that Hale suffered “severe facial fractures, contusions, cuts and
abrasions” and was “undergoing several scans and tests for his injuries and will be
hospitalized for a period of time.” FAC at J 42; see also ECF 19-1 at 6. Second, the
affidavit recounts that hospital staff “believe[d]” Hale had suffered “multiple facial
fractures, orbital socket fracture, clavicle fracture, humerus fracture and other severe
injuries” and would undergo further testing. FAC at 44; see also ECF 19-1 at 10.

cause existed because “[a]t no point prior to filing his criminal complaint and
affidavit of probable cause did Goodman ever interview or have a colleague
interview Plaintiff’); id. at 10 (arguing that no probable cause existed with respect
to the aggravated assault charge because “Goodman resorted to falsehoods to
establish a serious injury” in his criminal complaint and affidavit).
11

According to Matthie, those descriptions were “without basis” and “patently false.”
FAC at § 44.
Even accepting those allegations for purposes of this motion, Matthie must
still plausibly allege that the misstatements were “material, or necessary,” to the
magistrate’s probable-cause finding. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787. Materiality is assessed
by “excis[ing] the offending inaccuracies” and asking whether the “corrected”
affidavit would still establish probable cause. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 213.
Here, even with the challenged descriptions removed, the affidavit alleges that
Hale “was having trouble standing on his own and was very dizzy and
disoriented”—hallmarks of a concussion!*—and that he sustained “several broken

Tt is not entirely clear whether Matthie alleges that the challenged statements were
false because the nursing staff’s assessment proved incorrect, or instead, because
Goodman fabricated the staff’s statements outright. To the extent Matthie’s theory is
the former, Goodman cannot be deemed reckless for merely relaying the opinions of
medical staff who are better situated to evaluate the nature and extent of a patient’s
injuries. That sort of reliance does not amount to “reckless disregard” for the truth.
See Reedy, 615 F.3d at 213 (explaining that reckless disregard exists only where the
affiant “must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had
obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted))
2 See, eg, Concussion, Mayo CLINIC (Jan. 12, 2024),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/concussion/symptoms-causes/syc-
20355594 (noting that concussion symptoms may include difficulty with balance,
confusion, and dizziness). I may take judicial notice of such generally accepted
medical information from a readily accessible source of indisputable accuracy. See
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (stating that
“when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss,” courts may consider “matters of
which a court may take judicial notice”); Gov t of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d
140, 147 Gd Cir. 1975) (judicial notice is proper for facts “capable of immediate and
12

out front teeth, a large cut to the right eye brow/ temple area with moderate blood
loss and also contusions on his ribs.” (ECF 19-1 at 9). At a minimum, those

allegations would permit a reasonable officer (and magistrate) to conclude that Hale
suffered “serious bodily injury” within the meaning of Pennsylvania law. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 294 A.3d 482, 486 (Pa. Super. 2023) (concussion with
confusion, dizziness, and memory loss constituted “serious bodily injury”);
Commonwealth v. Kinney, 157 A.3d 968, 973 (Pa. Super. 2017) (chipped teeth, loss
of consciousness, and head bruising/swelling supported serious bodily injury);
Commonwealth v. Lyons, No. 3571 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3948412, at *1 (Pa. Super.
Aug. 21, 2019) (“Losing four teeth constitutes serious bodily injury.”);
Commonwealth v. Hanna, 2019 WL 6652177, at *3 (Pa. Super. Dec. 6, 2019)
(finding sufficient proof of serious bodily injury where victim suffered a
concussion).
Nor does § 2702(a)(1)’s mens rea component defeat probable cause here.
“When a victim actually sustains serious bodily injury . . . the statute’s intent

requirement can be met if the defendant acts recklessly under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 2

accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable
accuracy”’ (citation omitted)).

13

A.3d 598, 602 (Pa. Super. 2010). And Pennsylvania courts have sustained
ageravated-assault charges on conduct far less severe than was alleged here. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Patrick, 933 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that

a single punch to the head “was enough to establish a prima facie case for the offense
of aggravated assault”). In short, even crediting Matthie’s allegations that Goodman
overstated certain injuries, the corrected warrant materials would still support
probable cause for aggravated assault. Matthie’s theory of an inadequate showing of
probable cause does not plausibly establish a constitutional violation.

b. Self-Defense and Failure to Interview Matthie
Matthie’s second theory fares no better. He contends that Goodman lacked.
probable cause to charge him with any offense because “it was apparent from the

outset that [Matthie] lawfully acted in self defense” and because Goodman did not
interview him to investigate whether such a defense applied before filing his criminal
complaint and affidavit. Pltf. Br. at 6-7. Matthie relies on Pennsylvania’s self-
defense statute, which provides that force is justified “when the actor believes that
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the

use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” 18 Pa. C.S. §
505(a).
The problem with this argument is twofold. First, self-defense under § 505 is,
of course, an affirmative defense. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 108 A.3d 779, 787

14

n. 2 (Pa. 2014). And, in this Circuit, where an affirmative defense arises under

common law or a generally applicable statute—as opposed to appearing in the statute
defining the offense itself'*—an officer assessing probable cause is not required to
resolve that defense before seeking a warrant. See Holman, 564 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he
defense of necessity need not have been considered in the assessment of probable
cause for arrest for trespass at the scene.”’); Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 269
(3d Cir. 2007) (stating that it is a “faulty premise” to urge that affirmative defenses,
such as the statute of limitations, are “relevant considerations at the time a police
officer files charges”). In Holman, for example, the Third Circuit declined to require
an officer to consider a necessity defense when assessing probable cause for trespass
because whether the defense applied was “not clear cut” and turned on disputed
facts. 564 F.3d at 231. The Court reasoned that requiring a charging officer “to
resolve these questions, and painstakingly to weigh possible defenses, would be
impractical.” Jd.
That same logic applies to self-defense in this setting. As another district court
in this Circuit has explained:

'3 The Third Circuit has held that where an affirmative defense is “specifically
included in the statute setting forth the elements of the crime,” an officer must “‘act[]
reasonably . . . under the facts and circumstances’ known to him” to determine
whether the affirmative defense applied.” Holman v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 225,
230 (Gd Cir. 2009) (quoting Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (3d
Cir.1989)).

15

[C]laims of self-defense to an assault necessarily admit involvement in
a violent altercation. Thus, self-defense is inherently an issue that must
be decided at trial, not by a police officer or a judge at a hearing to issue
an arrest warrant. In other words, the forum in which to exercise a
defense of self-defense . . . is at trial, not in a subsequent civil rights
civil suit that challenges the sufficiency of an affidavit of probable
cause upon which an arrest warrant was issued by a judge.
Gorman v. Bail, 947 F. Supp. 2d 509, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2013); see also Davis v. Malitzki,
451 F. App’x 228, 233 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that whether an officer “should have
perceived [a defendant] as acting in self-defense . . . could not be legally
determinative of whether there was probable cause” to arrest the defendant); Berrios

v. City of Philadelphia, 96 F. Supp. 3d 523, 532 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“[T]he fact that
Plaintiff was acting in self-defense, even if true[,] .. . cannot overcome a finding of
probable cause.”).
Relatedly, probable cause is not defeated simply because an officer did not
interview a suspect before arresting him. See Merkle, 211 F.3d at 789 (3d Cir.2000)
(finding probable cause not defeated by failure to interview suspect before arrest);
Miller v. Cuneo, No. CA 11-124, 2012 WL 4926471, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2012)
(rejecting argument that an officer lacked probable cause “because, prior to the

arrest, he did not ask Plaintiff what occurred on the evening in question and did not
have any information regarding who the aggressor was”). To be sure, Matthie’s
allegation that he spent a substantial time incarcerated before getting to tell his side
of the story is serious and troubling. But the question here is whether the warrant

16

materials plausibly show that Goodman lacked probable cause in seeking the

warrant.
They do not. Self-defense is an affirmative defense that Goodman was not
required to resolve at the charging stage of the prosecution, and Goodman’s failure

to interview Matthie does not, by itself, negate probable cause. Matthie therefore has

not plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation and Goodman is protected by
qualified immunity.'* Matthie’s malicious prosecution claim will be dismissed.
2. Section 1983 Selective Enforcement and Prosecution
I turn next to Matthie’s Equal Protection claim. He alleges that Goodman,
motivated by racial animus, charged him with aggravated assault rather than simple
assault. (FAC at 9§ 136-144). According to Matthie, that charging decision differs
from the treatment accorded similarly situated white individuals, and therefore
violated the Equal Protection Clause. (/d.).
There is no serious dispute that, by the time of Matthie’s arrest, it was clearly
established that selective enforcement of the law on the basis of race violates the
Equal Protection Clause. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)
(“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on

Because Mathie has failed to establish a factual basis for the purported
constitutional violation, J need not inquire as to whether the rights Matthie identifies
were clearly established at the time of the purported violation. See Karns v.
Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 520 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he failure of either prong will result
in application of qualified immunity[.]’).
17

considerations such as race.”).!> So whether Goodman is protected by qualified
immunity turns on whether Matthie has plausibly alleged that Goodman violated that
clearly established right. He has not.
To state a selective-enforcement claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1)
that he was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals, and (2) that
this selective treatment was based on an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or
religion.” Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Put differently, the complaint must
plead facts supporting both “discriminatory effect” and “discriminatory purpose.”
Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 834 (3d Cir. 2002).

a. Discriminatory Effect
To plead discriminatory effect, Matthie must plausibly allege that he “is a
member of a protected class and that [he was treated differently from similarly
situated individuals in an unprotected class.” Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197,
206 (3d Cir. 2002). Goodman does not dispute that Matthie, a black man, is a
member of a protected class. The question, then, is whether the FAC plausibly

15 See also, e.g., Parada v. Anoka Cnty,, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1245 (D. Minn. 2018)
(“The law on selective enforcement based on race and alienage is clearly
established”); Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904, 942 (E.D. Ark. 2010)
(“[I]t is clearly established that selective enforcement of the law violates the Equal
Protection Clause[.]’).
18

alleges that Goodman treated Matthie less favorably than similarly situated non-
protected individuals.
For equal protection purposes, individuals are similarly situated when they are
“alike ‘in all relevant respects.’” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 205 (quoting Nordlinger v.
Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). A plaintiff may satisfy their burden by identifying
comparators who were treated more favorably. Bradley, 299 F.3d at 206. And,
although “similarly situated” does not mean “identically situated,” Harvard, 973
F.3d at 205, such comparators must be sufficiently similar that a prudent person,
“looking objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly equivalent and the
protagonists similarly situated,” id. at 206 (quoting Barrington Cove Ltd. P'ship v.
Rhode Island Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Here, Matthie offers as comparators three white individuals who were
involved in physical altercations, arrested (at least with some participation) by
Officer Goodman, and were not prosecuted for aggravated assault—Hale himself,
Richard Smeal,'®° and Jacob Battaglia.'” See Pltf. Br. at 8-10; 17-18. However, none
of these individuals are similarly situated to Matthie in all respects that matter to the
challenged charging decision.

16 See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Richard William Smeal (Docket No. CP-
17-CR-0000709-2024).
'7 See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Jacob R. Battaglia (Docket No. CP-17-
CR-0000558-2024).
19

Matthie first points to Hale, whom he characterizes as the aggressor in their
altercation. But the relevant comparison is not simply whether both men were
involved in the same fight; it is whether they were similarly situated with respect to
the facts bearing on probable cause for aggravated assault. Unlike Hale—who was
reported to have sustained serious bodily injuries—Matthie was not reported to have
suffered any injuries at the time.!'® That difference is directly relevant to a charging
decision under § 2702(a)(1). See, e.g., Burton, 2 A.3d at 602 (distinguishing cases in
which serious bodily injury was sustained from those in which it was not).”

18 Although Matthie alleges that he suffered “a terrible headache” after the altercation
(FAC at 25), he does not allege that he reported this symptom to the responding
officers or that Goodman otherwise knew of it when he sought the warrant.
To be sure, a victim need not actually sustain serious bodily injury to support a
charge of aggravated assault. See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 383 A.2d 887, 889
(Pa. 1978) (explaining that even absent serious bodily injury, “a charge of aggravated
assault can be supported [] if the evidence supports a finding that the blow delivered
was accompanied by the intent to inflict serious bodily injury.”). But the presence or
absence of serious bodily injury is certainly a “relevant” consideration in a charging
decision. Where a victim has not suffered serious bodily injury, the Government
must establish the defendant’s specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury, which
may be “gleaned from the other circumstances surrounding” the attack. Alexander,
383 A.2d at 889. Those circumstances include “1) if the defendant ‘was
disproportionately larger or stronger than the victim;’ 2) whether the defendant
would have escalated his attack but was restrained from doing so; 3) whether the
defendant was in possession of a weapon; and 4) ‘statements before, during, or after
the attack which might indicate [defendant’s] intent to inflict further injury upon the
victim.’” Burton, 2 A.3d at 602 (quoting Alexander, 383 A.2d at 889). By contrast,
where the victim actually sustains serious bodily injury, the mens rea element may
be satisfied by “reckless[ness] under circumstances manifesting an extreme
indifference to human life,” without the same need to infer intent from surrounding
factors. Id. at 602
20

Whatever the ultimate merits of Matthie’s account of the altercation, Hale and
Matthie were not alike “in all relevant respects” as to the perceived severity of
injuries reported to law enforcement. Harvard, 973 F.3d at 205.
Matthie’s next comparator, Richard Smeal, was arrested after attempting to
steal a woman’s purse. (ECF 19-4 at 6).”° The incident report reflects that Smeal
pointed an air-soft rifle at the victim, demanded money, and during an ensuing
struggle struck her in the head and face with the gun and his fists. /d.). Smeal was
charged with multiple offenses, including three felonies and two counts of simple
assault. (ECF 19-5 at 2). But the report does not indicate that the victim suffered any
bodily injury, let alone serious injury. Nor does it state that she required medical

treatment. That distinction, again, bears directly on whether aggravated assault was

a plausible charge and makes Smeal an inapt comparator.
Finally, Matthie points to the matter of Jacob Battaglia. The incident report
there indicates that Battaglia and another individual “were wrestling around as
friends” until the situation escalated into a fight in which Battaglia allegedly dug his
fingers into the victim’s eye sockets. (ECF 19-6 at 3). Although the victim suffered
“major damage to the eyes,” he initially declined to pursue criminal charges. (/d.).

Although Smeal’s incident report and criminal docket (along with those of
Battaglia) are attached to defendants’ motion to dismiss, I may consider them
because they are “integral to” and “explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” Doe, 30
F.4th at 342 (citation omitted); see FAC at J¥ 89-90. Matthie also does not object to □
their introduction and cites them throughout his brief. See Pltf. Br. at 9-10, 18.
21

While no two unrelated incidents will ever be exactly the same, those
circumstances—an initial consensual scuffle between acquaintances and a victim’s
reluctance to press charges—are not “roughly equivalent” to a report that a stranger
unexpectedly charged and repeatedly punched another person in the face and head,
producing the injuries ascribed to Hale here. Harvard, 973 F.3d at 205 (citation
omitted).7!
Because Matthie’s proposed comparators differ in material ways bearing on
the challenged charging decision, he has not plausibly alleged discriminatory effect.

b. Discriminatory Purpose
Even if Matthie could plausibly allege discriminatory effect, his selective
enforcement fails for the independent reason that he has not plausibly alleged
discriminatory purpose. An equal protection claim of this kind requires “an element
of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” PG Pub. Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91,
115 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)). In other
words, the complaint must plead facts permitting a reasonable inference that the
officer “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because

21 See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Neal, 331 A.3d 635, 636 (Pa. Super. 2024) (defendant
attacking “in an unexpected manner” was relevant to recklessness determination).

22

of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects” on a protected group. Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Matthie does not meet that burden. Setting aside his conclusory assertions of
racial animus—which I need not credit at the pleading stage, see Baraka, 481 F.3d
at 195—-Matthie alleges only that Goodman was “aware of Plaintiff’s race .. . before
he prepared documents necessary for an arrest warrant.” Pltf. Br. at 18; see also FAC
at 30-32. But awareness is not the same thing as intent. Without additional factual
allegations suggesting that Goodman acted because of Matthie’s race, Matthie has
not pleaded purposeful discrimination. See Snowden, 321 US. at 8
(“[D]iscriminatory purpose is not presumed . . . there must be a showing of clear and
intentional discrimination[.]” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); PG
Publ’g, 705 F.3d at 115 (holding that allegations of “some instances” of differential
treatment were “insufficient” to allege a discriminatory purpose).
In sum, Matthie has not plausibly alleged that Goodman’s charging decision
reflected both discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose. Qualified immunity
therefore bars the selective enforcement claim, and it will be dismissed.

B. Other Claims
Matthie presses two additional claims—malicious prosecution under
Pennsylvania law and municipal liability under § 1983. Both rise and fall with the
conclusions reached above and therefore require only brief discussion.
23

. 1. State Law Malicious Prosecution
Although not foreclosed by qualified immunity, E/, 975 F.3d at 334
(“[Q]ualified immunity is a defense only to violations of federal law under § 1983.”),
Matthie’s Pennsylvania malicious-prosecution claim fails for the same basic reason
his federal claim fails: probable cause. Under Pennsylvania law, to prove a malicious
prosecution claim a plaintiff must show that the defendant “instituted proceedings
against the plaintiff 1) without probable cause, 2) with malice, and 3) the proceedings
must have terminated in favor of the plaintiff.” Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414,
418 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local
Union 249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988)). Critically, as Matthie concedes, the
existence of probable cause is fatal to his state law claim. See Pltf. Br. at 15
(“[P]robable cause is a defense to state law malicious prosecution[.])
For the reasons already explained, the FAC does not plausibly allege that no
probable cause existed for the charges Goodman pursued. Accordingly, Matthie fails
to state a Pennsylvania malicious prosecution claim against Goodman, and that claim
will be dismissed.

2. Municipal Liability
Finally, Matthie alleges that Defendant Sandy Township maintained a pattern
or practice of overcharging African-American criminal defendants, in violation of
§ 1983. (FAC at J] 154-161). A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only

. 24

when a plaintiff's injury was caused by the municipalities own “policy or custom.”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (1)
an underlying constitutional violation and (2) that “the municipality caused that
constitutional violation through a policy, a custom, or a failure to train or other
inadequacy.” Onyiah v. City of Philadelphia, 660 F. Supp. 3d 407, 417 (E.D. Pa.
2023). Thus, critically, “for there to be municipal liability, there still must be a
violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Brown v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Dep t of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473,
482 (3d Cir. 2003).
Because Matthie has not plausibly alleged that Goodman violated his
constitutional rights, there is no predicate constitutional injury on which to premise
Monell liability. The § 1983 claim against Sandy Township therefore fails and will
be dismissed.
Accordingly, I will enter the following:

ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th of February, 2026, for the reasons set forth herein, IT IS
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 19) is GRANTED, and
Counts I, III, V, and VII of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint are dismissed with
prejudice.

25

/s/D. Brooks Smith
D. Brooks Smith
United States Circuit Judge
Sitting by Designation

26

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260898. Public record. Not legal advice.