# LUSTIG

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · February 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260796

## Case

- **Full name:** Janelle Lustig v. Switzerland County, Indiana in their official capacity
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** February 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260796

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that an adverse employment action must "follow[] close on the heels of protected expression," and timing must be "very close—as in no more than a few days" to show impermissible intent (citation modified)
- finding that two-day period between request for accommodation and termination did not save claims from summary judgment in light of intervening report of PTO policy violations by plaintiff, which supported proffered reason for termination
- stating that timing of the adverse action is suspicious when it occurs "fairly soon after the employee's protected expression"

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION

JANELLE LUSTIG, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:24-cv-00053-TWP-KMB
)
SWITZERLAND COUNTY, INDIANA in their )
official capacity, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 by Defendant Switzerland County, Indiana (the "County")
(Filing No. 58). Plaintiff Janelle Lustig ("Lustig") is a career paramedic with post-traumatic stress
disorder. After her termination from the County, Lustig filed this action asserting claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ("ADA"); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29
U.S.C. § 2601, ("FMLA"); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 ("FLSA"); and Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Lustig has since abandoned her FLSA claims
(Filing No. 57), and the County now moves for summary judgment on Lustig's remaining ADA,
FMLA, and Fourteenth Amendment claims. For the reasons discussed below, the County's Motion
for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, the facts are presented in the light most favorable to Lustig as the non-moving
party. See Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
A. Lustig's PTSD and 2021 FMLA Leave1
Lustig has worked in emergency services for over thirty years, and before the events at
issue, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") (Filing No. 59-4 at 25:10–
22, 118:1–5). In 2018, Lustig was hired as a paramedic for the County's Emergency Medical
Services ("EMS") Department. Id. at 26:4–28:18, 32:3–25. The County knew about Lustig's PTSD

when she was hired. Lustig's supervisor was Nadine Swift ("Swift") (Filing No. 59-1 ¶ 2).
As a paramedic, Lustig sometimes worked 24-hour shifts which required her to spend the
night at the station. Because of her PTSD, Lustig had trouble sleeping in the sleeping quarters. She
felt more "at rest" while sleeping in the ambulance bay. Swift allowed her to sleep in the ambulance
bay, albeit "with a lot of attitude." (Filing No. 59-4 at 120:24–122:2, 61:13–62:3). Lustig's PTSD
escalated while working for the County, but according to Lustig, she did not need any job
modifications for her PTSD other than sleeping in the ambulance bay. Id. at 108:3–5, 122:12–14.
Sometime in 2021, Lustig injured her back and needed surgery. Id. at 48:8–50:24. After the
accident and surgery, she took time off under the FMLA. Although Swift mistakenly marked
Lustig's time off only as sick leave, and not as FMLA-qualifying time, Lustig had no issues taking

that time off, and she was not required to work while on leave. Id. at 47:15–48:1. She returned to
work in 2022. Id. at 52:21–25.
B. Lustig's Requests for Critical Incident Stress Debriefing
Lustig eventually became concerned that Swift was overworking herself and not seeking
needed help. These concerns either began, or came to a head, during a May 2021 EMS run
involving a baby who tragically, was born in a toilet. Lustig thought Swift "froze on the call and
left the baby to die." Id. at 9:12–13, 55:25–57:16, 81:4–82:13. Swift's perceived recklessness and

1 Although it is unclear whether Lustig took FMLA leave for her back injury in 2021 or early 2022, the Court refers
to this leave as Lustig's "2021 FMLA leave" to distinguish it from the FMLA leave Lustig took in October 2022.
the lack of "checks and balances" in the EMS Department "took a toll on [Lustig] emotionally
[and] psychologically." Id. at 82:3–22.
After this run, Lustig made multiple requests to Swift for a Critical Incident Stress
Debriefing ("Stress Debriefing"), Id. at 55:12–17, 82:12–13. As described by Lustig, a Stress

Debriefing involves "[a] group of trained professionals that have an expertise in first responder's
trauma" listening without judgment and/or "walk[ing] you through the call. . . . It's a safe space to
be able to just process that trauma." Id. at 56:15–23. A Stress Debriefing can be one session or
many sessions, and it can be held in a one-on-one or group setting. Id. at 56:25–57:3. Lustig wanted
a Stress Debriefing for "[a]nybody that was involved in the [May 2021] call," including her, Swift,
the other paramedic on scene, and the firefighters and first responders who assisted. Id. at 57:4–
58:3. Lustig was hoping that after a Stress Debriefing, she would have fewer nightmares and "some
sort of inner peace about what happened." Id. at 120:24–130:3. Lustig did not seek other
counseling after the May 2021 run, but her doctors increased her prescription for prazosin, which
Lustig took to block nightmares. Id. at 130:4–14.

In September 2022, Lustig responded to another EMS call involving a child who was run
over by a bus driver. When the call came in, Lustig was at home and not scheduled to work. Id. at
15:15–19:3. Lustig was not required by the County to respond, but she responded anyway because
she was nearby and because she felt professionally and ethically obligated to respond. Id. 15:14–
18, 16:21–22, 17:8–11. After this September 2022 EMS run, Lustig again requested a Stress
Debriefing. Id. at 128:12–13.
Around this same time, employee Glen Scott ("Scott") made a derogatory comment about
Lustig's mental health. Lustig and Swift were discussing a father and daughter who had been
brought to the EMS Department when Lustig became emotional and was crying. Id. at 141: 5-15.
Scott then said to Lustig, "why don't we make you a sign that says you're not f[*]cking available,"
and Swift laughed. Id. at 154:7–155:8. Lustig interpreted Scott's comment as a joke about how
emotional Lustig had been. Id. at 155:12–15.
After the May 2021 EMS run, Lustig "started to become detached," "disassociate[d]," and

felt "unheard." Id. at 59:11–60:8. However, between the May 2021 EMS run and her later FMLA
leave in October 2022, Lustig was able to perform all her job duties, other than finishing paperwork
on time, without any job modifications or accommodations. Id. at 62:19–63:4, 65:12–18, 137:4–
10. But Lustig does not attribute her inability to complete paperwork to the lack of Stress
Debriefing. Instead, she attributes this inability to a lack of time and proper equipment. Lustig
testified that "[l]iterally just about everybody" in her department had trouble keeping up with their
paperwork. Id. at 66:15–67:3, 73:17–25, 78:10–14.
C. Meetings With Lustig, 2022 FMLA Leave, and Resignation of Full-Time Position
In September 2022, Swift spoke with County Administrator Susie Swank ("Swank") about
Lustig's "disruptive behavior" toward Swift and other EMS staff (Filing No. 59-3 ¶ 7). On October
7, 2022, Swank, Swift, and Lustig met to discuss Lustig's lack of job satisfaction and behavior. Id.

¶ 11. During this meeting, Lustig expressed a variety of concerns, including Swift's failure to
provide a Stress Debriefing, Swift's unwellness "wreaking havoc on the department," and Scott's
derogatory comment about Lustig's mental health. Id.; (Filing No. 59-4 at 110:24–111:3).
Lustig also expressed her disagreement with Commissioner Jerry Monjar's
("Commissioner Monjar") investigation into Swift's job performance. Several months earlier, in
February 2022, Commissioner Monjar had asked paramedic Eric Tuemler ("Tuemler") to collect
employee statements about Swift's performance. Id. at 111:6–112:8; (Filing No. 65-5). Tuemler
never delivered the statements to Commissioner Monjar and instead put the statements in Lustig's
work mailbox. Lustig knew that the statements were in her mailbox and left them there for several
months. Id. at 110:2–17. Following the October 7, 2022 meeting, Commissioner Monjar learned
that the statements were in Lustig's mailbox (Filing No. 59-7). He asked Lustig for the statements,
"[b]ut he was being, super, super nasty," so she refused (Filing No. 59-4 at 113:10–17).
On October 17, 2022, Lustig told Swank that she needed a mental health break from work

and asked how much paid leave time she had. Lustig also repeated her request for a Stress
Debriefing for the EMS Department (Filing No. 59-3 ¶¶ 15, 19). Lustig then obtained FMLA
paperwork, which her doctor completed. Id. ¶ 17; (Filing No. 59-4 at 88:19–90 & pp. 148–58).
On October 27, 2022, Commissioner Monjar sent Lustig a letter directing her to deliver the
employee statements to him within two business days or face potential disciplinary action (Filing
No. 59-7). Also on October 27, 2022, Lustig told Swank that she planned to start taking FMLA
leave the next day (Filing No. 59-3 ¶ 24). Lustig took FMLA leave from October 28, 2022, to
January 20, 2023 and she was not required to work while on leave (Filing No. 59-4 at 141:1–4, pp.
148–58; Filing No. 59-6 at 3).
On November 1, 2022, Lustig's husband retrieved the statements from her mailbox and

delivered them to Swank, who then gave them to Commissioner Monjar (Filing No. 59-4 at 114:2–
4; Filing No. 59-3 ¶ 26; Filing No. 65-6 at 1). On December 9, 2022, while still on FMLA leave,
Lustig received "her first disciplinary action which was a final written warning for not providing
the statements to the Commissioner." (Filing No. 66 at 17). However, Lustig cites no evidence
supporting the claim that she received this written warning. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(e), (h).
Before returning from FMLA leave, Lustig emailed Swift that she was resigning her full-
time position but wanted to continue serving as a part-time/back-up paramedic (Filing No. 59-1 at
5–6). As a part-time paramedic, she would not work a regular shift and would only work when a
shift needed coverage (Filing No. 59-4 at 24:2–10, 31:7–16). The County does not identify any
other differences between full-time and part-time paramedic positions.
When Lustig returned from FMLA leave in 2023, Swift told her that she could not serve
as a back-up paramedic until she had completed her unfinished paperwork for prior EMS runs. Id.

at 73:17–74:11. Swift allowed other paramedics to do runs despite unfinished paperwork. Id. at
74:1–7, 97:16–28:20. On March 9, 2023, Swift allowed Lustig to work a shift doing EMS runs,
even though Lustig still had not finished all her paperwork. Id. at 97:8–12, 100:15–16.
D. Lustig's Call with Tony Rose and Termination
On March 12, 2023, Lustig was at home with her minor foster child when she called a
volunteer paramedic, Tony Rose ("Rose"), about a birthday party for Rose's son (Filing No. 59-4
at 11:14–12, 148:23–149:17). While on the phone, Rose responded to an EMS call. Lustig then
had to quickly put down her phone to attend to her child, and Rose put down his phone to begin
assessing the patient. Neither Lustig nor Rose disconnected the call. Id. at 148:17–21; (Filing No.
59-5 at 17:7–9, 18:5–9). When Lustig picked the phone back up, she heard Rose say something
about the patient's lung sounds (Filing No. 59-4 at 149:19–20).

The next day, three EMS employees emailed Swift to report their belief that Lustig had
recorded the call between her and Rose while Rose was with the patient (Filing No. 59-1 ¶ 19, pp.
7–11). These reports concerned Swift because an open phone line or recording could have
constituted a HIPAA violation.2 Id. ¶ 20. Swift contacted the County's medical director, Dr. James
Coots ("Dr. Coots"), and Dr. Coots requested that James Corbin ("Corbin") conduct an internal
investigation into the potential HIPAA violation. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. Lustig was suspended from work

2 Lustig contends that these statements are inadmissible hearsay (Filing No. 66 at 4–5, 8). However, these statements
are not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Whether Lustig recorded the call with Rose and whether
Lustig violated HIPAA are immaterial for purposes of summary judgment.
effective March 17, 2023 (Filing No. 65-8). Swift communicated the suspension to Lustig, but Dr.
Coots made the decision to suspend Lustig and Rose (Filing No. 59-1 ¶ 21; Filing No. 65-7).
Corbin interviewed Rose and Lustig as part of his investigation (Filing No. 59-2 at pp. 3–
5). Corbin concluded that Lustig had not been honest about the recording of the call, that all

Switzerland County Emergency Response employees (except Rose) described Lustig's behavior
as toxic and disruptive, and that it was likely that Lustig would retaliate against the employees who
complained about her behavior if she returned to duty.3 Id. at p. 5. Based on his investigation,
Corbin recommended that the County: terminate Lustig; have Dr. Coots pull his authorization for
Lustig to work under his direction; or contact the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
to investigate a potential HIPAA violation. Id. After considering Corbin's report, the
Commissioners unanimously voted to terminate Lustig's employment. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Lustig received
a termination letter in May 2023 (Filing No. 65-1 ¶ 30; Filing No. 59-2 at 6). The Commissioners
also terminated Rose's volunteer status (Filing No. 59-5 at 30:25–31:8; Filing No. 59-2 ¶ 7 & p. 6).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary
judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hemsworth v.
Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court reviews "the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

3 Lustig disputes the truth of Corbin's conclusions (Filing No. 66 at 5), but these conclusions are not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted. They are offered merely to show what Corbin reported to the Commissioners.
draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted).
"However, inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a
summary judgment motion." Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation
modified). Additionally, "[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not

rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there
is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation
omitted). "The opposing party cannot meet this burden with conclusory statements or speculation
but only with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence." Sink v. Knox Cnty. Hosp., 900
F. Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).
"In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence
to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits
of [the] claim." Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation modified).
"Neither the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties nor the existence
of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary

judgment." Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation
modified); Bright v. CCA, No. 10-cv-01690, 2013 WL 6047505, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2013)
("Employment discrimination cases are extremely fact-intensive, and neither appellate courts nor
district courts are obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes."
(citation modified)).
III. DISCUSSION
Lustig's Amended Complaint asserts several claims against the County, Count I: ADA-
Disability Discrimination; Count II: ADA-Failure to Accommodate; Count III: ADA-Retaliation;
Count IV: Fair Labor Standards Act-Retaliation; Count V: Violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act; Count VI: FMLA Retaliation; Count VII: FMLA Interference: Count VIII: 14th Amendment
Procedural Due Process; Count IX: 14th Amendment Due Process; Count X: 14th Amendment
Substantial Due Process. (Filing No. 22 at 12-16). As noted earlier, Lustig abandoned her Fair
Labor Standard Act claims. The Court discusses the remaining types of claims in turn.
A. ADA Claims
Lustig alleges that the County failed to accommodate her disability by denying her requests

for a Stress Debriefing, and that her suspension and termination was discriminatory and retaliatory.
The Court will address Lustig's failure to accommodate claim before discussing her discrimination
and retaliation claims together.
1. Failure to Accommodate
Lustig alleges that the County failed to accommodate her disability by denying her repeated
requests for a Stress Debriefing (Filing No. 22 ¶¶ 71, 76–77, 86–89). To succeed on a failure-to-
accommodate claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability;
(2) the defendant was aware of the disability; and (3) the defendant failed to reasonably
accommodate that disability. Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 759 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2014).
The County argues that Lustig was able to perform her job without an accommodation, so the

County had no duty to provide one (Filing No. 69 at 3). The County alternatively argues that even
if Lustig could not perform her job duties, there is no evidence that a Stress Debriefing would have
effectively accommodated her disability. The Court agrees with the County on both grounds.
a. Whether Lustig Needed an Accommodation
The ADA's anti-discrimination provision applies to any "qualified individual," which
means "an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation," can perform their
essential job functions. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). The ADA's accommodation
provision, by contrast, applies only to an "otherwise qualified individual." Id. § 12112(5)(B)
(emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit has interpreted this distinction to mean that "an employer's
accommodation duty is triggered only in situations where an individual who is qualified on paper
requires an accommodation in order to be able to perform the essential functions of the job."
Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2013). This is "not because such an
accommodation might be unreasonable, but because the employee is fully qualified for the job

without accommodation and therefore is not entitled to an accommodation in the first place." Id.
During her deposition, Lustig was asked several times about her ability to perform her job
duties without accommodations (other than permission to sleep in the ambulance bay). Each time,
Lustig clearly answered that she was able to perform her job duties, other than paperwork:
Q. So within that time frame of May 14th of 2021 and 20 October 19th of 2022
did you continue going on runs as a paramedic?
A. Yes.
Q. And during that time frame were there any of your job duties that you could
not do as a paramedic?
A. No.
Q. For all the calls that you went out on were you able to complete all the tasks
that needed to be completed?
A. Other than paperwork.
* * *
Q. During that time period [May 14, 2021, through October 15, 2022] were
you put on that regular three day rotation?
A. Yes. . . . .
Q. And during all of those shifts were you able to perform all of your duties as
a paramedic?
A. Besides paperwork.
* * *
Q. Were there other modifications to your job [other than sleeping in the
ambulance bay] that you needed because of your PTSD?
A. No.
* * *
Q. Were you able to do everything you needed to do at work during your shift?
A. Besides getting caught up with my paperwork, yes.
Id. at 62:19–63:4, 65:6–14, 122:12–14, 137:4–6. Lustig does not contend that her struggles with
paperwork are related to her PTSD.
In response, Lustig submits a Declaration stating that she requested a Stress Debriefing

"because [she] needed support to manage the effects of work-related trauma," and that she "viewed
[the Stress Debriefing] as an accommodation that would help [her] continue performing [her]
duties as a paramedic." (Filing No. 65-1 ¶ 5). The County replies that Lustig cannot use her
Declaration to create a genuine dispute of material fact. The County is correct. During her
deposition, Lustig repeatedly and unambiguously stated that she was able to perform all the duties
of her paramedic position, even without a Stress Debriefing. Lustig's new declaration contradicts
these prior statements, and she offers no reason for the contradiction. Her declaration therefore
does not create a genuine dispute as to whether she was able to perform her essential job functions
without accommodation. See Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 572 (7th Cir. 2015); United
States ex rel. Robinson v. Ind. Univ. Health Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1044 (S.D. Ind. 2016).

Lustig argues that her need to take FMLA leave in 2022 shows that she "was unable to
perform the essential functions of her employment without the accommodation she requested."
(Filing No. 66 at 15). In her FMLA paperwork, Lustig's doctor lists occupational stress and mental
trauma as the reason for her 2022 FMLA leave (Filing No. 59-4 at pp. 154–58). However, to the
extent Lustig offers her doctor's statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that Lustig
was unable to perform her job duties because of work-related stress—they are inadmissible
hearsay. The undisputed material facts show that Lustig was able to perform all her job duties
without a Stress Debriefing. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could conclude that the County had
a duty to provide any further accommodation.
Lustig alternatively argues that even if she did not need the Stress Debriefing to perform
her job duties, the County was still required to reasonably accommodate her, citing Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission v. Charter Communications, LLC, 75 F.4th 729, 738–39
(7th Cir. 2023) (Filing No. 66 at 14). This case is inapposite. In Charter Communications, the
plaintiff had a visual impairment, and his doctor recommended that he avoid driving at night. Id.
at 732. The plaintiff requested a modified work schedule to limit his nighttime driving, but the
employer declined the request. Id. at 732–33. The district court granted summary judgment in the
employer's favor because the plaintiff "did not need any accommodation to perform an essential
job function once he arrived at work." Id. at 733 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit reversed.
The appellate court "decline[d] to draw a bright line between accommodations at the employer's
workplace and accommodations that address transportation problems," and held that that "if an
employee's disability substantially interferes with his ability to travel to and from work, the

employee may be entitled to a reasonable accommodation if commuting to work is a prerequisite
to an essential job function . . . and if the accommodation is reasonable under all the
circumstances." Id. at 734, 738.
Charter Communications did not hold that an employer is required to accommodate an
employee's disability whenever that accommodation does not pose an undue hardship (Filing No.
66 at 14). To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed that "if the employee can do his or her
job without any accommodation, the ADA does not require the employer to provide any." Id. at
739 (citing Brumfield, 735 F.3d at 630); see Bruno v. Wells-Armstrong, 93 F.4th 1049, 1053–54
(7th Cir. 2024) ("A reasonable accommodation is a measure that enables the employee to 'perform
the essential functions of the employment position.'" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8))); Severson v.
Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that a reasonable
accommodation "is expressly limited to those measures that will enable the employee to work.");
Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The duty of

reasonable accommodation is satisfied when the employer does what is necessary to enable the
disabled worker to work in reasonable comfort.").
By her own admission, Lustig did not require a Stress Debriefing or other accommodation
to perform her essential job duties. The County therefore owed her no duty of accommodation. See
Johnson v. Allure Lifestyle Cmtys., No. 23 CV 17062, 2025 WL 3210395, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
18, 2025) (finding that plaintiff's admission that he needed no accommodation to perform essential
job functions meant that employer had no duty to accommodate plaintiff's disabilities; granting
summary judgment in favor of employer on ADA failure to accommodate claim).
b. Whether Lustig Could Have Performed Her Duties With an Accommodation
The County alternatively argues that the reason for Lustig's increasing frustrations at work
was a lack of resources and accountability (Filing No. 59 at 17; Filing No. 69 at 4; Filing No. 59-

4 at 59:11–61:12). So Lustig's participation in a Stress Debriefing would not have affected her
ability to perform her job duties. "In response to an employer's motion for summary judgment, it
is the plaintiff's burden to produce evidence sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that she would
have been able to perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation."
Basden v. Pro. Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphases added).
Even assuming that Lustig was unable to perform her paramedic duties without an
accommodation, she offers no evidence as to how a Stress Debriefing would have enabled her to
perform those duties. During her deposition, she only stated that she was "hoping" a Stress
Debriefing would reduce her nightmares and give her "some sort of inner peace." (Filing No. 59-
4 at 129:24–130:2). See Basden, 714 F.3d at 1038 (finding that plaintiff had not adequately shown
that leave would have accommodated her disability despite evidence that "medication improved
her condition; that she had hoped for enough improvement to return to work regularly after leave;
and that she subsequently had brief employment that was interrupted by a two-week absence

caused by her condition"); Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of employer where plaintiff was already being provided the only
accommodation proven to effectively remedy plaintiff's disability, and where plaintiff offered no
evidence showing that her additional requested accommodation would have effectively
accommodated her); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 468–69 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of employer because treating physician's statement that "there was a
good chance" that plaintiff could have returned after requested leave was not sufficient to create a
triable issue as to whether plaintiff was a "qualified individual with a disability"). Lustig's
testimony that "talk therapy is not [her] thing" casts further doubt on her claim that a Stress
Debriefing (which Lustig describes as a type of talk therapy) would have been effective for her

(Filing No. 59-4 at 56:12–23, 118:13–14).
Lustig's evidence is "too conclusory and uninformative to support a conclusion that an
accommodation would have been successful." Basden, 714 F.3d at 1038; Wheatley v. Factory Card
& Party Outlet, 826 F.3d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 2016) ("The problem . . . is not that [plaintiff] failed
to produce a certain type of evidence; it is that the evidence she presented is insufficient to meet
her burden."); Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276, 289 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating plaintiffs
cannot "rel[y] upon a conclusory and untested opinion/hope that the proposed
treatment/accommodation would enable them to perform the essential functions of their jobs").
The County is therefore entitled to summary judgment "despite any shortcomings" in its
response to Lustig's requests for a Stress Debriefing. Basden, 714 F.3d at 1039 ("Even if an
employer fails to engage in the required process, that failure need not be considered if the employee
fails to present evidence sufficient to reach the jury on the question of whether she was able to

perform the essential functions of her job with an accommodation.").
There is no triable issue as to whether Lustig was entitled to an accommodation. Based on
the undisputed material facts, Lustig could perform her essential job duties without an
accommodation. But even if a reasonable jury could find that Lustig could not perform her job
duties without an accommodation, Lustig fails to show that she could have performed her duties
with one. In either case, the County was not obligated to provide an accommodation. The County's
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to the failure to accommodate claim.
2. Disability Discrimination and Retaliation
Lustig contends that the County suspended and terminated her because of her disability
and in retaliation for her requesting a Stress Debriefing and complaining about Scott's derogatory
comment about Lustig's mental health (Filing No. 66 at 18). For Lustig's disability discrimination

claim to survive summary judgment, the evidence must permit a reasonable jury to find that her
disability caused the adverse employment actions at issue. Upchurch v. Indiana, 146 F.4th 579,
586–87 (7th Cir. 2025). Similarly, for her retaliation claim, the evidence must permit a reasonable
jury to draw a causal link between Lustig's requests for an accommodation and/or complaints of
Scott's derogatory comments and the adverse employment actions. See Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird
& Assocs., Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2019) ("The key question is whether a reasonable juror
could conclude that there was a causal link between the protected activity or status and the adverse
action."). Although Lustig's discrimination and retaliation claims are distinct, they are based on
the same evidence, so the Court discusses them together. Upchurch, 146 F.4th at 579 (discussing
discrimination and retaliation claims together).
Lustig contends that based on the evidence in the summary judgment record, a reasonable
jury could find that the proffered, nondiscriminatory reasons for her suspension and termination—

disruptive behavior and a potential HIPAA violation—"were pretextual and that the true reason for
Lustig's suspension and termination was a disability and Lustig's protected activity." (Filing No.
66 at 24). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, "pretext means more than a mistake . . . pretext
means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action." Wolf v. Buss (Am.) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919
(7th Cir. 1996) (citation modified).
Lustig asserts that several types of evidence show pretext: Swift's personal animus;
deficiencies with Corbin's investigation into her phone call with Rose; inconsistencies in Swift's
summary judgment affidavit; suspicious timing; and departures from the County's standard
discipline policies. Id. at 18, 23–24.
a. Swift's Personal Animus
Lustig claims that Swift demonstrated unlawful animus by: laughing at Scott's derogatory

comment; making her own derogatory comments to Lustig; approving Lustig's sleep
accommodation "with a lot of attitude"; failing to mark Lustig's leave time as FMLA-qualifying;
and refusing to let Lustig go on EMS runs when she returned from FMLA leave (Filing No. 66 at
18, 22–23). However, Dr. Coots decided to suspend Lustig, and the Commissioners decided to
terminate her.4 Evidence of Swift's personal animus is not probative of Dr. Coots' or the
Commissioners' intent.

4 Lustig does not assert that Swift provided information that may have affected Dr. Coots' or the Commissioners'
decisions. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 897 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing the "cat's paw" theory of liability).
Further, most of Swift's remarks and conduct were not close in time to Lustig's suspension
or termination, and none related to Lustig's termination, giving this evidence even less probative
value. See Phelps v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., No. 22-cv-40, 2024 WL 1056149, at *10 (S.D.
Ind. Feb. 7, 2024) (granting summary judgment to defendant in race discrimination case;

"[plaintiff's] circumstantial evidence offers little probative value of discriminatory motive. Many
of the comments and incidents with colleagues occurred years before [his] termination, involved
non-decisionmakers, and had no relation to his employment status."); see also Rush v. McDonald's
Corp., 966 F2.2d 1104, 1116 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[Plaintiff] has not shown that the animus reflected
in the defendants' alleged conduct on other occasions was the cause of the decision to discharge
her, rather than a serious violation of [the] attendance policy.") McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Cos.,
924 F.2d 683, 686–87 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Unless the remarks upon which plaintiff relies were related
to the employment decision in question, they cannot be evidence of a discriminatory discharge.").
b. Deficiencies in County's Internal Investigation
Lustig also supports her claim of pretext with deficiencies in the County's internal
investigation. Lustig notes that the investigator, Corbin, had no investigatory experience; did not

ask anyone if they "heard the name of a patient or any other personally identifiable information";
declined Lustig's offer to submit her phone to a forensic examination; and was friends with Swift
(Filing No. 66 at 20). This evidence is not sufficient to show pretext.
"Pretext involves more than just faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the
employer." Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 736 (7th Cir. 2008). To show pretext based
on Corbin's investigation, Lustig "must offer evidence tending to show that the [County] did not
actually believe the findings of the investigation." Harden v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 799 F.
3d 857, 964 (7th Cir. 2015). The evidence "'must identify such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, or contradictions' in the report 'that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy
of credence.'" Id. (quoting Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 311 (7th Cir. 2012)
(alteration in original)). "In a typical sham investigation, persons conducting the investigation
fabricate, ignore, or misrepresent evidence, or the investigation is circumscribed so that it leads to
the desired outcome (for instance, by deliberately failing to interview certain witnesses)." Harden,

799 F.3d at 964. While Corbin's investigation could have been more thorough, focused on different
issues, or been led by someone more experienced, the investigation was not so deficient that it
suggests pretext.
Lustig argues that Corbin should have, but did not, obtain statements regarding whether
anyone heard personally identifiable information shared between Rose and Lustig, and a forensic
examination of Lustig's phone. Lustig believes that this information would have proven that she
did not violate HIPAA. However, Corbin never drew any conclusions about whether Lustig
violated HIPAA, and his recommendations to the Commissioners were not based on any such
conclusions. The fact that Corbin did not focus more on proving, or disproving, that a HIPAA
violation in fact occurred does not show that his investigation was a sham or pretextual.

Lustig also notes that Corbin previously worked with Swift elsewhere, but she fails to
explain how or whether Corbin's relationship with Swift affected his investigation. Importantly,
Swift had left the County by the time Corbin interviewed Lustig and submitted his
recommendation to the Commissioners. Lustig also alleges in her response brief that Sylvia Byers,
who sat in on Lustig's interview with Corbin, "was a church friend of Swift's." (Filing No. 66 at
20). But Lustig cites no evidence supporting this assertion.
There is no evidence that Corbin's report is factually baseless, or that the proffered reasons
for Lustig's termination are insufficient to warrant suspension or termination. See Gusewelle v. City
of Wood River, 374 F.3d 569, 575 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining how a plaintiff can show that a
proffered reason is "unworthy of belief" and thus pretextual). The undisputed material facts show
that Lustig was disruptive at work, at least to the extent she repeatedly criticized her supervisor
Swift. More generally, Lustig offers no evidence disputing her co-workers claims to Corbin that
they considered her behavior at work to be "toxic." Lustig also cites no evidence showing that

Corbin inaccurately documented her version of events, Rose's version of events (as Rose relayed
them to Corbin), or the differences between the two.
Although Lustig vehemently disagrees with Corbin's conclusions that she was dishonest
and might have violated HIPAA, she has not shown that Corbin's report was so deficient that it
suggests pretext. "[E]ven where a plaintiff . . . alleges that 'the company's investigation was
imprudent, ill-informed and inaccurate,' summary judgment is appropriate unless the employee
'could point to facts suggesting that the company investigated [her] differently'" because of her
protected status. Biolchini v. Gen. Elec. Co., 167 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1999); see Stockwell v.
City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 901–02 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[C]ourts are not 'superpersonnel
department[s]' charged with determining best business practices." (second alteration in original)).

c. Inconsistencies in Swift's Affidavit
Next, Lustig points out perceived inconsistencies in Swift's affidavit, which either relate to
immaterial details or are based on gross speculation (Filing No. 66 at 20–21 (implying that the
signature on Swift's affidavit was forged)). The Court will not spend time discussing these alleged
inconsistencies because they are immaterial to the pending summary judgment motion. The proper
way for Lustig to dispute facts in Swift's affidavit was to designate contrary evidence, and at this
stage, the Court does not weigh testimony, so Lustig's attacks on Swift's credibility are misplaced.
d. Suspicious Timing
Lustig claims that the timing of her suspension and termination are suspicious because she
"had not received any discipline prior to her complaining to Swank about Swift's discriminatory
conduct." (Filing No. 66 at 18). However, "the fact that an adverse action occurred sometime after
protected activity does not establish causation." Jackson v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 17-
cv-3248, 2020 WL 564311, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 5, 2020) (citation modified).
Lustig first requested a Stress Debriefing in May 2021, and in October 2022, she repeated

her request and complained about Scott's derogatory comment. Lustig was suspended five months
later, and terminated two more months after that. These months-long gaps do not suggest
discriminatory or retaliatory intent. See Bless v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 9 F.4th 565, 573 (7th
Cir. 2021) (explaining that an adverse employment action must "follow[] close on the heels of
protected expression," and timing must be "very close—as in no more than a few days" to show
impermissible intent (citation modified)); FKFJ, Inc. v. Vill. of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 587 (7th Cir.
2021) ("A delay of two or three months between any protected activity and adverse action is far
from sufficient to raise an inference of retaliation."); Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d
1003, 1009–10 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that timing of the adverse action is suspicious when it occurs
"fairly soon after the employee's protected expression").

To the contrary, the timing of Lustig's suspension and termination supports the County's
proffered reasons. Lustig received no discipline or other adverse employment action for nearly two
years after first requesting a Stress Debriefing in May 2021, and for approximately five months
after complaining to Swank about Scott and Swift's demeaning comments. By contrast, Lustig was
suspended approximately five days after her phone call with Rose; and terminated approximately
one month after Corbin submitted his investigation to the Commissioners. When comparing these
gaps, no reasonable jury could conclude that Lustig's suspension or termination was discriminatory
or retaliatory. See McCann v. Badger Mining Corp., 965 F.3d 578, 592 (7th Cir. 2020) ("Suspicious
timing alone is rarely enough to survive summary judgment particularly when there are reasonable,
non-suspicious explanations for the timing of the [adverse employment actions]." (citation
modified)); Parker v. Brooks Life Sci., Inc., 39 F.4th 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2022) (finding that two-day
period between request for accommodation and termination did not save claims from summary
judgment in light of intervening report of PTO policy violations by plaintiff, which supported

proffered reason for termination).
e. Departure from Disciplinary Policies in December 2022
Lustig further contends that the written discipline she received in December 2022 is
suspicious because it did not conform to the County's progressive discipline policy or problem
resolution policy. (Filing No. 66 at 22); see Long v. Teachers' Ret. Sys. of Ill., 585 F.3d 344, 352–
53 (7th Cir. 2009) ("An employer's departure from its own employment policies can constitute
circumstantial evidence of discrimination."). Lustig does not cite any evidence that she received
this written warning. However, even if the designated evidence did show that Lustig received this
written discipline, it would not suggest a discriminatory or retaliatory intent for two reasons.
First, there is no evidence that any written warning was a departure from the County's
disciplinary procedures. In her response brief, Lustig generally cites the County's disciplinary

handbook without identifying the part from which the County allegedly departed (Filing No. 66 at
22). A closer review of the policy reveals that the County is not bound by strict disciplinary
procedures. The policy provides examples of "offenses" and corresponding "discipline," but
iterates that these lists are "merely illustrative" and are not intended to limit "the County's
discretion in exercising discipline as it finds appropriate." (Filing No. 65-12 at 1, 4). "[W]hen a
progressive discipline policy permits the employer to exercise discretion in discharging an
employee without exhausting all of the policy's steps, failure to follow all of the steps does not
suggest a discriminatory motive." Long., 585 F.3d at 352–53. The County's disciplinary policy is
discretionary, so its decision to issue a written warning does not suggest an unlawful motive.
Second, no evidence connects any alleged deviation from the County's procedure to
Lustig's disability or protected activity. See Roney v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 857,
870–71 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2005) (finding that employee failed to connect departure from policies
to retaliation; granting employer's motion for summary judgment). The Seventh Circuit "do[es]

not require that an employer rigidly adhere to procedural guidelines in order to avoid an inference
of retaliation. Instead, [courts] look for pretext in the form of 'a dishonest explanation, a lie rather
than an oddity or an error.'" Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 969 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000)). "Moreover, when
independent surrounding circumstances indicate that the employee's performance was seriously
deficient and worthy of disciplinary action, a procedural abnormality will not suffice to establish
a retaliatory motive." Id. Lustig cites no evidence suggesting that the December 2022 written
warning was anything other than an abnormality, or any evidence that her refusal to promptly
deliver the employee statements to Commissioner Monjar was unworthy of a written warning.
Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 969.

f. Consideration of All Evidence
Based on the totality of the evidence, no reasonable jury could find that Lustig's suspension
or termination was caused by her disability or protected action. Lustig offers scant evidence of
discrimination and retaliation, including; statements by Swift, a non-decisionmaker; immaterial
deficiencies in the County's internal investigation; misplaced attacks on Swift's credibility; tenuous
evidence of suspicious timing; and the County's discretionary disciplinary policies. Lustig's very
limited evidence does not create a genuine dispute of material fact as to unlawful intent where a
wealth of evidence demonstrates a clear causal connection between the County's proffered reasons
and Lustig's suspension and termination, as well as evidence that Rose—who is not alleged to be
disabled or have engaged in protected activity—was also terminated. The County's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted as to the ADA discrimination and retaliation claims.
B. FMLA Claims
Lustig claims that the County interfered with her FMLA leave, unlawfully prohibited her
from participating in EMS runs upon her return from FMLA leave in 2023, and retaliated against

her by terminating her employment.
1. Interference with FMLA Leave
Lustig's Amended Complaint alleges that the County interfered with her FMLA rights "by
forcing her to work unpaid during her approved FMLA leave." (Filing No. 22 ¶ 107). However, as
the County notes in its brief, Lustig admits that "Defendant did not force [her] to work while on
FMLA leave." (Filing No. 59-6 at 3). In response, Lustig does not dispute her prior admission that
the County did not force her to work while on FMLA leave. But she does not concede a lack of
interference, either. Instead, Lustig contends that the County interfered with her FMLA leave when
Swift marked Lustig's FMLA leave as only "sick time," and not also as FMLA-qualifying leave
(Filing No. 66 at 4). As a matter of law, the County's failure to designate Lustig's leave time as

FMLA-qualifying does not constitute interference.
In Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002), the United States Supreme
Court invalidated an FMLA regulation requiring employers to provide additional leave time if the
employer failed to designate leave time as FMLA-qualifying. The Supreme Court explained that
this regulation "alter[ed] the FMLA's cause of action in a fundamental way" because it "relieve[d]
employees of the burden of proving any real impairment of their rights and resulting prejudice."
Id. at 90. Lustig concedes that her ability to take FMLA leave was not actually impaired, and she
identifies no prejudice resulting from the County's improper leave time designation (Filing No.
59-4 at 47:15–48:1). See Ridings v. Riverside Medical Ctr., 537 F.3d 755, 762 (2008) (finding no
FMLA interference where employer failed to designate time off as FMLA-qualifying).
Based on the undisputed material facts, the County did not interfere with Lustig's FMLA
rights. The County's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to the interference claims.

2. FMLA Violations Based on Return to Work in 2023
Lustig next alleges that the County violated the FMLA by not allowing her to "return to
the same terms and conditions of her employment" when she returned from her 2022 FMLA leave.
(Filing No. 22 at 14). Specifically, when Lustig returned to a part-time position in 2023, Swift
refused to allow her to participate in EMS runs until she completed her unfinished run reports
(Filing No. 66 at 24–25).
Under the FMLA, an employee on leave is entitled to be restored to the same or equivalent
position that she had before taking qualifying leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)–(2). The FMLA also
makes it unlawful to "discharge" or "in any manner discriminate" against a person for opposing
any practice the FMLA makes unlawful. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b). The failure to restore an employee
to an equivalent position upon return from FMLA could therefore constitute interference and/or a

retaliation under the FMLA. See Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., 604 F.3d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 2010).
It is unclear whether Lustig is asserting both interference and retaliation claims based on the
County's failure to return her to an equivalent position, but the Court assumes that she is.
The difference between retaliation and interference under the FMLA is that retaliation
"requires proof of discriminatory or retaliatory intent while [interference] requires only proof that
the employer denied the employee his or her entitlements under the Act." Kauffman v. Fed. Express
Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir. 2005). To succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show
that "the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's decision."
Lewis v. Sch. Dist. #70, 523 F.3d 730, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation modified).
The County argues that it did not interfere with Lustig's FMLA rights because Lustig
voluntarily resigned from her full-time position and requested a part-time position upon her return
from FMLA leave. The County also argues that it did not retaliate against Lustig and had a
legitimate, non-invidious reason for requiring her to complete her run reports before participating

in EMS runs (Filing No. 59 at 22–23).
The Court agrees with the County that Lustig voluntarily forewent her right to be returned
to her same position when she resigned her full-time paramedic position. The FMLA "does not
prohibit an employer from accommodating an employee's request to be restored to a different shift,
schedule, or position which better suits the employee's personal needs on return from leave." Id.
§ (e)(4). However, under the FMLA "[a]n equivalent position must have substantially similar
duties, conditions, responsibilities, privileges and status as the employee's original position." Id.
§ 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(e).
Based on the designated evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Lustig, a reasonable
jury could find that the County denied her an essential responsibility, duty, and privilege of her

former position—EMS runs. See Menge v. Simon's Trucking, Inc., No. C20-1016, 2021 WL
3921346, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 1, 2021) (citing Eighth Circuit cases in which changes to job
duties upon return from FMLA leave constituted interference; denying employer's motion for
summary judgment on interference claim based on failure to return plaintiff to equivalent position).
The Court likewise finds that a reasonable jury could find that Lustig's relegation to run
reports was motivated by discrimination or retaliation. The County does identify important and
lawful reasons for requiring Lustig to complete her outstanding run reports; unfinished reports
leave patient files incomplete and prevent the County from billing for its EMS services provided
(Filing No. 59 at 20–21). However, Lustig offers undisputed evidence that many County
paramedics regularly failed to timely complete their paperwork. The fact that only Lustig was
precluded from going on EMS runs might show that the County's proffered reasons are pretextual
(Filing No. 59-4 at 97:8–15). This evidence of pretext, combined with the suspicious timing of this
work restriction (immediately upon Lustig's return from FMLA leave for mental health reasons),

evidence that Swift lifted the restriction a month later for one shift and then never re-imposed the
restriction, id. at 97:8–15, and undisputed evidence of comments Swift made to Lustig about her
"emotional competen[ce]," id. at 98, are sufficient to create a genuine dispute as to the County's
motivation. The County's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore denied as to Lustig's FMLA
interference and retaliation claims based on her preclusion from EMS runs upon her return from
FMLA leave in 2023.
3. FMLA Retaliation Based on Termination
The Amended Complaint alleges that the County retaliated against Lustig in violation of
the FMLA by terminating her (Filing No. 22 ¶ 104). However, Lustig fails to discuss this claim in
her summary judgment response. To the extent this claim is not deemed abandoned, it must fail
for the same reasons as Lustig's ADA retaliation claim. Courts evaluate claims of FMLA retaliation

in the same way they evaluate claims of retaliation under other employment statutes. Buie v.
Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2004). As the Court discusses above, there is
ample evidence supporting the County's proffered, lawful reason for Lustig's termination. The five-
month gap between Lustig's December 2022 FMLA leave and termination in May 2023 cuts
strongly against a finding of suspicious timing, and there is no evidence connecting Lustig's 2022
FMLA leave (or Swift's actions and comments in 2023) to the Commissioners' decision to
terminate Lustig. The County is therefore entitled to summary judgment on any FMLA retaliation
claim based on Lustig's termination.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
Lustig lastly asserts claims for violations of her due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Lustig alleges that the County violated her
procedural due process rights by terminating her without prior notice, notices of certain rights, or
a hearing; and violated her substantive due process rights "by taking actions without due process

that resulted in the loss or eventual loss of her paramedic certification." (Filing No. 22 ¶¶ 109–19).
The Fourteenth Amendment establishes that "[n]o State shall . . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Procedural due
process claims involve "a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the defendants deprived the plaintiff[] of
a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest; and (2) if so, whether that deprivation
occurred without due process of law." Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 526 (7th Cir. 2003), as amended
on denial of reh'g (May 15, 2003) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). To assert
a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff "must allege that the government violated a
fundamental right or liberty," and that the violation was "arbitrary and irrational." Campos v. Cook
Cnty., 932 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2019).

The County argues that Lustig cannot show a procedural or substantive due process
violation because she has no protectible property right in her employment (Filing No. 59 at 24–
25). In response, Lustig does not dispute that she lacks a property interest in her employment.
Instead, she argues that because of her arbitrary termination, her paramedic "license was taken
from her without due process." (Filing No. 66 at 25–26).
Before replying to the merits of Lustig's response, the County argues that any due process
claims based on Lustig's paramedic certification—rather than her employment—are being raised
for the first time on summary judgment. The Court does not agree. The Amended Complaint
plainly alleges, "Defendants deprived Plaintiff of her Emergency Medical Certification resulting
in substantial [sic] and procedural due process deprivation of her rights," and "[a]t all times
relevant, Plaintiff was a 'certified employee' who, as a condition of employment, holds a valid
certification under IC § 16-31-3 by the Indiana emergency medical services commission
established by IC § 16-31-2-1." (Filing No. 22 ¶¶ 62–63). The Amended Complaint further alleges

"Defendant deprived Plaintiff of liberty by taking actions without due process that resulted in the
loss or eventual loss of her paramedic certification." Id. ¶ 117. Lustig raised procedural and
substantive due process claims related to her paramedic certification in her Amended Complaint,
so her summary judgment response appropriately argues that those claims are viable.
The County also argues that Lustig's due process claims fail on the merits because there is
no evidence that Lustig has no protectible interest in a paramedic "certification" rather than a
license; and because there is no evidence that Lustig's certification was revoked or will be revoked
(Filing No. 69 at 11–12). The Court must begin with the County's second argument because, in
substance, it challenges ripeness and standing and therefore implicates the Court's subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Wisconsin Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2008); Johnson v.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 719 F.3d 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013).
Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to resolving "cases" and "controversies."
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This limitation "requires a claim that is ripe and a plaintiff who has
standing." Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2007). To have standing,
a plaintiff must have suffered (1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant and
(3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 114
F.4th 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). A
claim is not ripe "if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all." Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (citation modified).
Lustig's brief states that her certification "was taken from her" (Filing No. 66 at 26), but
there is no evidence that her certification has been revoked, expired, or become inactive. Instead,
as explained in Lustig's Declaration, she is merely concerned that her certification "will expire and
become inactive" (Filing No. 65-1 at 4 (emphases added)). Lustig contends that she "is required to

be affiliated with a certified paramedic provider organization or supervising hospital to maintain
her license as a paramedic," citing 836 Ind. Admin. Code 4-9-3, and without an affiliation with
Switzerland County, her license will expire (Filing No. 66 at 26). The County correctly notes that
Section 4-9-3 relates to applicants for paramedic certifications, and not current certification
holders (Filing No. 69 at 12). Nevertheless, to the extent Lustig does need an affiliation to maintain
an active certification, she could become employed by or volunteer for another medical services
provider or hospital. Id. As a result, Lustig cannot show an "actual or imminent" deprivation of her
interest in her certification.
The possibility that Lustig might not become affiliated with another qualifying
organization, or that her certification might be revoked or declined for renewal at some later date,

is not enough to establish an injury in fact or ripeness. "A plaintiff who has not suffered a past
harm cannot simply rest on allegations that [s]he may suffer some 'possible future injury,' 'at some
indefinite future time.' [Her] threatened injury instead must be 'certainly impending' to satisfy
Article III." Dinerstein v. Google, LLC, 73 F.4th 502, 512 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation modified)
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2); see
Williams v. Vill. of Alsip, No. 22 C 4892, 2024 WL 1116106, at*6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2024) (finding
that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring due process claim because challenged ordinance only
"created a 'risk' or 'possibility'" that landlord might attempt to remove plaintiffs from their
apartment, which was "insufficient to give rise to an injury in fact"). Lustig's injury arising from
the revocation/non-renewal of her certification is not imminent and rests upon contingent future
events that may not occur. Her due process claims must therefore be dismissed without prejudice
for lack of standing and lack of ripeness.°
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed in this Order, the County's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing
No. 58) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is granted as to Counts
I, H, and I1—Lustig'’s ADA claims. Lustig voluntarily abandoned her FLSA Claims—Counts IV
and V, so those claims are dismissed with prejudice. Lustig's Fourteenth Amendment claims—
Counts VHI, [X and X are dismissed without prejudice.
A genuine dispute of material facts exists, and summary judgment is denied as to Count
VI and Count VIJ—Lustig's FMLA interference and retaliation claims based on her preclusion
from EMS runs upon her return from her 2022 FMLA leave. Those claims shall PROCEED to
trial or settlement.
This matter remains set for a final pretrial conference on July 1, 2026, and a jury trial
beginning July 27, 2026. The parties are directed to contact the Magistrate Judge to schedule a
settlement conference.
SO ORDERED.
Date: _ 2/13/2026 A ‘atten rath
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

5 A dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits and thus is without prejudice. See
Kowalski v. Boliker, 893 F.3d 987, 994 (7th Cir. 2018).
30

Distribution:

Julie C. Alexander
JOHN H. HASKIN & ASSOCIATES, LLC
jalexander@jhaskinlaw.com

Rachel Dever
CHURCH CHURCH HITTLE AND ANTRIM
rdever@cchalaw.com

John H. Haskin
JOHN H. HASKIN & ASSOCIATES, LLC
jhaskin@jhaskinlaw.com

Liberty L. Roberts
CHURCH CHURCH HITTLE & ANTRIM (Noblesville)
lroberts@cchalaw.com

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260796. Public record. Not legal advice.