# Pough

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · February 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260784

## Case

- **Full name:** Lance Pough v. Steve Weishar, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** February 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260784

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Brown to a prisoner’s Section 1983 claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

LANCE POUGH, ) Case No. 1:24-cv-2016
)
Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge
) James E. Grimes, Jr.
STEVE WEISHAR, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lance Pough, an inmate representing himself, brings this action
under Section 1983 against the Grafton Correction Institution prison investigator,
Steve Weishar, and the Chairman of the Rules Infraction Board, John Faltay, in their
individual and personal capacities. Defendants move to dismiss. For the following
reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in
Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must on the motion before it, Plaintiff bases his claims
on the following events.
A. The Alleged Assault
Although Plaintiff Lance Pough is currently incarcerated at North Central
Correctional Institution in Marion, Ohio, the relevant events occurred while he was
an inmate at Grafton Correctional Institution in Lorain County, Ohio. (ECF No. 1,
¶¶ 1 & 65 PageID #2.)
In June 2022, there was an attempted assault on a Grafton inmate that
resulted in an internal prison investigation into Mr. Pough. (Id., ¶¶ 10–19,
PageID #4–7.) According to the complaint, inmate Allen Oliver warned Mr. Pough

“to stay away from inmate Donny Berry because prison officials were investigating
him and were going to pick him up.” (Id., ¶ 10, PageID #4.) Instead, Mr. Pough told
Berry about the warning he was given. (Id.) As a result, Berry and Oliver had an
“argument and verbal dispute.” (Id.) Because Berry was “shouting loudly” during
the dispute, Oliver felt threatened and sought out another inmate to “assault and
fight” Berry on his behalf. (Id.) Berry asked inmate Bobby Nolan to “find someone

who could do the job.” (Id.) Nolan recruited inmate Lloyd Kelley Jr. (Id.) Kelley
attempted to assault Berry, but the two ended up talking instead. (Id., ¶ 11, PageID
#4–5.) During their conversation, Kelley explained to Berry that he had been sent by
Nolan and Oliver to assault him. (Id.)
Because of the attempted assault on Berry, Mr. Pough was placed in temporary
confinement. (Id., ¶ 15, PageID #5–6.) Unbeknownst to Mr. Pough, he was
investigated and put into confinement because Nolan, Oliver, and Kelley allegedly

informed Investigator Weishar that Mr. Pough was the mastermind behind the
attempted assault on Berry. (Id., ¶¶ 10–19, Page ID# 4–7.) Therefore, Investigator
Weishar filed a conduct report against Mr. Pough for violating Rule 4 (causing, or
attempting to cause, physical harm to another) and Rule 60 (attempting to commit,
aiding another in the commission of, soliciting another to commit, or entering into an
agreement with another to commit any of the above acts) for his alleged involvement
in the attempted assault on Berry. (Id., ¶ 22, PageID #8; ECF No. 1-3, PageID #32.)
The underlying conduct report did not include the names of accusers, victims, or the
time and location where the alleged incident took place. (Id., ¶ 22, PageID #8.) In

July 2022, Mr. Pough was formally charged with violating Rule 4 and Rule 60 and
subjected to two hearings of the rules infraction board, which Lt. Faltay oversaw.
(Id., ¶ 3, PageID #2.)
Mr. Pough claims that Investigator Weishar and Lt. Faltay’s actions during
the investigation and disciplinary proceedings violated his constitutional rights. (Id.,
¶¶ 2–9, PageID #2–4.) Because Investigator Weishar and Lt. Faltay had different

roles in the underlying disciplinary proceedings, and Mr. Pough obtained knowledge
of their actions at different times, the Court outlines the events giving rise to the
claims against each Defendant separately.
B. Lt. Faltay
When Mr. Pough was formally charged with violating Rule 4 and Rule 60 for
his alleged involvement in the assault of inmate Berry, Lt. Faltay served as the
Chairman of the Rules Infraction Board at Grafton Correctional Institution and acted

as a decisionmaker on the board. (Id., ¶ 3, PageID #2.)
In July 2022, Mr. Pough was formally charged with violating Rule 4 and
Rule 60 for his alleged involvement in the assault on Berry. (Id.) And his first
disciplinary hearing was scheduled for July 20, 2022. (Id., ¶ 23, PageID #8.)
Immediately preceding the hearing, on July 20, 2022, Lt. Faltay allegedly told
Mr. Pough that he would “find him guilty based on events that preceded the alleged
assault.” (Id., ¶ 25, PageID #9.) Mr. Pough claims that inmate Kenneth Livingston
witnessed this interaction. (Id.; ECF No. 1-10, ¶¶ 4–5, PageID #39.) Because of the
interaction, Mr. Pough told Lt. Faltay during the hearing that he was “biased and
predisposed” against him, which Lt. Faltay allegedly did not deny. (ECF No. 1,

¶¶ 26–27, PageID #9–10.)
Mr. Pough was found guilty at the initial hearing and appealed the decision.
(Id.) While his appeal was pending, and without Mr. Pough’s knowledge, the
Warden’s Administrative Review Board reversed and returned the July 20 decision
for reconsideration. (Id., ¶ 28, PageID #10.) The review board based its decision on
Lt. Faltay’s failure to find credible the statements of the confidential informants who

provided the basis for the report. (Id.)
Then, on July 28, 2022, Mr. Pough was unexpectedly called to a second hearing
for the same alleged assault. (Id., ¶ 29, PageID #10.) Mr. Pough contends that,
because he did not receive prior notice of this hearing, he was unable to call certain
witnesses for his defense. (Id., ¶ 30, PageID #10.) The second panel comprised of Lt.
Faltay and Mr. Tolley, who again found Mr. Pough guilty of violating Rule 4 and Rule
60. (Id., ¶ 32, PageID #11; ECF No. 1-6, PageID #35.)

Mr. Pough appealed this decision to the Warden, but this time the decision was
affirmed. (ECF No. 1-8, PageID #37.) Therefore, Mr. Pough appealed to Legal
Services, which also upheld the board’s decision. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 32, PageID #11; ECF
No. 1-9, PageID #38.) Because of the guilty finding, Mr. Pough’s security level was
increased from a level one to a level three in September 2022. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 3,
PageID #3–4.) With an increased security level, Mr. Pough was transferred from
Grafton to Mansfield Correctional Institution. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 9, PageID #3.)
C. Investigator Weishar

In August 2023, Kelley was transferred to Mansfield. (Id.) There, he
encountered Mr. Pough. (Id.) Kelley informed Mr. Pough about the alleged
conspiracy between himself and inmates Oliver and Nolan to blame the attempted
assault of inmate Berry on Mr. Pough. (Id.; ECF No. 1-1, PageID #18.) Additionally,
Kelley detailed Investigator Weishar’s alleged conduct surrounding Mr. Pough’s 2022
disciplinary actions. (Id., ¶ 9, PageID #3.)
According to the complaint, Investigator Weishar told Kelley that he “wanted

to get Pough off the compound . . . because . . . Pough had previously filed complaints
and grievances against his co-worker,” Officer Judkins. (Id., ¶ 19, PageID #7.)
According to Mr. Pough, in 2022 he filed a lawsuit against members of Grafton’s
parole board, which led to allegedly retaliatory searches of his property by Officer
Judkins and prompted Mr. Pough to file a grievance. (Id., ¶ 36, PageID #13.)
Before the investigation into Mr. Pough for the assault on Berry, Investigator

Weishar allegedly told Kelley that “his statements don’t have to be true, and
[Investigator Weishar] doesn’t care if they are true, as long as they are corroborated
by other inmate statements.” (Id., ¶ 20, PageID #7.) Based on this information,
Mr. Pough filed an internal complaint against Investigator Weishar for retaliatory
conduct on July 31, 2024. (Id., ¶ 34, PageID #3.)
On August 6, 2024, the prison’s seven-day deadline to respond to Mr. Pough’s
complaint expired. (Id.) Therefore, Mr. Pough filed a second complaint and, again,
did not receive a response within the deadline. (Id.) Mr. Pough attempted to escalate
the complaint to a grievance. (Id.) However, his assigned prison tablet was not
functional at that time. (Id.) Despite requesting the assistance of both the prison

inspector and ViaPath/GTL officials to file his grievance, Mr. Pough received no help.
(Id.) Ultimately, Mr. Pough was unable to escalate his complaint to a grievance
within the prison system. (Id., ¶ 35, PageID #12.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 11, 2024, Mr. Pough sent a handwritten complaint under
Section 1983, which was received on September 16, 2024. (ECF No. 1-16,

PageID #47.) But it was not accepted because there was no filing fee or motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1-13, PageID #43.) Then, Mr. Pough filed a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and the amended complaint was docketed on
November 18, 2024. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 2.) Included with the complaint were
affidavits from inmates allegedly involved in the conspiracy against him. (ECF
No. 1-1; ECF No. 1-10; ECF No. 1-11.)
Under Rule 15(c), an amendment to a complaint relates back to the date of the

original complaint when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the
original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). “When a petitioner files for permission to
file [in forma pauperis], a complaint is considered filed on the day the clerk’s office
receives both the complaint and the application to proceed IFP.” Scott v. Evans, 116
F. App’x 699, 701 (6th Cir. 2004). Mr. Pough’s initial filing was rejected because it
was filed without a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and without payment of the
filing fee. (ECF No. 1-13, PageID #43.) Though Mr. Pough's complaint is titled
“Amended Complaint 15(C) Relate Back,” the complaint was not considered filed until

Mr. Pough filed his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which was on November 18,
2024. Therefore, Mr. Pough’s second complaint does not relate back to his initial
attempted filing and is considered filed on November 18, 2024.
Defendants move to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, and raise
arguments based on the statute of limitations, the Eleventh Amendment, and
qualified immunity. (ECF No. 13, PageID #131.)

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim
on which a court may grant relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion under Rule
12(b)(6) tests “the plaintiff’s cause of action as stated in the complaint” and is “not a
challenge to the plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d
950, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2005). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A claim is plausible where “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” into the
“realm of plausible liability.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 n.5.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court construes factual allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts them as true, and draws all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Wilburn v. United States, 616 F. App’x 848, 852

(6th Cir. 2015) (citing DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). But
a pleading must offer more than mere “labels and conclusions,” and “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is a court required to accept “[c]onclusory
allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations.” Eidson v.
Tennessee Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 544).
Therefore, the Court must distinguish between “well-pled factual allegations,”
which must be treated as true, and “naked assertions,” which need not be. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.
Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that because some of the
plaintiff’s factual allegations were not well-pled, their conclusory nature disentitled
them to the presumption of truth). A plaintiff need not include detailed factual

allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678–79.
Although the pleadings and documents pro se litigants file are liberally
construed and held to less stringent standards than the formal pleadings of lawyers,
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004), litigants who do not have a
lawyer are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Even a pro se complaint must

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face’” to avoid dismissal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
ANALYSIS
Section 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations. Therefore, federal courts
borrow the applicable limitations period from the most analogous one available under

State law. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996); see Owens v. Okure,
488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989). For the claims Plaintiff asserts, the most analogous
statute is Ohio’s two-year limitations period in Section 2305.10(A) of the Ohio Revised

Code. Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10; see Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th
Cir. 1989) (en banc).
But federal law governs when a plaintiff’s federal claims against a defendant
accrue. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); see Green v. City of Southfield, 759

F. App’x 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir.
1984)). “The statute of limitations commences when the plaintiff knows or has reason
to know of the injury which is the basis of h[is] action.” Green, 759 F. App’x at 414
(quoting Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273) (cleaned up). Under the discovery rule, however,

equitable tolling delays the accrual of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury which is the basis of the claim. Sevier, 742
F.2d at 273. “This inquiry focuses on the harm incurred, rather than the plaintiff’s

knowledge of the underlying facts which gave rise to the harm.” Friedman v. Estate
of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff has
reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through the exercise
of reasonable diligence.” Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273 (citing Briley v. California, 564 F.2d

849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977)).
It is generally inappropriate to dismiss claims based on a statute of limitations
at the motion to dismiss stage. Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 698
(6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). But if the allegations in the complaint

“affirmatively show” that a claim is time barred, then dismissal is warranted. Id.
(quoting Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s entire complaint is time barred. (ECF
No. 13, PageID #135–36.) Because Plaintiff allegedly obtained knowledge of

Defendants’ actions at different times, equitable tolling applies differently to the
claims against each Defendant.
I. Lt. Faltay
Plaintiff’s claims against Lt. Faltay arise from his alleged bias against
Mr. Pough at the two hearings of the rules infraction board and the “lack of notice” of

the second hearing, which Plaintiff contends violated his constitutional rights by
denying him the ability to call witnesses on his behalf. (ECF No. 1, PageID #1.) Other
than the conduct or facts relating to the hearings, Plaintiff bases his claims against
Lt. Faltay on no other allegations.
Construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff, Mr. Pough knew of the perceived

bias at the time of the second hearing when it occurred on July 28, 2022. Sevier, 742
F.2d at 273. Indeed, Plaintiff argued in his appeal of that decision that Lt. Faltay
“was biased and predisposed and not impartial at the July 28, 2022 R.I.B. hearing
based on his conduct during the July 20, 2022 R.I.B. hearing.” (ECF No. 1,
PageID #11.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s cause of action against Lt. Faltay accrued on July
28, 2022. Because Plaintiff’s complaint was deemed filed on November 18, 2024, his

complaint was filed outside the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s claims
against Lt. Faltay are untimely.
II. Investigator Weishar
Plaintiff claims that Investigator Weishar retaliated against him. To
determine when Plaintiff’s claims against Investigator Weishar accrued, the Court
must determine when Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury that is the
basis for his retaliation claim. Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273.

Defendants do not take a firm position on when Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation
against Investigator Weishar accrued. Instead, they contend that the factual
allegations regarding Plaintiff’s retaliation claim could have occurred on various
dates: (1) at the earliest on July 13, 2022 when Investigator Weishar issued the
conduct report (ECF No. 15, PageID #159); (2) on July 22, 2022 when Mr. Pough was
found guilty at the hearing of the rules infraction board (ECF No. 13, PageID #136);
or (3) at the latest on August 15, 2022 when Mr. Pough filed his appeal with the Office
of Chief Legal Counsel (ECF No. 15, PageID #158–59). Although Defendants do not
identify it as a potential accrual date, Plaintiff’s appeal to the Office of Chief Legal
Counsel was not complete until September 14, 2022. (ECF No. 1-9.)

II.B.1. Exhaustion
Plaintiff did not argue for tolling of the statute of limitations for his claims
against Investigator Weishar. Instead, Plaintiff argues that he “attempted to
exhaust the retaliation claim” by filing complaints against Investigator Weishar and
escalate them to grievances. (ECF No. 14, PageID #145.) Specifically, Plaintiff
asserts that he filed his first complaint against Investigator Weishar on July 31, 2024,
to which there was not a response until after the “7 day deadline” of August 6, 2024.

(Id.) Plaintiff filed a second complaint after that deadline, on an unspecified date in
August 2024. (Id.) He states that he never received a response to either complaint.
(Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims that he attempted to escalate both complaints to
grievances but was unable to do so because the “escalation button/process on the
phone tablet was inoperable and would not work.” (Id.) Only after these
administrative remedies failed, through no fault of his own, did Plaintiff file this

lawsuit. (ECF No. 1-16, PageID #47.) Based on these events, Plaintiff maintains
that the statute of limitations does not bar his claims against Investigator Weishar.
(ECF No. 14, PageID #146.)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act mandates that “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C § 1997e(a).
Because the statute unambiguously requires administrative exhaustion as a
threshold to litigation, the statute of limitations for a civil rights action may be tolled
for the time in which these remedies are being exhausted. Brown v. Morgan, 209

F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Waters v. Evans, 105 F. App'x 827 (6th Cir.
2004) (applying Brown to a prisoner’s Section 1983 claim).
Plaintiff appears to argue that his lawsuit is timely because he was unable to
exhaust, such that the limitations period did not begin to run or was tolled. This
argument fails. Plaintiff filed his administrative complaints against Investigator
Weishar well outside the fourteen-day deadline to do so. See Ohio Admin. Code

§ 5120–9–31(J)(1) (requiring an inmate to file an informal complaint within fourteen
calendar days of the incident). The incident involving Investigator Weishar occurred
on July 13, 2022 when he filed the conduct report against Plaintiff. And Plaintiff’s
appeal to the Office of Chief Legal Counsel was not complete until September 14,
2022. Even this latter date is nearly two years before Plaintiff filed his first
administrative complaint on July 31, 2024. Under the Act, compliance with prison
grievance procedures is all that is required to exhaust. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

216 (2007). Because Plaintiff did not follow the required administrative procedures,
the attempted filing of an administrative complaint and escalation to a grievance
some two years after the conduct at issue cannot provide a basis for tolling the statute
of limitations. However, the failure to exhaust does not bar this complaint because
Defendants did not raise failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a defense.
(ECF No. 13.) Therefore, they forfeited the defense. Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906,
911 (6th Cir. 2004).
III.B.2. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling might not apply in all cases, particularly in retaliation cases
like this one. See Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 885 (6th Cir. 2026) (White, J.,
concurring) (“I would not relegate the discovery of a retaliatory motive in cases where
retaliation is an element of the claim to the domain of equitable tolling in all cases.
This is especially so because equitable tolling, unlike accrual, is generally determined
under state law.”) Nevertheless, the Court, as it must, liberally construes the
complaint in Plaintiff’s favor and considers whether equitable tolling applies to

Plaintiff’s claims against Investigator Weishar.
Plaintiff claims that he did not discover Investigator Weishar’s alleged
retaliation until August 2023 when Kelley informed him that there was a
“conspiracy . . . to place blame on [him] for the assault and attempt[ed] assault on
inmate Donny Berry.” (Id., ¶ 9, PageID #3.) Even so, his lawsuit is untimely for two
reasons.

First, the complaint, construed in Plaintiff’s favor, shows that he did not act
with reasonable diligence to pursue his claims. August 2023 still fell within the
limitations period. The latest accrual date for Plaintiff’s claims against Investigator
Weishar is September 14, 2022. Therefore, if Plaintiff had acted with reasonable
diligence, he could have exhausted his administrative remedies and/or filed suit
before expiration of the limitations period. Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273 (citing Briley, 564
F.2d at 855). But Plaintiff waited almost a year—until July 31, 2024—to file an
informal complaint. And he did not file this complaint until November 18, 2024.
Indeed, Plaintiff provides no justification for this delay. Although Plaintiff had the
necessary information providing the basis for his claims against Investigator Weishar

with in the limitations period, and months to spare before its expiration, he failed to
pursue his claims with reasonable diligence.
Second, in determining whether equitable tolling applies, courts focus on the
harm incurred, not the plaintiff’s knowledge of the underlying facts that gave rise to
the harm. Friedman, 929 F.2d at 1159 (citation omitted). This principle is consistent
with the general legal rule that a statute of limitations runs from when a tort was

committed, even if the injured party did not know or have reason to know of the tort.
See Reguli, 109 F.4th at 887 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[A] broad discovery rule
conflicts with . . . traditional principles. Even as late as 1939, the Restatement of
Torts noted that many States continued to adhere to the view that ‘the statutory
period runs from the time the tort was committed although the injured person had
no knowledge or reason to know of it.’” (citation omitted)).
Plaintiff should have known of the harm about which he complains by

September 14, 2022, at the latest. The fact that he did not learn of the underlying
facts until a year later—still within the limitations period—does not make his claims
timely. For these reasons, equitable tolling does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims against
Investigator Weishar, and the claims are time barred.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Lance Pough makes serious allegations that merit further
investigation and due consideration by the appropriate authorities. Because
Plaintiffs claims are time barred, this case is not the appropriate means for doing so.
Accordingly, those efforts fall to others to undertake.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 18).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 9, 2026

J.PhilipCalabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260784. Public record. Not legal advice.