# Ellis

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · January 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260722

## Case

- **Full name:** James P. Ellis v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** January 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260722

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that dismissal 6 of a suit against ODRC was proper because “a state is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983”
- holding that a trial sentence of “20 years to life” was void because it differed from the statutorily required sentence of “life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment”
- holding that dismissal 6 of a suit against ODRC was proper because “a state is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES P. ELLIS, :
:
Plaintiff, : Case No.: 2:25-cv-642
:
v. : Judge Algenon L. Marbley
:
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF : Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
REHABILITATION AND :
CORRECTION, :
:
Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER
Before this Court are the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF
No. 16), Plaintiff’s Objection to the R&R (ECF No. 24), and the following motions:
• Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2);
• Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 3);
• Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 5);
• Plaintiff’s Motion for Immediate Release (ECF No. 7);
• Plaintiff’s Motion for a Status Update (ECF No. 14);
• Plaintiff’s Supplemental Declaration and Motion for Emergency Relief (ECF No. 19);
• Plaintiff’s Motion for Equitable Relief (ECF No. 21);
• Plaintiff’s Motion to Toll the Statute of Limitations (ECF No. 25);
• Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production (ECF No. 26);
• Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27);
• Plaintiff’s Motion for a Status Update (ECF No. 28);
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• Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Refile Civil Rule 8(A) Statement (ECF No. 29);
• Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 30);
• Plaintiff’s Motion to Confirm Acceptance of Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31);

• Plaintiff’s Motion to Preserve Right to Amend Complaint to Add Defendants Upon
Discovery (ECF No. 32); and
• Plaintiff’s Motion to Accept and Recognize Amended Complaint as Operative Pleading
(ECF No. 34).
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (ECF No. 24) are OVERRULED, and this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Emergency Relief
(ECF No. 19) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s remaining Motions (ECF Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, 14, 21, 25, 26, 28,

29, 30, 31, 32, 34) are DENIED as Moot.
I. BACKGROUND
James Ellis is an inmate currently incarcerated with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction (“ODRC”). On May 17, 1995, Mr. Ellis was convicted of aggravated murder and
aggravated burglary and received the following sentence:
to be imprisoned in Department of Corrections for a period of LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN
COUNT #3 [aggravated murder] AND TEN (10) YEARS TO A MAXIMUM OF
TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS WITH TEN (10) YEARS ACTUAL INCARCERATION IN
COUNT #4 [aggravated burglary] TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO COUNT #3 WITH
CREDIT OF TWO HUNDRED NINETY-SIX (296) DAYS GIVEN FOR TIME SERVED.
(ECF No. 16 at 5). On May 27, 2015, a parole board first considered Mr. Ellis’s eligibility for parole,
ultimately denying him parole and scheduling the next hearing for 2025. (ECF No. 16 at 5). The
Decision and Minutes for the 2015 hearing listed Mr. Ellis’s “[a]ggregate sentence per Journal
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Entry” as “30 to Life.” (ECF Nos. 16 at 5; 1 at Exhibit “Decision and Minutes 5/27/2015”).
Likewise, at a second parole hearing on February 18, 2025, the board denied Mr. Ellis parole and
scheduled his next hearing for 2028. (ECF No. 16 at 5). Again, the Decision and Minutes for the
second hearing listed his aggregate sentence as “30.00–Life.” (ECF Nos. 16 at 5; 1 at Exhibit

“Decision and Minutes 2/18/2025”).
Along with these two Decisions and Minutes, Mr. Ellis received a letter on October 30, 2018,
from the Ohio Bureau of Sentencing Computation (“BOSC”) also listing his sentence as 30 to life.
(ECF No. 16 at 5). BOSC explained that “[u]nder the Ohio Revised Code on 3/31/1995, a ‘Life’
term for the offense on count 3 was 20-years.” (ECF No. 1-1 at Exhibit “October 30, 2018 BOSC
Letter”). Thus, his sentence of “Life imprisonment on count 3 and 10-years to a maximum of 25
years on count 4 to run consecutively to count 3” computed as “20 to Life consecutive to 10 to 25,”
which “translated as ‘30 to Life.’” (Id.).
Viewing this “translation” instead as an “unauthorized modification” of his sentence, Mr.
Ellis claims that BOSC, which is a part of ODRC, violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process “by unlawfully altering his sentence from ‘life imprisonment’ to ’30 to life.’” (ECF No. 1-
1 at 1). Advancing his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Ellis requests: (1) declaratory judgment
acknowledging “BOSCO’s [sic] modification of Plaintiff’s sentence [as] unlawful and void[;]” (2)
injunctive relief “preventing further unauthorized sentence modifications[;]” (3) an order restoring
Plaintiff’s original sentence; and (4) compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged
constitutional violations. (Id. at 8–9).
After filing his Complaint, Mr. Ellis filed five additional motions: a Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order (ECF No. 2), a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 3), a Motion to

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Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 5), a Motion for Immediate Release (ECF No. 7), and a Motion for a
Status Update (ECF No. 14).
On July 15, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R (ECF No. 16) recommending that
Mr. Ellis’s complaint be dismissed and his motions be denied as moot. (ECF No. 16 at 1–2). The

R&R identifies four flaws in Mr. Ellis’s Complaint. First, sovereign immunity bars his claims for
compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 6–7). Second, his due process claim fails because
“BOSC simply did not alter Plaintiff’s murder sentence,” and given that he received parole
eligibility hearings after 20 years and 30 years, he suffered no due process injury. (Id. at 7–8). Third,
his due process claim is time-barred given the two-year statute of limitations for Section 1983
claims. (Id. at 8–9). Accordingly, the R&R recommends that Mr. Ellis’s remaining motions be
denied as moot. (Id. at 9).
In response, Mr. Ellis filed timely objections to the R&R (ECF No. 24). Mr. Ellis argues that
his due process claim should survive dismissal because it is “fact-specific” and identifies the alleged
due process violation and the alleged parties responsible. (Id. at 2). He reiterates his claim that BOSC

modified his sentence by computing it as “30 to life” because “20 to life” was not a permissible
sentence for aggravated murder under Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.03, and that BOSC concealed this
modification and obstructed his appeal. (Id. at 3). Additionally, Mr. Ellis claims that he suffered a
due process injury in the form of: (1) the lack of a judicial hearing prior to the alleged modification
of his sentence; (2) the lack of notice at the time of the alleged modification; (3) the inability to
appeal; and (4) the lack of an administrative remedy to “challenge BOSCO’s [sic] authority to alter
a judicial sentence.” (Id. at 5).
Mr. Ellis also challenges the R&R’s determination that his claim is time-barred for three
reasons. First, he suggests that accrual did not start in 2015 since he “did not know BOSCO [sic]
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had modified his sentence until well after his 2015 parole board hearing, and even then, the
modification was not disclosed in a way that allowed legal challenge.” (Id.). Second, Mr. Ellis
claims BOSC “concealed the modification and deprived him of the ability to appeal.” (Id. at 6). He
calls this “state-created obstruction, which justifies equitable tolling.” (Id.). Third, Mr. Ellis claims

that the alleged modification is “an ongoing deprivation” under the continuing violation doctrine.
(Id.). Finally, Mr. Ellis refutes the recommended denial of his five motions. (Id. at 2).
Mr. Ellis also filed various other motions after the R&R: (1) a Supplemental Declaration and
Motion for Emergency Relief (ECF No. 19); (2) a Motion for Equitable Relief (ECF No. 21); (3) a
Motion to Toll the Statute of Limitations (ECF No. 25); (4) a Motion to Compel Production of
sentencing records (ECF No. 26); (5) a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (ECF No.
27); (6) a Motion for a Status Update (ECF No. 28); (7) a Motion for Leave to Refile Civil Rule
8(A) Statement (ECF No. 29); (8) an Emergency Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 30); (9) a
Motion to Confirm Acceptance of Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31); (10) a Motion to Preserve
Right to Amend Complaint to Add Defendants Upon Discovery (ECF No. 32); and (11) a Motion

to Accept and Recognize Amended Complaint as Operative Pleading (ECF No. 34).
This Court now considers Mr. Ellis’s Complaint, the R&R, Mr. Ellis’s Objections, and the
sixteen pending motions.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court
must review “de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected
to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). After this review, the district court
“may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
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While the district court must consider all timely objections, the “filing of vague, general, or
conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to
complete failure to object.” Slater v. Potter, 28 Fed. App'x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Miller
v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)). Likewise, “a general objection to the entirety of a

magistrate's report, without specifying a single issue of contention” does not meet the requirement
for proper objections. Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Instead, they must “be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are
dispositive and contentious.” Miller, 50 F.3d at 380 (citing Howard, 932 F.2d at 509). The objections
of a petitioner appearing pro se are construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than
documents drafted by lawyers. Cf. Erickson v. Parus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
This Court reviews the R&R’s recommendation for the dismissal of Mr. Ellis’s Section 1983
claim and the denial of his remaining motions as moot. Additionally, this Court considers Mr. Ellis’s
motions filed after the R&R. To begin, this Court assesses sovereign immunity with regards to Mr.

Ellis’s claim against ODRC and considers his Motion to Amend the Complaint to add individual
defendants. Second, this Court analyzes Mr. Ellis’s Section 1983 claim for declaratory and
preliminary injunctive relief. Third, this Court considers Mr. Ellis’s remaining motions.
A. Sovereign Immunity & Amended Complaint
As a threshold matter, Mr. Ellis cannot bring a Section 1983 claim against the named
defendant ODRC because ODRC is not a “‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (“[A] State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”);
Peeples v. Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 1995 WL 445714, at *1 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that dismissal

6
of a suit against ODRC was proper because “a state is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983”).
Accordingly, Mr. Ellis’s Section 1983 claim against ODRC is improper.
Additionally, Mr. Ellis’s Section 1983 claim faces a second sovereign immunity hurdle. As
the R&R (ECF No. 16) noted, Mr. Ellis’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages must be

dismissed given that sovereign immunity bars Section 1983 claims for monetary damages. (ECF
No. 16 at 6–7); Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 412 (6th Cir. 2017) (the exception to sovereign
immunity outlined in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) only applies in “claims for prospective
relief against state officials sued in their official capacity to prevent future federal constitutional or
statutory violations.”). In response to the R&R, Mr. Ellis did not object to the denial of these claims
for monetary and punitive damages, even conceding that they are barred by sovereign immunity.
(ECF No. 24 at 4). Without objection, Mr. Ellis’s claim against ODRC for compensatory and
punitive damages under Section 1983 is DISMISSED.
Given these bars, Mr. Ellis filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (ECF No. 27),
wherein he sought to remove ODRC and add seven individual defendants. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a)(2) states that courts “should freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice
so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This rule “reinforces the principle that cases ‘should be tried
on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings.” Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 388 F.3d 930,
937 (6th Cir. 2004). Since Rule 15 offers a “liberal policy of permitting amendments,” this Court
grants Mr. Ellis leave to amend his complaint and add seven individual defendants. Id. (citing
Ellison v. Ford Motor Co., 847 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1988). Thus, Mr. Ellis’s Motion for Leave
to Amend the Complaint (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED.
B. Section 1983 Due Process Claim

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Mr. Ellis’s Complaint alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights when his
sentence was computed by BOSC as “30 to life.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 6). He averred that this
computation was an unlawful modification of his sentence and sought compensatory and punitive
damages and declaratory and preliminary injunctive relief (Id. at 1). The R&R disagreed, stating

“BOSC simply did not alter Plaintiff’s murder sentence, impermissibly or otherwise.” (ECF No. 16
at 7–8). Mr. Ellis now objects, arguing that “20 to life” was not a valid sentence for aggravated
murder, so the alleged modification of his sentence to “30 to life” was unlawful. (ECF No. 24 at 3).
Mr. Ellis’s Section 1983 due process claim fails for three reasons: (1) the computation of
Mr. Ellis’s aggregate sentence did not constitute a modification of his sentence; (2) since Mr. Ellis
received a parole eligibility hearing, he suffered no deprivation of due process; and (3) Mr. Ellis’s
claim is time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
1. No Sentence Modification
First, the computation of Mr. Ellis’s aggravated murder sentence as “20 to life” and his
aggregate sentence as “30 to life” did not constitute a modification of his sentence. On the one hand,

Mr. Ellis is correct to recognize that “20 to life” differs from “life imprisonment with eligibility of
parole after 20 years,” and some Ohio courts have held that trial sentences that vary from statutory
requirements may be void. See State v. Mack, 2020 WL 2503935, ¶ 2, ¶ 6, ¶ 19, 2020-Ohio-2951
(Ohio Ct. App., Franklin Cty., May 14, 2020) (holding that a trial sentence of “20 years to life” was
void because it differed from the statutorily required sentence of “life imprisonment with parole
eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment”); State v. Smith, 2019 WL 259459, ¶ 3, ¶ 25,
2019-Ohio-155 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga Cty., Jan. 17, 2019). On the other hand, the Ohio
Supreme Court in State v. Leegrand determined that a trial sentence of “life in prison with eligibility
of parole after 15 years” was not void because any variation from the statutory requirement of
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“fifteen years to life” was a “distinction without a difference.” State v. Leegrand, 170 Ohio St. 3d
304, ¶ 2–3, ¶ 8–9, 2022-Ohio-3623, 212 N.E.3d 869, 870–71 (Ohio 2022). Regardless of whether
variation voids a trial sentence or not, the key distinction between these cases and Mr. Ellis’s case
is that Mr. Ellis does not challenge his trial sentence as different from the statutory requirement.

Rather, his challenge lies with any variation between his trial sentence and the computation of his
aggregate sentence.
Variation between a trial sentence and the computation of an aggregate sentence does not
constitute a modification because it is merely a “distinction without a difference.” State ex rel. Stokes
v. Ohio Dep’t Rehab. & Corr., 2023 WL 2033370, ¶ 19, 2023-Ohio-468 (quoting Leegrand, 170
Ohio St. 3d 304, ¶ 5). For example, in Stokes, the defendant was sentenced to three consecutive life
sentences for rape, 10-to-25 years for aggravated robbery, and 10-to-25 years for kidnapping, with
each sentence running consecutively. Id. ¶ 2. To determine the aggregate minimum sentence, BOSC
calculated that “pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-03, the aggravated robbery and kidnapping
sentences were diminished to a 15-year aggregate minimum sentence, and that pursuant to Ohio

Adm.Code 5120-2-10, Stokes became eligible for parole consideration for each life sentence after
serving ten full years in prison.” Id. ¶ 3. Thus, BOSC calculated that the defendant would become
eligible for parole consideration after serving an aggregate minimum sentence of 45 years. Id.
Calculating the life sentences in ten-year increments for the purpose of clarifying parole eligibility
did not constitute a modification of the defendant’s sentence. Id. ¶ 20 (“We disagree with Stokes
that his three life sentences have been modified by adding a ten-year minimum term to each sentence
and therefore increased his aggregate minimum sentence by 30 years. He was properly sentenced in
accordance with the law, and that sentence has not been modified.”). Thus, BOSC’s calculations
“did not change the trial court sentence in any way” because all that the calculations did was
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“provide some hope to inmates that they will be released. Defining a sentence as ten years to life
has the effect of setting as part of the sentence the minimum term from which parole eligibility can
be computed. The language amounts to a ‘distinction without a difference.’” Id. ¶ 19 (quoting
Leegrand, 170 Ohio St. 3d 304, ¶ 5).

Any variation between BOSC’s computation of Mr. Ellis’s aggregate minimum and the trial
sentence was also a distinction without a difference that did not constitute a modification of Mr.
Ellis’s sentence. Just as the Stokes defendant was eligible for parole after ten years for each life
sentence, Mr. Ellis was eligible for parole after 20 years for his life sentence, given that life
imprisonment for aggravated murder “is presumed to be a sentence of life imprisonment with parole
eligibility after twenty years….” Ohio Admin. Code 5120-2-10(B). Further, just as BOSC treated
the life sentences in ten-year increments for the purpose of calculating an aggregate sentence in
Stokes, BOSC treated Mr. Ellis’s life sentence in a twenty-year increment. Thus, BOSC performed
the same simple addition in Stokes as in the present case; three ten-year increments plus a 15-year
minimum equaled an aggregate minimum of 45 years to life. Here, a 20-year increment plus a ten-

year minimum equaled 30 years to life. Calculating this aggregate minimum did not impose a new
minimum term or modify Mr. Ellis’s sentence. Therefore, BOSC and its personnel did not
“unlawfully alter” Mr. Ellis’s sentence, nor did Defendants violate his due process rights.
2. No Due Process Injury
Secondly, Mr. Ellis’s Section 1983 due process claim fails because he suffered no due
process injury. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “depriv[ing] individuals of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Establishing a due
process violation requires two steps: “the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest
which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant
10
upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
460 (1989).
As the R&R noted, Mr. Ellis received due process as evidenced by his two parole eligibility
hearings after 20 and 30 years of incarceration. (ECF No. 16 at 8). Given that his aggravated murder

sentence specified parole eligibility after 20 years, Mr. Ellis “received consideration for release at
the earliest possible time under the statute on which he relies.” (Id.). Without any other identification
of process due to Mr. Ellis, the R&R determined his due process claim failed. (Id.).
In his objection, Mr. Ellis states that he suffered four due process injuries: (1) “No judicial
hearing was held prior to BOSCO’s [sic] modification”; (2) “No notice was provided…at the time
of modification”; (3) “No opportunity to appeal the modified sentence was available because the
change was concealed and not reflected in the original journal entry”; and (4) “No administrative
remedy existed to challenge BOSCO’s [sic] authority to alter a judicial sentence.” (ECF No. 24 at
5).
Given that BOSC’s computation of Mr. Ellis’s aggregate minimum sentence did not

constitute a modification of the trial sentence, Mr. Ellis’s allegation of due process injuries
necessarily fails. First, no hearing was necessary because no modification occurred. Second, there
was no notice requirement given that there was no modification, and further Mr. Ellis was made
aware of the aggregate minimum sentence in the 2015 parole hearing Decision and Minutes. (ECF
No. 16 at 5). Third, without a modification, there was nothing to appeal. Also, Defendants did not
conceal the aggregate minimum sentence since it was listed on the 2015 parole hearing Decision
and Minutes. (ECF No. 16 at 5). Finally, without a modification or error, there was nothing to
remedy. Therefore, because Mr. Ellis suffered no due process injury, his due process claim fails.

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3. Statute of Limitations
Third, Mr. Ellis’s due process claim fails because his claim is time-barred by the two-year
statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims as set by Ohio law. Browning v. Pendelton, 869 F.2d
989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989). While Ohio law determines the statute of limitations, federal law

determines the date of accrual. Ruiz-Bueno v. Maxim HealthCare Servs., 659 Fed. App’x 830, 833
(6th Cir. 2016). The statute of limitations begins to run when a person “knows or has reason to know
that the act providing the basis of her injury has occurred.” Ruiz-Bueno, 659 F. App’x. at 833.
The R&R determined that Mr. Ellis’s knowledge of BOSC’s computation dated “at least as
far back as his 2015 parole hearing.” (ECF No. 16 at 9). Thus, the R&R concluded that the accrual
date began in 2015, making Plaintiff’s complaint that was filed in 2025, well beyond the two-year
statute of limitations. (Id.). In response, Mr. Ellis raises three objections. First, he suggests the
accrual date started after 2015 since he “did not know BOSCO [sic] had modified his sentence until
well after his 2015 parole hearing[.]” (ECF No. 24 at 5). Second, Mr. Ellis argues that the alleged
modification constituted state-created obstruction that “justifies equitable tolling.” (Id. at 6). Third,

Mr. Ellis argues that the continuing violation doctrine applies because the “sentence modification is
not a one-time event—it is an ongoing deprivation.” (Id.).
Mr. Ellis’s first objection fails because he does not offer any detail or any evidence that
indicates he was not aware or at least should not have been aware of the alleged modification in
2015. Specifically, Mr. Ellis had reason to know of this alleged modification because he was advised
of BOSC’s “30 to Life” computation at his 2015 parole hearing. Mr. Ellis was again informed of
such by BOSC in a letter mailed to him on October 30, 2018. (ECF No. 1-1 at Exhibit “October 30,
2018 BOSC Letter”). Even if this Court considered the 2018 letter to be the date of accrual, Mr.
Ellis’s claims would still be untimely. Construing Mr. Ellis’s objection liberally, he fails to provide
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support that the statute of limitations only began to run within two years of 2025. Thus, this objection
fails.
Further, given that BOSC’s computation did not constitute a modification of Mr. Ellis’s
sentence, nor was it a state-created obstruction or an ongoing deprivation, Mr. Ellis’s second and

third objections also fail. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations serves as the third reason
why Mr. Ellis’s due process claim fails. Accordingly, Mr. Ellis’s objection is OVERRULED, and
his Section 1983 due process claim is DISMISSED.
C. Plaintiff’s Motions
Mr. Ellis has raised fifteen other motions besides his Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint that are now before this Court. Most of these are predicated on claims that this Court has
already rejected. For example, his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2), Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 3), Motion for Immediate Release (ECF No. 7), Motion for
Equitable Relief (ECF No. 21), and Motion to Toll the Statute of Limitations (ECF No. 25) all hinge
on the allegedly “unauthorized alteration” of Mr. Ellis’s sentence. (ECF Nos. 2 at 2; 3 at 2; 7 at 1;

21 at 1; 25 at 2). Given that no such “unauthorized alteration” occurred, these motions are MOOT.
Additionally, given the dismissal of Mr. Ellis’s claims, his Motions to Appoint Counsel
(ECF Nos. 5; 30), Motions for a Status Update (ECF Nos. 14; 28), and Motion to Compel Production
of Sentencing Records (ECF No. 26) are MOOT. This Court’s grant of Mr. Ellis’s Motion for Leave
to Amend the Complaint (ECF No. 27) also renders Mr. Ellis’s Motion for Leave to Refile Civil
Rule 8(A) Statement (ECF No. 29), Motion to Confirm Acceptance of Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 31), Motion to Preserve Right to Amend Complaint to Add Defendants Upon Discovery (ECF
No. 32), and his Motion to Accept and Recognize Amended Complaint as Operative Pleading (ECF
No. 34) as MOOT.
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Finally, Mr. Ellis also filed a Motion for Emergency Relief (ECF No. 19), alleging that
“prison officials conducted a shakedown of [his] assigned housing area/unit. During this search,
staff possessed and damaged [his] own personal typewriter, which [he] had been using to prepare
legal motions, conduct research, and correspond with the Courts.” (ECF No. 19 at 2). Mr. Ellis

claimed that this destruction to his typewriter violated his First Amendment right to access the courts
and his Fourteenth Amendment right because the destruction was “retaliatory conduct.” (Id.). This
Court considers Mr. Ellis’s First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims in turn.
“The First Amendment guarantees that ‘prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the
courts’ that is ‘adequate, effective, and meaningful.’” Bell v. Washington, 2025 U.S. (quoting
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1977)). While this right includes the provision of some
materials such as a “paper and pen to draft legal documents,” “notarial services,” and “stamps” for
indigent inmates, this does not extend to typewriters. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824–25; Looper v. Gibson,
63 Fed. App’x 877, 878–79 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he refusal of the Tennessee Department of
Correction to provide Looper with a typewriter and a copier has not…prejudiced Looper’s ability

to press forth his legal claims.”).
Here, Mr. Ellis does not allege that he was denied paper, pen, or any other materials included
under the right to access the courts. He claims a “lack of Law Library Time [sic]” but includes as
an exhibit a calendar with the times that the law library is available for inmates. (ECF No. 19 at 2,
Exhibit “Library Schedule”). Because the evidence supports Mr. Ellis’s access to the law library,
and his typewriter is not a recognized material under his First Amendment right to access the courts,
Mr. Ellis’s First Amendment claim fails.
Turning to Mr. Ellis’s Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claim, “[t]o state a claim for
retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that ‘(1) [he] engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action
14
was taken against [him]…; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two—
that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by [his] protected conduct.’” LaFountain v.
Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th
Cir. 1999)).

Here, Mr. Ellis alleges that he engaged in the protected conduct of pursuing legal action. He
also alleges that adverse action was taken against him in the form of the destruction of his typewriter.
Mr. Ellis does not, however, allege that the Defendants were the ones to conduct the “shakedown”
or damage his typewriter. (ECF No. 19 at 2). Rather, Mr. Ellis states that “prison officials” and
“staff” were the perpetrators. (Id.). If Mr. Ellis seeks to hold Defendants Harold May and George
Frederick, the past and present wardens, responsible for the actions of prison staff, then he would
require a theory of respondeat superior. This theory, however, is unavailable in Section 1983 claims.
Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996) (“A defendant cannot be held liable
under section 1983 on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability basis.”). Without named
perpetrators as Defendants, Mr. Ellis’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails. Given that this Motion

fails to identify First or Fourteenth Amendment grounds under Section 1983 to support relief, Mr.
Ellis’s Motion for Emergency Relief (ECF No. 19) is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 24) is OVERRULED, and this Court ADOPTS the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED. Additionally,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Emergency Relief (ECF No. 19) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s remaining Motions (ECF Nos.

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2, 3,5, 7, 14, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34) are DENIED as Moot. The Clerk is DIRECTED
to detach Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27-1), and file it separately on the docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Ls ef
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: January 27, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260722. Public record. Not legal advice.