# JONES

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · February 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260703

## Case

- **Full name:** Yolanda T. Jones v. Internal Revenue Service, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
YOLANDA T. JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:26CV149
)
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case came before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket
Entry 1 (the “Application”)), submitted with a form Complaint
(Docket Entry 2). (See Docket Entry dated Feb. 10, 2026 (referring
Application to undersigned Magistrate Judge).) The undersigned
Magistrate Judge granted the Application to allow consideration of
a recommendation of dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (see
Text Order dated Feb. 11, 2026) and now enters this Recommendation.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff brought this action against the Internal Revenue
Service and/or its Commissioner, as well as at least two and up to
four of its employees (two in their official capacity). (See
Docket Entry 2 at 1 (listing in caption as “Defendant(s)” “Internal
Revenue Service,” individual denoted as “Commissioner,” and two
individuals sued “in official capacity”), 2 (identifying
(A) “Defendant No. 1” as individual with title of “Commissioner,”
(B) “Defendant No. 2” and “Defendant No. 3” as same two individuals
named in caption as sued in their official capacity, and
(C) “Defendant No. 4” and “Defendant No. 5” as two other
individuals with titles of “Territory Manager” and “General
Manager,” respectively); see also Docket Entry 1 at 1 (naming only
“Internal Revenue Service” in space for “Defendant”); Docket Entry
3 at 1 (same).)1 According to the Complaint, this action presents
a “[f]ederal question.” (Docket Entry 2 at 3.) However, in
response to a directive to “[l]ist the specific federal statutes
. . . and/or provisions of the United States Constitution that are
at issue in this case” (id. (emphasis added)), Plaintiff offered
only this vague listing: “442 Civil Rights Jobs, 440 Due Process
Violations[,] 890 Privacy Act, 320 Assault[,] Libel[,] Slander.”
(Id. (parentheses omitted).)2 The Civil Cover Sheet, in turn,
“[c]ite[s] the U.S. Civil Statute under which [Plaintiff is]
filing” (Docket Entry 3 at 1) as “5 U.S.C. § 1221; FRCP 65” (id.;
see also id. (giving “[b]rief description of [that] cause [of
action]” as “Emergency TRO to Stay Retaliatory Removal based on
Fraudulent Saturday Record & Whistleblowing”)).

1 Quotations from Plaintiff’s filings apply standard
capitalization conventions and omit any bold font or italics.
2 The four items in that listing appear to correspond to
general descriptions of claims on the Civil Cover Sheet Plaintiff
filed with the Complaint. (See Docket Entry 3 at 1 (setting out
“Nature of Suit” categories/codes, including “320 Assault, Libel,
Slander,” “440 Other Civil Rights” and “442 Employment” (both under
heading “Civil Rigts”), and “890 Other Statutory Actions”).)
2
The Complaint contains a section for Plaintiff’s “Statement of
Claim” (Docket Entry 2 at 4), with directions to “[w]rite a short
and plain statement of the claim” (id.), which “[s]tate[s] as
briefly as possible the facts showing that [ P]laintiff is entitled
to the . . . relief sought” (id.) and “[s]tate[s] how each
[D]efendant was involved and what each [D]efendant did that caused
[ P)laintiff harm or violated [her] rights, including the dates and
places of that involvement or conduct” (id.); see also id. (“If
more than one claim is asserted, number each claim and write a
short and plain statement of each claim in a separate paragraph.
Attach additional pages if needed.”)). In the blank for Plaintiff
to provide that statement, she wrote “See Claim.” (Id.) Yet,
Plaintiff did not append to the Complaint any additional page(s)
with any such “Claim” (id.). (See id. at 1-5.)
Plaintiff did file a document entitled “Verified Complaint and
Petition for Emergency TRO” (Docket Entry 4 at 2), which asserts
that she “brings this action for Whistleblower Retaliation,
Fraudulent Record-Keeping, and Defamation (Stigma-Plus) under the
First and Fifth Amendments and the Whistleblower Protection Act”
(id.; see also id. at 3 (identifying Plaintiff’s claims as “Count
I: Retaliation for Protected Disclosures[, ] Count II: Violation of
Due Process (Stigma-Plus)[, and] Count III: Civil Conspiracy and
Document Fraud”)). In support of those asserted claims, Plaintiff
stated, inter alia, under penalty of perjury (see id. at 1):

1) “Plaintiff is a 4-year federal employee” (id. at 2);
2) “Plaintiff was physically assaulted twice by [Defendant
General] Manager” (id.; see also id. at 4 (“I was a victim of a
physical battery by a manager on December 10, 2025.” (internal
parenthetical omitted)));°
3) another Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) “{[a]cting
[m]anager formally notified [Defendant] Territory Manager (TM) of
the assault via email” (id. at 2), but “[Defendant] TM and [one of
the official-capacity Defendants] colluded to protect the aggressor
and target [] Plaintiff” (id.; see also id. at 5 (“My [computer]
access has been blocked to prevent me from communicating internally
while forcing me to travel back and forth to an environment with
the accused.”));
4) “({Defendant ] TM intentionally falsified Plaintiff’s
[disability retirement f]lorm . . . to sabotage Plaintiff’s medical
benefits and interfere with Department of Labor claims” (id. at 2),
by “fabricating a removal date of Saturday, October 18, 2025” (id.;
see also id. at 4 (“[Defendant IRS] submitted a retirement
application claiming [Plaintiff] retired on October 18,

° According to an e-mail sent by Plaintiff which she appended
to the above-quoted document, the first “physical[] assault[]”
(Docket Entry 4 at 2) occurred on March 7, 2024, when Defendant
General Manager, during a disagreement in the workplace, “touch[ed]
[Plaintiff’s] right arm approximately 6 to 8 times consistently
invading [her] personal space” (id. at 15; see also id. (“I did not
consent to it and told her I do not want her to touch me again
under any circumstances.”)).

2025. . . . The October 18 signature is a fabrication. . . . By
back-dating my retirement, [Defendant IRS] is attempting to strip
me of medical coverage for injuries sustained while on duty in
December.”), 5 (“[The Office of Personnel Management] has ‘fast-
tracked’ this forged application in under 30 days. If not stayed
today, my health insurance will lapse, halting treatment for my
battery-related injuries.” (internal parentheses omitted)));
5) “[i]n a further act of retaliation, [] Defendants have
intentionally blocked the processing of Plaintiff’s Workers’
Compensation [] claim, forcing [] Plaintiff into Leave Without Pay
(LWOP) status under the FMLA” (id. at 2-3; id. at 3 (“By holding
the claim hostage, Defendants are intentionally depriving Plaintiff
of her income and medical benefits as a direct result of this
workplace assault. This financial coercion is designed to force
Plaintiff’s resignation . . . .”), 4 (“[Defendant IRS] is refusing
to process my Workers’ Compensation forms, falsely claiming I am
‘retired’ or ‘denied based on a prior unrelated claim.’” (internal
parentheses omitted))); and
6) “Defendants . . . have engaged in a coordinated campaign to

defame Plaintiff’s professional character” (id. at 3; see also id.
(“Despite actual notice of physical assaults, [Defendant IRS’s
human resources and labor relations] departments have refused to
move Plaintiff from the dangerous management chain and have instead
disseminated false and malicious labels characterizing Plaintiff as
5
a ‘problem employee’ and ‘unstable.’ This ‘poisoning of the well’
by [Defendant IRS’s departments] proves that all internal
administrative remedies are exhausted and futile, as [Defendant
IRS’s] departments tasked with oversight are actively participating
in the retaliatory scheme.”)).
DISCUSSION
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at Section 1915], is intended to guarantee that
no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because his
poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs.”
Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th Cir.
1995) (en banc) (italics and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this
concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt
shall dismiss the case at any time if . . . (B) the action

. . . (i) is frivolous or . . . (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
As to the first of those two grounds for dismissal, the United
States Supreme Court has explained that “a complaint . . . is
frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
6
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also
Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256 (“The word frivolous is inherently elastic
and not susceptible to categorical definition.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).* The second, above-quoted ground for dismissal
attaches if a complaint fails “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard “demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id.; see also id. (“Nor does a complaint suffice if
it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”
(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)).°

“Notably, the Court bears “an independent obligation to
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,” Hertz Corp.
v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010), and, to that end, “[a]ls part of
thle] frivolity review under § 1915(e) (2), the Court may consider
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction,” Gateway Plaza
Greensboro, LLC v. Spigner, No. 1:22CV1047, 2022 WL 22839643, at *1
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 29, 2022) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.),
recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2023) (Eagles,
J.}; accord, e.g., Glenn v. Glenn, No. 1:21CV510, 2021 WL 12157701,
at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2021) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.),
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 21828633 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 11, 2022)
(unpublished) (Biggs, J.). Put another way, “[a]n in forma
pauperis complaint that fails to establish subject matter
jurisdiction lacks an arguable basis in law, and therefore may be
dismissed sua sponte.” Hill v. United States, No. 1:12CV92, 2013
WL 1192312, at *4 n.5 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 22, 2013) (unpublished);
accord, e.g., Utley v. Utley-Frye, No. 5:23CV14, 2023 WL 3775069,
at *3 (W.D. Va. June 2, 2023) (unpublished), recommendation
adopted, slip op. (W.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2023).
° Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
(continued...)

Here (as documented in the Introduction), the Complaint
purports to invoke the Court’s federal-question jurisdiction, see
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.”), but fails to clearly
identify any federal statute or constitutional provision which
provides a basis for relief, instead vaguely adverting to general
categories of claims, i.e., “Civil Rights Jobs” (Docket Entry 2 at
3), “Due Process Violations” (id.), “Privacy Act” (id.), and
“Assault[,] Libel[, and] Slander” (id.). In other filings (again,
detailed in the Introduction), Plaintiff more precisely invoked “5
U.S.C. § 1221” (Docket Entry 3 at 1; see also id. (describing claim
under said statute as concerning “Retaliatory Removal based on
Fraudulent Saturday Record & Whistleblowing”)), as well as “the
First and Fifth Amendments and the Whistleblower Protection Act”
(Docket Entry 4 at 2; see also id. at 2-3 (describing claims under
said provisions first as “Whistleblower Retaliation, Fraudulent
Record-Keeping, and Defamation (Stigma-Plus)” and later as
“Retaliation for Protected Disclosures,” “Violation of Due Process

(Stigma-Plus),” and “Civil Conspiracy and Document Fraud”)).

5(...continued)
citation, quotation marks, and italics omitted), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to
undermine [the] requirement that a pleading contain more than
labels and conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304
n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8
Accepting all of Plaintiff’s non-conclusory, factual allegations as
true, she has not stated a viable federal claim.
The lone federal statute actually cited by Plaintiff, “the
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA), 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e),
[does] provide[] legal protection for whistleblowers within the
civil service,” Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 144
S. Ct. 445, 450 (2024); however, it does so in conjunction with
“[t]he Civil Service Reform Act (‘CSRA’) [which] governs judicial
and administrative review of personnel actions regarding federal
employees,” Coleman v. Pentagon Force Prot. Agency, No. 1:24CV1628,
2025 WL 2345819, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2025) (unpublished). See
De La Torre v. Fink, No. 8:23CV3201, 2025 WL 460757, at *4 (D. Md.
Feb. 11, 2025) (unpublished) (“‘The CSRA and the WPA are integrated
into a single statutory scheme.’” (quoting Kerr v. Jewell, 836 F.3d
1048, 1058 (9th Cir. 2016))). “Read together, the[se] statutes
prohibit[] certain federal employees from taking adverse personnel
actions against ‘any employee’ for reporting ‘any violation of any
law, rule, or regulation or . . . abuse of authority . . . .’” Id.
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)

(generally providing that, “in any case involving an alleged
prohibited personnel practice as described under section 2302(b)(8)
. . ., [the Merit Systems Protection] Board shall order such
corrective action as the Board considers appropriate if the
employee . . . has demonstrated that a disclosure or protected
9
activity described under section 2302(b)(8) . . . was a
contributing factor in the personnel action”).
But, “[t]o the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring original WPA
claims before this Court, this Court is precluded from reviewing
Plaintiff’s claims.” Coleman, 2025 WL 2345819, at *4. Indeed,
“[n]o courts have jurisdiction to hear WPA claims ‘in the first
instance.’” Id. (quoting Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 142 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)). Rather, “[p]ursuant to the CSRA, covered employees
must first bring their WPA claims before the Office of Special
Counsel (‘OSC’) and then the Merit Systems Protection Board
(‘MSPB’).” De La Torre, 2025 WL 460757, at *4; accord Coleman,
2025 WL 2345819, at *4. Moreover, “[a]fter [WPA] claims have been
[administratively] exhausted, only the Federal Circuit or ‘any
court of appeals of competent jurisdiction’ is authorized to review
the MSPB’s decision.” Coleman, 2025 WL 2345819, at *4 (quoting
Zachariasiewicz v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 48 F.4th 237,
243 (4th Cir. 2022)). Simply put, “for the WPA claim alone,
[Plaintiff’s] possible avenues of relief do not include review by
this Court.” De La Torre, 2025 WL 460757, at *4. As a result, the

Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s WPA claim under Section
1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous (for lack of jurisdiction).6
6 As discussed previously, the Complaint does also contain an
ambiguous reference to the “Privacy Act” (Docket Entry 2 at 3), but
it lacks any supporting facts and Plaintiff’s related filing, which
alleges some facts (as detailed in the Introduction), “contains no
(continued...)
10
“The claims raised against . . . Defendants under the United
States Constitution fare no better.” Housecalls Home Health Care,
Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F. Supp.
2d 616, 628 (M.D.N.C. 2007) (Elaison, M.J.), recommendation
adopted, id. at 618 (Osteen, J.). For starters, “direct causes of
action do not ordinarily exist under the United States
Constitution.” Id. at 628. “Exceptions have been made in

°(,..continued)
non-conclusory allegations that would support the reasonable
inference - or plausible conclusion - that [Plaintiff] is entitled
to relief under the Privacy Act,” Tracy v. United States, Civ.
Action No. 16-651, 2016 WL 7664716, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2016)
(unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 2017 WL
2348070 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 2017) (unpublished); see also Haywood
v. Owens, No. 8:19CV1025, 2019 WL 2292548, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Apr. 23,
2019) (unpublished) (reviewing limited causes of action afforded by
Privacy Act), recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2284931 (D.S.C. May
29, 2019) (unpublished). In other words, “[t]he allegations in
[P]laintiff’s [C]omplaint [and related filing] . . . are too vague
and conclusory to meet minimum pleading requirements for a Privacy
Act claim . . . .” Hinson-Gribble v. United States Off. Pers.
Mgmt., No. 5:16CV70, 2017 WL 9480265, at *5 (E.D.N.C. July 11,
2017) (unpublished), recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3948531
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2017) (unpublished); see also id. (“The Privacy
Act may not be used to challenge the substantive decisions by an
agency reflected in its records.”). Lastly (for federal statutes),
Plaintiff has groused that Defendants (without specification) have
engaged in “[blad [flaith [u]se of FMLA [Family Medical Leave Act]”
(Docket Entry 4 at 2), by “block[ing] the processing of Plaintiff’s
Workers’ Compensation claim, forcing [her] into Leave Without Pay
status under FMLA” (id. at 2-3 (parentheticals omitted)). “Title
II of the FMLA covers leave for federal civil service employees who
have more than twelve months of service.” De La Torre, 2025 WL
460757, at *5 (internal citation omitted). As documented in the
Introduction, Plaintiff’s filings “make[] plain that [s]lhe has
served the [federal g]lovernment for more than twelve months,” id.
Some parts of the FMLA “provide[] a private right of action... .,
[but] Title II does not.” IZd. “Accordingly, . . . this Court
cannot hear [any FMLA] claim [from Plaintiff].” Id.
11

situations such as existed in Bivens[ v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)].” Housecalls,
515 F. Supp. 2d at 628. “However, a Bivens action is not available
against federal agencies such as [Defendant] IRS,” White v. United
States Internal Revenue Serv., No. 2:19CV9, 2019 WL 2413697, at *2
(E.D.N.C. June 6, 2019) (unpublished), aff’d, 785 F. App’x 168 (4th
Cir. 2019), or Defendants “sued in their official capacity,” Howard
v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 99-6708, 198 F.3d 236 (table),
1999 WL 798883, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 7, 1999) (unpublished).
At most then, “Bivens allows only claims based on tortious
conduct against [the remaining D]efendants sued in their individual
capacity.” Housecalls, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 624. And, “{[said
Djefendants must have directly and personally participated in the
tort. There is no respondeat superior liability in a Bivens
action.” Id. That principle precludes any Bivens claim against
Defendant Commissioner because (as documented in the Introduction)
“[t]here is simply no allegation that he personally played a role
in the [challenged] actions.” Id. The foregoing analysis leaves
only the possibility of Bivens claims against (A) Defendant General
Manager, who allegedly twice assaulted Plaintiff (see Docket Entry
4 at 2), and (B) Defendant TM, who allegedly (i) “colluded to
protect [Defendant General Manager] and target [] Plaintiff” (id.)
and (11) “intentionally falsified Plaintiff’s [disability

12

retirement florm” (id.), by “fabricating a removal date of
Saturday, October 18, 2025” (id.).
Those allegations cannot sustain Bivens claims. First,
Defendant General Manager’s alleged assaults preceded the acts of
retaliation and due process violations which form the basis of
Plaintiff’s claims under the First and Fifth Amendments;
Plaintiff’s reporting of the assaults (not the assaults themselves)
allegedly resulted in retaliatory actions and denials of due
process (as to which Plaintiff has alleged no direct participation
by Defendant General Manager). As such, Plaintiff has not stated
any possible Bivens claim against Defendant General Manager.’ Any

’ The allegations of assault cannot support the Court’s
exercise of jurisdiction because, apart from excessive-force-type
claims against law enforcement/detention officers under the Fourth,
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments, “[t]here is no federal cause
of action for ‘assault.’” Bowman v. Canapp, No. 1:09CV149, 2010 WL
686368, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 23, 2010) (unpublished). Similarly,
“claims such as defamation .. . are state-based claims ... that
are cognizable in this Court under its supplemental jurisdiction,
but only if there is .. .a viable federal-gquestion claim... .”
Dickerson v. City of Charleston Police Dep’t, Civ. Action No.
1:10-1625, 2010 WL 3927513, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2010),
recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3909497 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2010);
accord, e.g., Harr v. WRAL-5 News, No. 5:20CV362, 2021 WL 141697,
at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2021), aff'd, 853 F. App’x 859 (4th Cir.
2021). A narrow exception exists to allow a plaintiff to assert a
due process claim “under what is sometimes referred to as [the]
‘stigma plus’ test, . . . [which requires a showing that], in the
course of defaming a person, a public official .. . subject[ed the
person] to a present injury such as termination of government
employment.” Ridpath v. Board of Governors Marshall Univ., 447
F.3d 292, 310 n.16 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original).
Regardless, Plaintiff’s allegations that, at unspecified times,
unspecified Defendants (and others not named as defendants)
“engaged in a coordinated campaign to defame Plaintiff’s
(continued...)
13

Bivens claim against Defendant TM likewise falls short, as the
collusion accusation does not “suffice [because] it tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted), and the
falsification accusation does not suffice because a document
submitted by Plaintiff shows that someone other than Defendant TM
prepared the form listing Plaintiff’s retirement date as October
18, 2025 (see Docket Entry 4 at 13). In sum, Plaintiff has failed
to state a Bivens claim against Defendants General Manager and TM,
because Plaintiff has not alleged factual matter sufficient to show
that they committed any federal constitutional violation.
Alternatively, the Court should conclude that the Bivens
implied-cause-of-action-exception does not extend to the federal
constitutional claims asserted by Plaintiff. “In Bivens, the
[Supreme C]ourt permitted an implied cause of action for plaintiffs
whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by federal officers.”
Williams v. United States, Civ. Action No. 21-537, 2021 WL 1720230,
at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2021) (unpublished). Subsequently, “[t]he

[Supreme] Court allowed Bivens-type remedies twice more, in a Fifth
Amendment gender-discrimination case and in an Eighth Amendment

7(...continued)
professional character” (Docket Entry 4 at 3), by “characterizing
[her] as a ‘problem employee’ and ‘unstable’” (id.), constitute
nothing more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [which] do not
suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
14
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause case.” Ziglar v. Abassi, 582
U.S. 120, 121 (2017) (internal citations omitted). “The Supreme
Court has refused to extend Bivens a number of times and expansion
of the Bivens remedy is now disfavored.” Williams, 2021 WL
1720230, at *3. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had alleged facts
sufficient to show retaliation in violation of the First Amendment
and/or lack of due process in the handling of her retirement
application in violation of the Fifth Amendment, any Bivens claim
“would nevertheless be subject to dismissal,” id., as the “claims
asserted by [Plaintiff] . . . do not fit into any of the recognized
causes of actions to which Bivens has been extended,” id. See,
e.g., Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899, 904 (4th Cir. 1984) (“[I]n Bush
v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the Supreme Court declined to permit

a federal employee to bring a Bivens-type cause of action . . .
against his supervisors for alleged violations of his first
amendment rights.” (parallel citation omitted)).
Finally, the Court must note that Plaintiff has requested
injunctive relief, including presumably in relation to her claims
for retaliation for reporting workplace assaults (in violation of
the First Amendment) and for (related) denial of due process via
falsification of her retirement date (in violation of the Fifth
Amendment). (See Docket Entry 2 at 4 (stating “See Relief
Statement” in space for articulation of “relief [ P]laintiff asks
the [C]ourt to order”); Docket Entry 4 at 3 (seeking, under heading
15
of “Prayer for Relief,” order “stay[ing] the illegal removal [of
Plaintiff’s employment status], restor[ing] pay and benefits, and
enjoin[ing] Defendants from further interference with Plaintiff’s
career and health”).) “[U]nlike the Bivens remedy, which [the
Supreme Court] ha[s] never considered a proper vehicle for altering
an entity’s policy, injunctive relief has long been recognized as
the proper means for preventing entities from acting
unconstitutionally.” Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (emphasis added); see also Pinar, 747 F.2d at
909 (endorsing position “that federal courts have the authority to
grant injunctive relief to the victim of a constitutional violation
by virtue of their jurisdiction to decide all cases arising under
the Constitution”). The Court thus theoretically possesses
jurisdiction to order injunctive relief if Plaintiff can show that
Defendant IRS (through its supervisory personnel) violated her
federal constitutional rights.
The question remains “whether th[is C]ourt’s power to grant
injunctive relief should be exercised in light of the comprehensive

and constitutionally adequate remedial scheme Congress has
established in the CSRA [which includes the WPA].” Pinar, 747 F.2d
at 910. Fourth Circuit authority indicates that the Court should
answer that question in the negative:
A review of the remedial provisions of the CSRA supports
the finding that Congress clearly intended the
comprehensive remedies available to [federal employees]
to be exclusive. . . .
16
The absence of a provision for direct judicial review of
prohibited personnel actions[, i.e., retaliation barred
by the WPA,] among the carefully structured remedial
provisions of the CSRA is evidence of Congress’ intent
that no judicial review in district court be available
for the actions involved in this case.
Id.; see also id. at 912 (noting with approval decision in Hallock
v. Moses, 731 F.2d 754 (11th Cir. 1984), “affirm[ing] the
[district] court’s dismissal of a federal employee’s claims for
. . . injunctive relief grounded on the first and fifth
amendments,” alleging that supervisors “had harassed and retaliated
against her . . . because she filed a valid employee grievance and
spoke out in opposition to unlawful acts suffered by her”).8
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has asserted claims over which this Court lacks
jurisdiction (or should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction)
and otherwise has failed to state a claim.

8 In the alternative, the Court should deem Plaintiff’s
federal constitutional claims unripe, as her filings confirm that
administrative processes underlying her claims have not concluded
(see, e.g., Docket Entry 5 at 1 (“On 02/11/2026 Plaintiff accessed
personal email from [Defendant IRS] stating [her] retirement has
not been sent to [the Office of Personnel Management].”)). See
American Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Office of Special Counsel, 1 F.4th
180, 188 (4th Cir. 2021) (emphasizing “particular role ripeness
doctrine plays in the administrative context,” including
“prevent[ing] the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements,” as well as “protect[ing] agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
17
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
February 13, 2026

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260703. Public record. Not legal advice.