# Cregan

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · February 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260654

## Case

- **Full name:** Carlos Cregan v. Jennifer Garcia, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260654

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying municipal liability to private corporations performing governmental functions
- applying municipal liability to private corporations performing governmental functions
- finding statements allegedly made by a nurse about an inmate’s failed attempted suicide could constitute cruel and unusual punishment because “medical staff use[d] an inmate’s known psychological vulnerability to cause psychological anguish”

## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

CARLOS CREGAN,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-01306-JEH

JENNIFER GARCIA, et al.,
Defendants.

Merit Review Order
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center, filed a Second Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was detained at the McLean
County Detention Facility (“Jail”). (Doc. 12). This case is before the Court for a
merit review of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.
I
The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and
dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A
claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Second Amended
Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing
them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).
However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be
provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United
States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
II
Plaintiff files suit against Nurse Jennifer Garcia, Correctional Officer
Kirkland, Jail Superintendent Diane Hughes, Advanced Correctional Healthcare
(“ACH”), and McLean County.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Nurse Garcia conducted “med line” in the west
pod on March 13, 2025. While waiting in the long line, Plaintiff became frustrated
and sighed loudly. In response, Defendant Garcia allegedly yelled at Plaintiff: “Do
you ever shut your cock hole?” (Doc. 12 at p. 6). When another detainee asked who
she was speaking to, Defendant Garcia allegedly looked at Plaintiff and said,
“Yeah, you heard me right! I said cock hole!” Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Garcia
made these comments in front of approximately fifty detainees.
Plaintiff states Defendant Kirkland, the correctional officer assigned to the
pod, was present during the incident. Plaintiff states he looked at Defendant
Kirkland for assistance, but he only chuckled nervously. When Plaintiff later asked
Defendant Kirkland why he did not react, he allegedly told Plaintiff he was not
trained to deal with staff misconduct. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kirkland did not
report the incident.
At the time of the incident, Plaintiff alleges he was a pretrial detainee and
had been charged with sexual assault. He claims staff members were aware of his
charges because he had been at the Jail for two years. Plaintiff alleges “people had
already left [him] alone about the nature of [his] charges,” but Defendant Garcia’s
insults caused a “catastrophic domino effect” and made his charges relevant again.
Id. at p. 7. Plaintiff alleges his environment became increasingly hostile. Other
detainees constantly degraded, humiliated, and harassed him. Some unknown
detainees made sexual advances toward him. Plaintiff alleges he was forced to
fight someone to defend himself. Plaintiff alleges the situation traumatized him
and caused mental anguish.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant ACH, Defendant Garcia’s employer, allowed her
to resign and did not fire her. Plaintiff claims Defendant ACH was responsible for
hiring, training, and disciplining their staff.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants McLean County and Superintendent Hughes
were responsible for hiring, training, and firing correctional officers and failed to
train officers how to address staff misconduct, including verbal harassment.
III
Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, his claims arising from the
conditions of his confinement are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015); Smith v. Dart,
803 F.3d 304, 310 (7th Cir. 2015)). “Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s claim is analyzed under
the same lens as an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment.”
Peters v. Hendrickson, No. 23-CV-232-WMC, 2025 WL 3641161, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Dec.
15, 2025) (citing Smith, 803 F.3d at 310) (“We have held that there is little practical
difference, if any, between the standards applicable to pretrial detainees and
convicted inmates when it comes to conditions of confinement claim, and that such
claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment are appropriately analyzed
under the Eighth Amendment.”).
“Verbal harassment generally does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation, though some harassment may be serious enough to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.” Boston v. Brown, No. 25-CV-1525-DWD, 2025 WL 2377992,
at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2025) (citing Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015)
(finding that verbal sexual harassment, accompanied by suggestive gestures, that
created a risk both from the harasser and fellow inmates, was sufficient to proceed
beyond initial review)); see also Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 718-19 (7th Cir. 2019)
(finding statements allegedly made by a nurse about an inmate’s failed attempted
suicide could constitute cruel and unusual punishment because “medical staff
use[d] an inmate’s known psychological vulnerability to cause psychological
anguish”). “[V]erbal abuse using derogatory terms that suggest a detainee is
homosexual may increase the likelihood of sexual assault from other inmates, and
thus, can be an Eighth Amendment violation.” Peters, 2025 WL 3641161, at *4
(citing Beal, 803 F.3d at 358-59).
Here, Plaintiff alleges the degrading remarks were made in front of
approximately fifty other detainees. Plaintiff alleges staff members were aware he
faced sexual assault charges. Based on the nature of his charges, and fueled by
Defendant Garcia’s sexual insults, other detainees constantly degraded,
humiliated, and harassed him. Some unknown detainees made sexual advances,
telling Plaintiff that “they heard [he] was a cock sucker” and asked if he was
interested in them. (Doc. 12 at p. 7). Plaintiff states he was forced to physically
defend himself. The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on
a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Garica.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kirkland, who was present during the incident,
chuckled nervously and did not come to Plaintiff’s aid or report the incident.
Plaintiff’s threadbare allegations against Defendant Kirkland are insufficient to
state a constitutional claim. Defendant Kirkland is dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (b)(6) and § 1915A.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant ACH is liable because Defendant Garcia was not
fired and was allowed to resign after the incident. Plaintiff also alleges ACH is
responsible for hiring, training, and firing their staff. Plaintiff claims it is obvious
Defendant Garcia was not trained or disciplined properly. Private corporations,
such as ACH, have potential liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978), if they perform a governmental function
and, in doing so, injure plaintiff through an unconstitutional policy or practice.
Iskander v. Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying municipal
liability to private corporations performing governmental functions). “Liability
may be based on (1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional
deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written
law or express policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom
or usage with the force of law; or (3) a constitutional injury caused by a person
with final policy making authority.” Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No.15-
5190, 2016 WL 3227310, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2016) (citing McCormick v. City of
Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000)). “Although Monell claims may proceed
with conclusory allegations of a policy or practice, some facts must be pleaded to
put the defendant on notice of the alleged wrongdoing.” Taylor, 2016 WL 3227310,
at *4. Plaintiff has not pled the existence of a particular policy or practice nor
alleged that he was injured by an unofficial policy or custom. Allegedly failing to
train or discipline Defendant Garica is not a policy, practice, or custom. Defendant
ACH is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule (b)(6)
and § 1915A.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Superintendent Hughes and McLean County
are liable for failing to train correctional officers how to respond to staff
misconduct. In a failure to train claim, liability is not based on respondeat superior,
but rather the supervisor’s own actions or inactions. Stewart v. Eiler, No. CIV. 08-
1033, 2008 WL 548637, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2008). As Plaintiff pleads only the
incident regarding himself, he fails to plead that Defendants should have been on
notice and rectified deficiencies in staff training. Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2006) (“There is no clear consensus as to how
frequently [certain conduct] must occur to impose Monell liability, except that it
must be more than one instance, or even three.”) (internal citations omitted)).
Plaintiff also did not include any specific allegations to demonstrate that
Defendant Superintendent Hughes was personally involved in any constitutional
deprivation. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates
a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus,
liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in
a constitutional deprivation.”). There is no respondeat superior under § 1983. In
other words, Defendant Hughes cannot be liable solely based on her supervisory
role. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Officials are accountable
for their own acts; they are not vicariously liable for the conduct of subordinates.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203-
05 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). If Jail officials are named, they must be named in their
individual capacities, and Plaintiff must allege that the official personally
participated in the deprivation or was deliberately reckless as to the misconduct
of subordinates or was aware and condoned, acquiesced, or turned a blind eye to
it. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Defendant Hughes and
McLean County are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under
Rule (b)(6) and § 1915A.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to proceed on
a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Defendant
Jennifer Garcia based on the alleged verbal harassment on March 13, 2025.
Additional claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court's
discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15.
2) Defendants Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Diane Hughes,
McLean County, and Kirkland are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE these Defendants.
3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff
to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give
Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed
before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as
premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless
otherwise directed by the Court.
4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of
service. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within
30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will require
Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).
5) Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk
sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer
should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and
subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In
general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on
the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore,
no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendant has not
filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this
Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant
has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting discovery and
dispositive motion deadlines.
6) If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the
entity for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding
address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of Defendant’s forwarding address shall be retained only by the
Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s
counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive
electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.
Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other
documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to
discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed
with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly
to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be
returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.
Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance and
the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process
in more detail.
8) Defendant’s counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at
Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the
deposition.
9) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change
in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court
of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this
lawsuit, with prejudice.
10) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records
upon request.
11) Within 10 days of receiving from Defendant’s counsel an
authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the
authorization to Defendant’s counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard
qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
12) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from
the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter
scheduling deadlines.
It is so ordered.

Entered: February 13, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11260654. Public record. Not legal advice.